JUDGMENT : K.M. JOSEPH, C.J. The controversy in this case relates to the appointment to the post of Principal of M.K.P. (P.G.) College, Dehradun, of which the first respondent is shown as the Secretary. A Selection Committee, consisting of six persons, recommended the appointment of the second respondent on the post of Principal. Pursuant to the same, the matter was considered by the Managing Committee of the College and, finally, after correspondence between the Committee and the Vice Chancellor, on the strength of the decision of the Committee accepting the recommendation of the Selection Committee, appointment order dated 08.03.2007 came to be issued in favour of the second respondent. Petitioner, who was also one of the candidates, who appeared for the interview, has approached this Court seeking the following reliefs: “(i) A writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the selection and appointment of Respondent no. 2 on the post of Principal M.K.P. (P.G.) College, Dehradun vide appointment letter dated 08.03.2007. (ii) A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the Respondent no. 1 to appoint the petitioner as Principal of the College who is fit and eligible candidates for the said Post.” 2. Pleadings have been exchanged. We have heard Mr. I.M. Quddusi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner; Mr. Anil Kumar Tewari, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of respondent No. 2, who was appointed by the impugned order; Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, which is the University to which the College is affiliated; and Mr. Neeraj Garg, Advocate, who purported to submit that he would enter appearance on behalf of respondent No. 1. 3. Initially, this matter was heard and the following interim order dated 08.03.2011 was passed by a Bench of this Court: “In this writ petition, it is being contended by the petitioner, to which we are ad idem, that the academic record of the petitioner was better than the academic record of the private respondent, who has been selected and appointed as the Principal of the Post Graduate College. It is the contention of the petitioner that in the matter of selecting the private respondent, the selectors did not apply their mind for the purpose of ascertaining better suitability of the candidates but were influenced by something else which have not been brought on record by the College in their counter affidavit, despite opportunities given to them. The College has filed its counter affidavit and, as directed, the representative of the Managing Committee of the College is also present in Court. It has been contended by the College as well as by the representative of the Managing Committee of the College that the selectors, apart from making a recommendation of the private respondent, did not furnish any other piece of paper to the College, except minutes of their meeting recording that they have prepared a select list but expressly recorded in the minutes that the same is not being furnished, as the same is a secret document. In the circumstances, there is nothing from where one can gather on what criteria/basis, the selectors selected the private respondent. True, in absence of statutory requirement, the criteria of selection may be fixed by the selectors and unless there is a requirement of law, it is not necessary to write down such criteria. It is also true that when very highly reputed people are appointed as selectors to select a person as that of a Principal of a Post Graduate College, there must be a presumption that the selectors have done what they found appropriate in the matter. At the same time, it is true that selectors, being experts in the matter, there is hardly any scope of interference by the writ Court in such selection, unless selection is capricious on the face of record. However, the selectors, while selecting, are required, in terms of the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, to be fair. They must indicate in the records that in the matter of selection made by them, they acted fairly and their decision is fair. In the event selectors fail to keep on record something to suggest that they were fair, a Court, where it is alleged that the selectors had not been fair but they acted in an arbitrary manner, cannot protect the selectors and consequentially the selection. In the event selectors fail to keep on record something to suggest that they were fair, a Court, where it is alleged that the selectors had not been fair but they acted in an arbitrary manner, cannot protect the selectors and consequentially the selection. In the instant case, the selectors kept nothing on record to suggest that they had acted fairly in the matter of selection. Even the select list they prepared and kept the same confidential remained confined to them; they did not even bother to furnish the said select list to the College. Therefore, there is nothing before us, from where we can say that the contention of the petitioner that in the matter of selection of private respondent, the selectors acted in an unfair manner is of no substance. 2. The petitioner has, therefore, been able to make out a case for interference by this Court. However, taking into account the fact that upon such selection, the private respondent is working in the College as its Principal for last three years and that the Managing Committee, which was managing the College at the time selection took place, has been replaced by a new Managing Committee, it would not be appropriate on our part, at this stage, to hold that the selection of the private respondent was improper. Before doing that, it would be appropriate on our part to request the Vice Chancellor of the University to constitute a selection committee with such members, as are required by law, with a request to the said selection committee to make an effort to ascertain whether anyone, who appeared before the previous selection committee including the petitioner, is a better candidate than the private respondent. While doing so, the selection committee will keep on record something from where a prudent man can come to the conclusion that while they exercised their power of selection, they acted in a fair manner. We request the Vice Chancellor to constitute such a selection committee as quickly as possible but not later than two months from the date of service of a copy of this order upon him. Through the Vice Chancellor, we are requesting the selection committee to discharge their obligations in terms of this order as quickly as possible but not later than two months from the date of its constitution. Through the Vice Chancellor, we are requesting the selection committee to discharge their obligations in terms of this order as quickly as possible but not later than two months from the date of its constitution. They shall submit their report of selection to the Vice Chancellor and we request the Vice Chancellor to transmit the same to this Court. 3. List this matter five months hence.” 4. It appears that a review was filed by respondent No. 2 against the said order and the same came to be dismissed by order dated 11.05.2011 as follows: “Delay Condonation Application No. 2850 of 2011 Considering the averments made in application for condonation of delay in filing the review application and being satisfied therewith, we allow the application and thereby condone the delay in preferring the review application. Review Application No. 2851 of 2011 Interim Stay Application No. 4581 of 2011 By consent of the parties, review application is taken up for final disposal. A glance at the review application suggests that the review applicant is seeking reconsideration of the order under review on the basis of a document, which was allegedly not filed by respondent No. 2. The document in question is the Minutes of a meeting of the Managing Committee of the college. The said Minutes were not, nor are at all germane to the decision rendered in the order under review. The review application is thoroughly misconceived and the same is dismissed. Consequently, the stay application also fails and the same is also dismissed.” 