Okram Pramodini Devi and Ors. v. State of Manipur and Ors.
2015-04-07
KH.NOBIN SINGH
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Kh. Nobin Singh, J. 1. Heard Shri T. Rajendra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; Smt. Th. Sobhana, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 and Shri S. Rupachandra, learned ASG appearing for the respondent No. 4. 2. The present writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners challenging the impugned Government orders dated 25-04-2014 and 04-06-2014 and since all the petitions have arisen out of the same set of facts, the same are being disposed of by a common judgment and order. 3.1 According to the petitioners namely Shri K. Manojkumar Singh and Smt. O. Pramodini Devi, they retired from service as Librarians, L.M.S. Law College and Imphal College on attaining the age of superannuation of 62 years with effect from 31-03-2014 and 31-12-2013 respectively vide order dated 28-01-2014 issued by the Deputy Secretary (Hr. Education), Government of Manipur. While the petitioners were waiting for the retirement benefits as well as pension being given to them and to the shock of the petitioners, the Deputy Secretary (Hr. Education) issued another order dated 25-04-2014, in partial modification of the earlier order dated 28-01-2014, stating that the Governor was pleased to retire the petitioners on attaining the age of 60 years with effect from 31-03-2012 and 31-12-2011 respectively. 3.2 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 25-04-2014, the petitioners submitted two separate representations dated 12-05-2014 to the respondents praying for revocation of the said order dated 25-04-2014 and for payment of retirement benefits and pension as well. Since the said representations had not been considered, the petitioners filed two separate writ petitions being W.P. (C) No. 392 of 2014 and W.P. (C) No. 393 of 2014 challenging the correctness and legality of the said Government order dated 25-04-2014 mainly on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice.
Since the said representations had not been considered, the petitioners filed two separate writ petitions being W.P. (C) No. 392 of 2014 and W.P. (C) No. 393 of 2014 challenging the correctness and legality of the said Government order dated 25-04-2014 mainly on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. The said writ petitions were contested by the State respondents by filing an affidavit-in-opposition stating therein that the retirement age of College Librarian is 60 years since the College Librarian was not included in the O.M. dated 30-11-2010 wherein the retirement age of College teachers only was enhanced from 60 to 62 years; that it was by oversight/mistake that the petitioners were allowed to retire on attaining the age of 62 years; that even though the retirement age of College Librarian was prescribed in the UGC Regulation as 62 years, the State Cabinet as a policy decision did not consider regarding raising the age of retirement of College Librarian from 60 to 62 years and the bonafide mistake was rectified vide letter dated 08-05-2014 addressed to the Accountant General. It is also stated that the representations of the petitioners had been considered and disposed of by issuing a speaking order dated 04-06-2014. The averments made in the said affidavit-in-opposition were denied by the petitioners in their reply filed thereto. A short affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the respondent No. 4 was filed stating therein that it could not intervene the retirement order issued by the competent authority and that there was no violation of fundamental rights on their part. 3.3 The writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 453 of 2014 was jointly filed by the petitioners challenging the correctness and legality of the Government order dated 04-06-2014 on the ground that no opportunity of being heard was given to them before passing it. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that as per the scheme of the University Grants Commission, New Delhi informed vide its letter dated 19-10-2006 and its Regulation 2010, the age of superannuation of Assistant Librarians/College Librarians and Assistant Directors of Physical Education had been decided to be 62 years which is substantiated by the clarificatory letter dated 24-10-2013 of the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur wherein it is stated that the Govt.
& Tech. Edn.), Government of Manipur wherein it is stated that the Govt. College Librarian posted in Colleges, being not involved in class room teaching, were to retire on attaining the age of 62 years and accordingly, the Joint Director of Univ. & Hr. Education vide its letter dated 30-10-2013 sought for conveying approval. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the State Government had rightly issued the order dated 28-01-2014 retiring the petitioners on attaining the age of 62 years with the last pay certificates being issued and that after having the whole thing being settled including the payment of salary upto the age of 62 years, the orders dated 25-04-2014 and 04-06-2014 issued without giving an opportunity of being heard, are bad in law and are liable to be quashed. An alternative submission was made by the counsel for the petitioner that since the petitioners had been allowed to continue in service till the age of 62 years with full salary and for no fault of theirs, the retirement benefits as well as the pension was to be computed on the basis of the last pay drawn in terms of the law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash Singh v. State of Bihar & ors., reported in (2005) 13 SCC 576 . The learned Government Advocate, relying upon the stand indicated in the affidavit-in-opposition, has submitted that the age of retirement for the College Librarians is 60 years; that by oversight/mistake, the petitioners were allowed to retire on attaining the age of 62 years and that the mistake was rectified by issuing the impugned orders dated 25-04-2014 and 04-06-2014. During the course of hearing, she produced a copy of the order dated 29-11-2010 issued by the Addl. Secretary (DP) to substantiate her contention. 5. Before considering the rival contentions of the parties, it may be appropriate for this court to examine as to what are the principles of 'Natural justice' and what are its extent and scope. Natural justice is an important concept in administrative law. It is not possible to define precisely and scientifically the expression 'natural justice'. It is, like the doctrine of ultra vires and public policy, is a branch of public law.
