JUDGMENT : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. The petitioner-State (hereinafter referred to as the 'petitioner/employer'), in the instant writ application, questions the legality and validity of the award dated 4th May, 2006, passed by the Labour Court, Ajmer, in LCR Case Number 10/1997, wherein the Labour Court answering the reference in favour of the respondents/workmen held the termination of their employment on 27th September, 1991, to be illegal and invalid. The Labour Court further recorded the fact that two of the workmen, namely, Smt. Fulmi and Smt. Sayri, died during the pendency of the proceedings. The petitioner/State was directed to reinstate the workmen, with continuity of service and full back wages. The monetary benefits on account of two workmen aforesaid were released to their legal heirs. 2. Shorn off unnecessary details, the indispensable skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy needs to be first noticed. The respondent/workmen were engaged on daily wages basis in different years in the year 1979 to 1987. The period of commencement of the appointment is as under:- 1. Smt. Jamna May, 1979 2. Smt. Sayri March, 1983 (dead) 3. Smt. Fumli March, 1983 (dead) 4. Smt. Rafiqa January, 1985 (dead) 5. Smt. Bundunisha June, 1986 6. Smt. Surma November, 1986 7. Gopal 1st May, 1987 2.1 On the date of termination of their employment i.e. 27th September, 1991, the respondent-workmen completed, in the employment of the petitioner/State, a period ranging from four and half years to thirteen years. The details of each of the respondent-workmen are as under:- 1. Smt. Jamna 13 years 2. Smt. Sayri 9 years 3. Smt. Fumli 9 years 4. Smt. Rafiqa 7 years 5. Smt. Bundunisha 6 years 6. Smt. Surma 5 years 7. Gopal 4½ years 2.2 It is pleaded case of the respondent-workmen before the Labour Court that the compensation paid and the compensation ought to have been paid in compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1947’, for short), was short of the required amount, and therefore, the termination of their employment was contrary to the mandate of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. Violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947 was also specifically pleaded. 2.3 The petitioner/employer submitted it's response to the statement of claim and adduced evidence. The respondent-workmen placed on record Ex.W1 to Ex.W31. Violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947 was also specifically pleaded. 2.3 The petitioner/employer submitted it's response to the statement of claim and adduced evidence. The respondent-workmen placed on record Ex.W1 to Ex.W31. The petitioner/employer also produced Ex.M1 to Ex.M18. 2.4 The Labour Court taking into consideration the pleaded facts, evidence adduced by the parties and the materials available on record and after a proper analysis and appreciation of evidence, recorded a finding that the amount of compensation paid to the respondent-workmen in compliance of the mandate of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, was deficient but for one respondent-workman, namely, Gopal, who was paid adequate amount on account of compensation and notice, but his termination has been faulted for violation of mandate of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner/employer has assailed the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned award dated 4th May, 2006, for being contrary to the facts and materials available on record as well as for the Labour Court failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective. According to the counsel for the petitioner/employer, the respondent-workmen did not complete 240 days in a calender year. The opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Pritam Singh: JT 2001 (3) (SC) 326, was applied by drawing a wrong inference. Further, the respondent-workmen accepted the retrenchment compensation without any protest, and therefore, the impugned award is bad on that count as well. 4. The engagement/employment of the respondent-workmen is also stated to be in a specific/special programme, which was conducted with the assistance of the World Bank in the year 1985- 86, and therefore, the Labour Court fell in gross error while making a direction for reinstatement of the respondent-workmen. None, junior to the respondent-workmen was retained in employment, and therefore, the finding arrived at by the Labour Court for violation of mandate of Section 25-G of the Act of 1947, is assailed as a perverse finding. 5. In the alternative, the learned counsel for the petitioner/employer, relying upon the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Dev. Corporation & Anr. 5. In the alternative, the learned counsel for the petitioner/employer, relying upon the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Dev. Corporation & Anr. v. Gitam Singh: (2013) 5 SCC 136 , argued that a distinction has been drawn between daily wager and employee appointed on a regular post for the purpose of grant of consequential relief. Therefore, in the instant case at hand, the relief of reinstatement was not justified as the respondent-workmen were engaging as daily wagers, and instead, monetary compensation would have been the proper relief. 6. Per contra, learned counsel, Mr. Sunil Samdaria, appearing on behalf of the respondent-workmen supporting the impugned award while reiterating the stand in the statement of claim, strenuously argued that the findings arrived at by the Labour Court on the basis of proper appreciation of the evidence and careful analysis of the factual matrix, is not open for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land. The learned counsel would further submit that the Labour Court examined the pleaded facts in the statement of claim, in the light of the response submitted by the petitioner/employer. Documents adduced in evidence by the respondent-workmen as Ex.W1 to Ex.W30, were considered while arriving at the findings. The amount of compensation paid, and the compensation which ought to have been paid, was meticulously calculated in view of the documentary and oral evidence, and it was found that out of seven respondent-workmen, only one respondent-workman i.e. Gopal, was paid the required compensation in compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, whereas in the case of other six respondent-workmen, the amount was found to be deficient. 