JUDGMENT : Akshaya Kumar Rath, J. 1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenge is made to the order dated 27.1.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nimapara in T.S. No. 382 of 1991, vide Annexure-2. By the said order, the learned trial court allowed the application for amendment of the counter claim filed by the opposite parties. The petitioners as plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of right, title, interest and confirmation of possession over the suit schedule land and for permanent injunction in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nimapara, which is registered as T.S. No. 382 of 1991. The foundation of the claim of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule property originally belonged to one Mani Sahu and Banchha Sahu and recorded as such in the settlement ROR of 1927-28 jointly. The plaintiffs represent the branch of Mani Sahu and proforma defendant No. 2 represents the branch of Banchha Sahu. The suit property is now recorded as such in consolidation plot No. 234, khata No. 131 measuring an area of Ac. 0.01 dec. Consolidation plot No. 235 adjoining south of plot No. 234 belongs to defendant No. 1-the predecessor-in-interest of present opposite parties 1 to 7. It is further pleaded that defendant being rich and influential person of the locality claimed to have purchased the suit land from proforma defendant No. 2 by registered sale deed and threatened to amalgamate the same in his plot No. 235 by demolishing the green fence of plot No. 234. Hence the suit. 2. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendant No. 1 entered appearance and filed written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. During pendency of the suit defendant No. 1 died and duly substituted by present opposite parties 1 to 7 as defendant No. 1 (ka) to 1 (chha) who in turn also filed counter claim. The case of the defendant is that there has been a prior partition by metes and bounds between Mani and Banchha prior to 1979 in which the suit property fell to the share of Banchha. When proforma defendant No. 2 was in exclusive possession of the suit land, alienated the same in favour of defendant No. 1 vide registered sale deed dated 7.9.1989 for a consideration of Rs. 2000/- and delivered possession. When proforma defendant No. 2 was in exclusive possession of the suit land, alienated the same in favour of defendant No. 1 vide registered sale deed dated 7.9.1989 for a consideration of Rs. 2000/- and delivered possession. Subsequently defendant No. 1 also got the suit land mutated in his name. But during the consolidation operation defendant No. 2 got the suit land recorded jointly in favour of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 2. It is further pleaded that the suit land is a part of kitchen garden of defendants and the same is also used as approach space to their house. Thus defendants prayed for declaration of right, title, interest and possession over the suit land. 3. The written statement was filed on 21.12.1991 and the counter claim was filed on 7.12.1992. The defendants filed an application for amendment of the cause title of the counter claim. On 14.8.1995, they filed an application for amendment of the counter claim inserting the cause of action, valuation and also court fee to be paid in the counter claim. The plaintiffs filed an objection to the said petition. Learned trial court by order dated 25.8.1995 came to the conclusion that the counter claim is not entertainable and rejected the same. The defendants challenged the said order dated 25.8.1995 in Civil Revision No. 44/117 of 1997/95 before the learned 2nd Addl. District Judge, Puri. The learned revisional court remanded the matter for reconsideration. By a laconic order dated 27.1.2000, vide Annexure-2, learned trial court allowed the petition for amendment of the counter claim. The same is quoted hereunder: "Order No. 111 dated 27.1.2000: This order arises out of petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC by defendant No. 1-Ka to Cha for amendment of the cause title of the counter claim. The copy of petition served on the other side who raised no objection. Heard. The proposed amendment is formal in nature and is necessary to move any future ambiguity. Hence petition is allowed. Defendant to carry out the amendment and to see the amended copy of counter claim by 7.2.2000 positively. Order dated 27.1.2000: The defendant No. 1-Ka to Cha have filed another petition for amendment of the counter claim in paragraph-8 as detailed in the schedule of proposed amendment. Copy served on the other side. Heard. Petitioner bears merit. Hence it is allowed. Order dated 27.1.2000: The defendant No. 1-Ka to Cha have filed another petition for amendment of the counter claim in paragraph-8 as detailed in the schedule of proposed amendment. Copy served on the other side. Heard. Petitioner bears merit. Hence it is allowed. The petitioners to carry out amendment by 7.2.2000." 4. Heard Mr. Soumya Mishra on behalf of Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners. None appears for the opposite parties. 5. The only question arises for consideration is as to whether the learned trial court is correct in allowing the application for amendment of the counter claim without assigning any reason? 6. A duty is cast upon the court to assign reasons. In MMRDA Officers Association Kedarnath Rao Ghorpade v. Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority and another, (2005) 2 SCC 235 , the apex Court in paragraph-5 of the report held as follows: "Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.P. in Breen Vs. Amalgamated Engg. Union reported in (1971) 1 All ER 1148 observed : (All ER p. 1154h). "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree reported in 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx," it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. (Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank Vs. P.C. Kakkar, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364 .)" 7. The apex Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited and another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 has summarized the principles, which are quoted hereunder: "47. (Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank Vs. P.C. Kakkar, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364 .)" 7. The apex Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited and another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 has summarized the principles, which are quoted hereunder: "47. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must, also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions." (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process." Resultantly the impugned order dated 27.1.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Nimapara in T.S. No. 382 of 1991 is quashed. The matter is remitted back to the learned trial court to consider the application for amendment afresh by passing a reasoned order after hearing the parties. The petition is allowed. Petition Allowed.