Natural justice is an important concept in administrative law. It is not possible to define precisely and scientifically the expression 'natural justice'. It is, like the doctrine of ultra vires and public policy, is a branch of public law. The law is settled after the powerful pronouncement of Byles, J in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works wherein it has been held that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will apply the omission of the legislature. The above principle is accepted in India also. In the case of A.K. Karaipak v. Union of India, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262 , the Supreme Court propounded: 'The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it'. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 , the Supreme Court observed: 'It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made there under for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that individual the duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the functions to be performed by the authority which has the power to take positive or damaging actions'. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 , Krishna Iyer, J says “indeed, from the legendary days of Adam - and of Kautilya Arthashastra- the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice which makes it social justice”. In Maneka Ganghi v. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court observed: “The rigid view that the principles of natural justice applied only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts and not to administrative acts no longer holds the filed”. The expression “civil consequences” used in National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan reported in (1983) 1 SCC228 has not been defined. But in Mohinder Singh Gill case, Krishna Iyer, J observed: “In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence”.
The expression “civil consequences” used in National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan reported in (1983) 1 SCC228 has not been defined. But in Mohinder Singh Gill case, Krishna Iyer, J observed: “In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence”. In Sahara India (Firm) v. CIT reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151 , the Supreme Court held that with the growth of administrative law, the old distinction between judicial act and administrative act has withered away. Today, even a pure administrative action entailing civil consequences must be consistent with the rules f natural justice. In Union of India v. PK Roy, reported in AIR 1968 SC 850 , the Supreme Court observed: “The extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice can not be imprisoned within the straitjacket of a rigid formula”. Similarly in A.K. Kairakpak case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that what a particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy reported in (2005) 6 SCC 321 , after referring to several decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court sated: “Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice”. In Dev Dutt v. Union of India reported in (2008) 8 SCC 725 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the rules of natural justice are not codified nor are they unvarying in all situations, rather they are flexible. 6. The undisputed facts are that as per the scheme of the University Grant Commission informed vide letter dated 19-10-2006, the age of retirement of the College Librarian is 62 and the relevant para is under: “2. It has been decided that the age of superannuation for Assistant Librarian/College Librarians and Assistant Directors of Physical Education/College Directors of Physical Education would henceforth be 62 years”.
It has been decided that the age of superannuation for Assistant Librarian/College Librarians and Assistant Directors of Physical Education/College Directors of Physical Education would henceforth be 62 years”. Similarly, para 2.3.0 (ii) of the University Grant Commission Regulation, 2010 provides as under: “(ii) Whereas the enhancement of the age of superannuation for teachers engaged in class room teaching is intended to attract eligible persons to a career in teaching and to meet the shortage of teachers by retaining teachers in service for longer period, and whereas there is no shortage in the categories of Librarians and Directors of Physical Education, the increase in the age of superannuation from present sixty two years shall not be available to the categories of Librarians and Directors of Physical Education”. In a letter dated 24-10-2013 of the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Education) addressed to the Accountant General, Addl. Secretary (Finance) and Principal Secretary (DP) clarifying as regards retirement age of College teachers as 65 years, it is specifically stated that Govt. College Librarians were to retire on attaining the age of 62 years. Similarly, while seeking an approval vide its letter dated 30-10-2013, the Jt. Director of Univ. & Hr. Education) had mentioned that the petitioners were due for retirement on attaining the age of 62 years. The petitioners were allowed to retire on attaining the age of 62 years vide order dated 28-01-2014 issued by the Deputy Secretary (Hr. Education), Government of Manipur. Having retired from service on 31-12-2013 on attaining the age of 62 years, the petitioner No. 2's last pay certificate dated 07-02-2014 was issued by the Treasury Officer. The impugned order dated 25-04-2014 was issued by the Deputy Secretary (Hr. Education) stating that the Governor was pleased to retire the petitioners on attaining the age of 60 years. It may be noted that the specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after the petitioners having served at the age of 62 with full salary and even retired, the impugned order dated 25-04-2014 has unsettled the settled position without giving an opportunity of being heard and without assigning any reason thereof. It is nowhere stated in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners were given an opportunity of being heard before the order dated 25-04-2014 was issued.
It is nowhere stated in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners were given an opportunity of being heard before the order dated 25-04-2014 was issued. The perusal of the order dated 25-04-2014 itself makes it very clear that no reason for issuing the same is mentioned at all. Over and above, this court has perused the original file bearing No. 7(2)/12/2008/HE(pt) produced before this court on 25-03-2015 in compliance of this court order dated 19-03-2015 wherein there is no any note about notice being given to the petitioners before the order dated 25-04-2014 was issued by the State respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Darshan Singh Nagpal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Government of NCT of Delhi, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 327 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to and relied upon the earlier decisions in respect of the audi alteram partem rule. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and in view of the aforesaid, this court is of the view that the order dated 25-04-2014 being violative of the principles of natural justice, is liable to be quashed and set aside. 7. As regards the legality of the order dated 04-06-2014 being challenged in W.P. (C) No. 453 of 2014, the counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the said order dated 04-06-2014 is bad in law for the reason that no opportunity of being heard is given to them before issuing the said order. However, there is no force in his submission which is not sustainable in law. As has been stated in the order itself that it was issued as a speaking order disposing of the several representations, including that of the petitioners. Oral hearing is not considered or regarded as sine qua non of natural justice. A person is not entitled to an oral hearing as of right although in Designated Authority reported (2011) 2 SCC 258 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to earlier decisions emphasised that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relation exercise. In the absence of statutory requirement about oral hearing, courts will have to decide the matter taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case.
