ORDER : 1. The petitioner before this Court has filed this present writ petition for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to issue an appointment order for the post of Kanishk Apoorti Adhikari and Inspector Weights and Measurements. 2. Contention of the petitioner is that an advertisement was issued in the year 2012 inviting applications for the post in question and the petitioner was selected in the written examination. Petitioner was placed at S.No.19 of the Select List and thereafter the petitioner was directed vide letter dated 9.11.2012 and 22.11.2012 to attend the office of District Officer Food Civil Supplies and Consumer Protection Department at Indore. The petitioner appeared along with all relevant certificates, however, to his utter surprise, no appointment order was issued in his favour. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner was working as Junior Engineer with M.P. Power Generating Company Ltd., Sarni and on account of his selection and subsequent offer of appointment, he has submitted his resignation from the post of Junior Engineer and the same was accepted on 13.1.2013. Contention of the petitioner is that he was placed at S.No.19 of the Select List and the person who was placed at S.No.23 has been appointed by the respondents. 3. A reply has been filed by the respondents and the stand of the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 is that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case for offence under sections 147, 452, 323 and 325 of of the Indian Penal Code and he has been acquitted on account of the compromise and also on account of non examination of witnesses. The Investigating Officer was not examined and in those circumstances the trial Court has acquitted the petitioner. The respondents have stated that the acquittal of the petitioner cannot be termed as clean acquittal and, therfore, they have not issued appointment order in favour of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued before this Court that the respondent No.4 has rightly been appointed as he was in the waiting list. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of at the admission stage itself with the consent of the parties. 5.
Learned counsel for the respondent has argued before this Court that the respondent No.4 has rightly been appointed as he was in the waiting list. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of at the admission stage itself with the consent of the parties. 5. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner was serving as a Junior Engineer under the M.P. Power Generating Company Ltd., and was selected for the post of Kanishk Apoorti Adhikari and Inspector Weights and Measurements. He was placed at S.No. 19 of the Select List. The respondents directed him to submit original documents and the petitioner submitted the original documents on 27.11.2012. The petitioner, as he was selected, resigned from the post on which he was working, however, no appointment order was issued and the person placed at S.No. 23 was appointed by the respondents vide order dated 10.1.2013. It is true that a criminal case was registered against the petitioner. The judgment of acquittal which is on record Annexure P-12 dated 28.7.2006 reflects that the petitioner was prosecuted for offence under sections 147, and 323, 325 and 452/34 of the Indian Penal Code. In respect of sections 325 and 323/34, a compromise took place on 27.7.2006. The trial Court has passed the judgment only in respect of sections 147 and 452/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Operating paragraph of the judgment reveals that in absence of evidence produced by the prosecution, the trial Court has acquitted all the accused persons including the petitioner. It is not a case where the petitioner was prosecuted for some heinous offence. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Methu Meda v. Union of India and others [Writ Petition No.3897/2013, decided on 27.9.2013], wherein in similar circumstances, a writ petition has been allowed. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Dinesh Parihar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others [Writ Petition No.896/2014, decided on 18.6.2014]. 7.
He has also placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Dinesh Parihar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others [Writ Petition No.896/2014, decided on 18.6.2014]. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent State has placed heavy reliance upon the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh [Civil Appeal No.4842/2013, decided on 27.2.2013], and the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent State is that the question of granting appointment to the petitioner in the services of the State Government in the light of the aforesaid judgment does not arise. 8. This Court has very carefully gone through the judgment delivered in the case of Dinesh Parihar (supra). In the aforesaid case, this Court has held as under : Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. In the present case, the petitioner has never at any point of time suppressed the factum of criminal case, which was registered at Crime No.44/2012 and he has been honourably acquitted. A similar controversy came up before this Court and this Court in the case of Rakesh Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and 5 others [Writ Petition No.9913/2012], and in the aforesaid case this Court has held as under: “The petitioner before this Court has filed this present writ petition for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner on the post of Constable General Duty. Petitioner is also aggrieved by order dated 13.7.2012 by which the Inspector General of Police has rejected the claim of the petitioner. In the present case, the petitioner has participated in the process of selection for the post of Constable in the year 2012 and has also submitted a police verification form stating categorically therein that he has been acquitted in S.T. No.196/2007 on 14.2.2008. The petitioner by virtue of his merit was selected for the post of Constable, however, the appointing authority as well as the Inspector General of Police have rejected the petitioner’s claim for appointment even though he is more meritorious and persons who are less meritorious have been appointed to the post of Constable General Duty.