5. Against the said orders, SLPs were carried by the second respondent before the Hon’ble Apex Court. Leave was granted and being converted as Civil Appeal Nos. 7479-7480 of 2014, the Hon’ble Apex Court disposed of the matter by passing the following order dated 05.08.2014: “We do not wish to dialte on the merits and tenability of the impugned findings and directions, save and except that the High Court, in our considered view, did not address itself to the issues in hand and did not render any decision on the merits of the controversy before it. In the above view of the matter, we set aside the order dated 08.03.2011 passed by the High Court and remand the matter back to the High Court with a request to consider the matter afresh, after hearing the parties and pass a reasoned order on the merits of the controversy before it. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in terms of the above. The contesting parties may request the High Court for leave / liberty to file additional documents and additional pleadings, which request of the parties will, naturally, be considered by the High Court, in accordance with law.” 6. It is, thereafter, that the matter was taken-up for hearing. 7. Mr. I.M. Quddusi, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that there were no norms in the matter of selection to the post of Principal. That is to say, there were no criteria. The selection procedure was not transparent. He drew our attention to paragraph 64 of the writ petition, which also contains a Chart of the comparative achievements of the petitioner on the one hand and the second respondent on the other hand. It reads as follows: “64. That as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs the petitioner is more meritorious than the selected candidates (Dr. Indu Singh) but her selection as Principal was competed by overlooking the petitioner’s academic qualifications, participation in extension and co-curricular activities, her administrative experience as a Coordinator, NAAC and many other administrative committees and above all her research experience. An undue advantage was extended to Dr. Indu Singh in this respect. The comparative chart between the petitioner and Dr. Indu Singh shows that there is a wide gap between the two. The petitioner is fortunate to find place in the merit list of U.P. Board in 1969 in High School examination and again got a merit position in the list of Meerut University in 1973 for B.A. Examination. She did Sanskrit Hons alongwith English Literature and Political Science. Dr. Kiran Sood (Petitioner) Indu Singh (Respondent No. 2) First joining date 23.9.1975 As Lecturer, Political Science. First joining date 20.12.1977 As Lecturer, Political Science. Promoted as Reader on 3.1.1992 Promoted as Reader in 2001 Qualification: (National scholarship on the basis of merit U.P. Board and Meerut University) High School- First division with honours Intermediate- First division Graduation- First div. Dr. Kiran Sood (Petitioner) Indu Singh (Respondent No. 2) First joining date 23.9.1975 As Lecturer, Political Science. First joining date 20.12.1977 As Lecturer, Political Science. Promoted as Reader on 3.1.1992 Promoted as Reader in 2001 Qualification: (National scholarship on the basis of merit U.P. Board and Meerut University) High School- First division with honours Intermediate- First division Graduation- First div. with honours Post Graduation- Second division Qualification: High School - Second Division Intermediate - Second Division Graduation - Second Division Post Graduation- Second Division D. Phill. awarded on 3.1.92 D. Phil awarded in 2001 Completed 15 years of teaching experience after D. Phil. Degree at the time of the interview for appointment of the Principal. Research Experience since 1978 under supervision of Dr. Bhagwant Sharan Upadhyaya and Dr. C.P. Barthwal. Completed 6 years of teaching experience after Dr. Phil degree at the time of the interview and appointment of the Principal. Research experience under supervision of Dr. Ajai Saxena. Kiran Sood has done 10 orientation / refresher courses including one course at U.K. Indu Singh got promoted as Reader on condition as she has not done any refresher course. Two week Principal’s Orientation programme, Indian Institute of Education, Pune. X Three week International workshop on Modern Technological Course Materials, Paisley, U.K. 1990 X Asian Guest Delegate at U.K.’s National Conference on Women into Computing, University of Norwich, U.K. 1990 X Chief Coordinator, Steering Committee, NAAC X Programme Officer, Adult education and extension since 1984. X Director, Sri Aurobindo Studies Centre under UGC Scheme for Epoch making Indian Philosophers’ studies centre. X Approved supervisor for D. Phil degree on 3.8.1992 (University Education: Administration, Management and Political Interference) At present three scholars are doing research under supervision. 8. The learned counsel would point out that it would show that the petitioner was senior to the second respondent; was certainly more qualified in the sense that the petitioner has high academic attainments in comparison to the second respondent; and the petitioner had 15 years of teaching experience, after being awarded D. Phil., at the time of interview, whereas the second respondent had obtained D. Phil. in 2001 and, as at the time the interview took place in the year 2007, she had only completed 6 years of teaching experience. In this connection, he drew our attention to Clause 11.14 of the Statutes. It reads as follows: “11.14. in 2001 and, as at the time the interview took place in the year 2007, she had only completed 6 years of teaching experience. In this connection, he drew our attention to Clause 11.14 of the Statutes. It reads as follows: “11.14. In the case of any college affiliated to the University the following shall be the minimum qualifications for the post of Principal for a, -       ….. (2) Post-graduate College – (a) a consistently good academic record (that is to say, the overall record of all assessments throughout the academic career of a candidate) with first or high second class (that is to say, with an aggregate of more than 54 per cent marks) Master’s degree or an equivalent degree of a foreign University in one of the subjects taught in the college; and (b) a doctorate degree in one of the subjects taught in the college, with 7 years experience of teaching Post-graduate classes or 5 years experience of Principalship of a degree college: Provided that if a candidate possesses 7 years experience of teaching Post-graduate classes or 20 years or more experience of teaching degree classes or 7 years’ experience of Principalship of a Degree College or if he is or has been a confirmed Principal of five years or more standing of any Post-graduate college, the Selection Committee may relax the requirement of doctorate degree. Provided further that if the Selection Committee is of the view any of the qualifications prescribed in sub-clause (a); or from his published work is of a very high standard it may relax any of the qualifications prescribed in sub-clause (a).” 9. On the basis of the same, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that this is a case, where the second respondent did not have 7 years’ teaching experience at the Post Graduate level after obtaining the doctorate degree; whereas, the petitioner had, as already noted, 15 years of teaching experience and, on this ground itself, the selection and subsequent appointment are infirm. He points out that the petitioner had a consistently good academic record; whereas, the second respondent could not possibly claim such consistent good academic record, as she has always passed, at various stages of her academic career, only in second division. He further drew our attention to the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983. He points out that the petitioner had a consistently good academic record; whereas, the second respondent could not possibly claim such consistent good academic record, as she has always passed, at various stages of her academic career, only in second division. He further drew our attention to the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983. He pointed out Regulation 6(2), which reads as follows: “6. Procedure for selection. – (2) The Commission shall interview the candidates in accordance with the criteria, minimum standards and guidelines set out by it. The Commission may, if it considers necessary, hold practical test also as part of interview.” 