JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Both these writ petitions emanate from disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioners in respect of the same incident. They have, accordingly with the consent of parties, been taken up together for disposal. 2. Disciplinary proceedings against both the petitioners herein were instituted in the following backdrop. It appears that one Election Petition registered as Election Petition No. 3 of 2005-06, Smt. Shail Devi v. Smt. Phulesri and others, came to be instituted in the Court of the respondent No. 6. The Election Petitioner filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 74990 of 2005 which was dismissed by this Court by its order dated 9.12.2005. This Court noticing the fact that an Election Petition had already been filed required the respondent No. 6 to decide the same preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order of this Court. 3. It transpires that the said petition was not disposed of within the aforesaid period. As a result of the above, the election petitioner instituted contempt proceedings, on which notices were issued to the Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar, Deoria for non-complinace of the order of this Court. Both the petitioners here were posted as Ahalmads (revenue) in the Court of respondent No. 6 and were accordingly charged with derelection of duty and negligent conduct and ultimately imposed the penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect together with an entry of censure in their relevant service records. These punishments were imposed upon both the petitioners on 6th June, 2008 and subsequently affirmed in appeal by orders dated 31st March, 2009 and 18th April, 2009 respectively. It is aggrieved by the aforesaid orders that these two petitions came to be preferred. 4. The genesis of the dispute which gave rise to the present writ petitions, as noticed above, is the same. However, for a proper appreciation of the undisputed facts, it would be relevant to note the following. 5. It is not disputed that this Court disposed of Writ petition No. 74990 of 2005 by its order dated 9th December, 2005 requiring the respondent No. 6 to decide the pending election petition within a period of one year from the date of production of the certified copy of the order. 5. It is not disputed that this Court disposed of Writ petition No. 74990 of 2005 by its order dated 9th December, 2005 requiring the respondent No. 6 to decide the pending election petition within a period of one year from the date of production of the certified copy of the order. It is also not disputed that the certified copy of the order of this Court was filed in the proceedings pending before the Respondent No. 6 on 28th December, 2005. This fact is duly noticed by the respondent No. 6 in the order sheet maintained in respect of the election petition in question. The writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 42107 of 2009 joined on the post of Ahalmad (Revenue) in the Court of the respondent No. 6 on 11th July, 2007 while the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 42110 of 2009 joined the post of Peshkar in the Court of the respondent No. 6 on 24th August, 2007. One Prabhakar Chaubey was posted as Peshkar in the Court of the respondent No. 6 and Ravindra Srivastava was posted as Ahlmad (Revenue) at the time when the order of this Court came to be produced before the said respondent. 6. It appears that when the election petition was not decided by the respondent No. 6 within a period of one year when computed from 28th December, 2005, contempt proceedings were initiated and notices on the said petition were served upon the respondent No. 6 on 20th November, 2007. It is also apposite to note that the election petition itself came to be decided on 3rd December, 2007 by the respondent No. 6. Upon the matter thus coming to light, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 26th December, 2007. 7. From the further facts brought on record, it appears that similar proceedings were taken against Prabhakar Chauvey and Ravindra Nath Srivastava and the said employees were also indicted in departmental proceedings and similar punishments of censure and stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect were inflicted upon them. 7. From the further facts brought on record, it appears that similar proceedings were taken against Prabhakar Chauvey and Ravindra Nath Srivastava and the said employees were also indicted in departmental proceedings and similar punishments of censure and stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect were inflicted upon them. These orders of punishment were assailed by Ravindra Nath Srivastava in Writ Petition No. 25858 of 2009 which came to be allowed by this Court by its judgment and order dated 22nd April, 2011 and the impugned order of punishment imposed qua him on 6th June, 2008 as affirmed in appeal vide order dated 19th March, 2009 came to be quashed. But more on this aspect a little later. 8. Picking up the thread from the time when the petitioners were served a charge-sheet, it appears that it was alleged that the petitioners failed to bring to the attention of the Presiding Officer the order passed by this Court on 9th December, 2005 and that they in collusion with others acted in order to ensure that the orders of this Court are not complied with. The charge-sheet further records that after the order of this Court came to be brought on record on 28th December, 2005, the proceedings in the case continued to linger between 11th January, 2006 and 23rd May, 2006. The charge-sheet further records that the papers of the election petition do not appear to have been even placed before the Prescribed Authority upto 30th May, 2006, on which date too, the orders passed by this Court, were not brought to his attention. 9. Upon service of the charge-sheet, the petitioners submitted their replies and disciplinary proceedings commenced. The Inquiry Officer submitted a Report in respect of the petitioners on 11th February, 2008 holding the charge to be partly proved to the extent that the Petitioners were guilty of not having flagged the order in question. It was on the basis of the above report that the petitioners were called upon to show-cause why the major penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect and censure be not imposed upon them. Upon the petitioners responding to the said notice, these proceedings ultimately culminated in the passing of the impugned order dated 6th June, 2008. 10. It was on the basis of the above report that the petitioners were called upon to show-cause why the major penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect and censure be not imposed upon them. Upon the petitioners responding to the said notice, these proceedings ultimately culminated in the passing of the impugned order dated 6th June, 2008. 