The petitioner by virtue of his merit was selected for the post of Constable, however, the appointing authority as well as the Inspector General of Police have rejected the petitioner’s claim for appointment even though he is more meritorious and persons who are less meritorious have been appointed to the post of Constable General Duty. The only reason assigned in the return is that the petitioner as he has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt in respect of Crime No.126/2006, cannot be appointed to the post of Constable General Duty. Learned counsel for the respondents-State has drawn attention of this Court towards paragraph 53 of the M.P. Police Regulations and his contention is that a person who is seeking appointment on the post of a Constable should bear a good moral character and therefore, as the petitioner was prosecuted for an offence under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, he does not bear good moral character, hence the order passed by the Inspector General of Police does not warrant any interference. This Court is of the considered opinion that once the petitioner has been acquitted, the entire crime registered against him stands wiped out. An acquittal is an acquittal whether it is a “clean acquittal”, whether it is “honourable acquittal” or “acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt”. The “clean acquittal”, the “honourable acquittal” or “acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt” has not been distinguished in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court in the case of Smt. Panna Mehta v. State of M.P., reported in 2002(4) MPHT 226 , in paragraphs 11 and 12 held as under : “11. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code, Evidence Act or any other enactment, the word, “acquittal” has not been defined. As per the Law Lexicon, the Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary (Edn. 1992) “Acquittal” defined, Act X of 1882, section 403, “the word acquittal is verbum equivocum , and may in ordinary language be used to express either the verdict of a jury, or the formal judgment of the Court, that the prisoner is not guilty”. {Per Tindal, C.J., Burgess v. Boetefeur [13 LJMC 126 : 135 ER 193]}. It is generally said that a party is acquitted by the jury, but in fact, the acquittal is by the judgment of the Court (ibid).
{Per Tindal, C.J., Burgess v. Boetefeur [13 LJMC 126 : 135 ER 193]}. It is generally said that a party is acquitted by the jury, but in fact, the acquittal is by the judgment of the Court (ibid). According to the Oxford Dictionary, “acquittal” means that a person is not guilty oif a crime, with which he has been charged. So in a criminal jurisprudence there is no difference between “clean acquittal”, “honourable acquittal” or “acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt”. When the accused is acquitted by giving benefit of doubt means the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond doubt. 12. As ruled by the Supreme Court in case of Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal [ AIR 1971 SC 330 ], and Dilip Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 1976 SC 133 ], order of acquittal means a person concerned, has not committed the offence for which he was charged and tried. Criminal Courts are recording acquittal when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and benefit of doubt given to the accused does not mean that the accused was involved in the case but the same could not be proved by the prosecution. In Criminal Law, words “beyond reasonable doubt” cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge against acquitted accused. Therefore, petition for expunging the same is not maintainable under section 482, CrPC and the same is misconceived.” Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, as the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, it cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge against the acquitted person. Resultantly, there is no other material available against the petitioner and as there was no suppression on the part of the petitioner, the criminal case which is no longer in existence and in which the petitioner has been acquitted will not come in way of the petitioner in the matter of appointment. Resultantly, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Smt. Panna Mehta (supra), as the petitioner has been acquitted, he is certainly entitled for appointment for the post of Constable General Duty.
Resultantly, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Smt. Panna Mehta (supra), as the petitioner has been acquitted, he is certainly entitled for appointment for the post of Constable General Duty. The writ petition is allowed with the following directions : “(1) Respondent Superintendent of Police, Dewas is directed to issue an appointment order in respect of the petitioner forthwith on the post of Constable General Duty by virtue of his placement in the merit list and the criminal case in which the petitioner has been acquitted will not come in way of the petitioner. (2) The petitioner shall be entitled for the seniority from the date other persons have been appointed on the basis of same examination and shall be entitled for all consequential benefits except backwages. (3) The exercise of appointing the petitioner and granting all consequential benefits be concluded within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.” It is pertinent to note that the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh in Civil Appeal No.4842/2013 decided on 2.7.2013, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents was relating to appointment under the Delhi Police Establishment and there was a Standing Order i.e. Standing Order 398, which was applicable in the aforesaid case, whereas in the present case there is no such Standing Order in existence, on the contrary the Madhya Pradesh Manual and Regulations under the Regulation 54, even provides for appointment of a person, who has been convicted with the approval of Inspector General of Police on the post of Constable and therefore, in light of the aforesaid Regulations and also in light of the fact that there is no such Standing Order in existence in the present case, which has been considered by the apex Court in the aforesaid case, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 11.11.2013 is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to take appropriate steps for issuance of appropriate orders for appointment of the petitioner within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order keeping in view his placement in the merit list.