10. In this connection also, he drew our attention to paragraph 32 of the writ petition, which reads as follows: “32. That the guidelines issued by Hon’ble Governor to all Vice Chancellors of State Universities, states clearly that for making appointment in higher education. The academic qualification of candidates must be examined carefully and that the Board while making selection must consider academic qualifications, experiences and to give marks for the same clearly. The marks allocated for the interview has been fixed at 30 persons only. The petitioner states that the marks obtained by her have been ignored as well as her work experience has not been considered in the selection process. The petitioner is much senior to the respondent no. 2. True copy of seniority list is being filed herewith collectively and marked as Annexure No. 15 to this writ petition.” 11. In connection with the Statute, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision in S. Krishnan & others vs. The State of Madras & another, reported in AIR 1951 SC 301 . S. Krishnan & others vs. The State of Madras & another (supra) related to a case under the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951. Therein, the majority view was that the word ‘and’ should be understood in a disjunctive sense. In the said context, we do not see how the petitioner can draw any support from the discussion of the law therein, which pertained to the law relating to preventive detention being upheld as not ultra vires to Article 22. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is a distinction between the words ‘with’ and ‘and’. In the said context, we do not see how the petitioner can draw any support from the discussion of the law therein, which pertained to the law relating to preventive detention being upheld as not ultra vires to Article 22. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is a distinction between the words ‘with’ and ‘and’. He would submit that clauses (a) & (b) of Statute 11.14(2) are separated by the word ‘and’; whereas, when the word ‘with’ is used after the words ‘doctorate degree in one of the subjects taught in the college’ in clause (b), it must necessarily mean that it was meant to be mandatory that the teaching experience must be one rendered after obtaining the doctorate degree. He also drew our attention to paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 (page 248 of the paper-book), which reads as follows: “21. That the contents of para nos. 33 & 34 of the writ petition are matter of record and can be verified from the same. The proper reply has already been given by Dr. N.S. Bhatnagar that no short listing or screening of candidates was conducted before the interview. There is no marking or grading done during interview. Therefore how one can claim to be better than other. The name of the candidate was put before the management committee when the same was asked by hon’ble Vice-Chancellor. It is further submitted here that the selection process of the principal was conducted in accordance with the Provisions of Section 31(4)(e) of U.P. State Universities Act as adopted by State of Uttarakhand. There is no illegality committed in conducting the selection process.” 13. He further drew our attention to the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. The same reads as follows: “1. That the deponent was the Honarary Secretary of the Managing Committee of the MKP College and also one of the members of the then selection committee which had recommended the name of Mrs. Indu Singh as Principal of MKP Post Graduate College, Dehradun. As such he is fully acquainted with the facts deposed to hereunder. 2. That the other members of the then Selection Committee who had recommended the name of Mrs. Indu Singh as Principal of the MKP Post Graduate College were as under:- (i) Shri Rakesh Oberoi, the then President, MKP College Society. As such he is fully acquainted with the facts deposed to hereunder. 2. That the other members of the then Selection Committee who had recommended the name of Mrs. Indu Singh as Principal of the MKP Post Graduate College were as under:- (i) Shri Rakesh Oberoi, the then President, MKP College Society. (ii) Prof. A.K. Bhatnagar of Delhi University. (iii) Prof. Brij Gopal of Jawahar Lal Nehru University. (iv) Prof. Purnima Srivastava of Banaras Hindu University. (v) Prof. Neelima Mishra of Lucknow University. 3. That each member of the Selection Committee was provided with the biodata of each of the candidates who had applied for the post of Principal. Each member of the Selection Committee had separately made assessment in respect of each of the candidates on the assessment sheet. 4. That after the interview was over, a discussion took place amongst the members of the Selection Committee and finally the Selection Committee recommended the name of Mrs. Indu Singh, which was later on approved by the Managing Committee and finally by the Vice Chancellor.” 14. From the statements contained in the aforesaid affidavit, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that it clearly shows that no marks were awarded by the members of the Selection Committee and there were no norms. He would also submit that there are no reasons given for selecting the second respondent. 15. Mr. I.M. Quddusi would also submit that no decision was taken on the representation, which the petitioner had filed before the Chancellor under Section 68 of the State Universities Act, as, by that time, the University had become a Central University and the Chancellor stood deprived of his powers. 16. In reply to this, Mr. Anil Kumar Tewari, learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent, would submit that, if no decision had been taken on the representation by the Chancellor, the writ petition could not be maintained, as the petitioner could not go to the Chancellor and invoke the statutory remedy and, without a decision being taken, could not possibly come to the writ court. This is apart from the plea that, actually, a decision was, indeed, taken, as is evident from order dated 07.03.2008. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that no case has been made out for interference. This is apart from the plea that, actually, a decision was, indeed, taken, as is evident from order dated 07.03.2008. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that no case has been made out for interference. He would submit that no case of mala fides is made out and no foundation has been laid for a plea of mala fides, be it factual or legal. He would submit that the appointment of the year 2007 is challenged in the writ petition in the year 2010. He would further submit that the petitioner availed of the remedy under Section 68 of the State Universities Act by approaching the Chancellor. An order was passed on 07.03.2008 by the Chancellor rejecting the contentions of the petitioner. This is, of course, apart from the fact that the Vice Chancellor had already approved the appointment of the second respondent. It is relevant and crucial, he points out, to notice that the order passed by the Chancellor under Section 68 was not challenged by the petitioner. He poses the question as to how the writ petition could be filed seeking the prayers, as we have already noticed, which prayers do not include a challenge to the decision of the Chancellor. Thus, having accepted the decision of the Chancellor, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to merely challenge the appointment of the second respondent by the Committee. With reference to the second prayer, he would submit that the petitioner cannot seek a right to be appointed. The only right the petitioner had was a right to be considered and he poses the question as to how the petitioner can seek a mandamus for her appointment. He would submit that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. This, he submits on the basis that the petitioner had filed a writ petition earlier being Civil Writ Petition No. 116 of 2008 (S/B) and that came to be disposed of by the following order: “Mr. Arvind Vashisth, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave of this court to withdraw this writ petition with liberty to file fresh petition on the same cause of action. Prayer allowed. Arvind Vashisth, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks leave of this court to withdraw this writ petition with liberty to file fresh petition on the same cause of action. Prayer allowed. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn.” Learned Senior Counsel would, then, pose the question that as, at that time, petitioner had filed the petition before the Governor and without seeking liberty to challenge the order of the Governor, how it is possible for the petitioner to have approached this Court. Admittedly, this is the second writ petition, he submits. With reference to paragraph 32 of the writ petition, which contains general averments about there being guidelines, about the norms and criteria and also about the interview being for 30 marks, issued by the Chancellor; he would submit that there are no such guidelines and, in the absence of guidelines, when a decision is taken by the Selection Committee, which comprises of experts, an unbroken catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court establish the principle that the court will defer to the views of the experts and will not interfere with the selection. In this connection, he drew our attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences vs. Dr. K. Kalyana Raman and others, reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 481, wherein it is, inter alia, held as under: “7. We will first consider the second point. In the first place, it must be noted that the function of the Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The High Court seems to be in error in stating that the Selection Committee ought to have given some reasons for preferring Dr. Gauri Devi as against the other candidate. The selection has been made by the assessment of relative merits of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of candidates possessing the required eligibility. There is no rule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to record reasons. In the absence of any such legal requirement the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning has however, referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836 . That decision proceeded on a statutory requirement. In the absence of any such legal requirement the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning has however, referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836 . That decision proceeded on a statutory requirement. Regulation 5(5) which was considered in that case required the Selection Committee to record its reasons for superseding a senior member in the State Civil Service. The decision in Capoor case was rendered on September 26, 1973. In June 1977, regulation 5(5) was amended deleting the requirement of recording reasons for the supersession of senior officers of the State Civil Services. The Capoor case cannot, therefore, be construed as an authority for the proposition that there should be reason formulation for administrative decision. Administrative authority is under no legal obligation to record reasons in support of its decision. Indeed, even the principles of natural justice do not require an administrative authority or a Selection Committee or an examiner to record reasons for the selection or non-selection of a person in the absence of statutory requirement. This principle has been stated by this Court in R.S. Dass v. Union of India, 1986 Supp. SCC 617, in which Capoor Case was also distinguished.” 17. Learned Senior Counsel would further refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Mylarappa Alias Dr. Chikkamylarappa vs. Dr. R. Venkatasubbaiah and others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 306 . Therein, it is, inter alia, held as follows: “28. In National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences vs. Dr.K.Kalyana Raman & Ors. [1992 Supp (2) SCC 481], this Court considered in detail the role of an expert body in deciding the candidature for selection to a particular post. While doing so, this Court at Para 7 at P. 484 of the said decision observed as follows: “7. … In the first place, it must be noted that the function of the Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The High Court seems to be in error in stating that the Selection Committee ought to have given some reasons for preferring Dr. Gauri Devi as against the other candidate. … In the first place, it must be noted that the function of the Selection Committee is neither judicial nor adjudicatory. It is purely administrative. The High Court seems to be in error in stating that the Selection Committee ought to have given some reasons for preferring Dr. Gauri Devi as against the other candidate. The selection has been made by the assessment of relative merits of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of candidates possessing the required eligibility. There is no rule or regulation brought to our notice requiring the Selection Committee to record reasons. In the absence of any such legal requirement the selection made without recording reasons cannot be found fault with. The High Court in support of its reasoning has, however, referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lai Capoor. That decision proceeded on a statutory requirement. Regulation 5(5) which was considered in that case required the Selection Committee to record its reasons for superseding a senior member in the State Civil service. The decision in Capoor case was rendered on 26 September, 1973. In June, 1977, Regulation 5(5) was amended deleting the requirement of recording reasons for the supersession of senior officers of the State Civil services. The Capoor case cannot, therefore, be construed as an authority for the proposition that there should be reason formulation for administrative decision. Administrative authority is under no legal obligation to record reasons in support of its decision. Indeed, even the principles of natural justice do not require an administrative authority or a Selection Committee or an examiner to record reasons for the selection or non-selection of a person in the absence of statutory requirement. This principle has been stated by this Court in R. S. Dass v. Union of India in which Capoor case was also distinguished.” Keeping this observation in our mind and considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that there was no dispute in this case that the selection was made by the assessment of relative merit of rival candidates determined in the course of the interview of the candidates and after thoroughly verifying the experience and service of the respective candidates selected the appellant to the post of the Professor in the said Department. 29. 29. It is not in dispute that there is no rule or regulation requiring the Board to record reasons. Therefore, in our view, the High Court was not justified in making the observation that from the resolution of the Board selecting the appellant for appointment, no reason was recorded by the Board. In our view, in the absence of any rule or regulation requiring the Board to record reasons and in the absence of mala fides attributed against the members of the Board, the selection made by the Board without recording reasons cannot be faulted with. 31. A reading of the scrutiny report which was extracted by the learned Single Judge in his order would clearly show that the Chairman found only four persons eligible for the post and invited the appellant and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and one more candidate for interview. After being satisfied and after verifying the report of the eligibility and the requirements for appointment to the post of Professor in the Sociology Department of the University, the scrutiny and verification report was filed by the Chairman and on the basis of which the appellant was selected and appointed in the post of Professor in the University. That being the position and in view of our discussions made herein above, we are of the view that the Division Bench as well as the learned single judge ought not to have exercised the writ jurisdiction and interfered with the selection of the expert committee of the University for the reasons made in the order and particularly when the selection of the appellant was not challenged on the ground of mala fides.” 18. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that there was no requirement in law that Selection Committee must record its reasons and, in such circumstances, as no case of mala fide is made out, the Court should not interfere with the matter. 19. Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the University, would also point out that the pleadings of the petitioner are without any basis. In this connection, he drew our attention to paragraph 31 of the writ petition, wherein the petitioner has referred to Section 14(xiv) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 to contend that marks obtained by the candidates is indicative of the measure of the merit of a particular candidate. In this connection, he drew our attention to paragraph 31 of the writ petition, wherein the petitioner has referred to Section 14(xiv) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 to contend that marks obtained by the candidates is indicative of the measure of the merit of a particular candidate. He points out that Section 14(xiv) has got nothing to do with the same. He would also submit that there is no merit in the contention based on the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983, as the said provisions have no application to the selection in question carried out in the State of Uttarakhand and he points out that the said provisions relate to the appointment or selection by a Commission and he poses the question, how it will have any relevance at all to selection by a Selection Committee. 20. In reply to the same, Mr. I.M. Quddusi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that there were norms. Norms were prescribed by the University Grants Commission under the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications required for the Appointment and Career Advancement of Teachers in Universities and Institutions affiliated to it) Regulations, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “UGC Regulations 2000”). He points out that these Regulations came into force in the year 2000. He contends that it provides, inter alia, for qualifications for various posts, including the post of Principal. He would submit that, in regard to the post of Principal, Clause 3.5.0 recommends the following as composition of the Selection Committee: “3.5.0 For the post of Principal (1) Chairperson of the Governing Board as Chairperson. (2) One member of the Governing Board to be nominated by the Chairperson. (3) Two Vice-Chancellor’s nominees, out of whom one should be an expert. (4) Three experts consisting of the Principal of a College, a Professor and an accomplished educationist not below the rank of a professor (to be nominated by the Governing Board) out of a panel of experts approved by the Vice-Chancellor. At least four members, including two experts, should constitute the quorum.” 21. More importantly, the process of selection was to involve the following: “(a) Assessment of aptitude for teaching and research. (b) Ability to communicate clearly and effectively. (c) Ability to analyse and discuss. At least four members, including two experts, should constitute the quorum.” 21. More importantly, the process of selection was to involve the following: “(a) Assessment of aptitude for teaching and research. (b) Ability to communicate clearly and effectively. (c) Ability to analyse and discuss. (d) Optional: Ability to communicate may be assessed by requiring the candidate to participate in a group discussion or by exposure to a class room situation / lecture, wherever it is possible.” 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner would, therefore, submit that, inasmuch as there is no dispute that there were no norms as such, which could be made out; it is a case, where the Selection Committee acted against the statutorily proclaimed norms, as the Selection Committee decided the issue of selection, apparently, in disregard of the norms. 23. In response to this, apparently, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 2 would submit that at this last moment contention based on the UGC Regulations 2000 may not be permitted, as there is absolutely no pleading in the writ petition. At any rate, the learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 2 would submit that there was no amendment to the Statutes giving effect to the UGC Regulations. He would also submit that there is no case set up that the Selection Committee acted in violation of the norms. In fact, he would submit that the case of the petitioner is that there were no norms and, having participated in the interview on the basis that there were no norms, it is not open to her to even contend that there were norms and those norms were observed in its breach by the Selection Committee. The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent would also point out that, actually, the UGC Regulations 2000 relate to career advancement and does not relate to appointment. 24. Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned counsel for the University, on getting instructions during the course of the day, in fact, submitted that the UGC Regulations in regard to the norms during selection were not translated into Statutes by an amendment to the existing Statutes. 24. Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned counsel for the University, on getting instructions during the course of the day, in fact, submitted that the UGC Regulations in regard to the norms during selection were not translated into Statutes by an amendment to the existing Statutes. In fact, he would point out that the Statutes, which the petitioner had relied on in the course of her opening arguments, contained qualification of Doctorate along with 7 years’ teaching experience, which, in fact, was harped upon by the petitioner; but, it is conspicuous by its absence in the UGC Regulations 2000. 25. Learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent would also submit that, even with the norms, the Court may bear in mind what exactly is the impact of the norms, as they profess to assess the aptitude for teaching and research, the ability to communicate clearly and effectively and ability to analyse and discuss. He would immediately pose the question as to, when the interview board was composed of experts, what else would they have gone into by way of interviewing candidates for the post of Principal. He would submit that, since there was no duty cast on the Selection Committee to record its reasons, even applying the norms at worst, petitioner could not possibly derive any further advantage than to say there were norms. In the absence of a duty to give reasons for recommending the name of the second respondent, he would submit that the petitioner cannot succeed on the basis of the new argument, which was advanced at the stage of reply. When the matter had gone to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it appears that the petitioner had produced the UGC norms in the proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court; but, the petitioner had not taken the trouble of amending the writ petition even after being given an opportunity by the Hon’ble Apex Court to introduce new pleadings. It is, therefore, submitted that the Court may not permit the petitioner to lay store by a plea at the Bar unsupported by any pleading in the writ petition. 26. It is, therefore, submitted that the Court may not permit the petitioner to lay store by a plea at the Bar unsupported by any pleading in the writ petition. 26. The learned Senior Counsel for the second respondent, in fact, pointed out that the second respondent has filed a detailed supplementary counter affidavit, which, essentially, consisted of giving various orders and dates; but, in particular, he would point out that, actually, the petitioner had been proceeded against by the College in a disciplinary proceeding in the year 2006, i.e. prior to the selection, and it was brought to its logical conclusion after the date of selection of the second respondent by imposition of a penalty. 