In the absence of statutory requirement about oral hearing, courts will have to decide the matter taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. In view of the aforesaid, it can not be said that the Government order 04-06-2014 is liable to be quashed and set aside only on the ground of not giving an opportunity of being heard. 8. As regards the merit of the case, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as per the provisions of the University Grant Commission Regulation, 2006 and 2010, the age of superannuation of the Librarians is 62 years which is evident from the letter dated 24-10-2013 of the Deputy Secretary (Hr. & Tech. Education) addressed to the Accountant General, Addl. Secretary (Finance) and Principal Secretary (DP) clarifying that Govt. College Librarians were to retire on attaining the age of 62 years and the letter dated 30-10-2013 wherein the Jt. Director of Univ. & Hr. Education) had mentioned that the petitioners were due for retirement on attaining the age of 62 years. The said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was not denied by the learned counsel for the State respondents and all that she submitted was that the regulations of the University Grant Commission had not been adopted in toto; that the age of superannuation of the Librarians is 60 years and that it was due to bonafide mistake that the Deputy Secretary (Hr. Education) had mentioned in his letter dated 24-10-2013 that Govt. College Librarians were to retire on attaining the age of 62 years. There is no material on record to substantiate her submission except relying upon the O.M. dated 30-10-2013 to contend that the age of superannuation was enhanced to 62 years only in respect of teachers and not of Librarians. In the original file being No. 7(2)/12/2008-S/HE(pt) placed before this court as aforesaid, there is nothing about the decision being taken by the State Government that the regulations of the University Grant Commission would be partly adopted except effective date of implementation, actual payment, age of superannuation for College Librarians etc. 9.
In the original file being No. 7(2)/12/2008-S/HE(pt) placed before this court as aforesaid, there is nothing about the decision being taken by the State Government that the regulations of the University Grant Commission would be partly adopted except effective date of implementation, actual payment, age of superannuation for College Librarians etc. 9. Since the State respondents have not produced the relevant file wherein the decision is taken by the State Government in regard to adoption of the Regulations of the University Grant Commission, it may not be right on the part of this court to accept the submission of the counsel for the State respondents. At this juncture, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash Singh v. State of Bihar & ors, reported in (2005) 13 SCC 576 would apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, has some force. In Kailash Singh case (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “6. So far as post-retiral benefits are concerned it is submitted that they may not be admissible to him. We fail to appreciate the submission made on behalf of the respondents in the background of the facts indicated in the earlier paragraph. The respondents took work from the appellant without any dispute. He would obviously be entitled to his salary and there is no reason as to why he should be denied the post-retiral benefits. His total service comes to 32 years. We have already adverted to the fact that the medical report has not been placed on the record, nor as to what is meant by the term “average age”, has been explained to us. In the totality of the facts and the circumstances of this case, we find no good reason to deny those benefits to the appellant”. The facts of the present case are not exactly the same as that of the above case but the circumstances in which the above decision was rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are similar. In the present case, the petitioners were allowed to continue in service till the age of 62 and having served till 62 years, they were given their full salary and were allowed to retire vide Government order dated 28-01-2014.
In the present case, the petitioners were allowed to continue in service till the age of 62 and having served till 62 years, they were given their full salary and were allowed to retire vide Government order dated 28-01-2014. Before the said order dated 28-01-2014 was issued, there was no any document placed on record to show specifically that the age of retirement for the Librarians would be 60 years whereas the Regulations of the University Grant Commission 2006 and 2010, relied upon by the petitioners, clearly state that the age of retirement for the Librarians would be 62 years. Even assuming that allowing the petitioners to retire at the age of 62 was a mistake, it could not be attributed to the petitioners because the State respondents had admitted that the mistake was theirs. Moreover, the State respondents have failed to produce the relevant file showing the policy decision that the Regulations of the University Grant Commission were partly adopted except effective date of implementation, actual payment, age of superannuation for College Librarians etc. Therefore, relying upon the above decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there is no reason why the petitioners be denied the post-retiral benefits and the Government order dated 04-06-2014 is liable to be quashed and set aside. In view of the above observations, the writ petitions being W.P. (C) No. 392 of 2014; W.P. (C) No. 393 of 2014 and W.P. (C) No. 453 of 2014 are allowed and consequently the impugned orders dated 25-04-2014 and 04-06-2014 issued by the Deputy Secretary (Hr. Education) and the Commissioner (HTE), Government of Manipur respectively are quashed and set aside with no order as to costs. ___