10. Sri Vivekanand Yadav, learned counsel appearing in support of this petition has contended that the findings of guilt as recorded and returned against the petitioners is clearly perverse inasmuch as admittedly they joined on their posts on 11.7.2007 and 24.8.2007 respectively. He submitted that the charge of failure to bring to the attention of the Prescribed Authority the order of this Court therefore, could not have been made against them. This, he would submit, especially in light of the fact that admittedly the order was brought on record on 28th December, 2005 and the period of one year when computed from the said date evidently expired prior to the petitioners joining their posts. Sri Yadav further submitted that no wrong doing could have been fastened upon the petitioners in light of the fact that the election petition itself came to be decided within three months of their joining their respective posts. He further submitted that the papers of the election petition were duly put up before the Prescribed Authority on 25th August, 2007, 29th August, 2007, 1st September, 2007, 6th September, 2007, 19th September, 2007 as well as on 26th September, 2007. He submitted that the petitioners had categorically asserted that as many as 27 dates were fixed in the election petition and out of which most of the orders were maintained and penned by the Prescribed Authority himself. He submits that the petitioners have been wrongly held guilty on the mere ground that they had failed to flag the order of this Court in the records of the respondent No. 6. 11. More fundamentally, Sri Yadav would submit that the imposition of the penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect was in fact a major penalty which could not have been imposed without following the procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. Elaborating his submissions, Sri Yadav submitted that Rule 7 prescribes a detailed procedure where a major penalty is to be imposed upon a Government servant. Elaborating his submissions, Sri Yadav submitted that Rule 7 prescribes a detailed procedure where a major penalty is to be imposed upon a Government servant. This procedure, according to him, requires a charge-sheet being served, the delinquent employee being afforded an opportunity to deny the charges, examination and cross-examination of witnesses etc. He submits that no such procedure was followed in the instant case. 12. This argument urged by Sri Yadav seeks to draw sustenance from the judgment rendered by this Court in Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra). In the said case, this Court relying upon the observations of the Apex Court made in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab; 1991 Supp (1) SCC 504, held as follows: “Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter undoubtedly is a minor penalty within the meaning of Rule 5(iv). But sub-rule (v) postulates reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period with further directions as to whether or not the Government employee shall earn increments of pay during the period of such reductions and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is an inde-pendent head of penalty and it could be imposed as punish-ment in an appropriate case. It is one of the major penalties. The impugned order of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect whether would fall within the meaning of Rule 5(v)? If it so fails Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules require conducting of regular enquiry. The contention of Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the State is that withholding two increments with cumulative effect is only a minor penalty as it does not amount to reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay. We find it extremely difficult to countenance the contention. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule 5(iv) of the Rules. But when penalty was imposed withholding two increments i.e. for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. But when penalty was imposed withholding two increments i.e. for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order, by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time-scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years’ increments would not be counted in his time-scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words are the skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule 5(v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division Bench in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab and others, ILR 1985 2 P & H. 193, P.C. Jain, A.C.J. speaking for the division bench, while considering similar question, in paragraph 8 held that the stoppage of increments with cumulative effect, by no stretch of imagination falls within clause (v) of Rule 5 or in rule 4.12 of Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held that under clause (v) of Rule 5 there has to be a reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay by the competent authority as a measure of penalty and the period for which such a reduction is to be effective has to be stated and on restoration it has further to be specified whether the reduction shall operate to postpone the future increments of his pay. In such cases withholding of the increments without cumulative effect does not at all arise. In case where the increments are withhold with or without cumulative effect the Government employee is never reduced to a lower stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held that clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts of that case. With respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. In case where the increments are withhold with or without cumulative effect the Government employee is never reduced to a lower stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held that clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts of that case. With respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the back of the mind, it would always be so, the result will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. If the reasoning of the High Court is given acceptance, it would empower the disciplinary authority to impose, under the garb of stoppage of increments, of earning future increments in the time scale of pay even permanently with expressly stating so. This preposterous consequences cannot be permitted to be permeated. Rule 5(IV) does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose penalty of withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be without jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be per se void. considering from this angle we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the impugned penalty without enquiry is per se illegal.” Sri Yadav’s submissions are necessarily to be considered bearing in mind the fact that Ravindra Nath Srivastava was the Revenue Ahlmad attached to the Court of the respondent No. 6 at the relevant time when the order of this Court was filed before him. The Court is further informed that the judgment of this Court in Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra) has attained finality and has not been assailed by the State. 13. Contesting the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioners were rightly inflicted the punishment inasmuch as it was because of their negligent conduct that the election petition could not be decided in accordance with the directions issued by this Court. 