27. He would also submit that it is most pertinent to note that the case of the petitioner was based on her alleged comparatively high academic attainments and her experience and he would invite us to contrast the same with the norms, which did not have anything to do with the same. Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the University, also would reiterate the same and submit that no case is made out. 28. In our view, the following issues would arise: (i) Whether there is an order passed by the Chancellor under Section 68 of the State Universities Act and the impact of any such order on seeking the relief as sought without challenging the said order? (ii) If there is no such order, what is the effect of the petitioner having filed the earlier writ petition and getting it dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition alone without seeking liberty to persevere in proceedings under Section 68? (iii) What is the effect of Clause 11.14, i.e. whether it is a requirement of law that the teaching experience at the Post Graduate level must be after obtaining the Doctorate Degree? (iv) Whether the selection of the second respondent is flawed for any reason? Findings: 29. If the petitioner has, actually, approached the Chancellor and if there is a decision by the Chancellor, then it is certainly incumbent upon the petitioner to challenge the same. A perusal of the prayers sought in the writ petition would show that there is no challenge to any order passed under Section 68. Findings: 29. If the petitioner has, actually, approached the Chancellor and if there is a decision by the Chancellor, then it is certainly incumbent upon the petitioner to challenge the same. A perusal of the prayers sought in the writ petition would show that there is no challenge to any order passed under Section 68. Therefore, we would have to examine whether there is any such order, as the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that there is no such order in view of the subsequent development in the form of the University becoming a Central University robbing the Vice Chancellor of his powers to entertain the petition under Section 68. In this regard, we may notice Ground C as also Ground E of the writ petition, which are as follows: “C. Because, the order dated 7.3.2008 is cryptic and does not contained any reason. The order merely shows that the appointment has been found in accordance with the provisions of the First Statute and the act. The order also mentions some enquiry report which was not at all annexed with the letter dated 7.3.2008 and recital about its enclosure with the order dated 7.3.2008 is incorrect. E. Because, the Central Universities Bill establishing 12 new central universities from scratch and upgrading three universities was passed in the Rajya Sabha on 24th Feb 2009. It was earlier introduced in the Lok Sabha on 17th Feb 2009 and passed in the Lok Sabha on 19th Feb 2009. Together with that the earlier ordinance was withdrawn and the act being effective from January 15, 2009.” Therefore, the omission on the part of the petitioner to challenge the order dated 07.03.2008 would appear to be unjustified, as not only the petitioner was aware of it, but she takes a ground in regard to the said order. Ground E also would show that, even according to the petitioner, the Central Universities Bill, upgrading the three universities, became law w.e.f. 15.01.2009 only; whereas, the order is dated 07.03.2008. The decision dated 07.03.2008, which is referred to by respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in this regard, is Annexure No. 4 to the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 2. English translation of the same reads as under: “Raj Bhawan Governor’s Secretariat Uttarakhand No./ 3077/G.S./G.V.V./Dr. Sood/2008 Dehradun Dated 07 March 2008 To, Dr. Kiran Sood, Vice Principal, Political Science, M.K.P. College, Dehradun. 2 & 3 in this regard, is Annexure No. 4 to the counter affidavit filed by respondent No. 2. English translation of the same reads as under: “Raj Bhawan Governor’s Secretariat Uttarakhand No./ 3077/G.S./G.V.V./Dr. Sood/2008 Dehradun Dated 07 March 2008 To, Dr. Kiran Sood, Vice Principal, Political Science, M.K.P. College, Dehradun. Sub.: In relation to investigation of appointment made on the post of Principal in M.K.P. College, Dehradun. Madam, With reference to your letter dated 01.11.2007 on the subject noted above, it is to inform you that, on the above subject, after investigation, a report has been received from H.N.B. Garhwal University. It has been informed by the Registrar in its report that an inquiry was conducted in the matter after constituting an inquiry committee. It was made clear by the Registrar that selection to the post of Principal in M.K.P. College, Dehradun, has been made through a Selection Committee legally constituted by the Managing Committee, which is in accordance with the Statute / Act of the University. Hence, please be informed of the report received from the above said University. A copy of the report of the inquiry committee is also enclosed for ready reference. Yours sincerely Sd./- Addl. Secretary to Chancellor” 30. What is stated is that a report has been received from the University, wherein the Registrar points out to the inquiry held in the matter after constituting an inquiry committee. It is, further, pointed out that the Registrar has pointed out that selection has been made by a legally constituted committee, which is in accordance with the Statute / Act of the University. A copy of the report was also made available to the petitioner. No doubt, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that this cannot be a decision as such under law of the Chancellor. We must hold that, apparently, on the basis of the complaint of the petitioner, an inquiry was got done and inquiry did not find anything wrong with the selection committee. There is no further order from the Chancellor as such. We also notice that the order is signed by the Additional Secretary to Chancellor; but, we would think that we can proceed on the basis that it has been done on behalf of the Chancellor; may be, the decision may not have dealt with the contentions of the petitioner as such. We also notice that the order is signed by the Additional Secretary to Chancellor; but, we would think that we can proceed on the basis that it has been done on behalf of the Chancellor; may be, the decision may not have dealt with the contentions of the petitioner as such. But, if it is a decision, it cannot be ignored on the ground that it is not correct or that it does not contain reasons. Therefore, we would think that the petitioner was bound to challenge the said decision. 31. The next question we must consider, at any rate, even proceeding to consider the writ petition on merits, is the effect of Statute 11.14. We are of the view that there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The Statute only provides that the candidate must have obtained Doctorate Degree and, along with the said qualification, there is a further requirement, no doubt, that the candidate must possess 7 years’ teaching experience at the Post Graduate level. We are of the view that the said provision only mandates two separate requirements. Firstly, the candidate must have obtained a Doctorate Degree. Still further, the candidate must also have a teaching experience of 7 years of Post Graduate classes. The teaching experience may be after obtaining the Degree or it may also be teaching experience of a candidate prior to obtaining the Doctorate Degree. The Statute cannot be read as meaning that the teaching experience is one obtained after obtaining of the Doctorate Degree. The significance of the word ‘with’, in the context of the Statute in question, can only mean that the qualification of teaching for 7 years at the Post Graduate level is prescribed as a distinct qualification apart from the qualification of possessing Doctorate Degree. We have also referred to the proviso to the said Statute. It contemplates the power to dispense with the qualification of Doctorate in an appropriate case of teaching experience, where the candidate has certain number of teaching experience. If, at all, the proviso sheds any light on the requirement contained in the main provision, we would think that it fortifies us in our view that there is no requirement that the teaching experience should be after obtaining the Doctorate Degree. Therefore, we reject the said contention of the petitioner. 