7. Referring to the findings arrived at by the labour Court while answering the reference in favour of the respondent-workmen, the learned counsel urged that the details of amount of compensation ought to have been paid, and actually paid, was specifically detailed out under paragraph 11.9 with required details, which were reflected in Ex.W17 to Ex.23. 7. Referring to the findings arrived at by the labour Court while answering the reference in favour of the respondent-workmen, the learned counsel urged that the details of amount of compensation ought to have been paid, and actually paid, was specifically detailed out under paragraph 11.9 with required details, which were reflected in Ex.W17 to Ex.23. Further, the respondent-workmen also made a prayer before the Labour Court for summoning of the original record in this reference and the representative on behalf of the petitioner/employer, assured the Court to produce the same by the next date, but the original record was not produced, and therefore, the inference drawn by the Labour Court while arriving at the findings cannot be faulted. To reinforce his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Hanuman Singh v. Municipal Council, Jaipur: RLR 1988 (1) 931; Devendra Salodia v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: RLR 1990 (1) 734; Smt. Ram Janki Bai v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: 1992 (1) WLC 416, and the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. M/s. Hindalco Industries Limited. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record. 9. The details of engagement of the respondent-workmen, as recorded by the Labour Court while making the impugned award dated 4th May, 2006, have not been disputed, from where it is reflected that the respondent-workmen continued in the employment of the petitioner/employer for a period ranging from four and half years to thirteen years. Two of the respondent-workmen i.e. Smt. Sayri and Smt. Fumli, died while proceedings were pending before the Labour Court. Smt. Rafiqa expired during the pendency of the writ proceedings. 10. From the order dated 6th August, 2007, passed by this Court at the motion stage, it would reflected that while entertaining the challenge to the impugned award, the operation of the impugned award was stayed only to the extent of awarding back wages. Since there was no stay with respect to reinstatement, it was the duty of the petitioner/employer to reinstate the respondent-workmen, in compliance of the award wherein a direction was issued to comply with the award within three months. 11. Since there was no stay with respect to reinstatement, it was the duty of the petitioner/employer to reinstate the respondent-workmen, in compliance of the award wherein a direction was issued to comply with the award within three months. 11. On 19th May, 2014, the learned Additional Government Counsel for the petitioner/employer, was called upon to inform the Court as to whether the respondent-workmen have been reinstated in service, and if not, to furnish the explanation for not doing so for the reason that vide order dated 6th August, 2007, the operation of the impugned award was stayed only to the extent of back wages. The learned Additional Government Counsel was also called upon to ensure filing of specific affidavit to that effect, within two weeks. 12. It is further reflected from the record of proceedings that no affidavit was submitted, but on 7th August, 2014, a second stay application was preferred on behalf of the petitioner/employer whereupon an order was passed on 8th August, 2014, which reads thus:- "The present writ petition has been filed by the Divisional Forest officer, Forest Building, Jaipur Road, Ajmer, challenging the award dated 04.05.2006 of the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer, in L.C.R.10/1997, whereby the Labour Court held the termination of the respondents-workmen to be illegal and ordered their reinstatement in service with continuity and all consequential benefits. Respondents no.1 and 7, who are personally present in the court, have submitted that this court, vide its order dated 06.08.2007, while issuing notice to the respondents, stayed operation of the impugned award dated 04.05.2006 only to the extent of awarding back wages. Meaning thereby, the petitioner was required to reinstate the respondents-workmen in service, but they have not been allowed to join the duties. The Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Building, Jaipur Road, Ajmer, shall ensure joining of the respondents-workmen immediately, failing which he shall personally appear before this court to explain why compliance of direction of Labour Court for reinstatement of respondents-workmen, has not been made so far, as that part of the award has not been stayed by this court. Put up on 18.08.2014. The respondents-workmen shall report on duty in the office of Divisional Forest officer, Forest Building, Jaipur Road, Ajmer, on any day in the next week." 13. Put up on 18.08.2014. The respondents-workmen shall report on duty in the office of Divisional Forest officer, Forest Building, Jaipur Road, Ajmer, on any day in the next week." 13. On 12th September, 2014, Shri Rajeev Chaturvedi, DFO, appeared in person before the Court and stated that the respondent-workmen could not be reinstated since the Finance Department did not agree to the proposal for their reinstatement. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the text of the order passed by the Court on 12th September, 2014, which reads thus:- "Shri Rajeev Chaturvedi, DFO present in person submits that so far the respondent-workmen has not been reinstated in service because the Finance Department has not agreed to the proposal for their reinstatement. This is quite surprising that despite this Court's not staying the operation of that part of award by which the respondents were ordered to be reinstated and staying award only to the extent they were awarded back wages way back on 6.8.2007, the mighty State has chosen not to reinstate the poor workmen despite lapse of seven years. Shri Rajeev Chaturvedi wants time to prepare the matter for final arguments. List on 17.9.2014. The matter to be heard finally on that date." 14. The matter was heard and closed for orders on 17th September, 2014, but was released later on in view of the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-workmen. The additional affidavit was responded to by the petitioner/employer, followed by filing of written submissions on behalf of the respondent-workmen. The learned counsel for the petitioner/employer was allowed accommodation to argue the matter finally as requested by him. 15. The matter has been taken up for final disposal on the request of the counsel for the parties. 16. The Labour Court has recorded a specific finding for noncompliance of mandate of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, after a proper analysis of the facts and appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties. The details of deficiency in the amount of compensation have been specifically furnished in the written submissions, which have not been denied. 17. 16. The Labour Court has recorded a specific finding for noncompliance of mandate of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, after a proper analysis of the facts and appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties. The details of deficiency in the amount of compensation have been specifically furnished in the written submissions, which have not been denied. 17. Be that as it may, the finding arrived at by the Labour Court after due appreciation of the evidence and analysis of the facts and materials available on record, cannot be faulted in absence of any ground sustainable in law to question the finding arrived at by the Labour Court. 18. From the memo of the writ application while questioning the legality and validity of the impugned award, it is evident that nothing has been pleaded to indicate the findings as perverse or contrary to evidence adduced and/or materials available on record. No material is available on record on the basis of which, an inference could be drawn that the findings arrived at are perverse or contrary to the materials available on record. 19. The Labour Court has also recorded a finding to the effect that while effecting retrenchment of the respondent-workmen, junior persons to the respondent-workmen, were retained. Junior persons were also continued, who were successful in assailing the retrenchment, and as a consequence thereof, they were reinstated. The learned counsel has specifically pointed out the two sets of employees, who were juniors to the respondent-workmen and were accorded regularisation. Another set of employees was retained by of reinstatement as they were successful in assailing the action of ‘retrenchment’ of the petitioner/employer, as would be reflected from the findings arrived at by the Labour Court. 20. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner/employer, in alternative, for grant of compensation in lieu of reinstatement has to be examined on the basis of the principles enunciated in the case of Gitam Singh (supra), which has been referred to and relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner/employer, wherein taking note of the earlier opinions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:- "20. In Mahboob Deepak : (2008) 1 SCC 575 , this Court stated that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an order of reinstatement should not however be automatically passed. In Mahboob Deepak : (2008) 1 SCC 575 , this Court stated that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act may be set aside but an order of reinstatement should not however be automatically passed. The Court observed in paragraphs 11 and 12 (pg. 578) of the Report as follows: 11. The High Court, on the other hand, did not consider the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Appellant was entitled to compensation, notice and notice pay. 12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that in a situation of this nature instead and in place of directing reinstatement with full back wages, the workmen should be granted adequate monetary compensation. (See M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban: (2007) 9 SCC 748 )." 21. The issue of reinstatement with full back wages and consequential relief, again fell for consideration of the Hon'ble Apex Court of the land, in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, taking note of several earlier opinions, observed that the power of judicial review is neither unqualified nor unlimited and it has its own limitation. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to exercise of power by the High Courts under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with reference to setting aside the award of reinstatement, back wages and other consequential reliefs and granting compensation, reads thus:- "16. The Appellant has claimed that the High Court has modified the award passed by the Labour Court which has awarded reinstatement of the Appellant with full back wages and other consequential benefits to simply awarding compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the High Court in lieu of reinstatement with back wages and consequential benefits which order is bad in law in the light of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the catena of cases. In the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India: (2012) 5 SCC 443 , this Court, on the issue of the power of the High Court for judicial review Under Article 226, held as under: 60. The power of judicial review is neither unqualified nor unlimited. It has its own limitations. In the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India: (2012) 5 SCC 443 , this Court, on the issue of the power of the High Court for judicial review Under Article 226, held as under: 60. The power of judicial review is neither unqualified nor unlimited. It has its own limitations. The scope and extent of the power that is so very often invoked has been the subject-matter of several judicial pronouncements within and outside the country. When one talks of 'judicial review' one is instantly reminded of the classic and oft quoted passage from Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v. Minister for the Civil Service (1984) 3 All ER 935, where Lord Diplock summed up the permissible grounds of judicial review thus: Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. By ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the State is exercisable. By ‘irrationality’ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness'. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system.... I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. 16.1 Further, in the case of Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur : (2011) 6 SCC 584 , it was held that: 22....A careful analysis thereof reveals that the High Court neither found any jurisdictional infirmity in the award of the Labour Court nor it came to the conclusion that the same was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Notwithstanding this, the High Court set aside the direction given by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the Appellant by assuming that his initial appointment/engagement was contrary to law and that it would not be in public interest to approve the award of reinstatement after long lapse of time. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the award of the Labour Court was ex facie erroneous and contrary to the law laid down in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan : AIR (1964) SC 477, Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab: (1976) 2 SCC 868 , P.G.I. of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh v. Raj Kumar : (2001) 2 SCC 54 , Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai: (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Shalini Shyam v. Rajendra Shankar Path: (2010) 8 SCC 329 . 23. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (supra), this Court identified the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following words: The question about the' limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari Under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts Under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. In the second judgment - Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), this Court reiterated the limitations of certiorari jurisdiction indicated in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan (supra) and observed: In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. 17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh's case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction Under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38,39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10. ...The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR p. 928, para 10.) 18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an Order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the Appellant." 22. Neither from the memo of the writ application nor from the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner/employer, any perversity could be reflected in the impugned award dated 4th May, 2006. Moreover, the petitioner/employer has taken a stand, which cannot be appreciated. Even after, the respondent-workmen were successful before the Labour Court, as the award was answered in their favour, with a direction of reinstatement and all consequential benefits including back wages and continuity of service, but the same was not complied with, even in the fact of the order dated 6th August, 2007, wherein at the motion stage, while entertaining the writ application, stay was granted only to the extent of back wages. 23. The petitioner/employer did not reinstate the respondent-workmen in spite of the fact that they were called upon to do so. The approach of the petitioner/employer, a welfare State, did not comply with the award, and also ignored the specific directions made by the Court. 24. In the instant case at hand, out of seven, three respondent-workmen have already expired and could not enjoy the fruits of the long drawn litigation. Remaining four respondent-workmen are yet to be reinstated, but the reinstatement has been declined since the proposal was not acceded to by the Finance Department of the welfare State. 25. 24. In the instant case at hand, out of seven, three respondent-workmen have already expired and could not enjoy the fruits of the long drawn litigation. Remaining four respondent-workmen are yet to be reinstated, but the reinstatement has been declined since the proposal was not acceded to by the Finance Department of the welfare State. 25. For the reasons and discussions herein above, I find no force in the writ application, which totally lacks in merit, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 26. Ordered accordingly. 27. The petitioner/employer is directed to ensure compliance of the impugned award dated 4th May, 2006, in to, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 28. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the second stay application stands closed. 29. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ petition and stay application dismissed.