13. Contesting the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioners were rightly inflicted the punishment inasmuch as it was because of their negligent conduct that the election petition could not be decided in accordance with the directions issued by this Court. Learned Standing Counsel has contended that the petitioners were posted and attached to the Court of the respondent No. 6 when notices on the contempt petition were issued by this Court and therefore, submitted that there was no illegality attached to the action taken against the petitioners. Insofar as the judgment rendered by this Court in Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra) is concerned, the learned Standing Counsel admitted that the State-respondents had not taken the said decision in appeal and that therefore for all intent and purposes the same had attained finality. 14. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the contesting parties and having perused the material on record, this Court finds that it is not disputed by the respondents that the petitioners joined the Court of the respondent No. 6 on 11th July, 2007 and 24th August, 2007 respectively. It is also not disputed that the order of this Court was brought on record of the respondent No. 6 on 28th December, 2005. By the time the period of one year, when computed from the said date, expired, the petitioners had not even joined nor had they been posted in the Court of the respondent No. 6. In light of the above undisputed position emerging from the record, it cannot be said that the petitioners aided or abetted any action or design intended to flout the orders of this Court. 15. The fact that the records of the election petition were placed before the respondent No. 6 on more than one occasion prior to the joining of the petitioners is also not disputed by the respondents. The inquiry report does not return any finding of collusion between the petitioners and unknown others as part of a concerted effort/design to mislead the Presiding Officer or to conceal the factum of the order of this Court having been passed and existing on record. All that is recorded by the Inquiry Officer in his report is that the petitioners failed to flag the order in question after they had been posted in the Court of the respondent No. 6. All that is recorded by the Inquiry Officer in his report is that the petitioners failed to flag the order in question after they had been posted in the Court of the respondent No. 6. This finding however, does not appear to take into account the fact that by this time the damage had already been done and the order of this Court stood non complied with. Even if it were urged that this was a continuing negligent act, insofaras the petitioners herein are concerned, the same stood attracted against them only post July and August, 2007. In fact, as noticed hereinabove, it was in the above background that the Inquiry Officer held that the charges levelled against the petitioners were only partly proved. The issue of whether this would justify the imposition of a major penalty may for the present be deferred and the reasons for this follows. 16. It is not disputed by the learned Standing Counsel that the imposition of the penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect upon the petitioners was a major penalty. If that be the admitted position, the procedure prescribed under Rule 7 was to be mandatorily followed. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that in the case of imposition of a major penalty, a failure to hold an oral inquiry is fatal. If there be any need to refer to authority for this proposition, one may only note the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sharad Kumar Varma v. State of U.P. and others; 2006 (110) FLR 630. 17. In fact it was this aspect of the matter which was noticed by the learned Single Judge deciding and rendering judgment in Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra). The learned Single Judge deciding the petition of Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra) has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill (supra) to hold that withholding of two increments with cumulative effect was a major penalty. 18. In the opinion of this Court, the imposition of a major penalty without holding any inquiry as envisaged under Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 would be per se illegal and unsustainable in law. Neither the records indicate nor has the learned Standing Counsel in his submissions contended that the procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 was followed. Neither the records indicate nor has the learned Standing Counsel in his submissions contended that the procedure prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 was followed. The impugned orders therefore, must suffer and fall in light of this fundamental flaw alone. 19. Further this Court in Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra) had proceeded to quash the orders impugned against the said employee on this ground alone. Ravindra Nath Srivastava and Praphakar Chaubey were the two employees posted in the Court of respondent No. 6 at the relevant time. The petitioners came on to the scene as noticed only in July and August, 2007. The order of punishment against Ravindra Nath Srivastava has already been quashed by this Court. The respondents do not contend that further action was taken against the said employee. They also do not contend that the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in Ravindra Nath Srivastava (supra) was subjected to an appeal. It has therefore attained finality inter parties. When the orders of punishment against the main perperators has come to be quashed and no further action taken, the imposition of a major punishment on the petitionerss would clearly be in defiance of logic. For these additional reasons, this Court is constrained to hold that the impugned orders insofar as they impose the major penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect clearly shock its conscience and is a punishment clearly not commensurate with the charge found partly proved against the petitioner. 20. Accordingly and in view of the above, the impugned orders dated 6th June, 2008 and 31st March, 2009 in Writ Petition No. 42107 and 6th June, 2008 and 18th April, 2009 in Writ Petition No. 42110 of 2009, are hereby quashed to the extent they impose the major penalty of stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect. The respondents in light of the above shall proceed to compute the consequenial reliefs liable to flow to the petitioners in light of the aforesaid. 21. Since this Court has faulted the action of the Respondents upon a breach of the principles of natural justice and infraction of Rule 7 of the Rules, 1999, it leaves it open to the Respondents to consider whether further action in the matter, if otherwise permissible in law, is warranted including the issue of substitution of penalty in light of the observations of this Court. The writ petitions stand allowed in the above terms. ——————