32. We have already noticed the case-law. If, at all, the proviso sheds any light on the requirement contained in the main provision, we would think that it fortifies us in our view that there is no requirement that the teaching experience should be after obtaining the Doctorate Degree. Therefore, we reject the said contention of the petitioner. 32. We have already noticed the case-law. When a selection is made by a body of experts, the courts would defer to it. This principle is rooted not only in the very purport of judicial review, but also in the principle that the views of the experts in the field must hold sway over the view that the court may have as regards merits of the selection. It arises from the demarcation of the powers available to the courts on a practical and also juristic understanding of the role played by experts in the matter of selection of candidates to high academic posts. It is as much as recognition of the courts’ own lack of expertise in the subject as much as it underlines the deference to the views of the experts. The exceptions to the principle would appear to be mala fides, which is established in a duly constituted proceeding; any procedural or other irregularity, which affects the selection otherwise and results in a violation of any injunction by the Selection Committee in the matter of conducting selection. The courts would lean in favour of upholding the proceedings of the Selection Committee, ordinarily. 33. In this case, the members of the Selection Committee were all experts. The members are as follows: S. No. Name of Prof. Deptt. University 1 Prof. A.K. Bhatnagar Head of the Department, Botany Delhi University, Delhi Nominee of the Vice Chancellor 2 Prof. Brij Gopal School of Environment Science Jawahar Lal Nehru University, Delhi -do- 3 Prof. Purnima Srivastava Deptt. of Home Science Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi 3 Experts nominated by the Management Committee from the panel approved by the Vice Chancellor 4 Prof. Neelima Mishra Deptt. of Psychology Lucknow University, Lucknow -do- 5 Prof. R.R. Dass Environmental Sciences Indira Gandhi Academy of Environmental Education Research and Ecoplanning Vidya Vihar Jiwaji University, Gwalior -do- 6 Shri Rakesh Oberoi President, MKP College Society Dehradun 7 Dr. N.S. Bhatnagar Hony. Secretary, MKP College Society Dehradun 34. There is no challenge to their expertise. Neelima Mishra Deptt. of Psychology Lucknow University, Lucknow -do- 5 Prof. R.R. Dass Environmental Sciences Indira Gandhi Academy of Environmental Education Research and Ecoplanning Vidya Vihar Jiwaji University, Gwalior -do- 6 Shri Rakesh Oberoi President, MKP College Society Dehradun 7 Dr. N.S. Bhatnagar Hony. Secretary, MKP College Society Dehradun 34. There is no challenge to their expertise. No case is made out that there is any mala fides involved in making the selection. There is no requirement that the members were required to furnish reasons. As per the decisions cited before us, it is clear that, in the absence of any requirement that reasons should be furnished, the selection cannot be impugned on the basis that no reasons are furnished. 35. The only remaining question, which would have to be considered, is the effect of the UGC Regulations 2000. We noticed that this is not a contention, which has been taken in the pleadings. There is no dispute in this regard that the petitioner has not taken a plea and it amounts to taking the respondents by surprise at the stage of reply to the arguments of the respondents in fact. No doubt, Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the University, would submit that the recommendations in the form of Regulations made by the UGC do have the force of law even without an amendment to the Statutes. Incidentally, we may also notice that in Kalyani Mathivanan vs. K.V. Jeyaraj & others, reported in 2015 AIR SCW 1791, a bench of two Judges of the Hon’ble Apex Court had occasion to consider the question, whether the Regulations, being subordinate Legislation, would prevail over even State Legislation in case of conflict and the court, inter alia, held as follows: “44. In view of the discussion as made above, we hold: (i) To the extent the State Legislation is in conflict with Central Legislation including sub-ordinate legislation made by the Central Legislation under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List shall be repugnant to the Central Legislation and would be inoperative. (ii) The UGC Regulations being passed by both the Houses of Parliament, though a sub-ordinate legislation has binding effect on the Universities to which it applies. (iii) UGC Regulations, 2010 are mandatory to teachers and other academic staff in all the Central Universities and Colleges thereunder and the Institutions deemed to be Universities whose maintenance expenditure is met by the UGC. (iii) UGC Regulations, 2010 are mandatory to teachers and other academic staff in all the Central Universities and Colleges thereunder and the Institutions deemed to be Universities whose maintenance expenditure is met by the UGC. (iv) UGC Regulations, 2010 is directory for the Universities, Colleges and other higher educational institutions under the purview of the State Legislation as the matter has been left to the State Government to adopt and implement the Scheme. Thus, UGC Regulations, 2010 is partly mandatory and is partly directory. (v) UGC Regulations, 2010 having not adopted by the State Tamil Nadu, the question of conflict between State Legislation and Statutes framed under Central Legislation does not arise. Once it is adopted by the State Government, the State Legislation to be amended appropriately. In such case also there shall be no conflict between the State Legislation and the Central Legislation.” 36. But, even there, we have already noticed the nature of the norms. Does the petitioner have a case that the interview was held violating these norms; and is there material before the Court in the absence of reasons furnished for the recommendation? There are no reasons forthcoming by the Selection Committee. They have not acted illegally in not giving reasons. In fact, the only thing, which is available as such on record, would appear to be Annexure No. 21, which is a report of the Selection Committee and it shows that the Committee consisted of 7 members, of which 6 were present and the number of candidates, who applied for the post, were 18 as per list at Annexure ‘A’ and the candidates, who appeared for the interview, were 16 as per list at Annexure ‘B’. Thereafter, all that is stated is that the Selection Committee recommends the following candidates in order of merit suitable for appointment as the Principal and, thereafter, at first place, the name of the second respondent is shown. 