Resultantly, the impugned order dated 11.11.2013 is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to take appropriate steps for issuance of appropriate orders for appointment of the petitioner within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order keeping in view his placement in the merit list. The petitioner shall not be entitled for back wages, however he shall be entitled for seniority and all other consequential benefits. With the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.” 9. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner was certainly entitled for appointment by virtue of his selection and the respondents should have appointed the petitioner as he was more meritorious candidate. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, reported in (2015)2 SCC 377 , wherein the apex Court in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23 and 27 has held as under : 15. To answer Point (i), we must first consider whether the acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal. It is the contention of the respondent that even though the appellant was acquitted in the criminal case, the appointment of the appellant by the appointing authority to the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police, which is a disciplined force was not desirable. The High Court has held that what would be relevant is the conduct and character of the candidate to be appointed in the service of the State police and not the actual result thereof in the criminal case as claimed by the appellant. Further, the relevant consideration to the case is the antecedents of the candidate for appointing him to the post of Constable. 16. However, adverting to the criminal proceeding initiated against the appellant, we would first like to point out that the complainant did not support the case of the prosecution as he failed to identify the assailants and further admitted that the contents of section 161 CrPC statement were not disclosed to him and his signatures were obtained on a blank sheet of paper by the investigating officer.
Further, Sajjan Singh, who was an eyewitness of the case, who was also injured, had failed to identify the assailants. Both the witnesses were declared hostile on the request of the prosecution. 17. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani held that the prosecution has not been able to prove in any way the allegations against the appellant. Thus, the learned Judge held that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, we are in agreement with the findings and judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and are of the opinion that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal. 19. Further, an acquittal of the appellant is an “honourable” acquittal in every sense and purpose. Therefore, the appellant should not be deprived from being appointed to the post, in the public employment, by declaring him as unsuitable to the post even though he was honourably acquitted in the criminal case registered against him. 20. Further, undisputedly, there has been no allegation of concealment of the fact that a criminal case was registered against him by the appellant. Thus, the appellant has honestly disclosed in his verification application submitted to the selection authority that there was a criminal case registered against him and that it ended in an acquittal on account of compromise between the parties involved in the criminal case, he cannot be denied an opportunity to qualify for any post including the post of a Constable. 23. Further, a bare perusal of rules 12.12, 12.14 and 12.18 of the Rules, which would indicate that the recruit should be of a good character and suitability. The said rules are extracted hereunder : “12.12. Supervision of recruitments. -- The standard of performance and the reputation of the whole police force depend above all upon the quality of its Constables. Standards for recruits are laid down in the rules which follow, but, over and above these, constant attention and effort to raise the general standard of recruitment are essential. Gazetted officers shall at all times devote special attention to discovering and encouraging men of a thoroughly good stamp to enrol themselves. Efforts shall be made to enrol a proportion of men belonging to communities or classes, whose representation in the force is desirable, but who appear reluctant to offer themselves.
Gazetted officers shall at all times devote special attention to discovering and encouraging men of a thoroughly good stamp to enrol themselves. Efforts shall be made to enrol a proportion of men belonging to communities or classes, whose representation in the force is desirable, but who appear reluctant to offer themselves. The examination and measuring of candidates for enrolment shall invariably be carried out by a gazetted officer, who shall concern himself specially to prevent the victimisation of, or the taking of illegal gratification from, candidates by subordinate Government servants concerned in the conduct of their examination. Superintendents shall personally satisfy themselves that the arrangements for the reception of new recruits in the Lines, and for providing them with bedding and warm clothing, whether as a sanctioned government issue or under a system whereby the cost is recovered later in instalments from pay, are adequate, and that recruitment is not discouraged by initial and avoidable hardships. Deputy Inspectors General, in addition to exercising a careful control over recruitment generally, and preventing the enrolment of undesirable types, shall, at their inspections, formal and informal, pay special attention to the observance of this rule. 27. We, therefore, hold that the High Court has committed a grave error both on facts and in law and it has failed to follow the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra and uphold the decision of CAT. For the foregoing reasons both the appeals succeed and are allowed.” 11. This is not a case where the petitioner has suppressed the factum of his conviction and acquittal in criminal case, he is qualified for appointment as he had successfully fulfilled other requisites. The authorities/police authorities cannot sit over the judgment of the Court acquitting the petitioner and, therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judgment delivered by the apex Court, the writ petition stands allowed. The respondents are directed to issue appointment order in favour of the petitioner within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The petitioner shall also be entitled for all consequential benefits except back wages. ..........