37. At this juncture, it is relevant to notice the subsequent development in the form of new Regulations coming into force in 2010. The UGC Regulations 2000 have been superseded by the UGC by Regulations framed on 30.06.2010. In the same, Clause 5.1.6 provides as follows: “5.1.6 College Principal (a) The Selection Committee for the post of College Principal shall have the following composition: (1) Chairperson of the Governing Body as Chairperson. The UGC Regulations 2000 have been superseded by the UGC by Regulations framed on 30.06.2010. In the same, Clause 5.1.6 provides as follows: “5.1.6 College Principal (a) The Selection Committee for the post of College Principal shall have the following composition: (1) Chairperson of the Governing Body as Chairperson. (2) Two members of the Governing Body of the college to be nominated by the Chairperson of whom one shall be an expert in academic administration. (3) One nominee of the Vice Chancellor who shall be a Higher Education expert. In case of Colleges notified / declared as minority educational institutions, one nominee of the Chairperson of the College from out of a panel of five names, preferably from minority communities, recommended by the Vice-Chancellor of the affiliating university of whom one should be a subject expert. (4) Three experts consisting of the Principal of a college, a Professor and an accomplished educationist not below the rank of a Professor (to be nominated by the Governing Body of the college) out of a panel of six experts approved by the relevant statutory body of the university concerned. (5) An academician representing SC/ST/OBC / Minority / Women / Differently-abled categories, if any of candidates representing these categories is the applicant, to be nominated by the Vice Chancellor, if any of the above members of the selection committee do not belong to that category. (b) At least five members, including two experts, should constitute the quorum. (c) All the selection procedures of the selection committee shall be completed on the day of the selection committee meeting itself, wherein, minutes are recorded along with the scoring proforma and recommendation made on the basis of merit with the list of selected and waitlisted candidates / Panel of names in order of merit, duly signed by all members of the selection committee. (d) The term of appointment of the college principal shall be FIVE years with eligibility for reappointment for one more term only after a similar selection committee process.” These Regulations contemplate through Clause 6.0.1 that the overall selection procedure shall incorporate transparent, objective and credible methodology of analysis of the merits and credentials of the applicants based on weightage given to the performance of the candidate in different relevant dimensions and his performance on a scoring system proforma based on the Academic Performance Indicators (API) as provided in the Regulations in Tables I to IX of Appendix III, inter alia. Clause 6.0.7 deals with the selection of Professor and it provides, inter alia, that it shall involve inviting bio-data with duly filled Performance Based Appraisal System (PBAS) proforma developed by the respective universities based on the API criteria based PBAS set out in the Regulation and reprints of five major publications of the candidates. Clause 6.0.9, specifically, deals with the selection to the post of Principal. It indicates as follows: “6.0.9 The Academic Performance Indicator (API) scoring system in the process of selection of Principal shall be similar to that of directly recruited College Professors. In addition, the selection committee shall assess the following dimensions with the weightages given below: a. Assessment of aptitude for teaching, research and administration (20%); b. Ability to communicate clearly and effectively (10%); c. Ability to plan institutional programmes, analyze and discuss curriculum development and delivery, research support and college development / administration (20%); d. Ability to deliver lecture programmes to be assessed by requiring the candidate to participate in a group discussion or exposure to a class room situation by a lecture (10%); and e. Analysis of the merits and credentials of the candidates on the basis of the Performance Based Appraisal System (PBAS) proforma developed by the affiliating University based on these Regulations (deduced to 40% of the total API score).” We may notice that, under the UGC Regulations 2000, in fact, while the norms provide for assessment of aptitude for teaching and research, ability to communicate clearly and effectively, and, lastly, ability to analyse and discuss, no separate marks are provided under the Regulations. In the Regulations, which came into force in 2010 and which, obviously, are not applicable to the selection in question, even accepting the petitioner’s case, in regard to the selection to the post of Principal, firstly, Clause 5.1.6, which we have referred to, indicates that the selection procedures shall be completed on the day of the selection committee meeting itself, wherein the minutes are recorded along with the scoring proforma and recommendation made on the basis of merit with the list of selected and waitlisted candidates / panel of names in the order of merit duly signed by all members of the selection committee. Furthermore, we notice that weightage is separately given in percentage terms for the various norms under Clause 6.0.9. Reading the provisions together under the 2010 Regulations, it contemplates the maintaining of minutes with the details and recommendation made on the basis of merit; whereas, such a requirement does not appear to have been there under the UGC Regulations 2000. Since the selection took place in the year 2007, i.e. prior to the 2010 Regulations coming into force, at any rate, the requirements under the 2010 Regulations cannot be applied to the selection, which, if had been applicable, may have resulted in our holding that there is a duty to give reasons in the form of the minutes containing the scoring proforma and the recommendation based on merit. The norms have been given specific weightage. This is, apparently, to bring about transparency and objectivity. 38. No doubt, ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the Selection Committee was also oblivious to the requirement under the norms and breached the norms in making the selection, it may become vulnerable. There is a case for the respondents, as pointed out by Mr. Paresh Tripathi, that the Court must remember that the experts were drawn from various other universities and the Court cannot proceed on the basis that they would have made the selection de hors the norms. In this connection, there is also a case for respondent No. 2 that there is no case for the petitioner that the interview was a farce, in the sense, petitioner was not interviewed for a sufficiently long period or that the questions, which were asked, were irrelevant. In other words, there is no case for the petitioner that the interview took place in violation of the norms proclaimed by the UGC. In other words, there is no case for the petitioner that the interview took place in violation of the norms proclaimed by the UGC. When there is no requirement to give reasons and reasons have not been given by the Selection Committee, the Court must desist from interfering with the view of the experts recommending the second respondent. We have also noted the distinction between the norms in the Regulations of 2000 and that brought out in 2010 in the earlier paragraph. 39. No doubt, it is true that there is no duty to give reasons; but, that may be different from holding that there is no duty to act fairly or on the basis of some rational criteria. But, we may also notice that the case of the petitioner, essentially, has been based on the high academic attainments of the petitioner, including the fact that she has been in research for longer period; but, that would not have much relevance in the light of the UGC Regulations 2000 as such. We must also bear in mind that, while academic attainments are, undoubtedly, not irrelevant and do play a role as indicated by the requirement in the Statute itself and which, incidentally, pegs the requirement with reference to the cut-off marks of 54 per cent; when it comes to selection to the post of Principal of an educational institution, other criteria also would be relevant, as is evident from the norms themselves proclaimed by the UGC, like aptitude for teaching and research, communicative skills, capacity for analyses and discussion, would all play a role. These are all matters, which a meaningful interview could bring out and that is the purport of holding the selection as contemplated in law. 40. We would think that, in the facts of this case, we cannot permit the petitioner to draw support from the norms and unsettle the selection on the basis that the norms proclaimed by the UGC Regulations were violated. 41. In such circumstances, in the facts of this case, petitioner has not made out a case for interference. Consequently, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. No order as to costs.