ORDER : Akshaya Kumar Rath, J. 1. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated 11.12.2006 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Angul in R.F.A. No. 9 of 2006, the instant petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. By the said order, learned Addl. District Judge rejected the application filed by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently the appeal was dismissed. The opposite parties as plaintiffs filed a suit for a declaration that plaintiff No. 2 was the Secretary of the Trust Board of plaintiff No. 1 and entitled to manage the affairs of the institution, defendant Nos. 1 to 5 ceased to be the members of the trust board and for permanent injunction against the defendants in the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul, which was registered as C.S. No. 69 of 2002. The suit was dismissed. Challenging the judgment and decree dated 21.3.2006 and 31.3.2006 respectively passed by the trial court, they have filed RFA No. 9 of 2006 under Section 96 CPC before the learned Addl. District Judge, Angul. Since there was a delay in filing the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed. At the time of admission of the appeal, learned appellate court condoned the delay. Subsequently after appearance of the respondents and on hearing the parties and relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Panchu Das and another v. Jata Behera and others, 62 (1986) CLT 557, that ex parte condonation of delay can be questioned by a party after appearance of the parties, learned appellate court recalled its order and accordingly dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Consequently the appeal was dismissed. 2. The seminal question that hinges for consideration of this Court is as to whether an appeal filed along with an application for condonation of delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on refusal to condone the delay is a decree ? 3. Consequently the appeal was dismissed. 2. The seminal question that hinges for consideration of this Court is as to whether an appeal filed along with an application for condonation of delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on refusal to condone the delay is a decree ? 3. A Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Ainthu Charan Panda v. Sitaram Jayanarayan Firm represented by Ramnibas and another, 58 (1984) CLT 248 (F.B.), held that an order rejecting a memorandum of appeal or dismissing an appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But then, the apex Court, in the case of Shyam Sunder Sarma v. Pannalal Jaiswal and others, AIR 2005 SC 226 , held that an appeal filed along with an application for condoning the delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay is nevertheless a decision in the appeal. 4. In Shyam Sunder Sarma (supra), the view of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Mamuda Khateen and others v. Beniyan Bibi and others, AIR 1976 Calcutta 415, that an order rejecting a time barred memorandum of appeal consequent upon refusal to condone the delay in filing that appeal was neither a decree nor an appellable order, was held to be not laying down a correct law. 5. Further, the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Thambi v. Mathew, 1987 (2) KLT 848 , that an appeal presented out of time was nevertheless an appeal in the eye of law for all purposes and an order dismissing the appeal was a decree that could be the subject of a second appeal, was approved by the apex Court. Be it noted that the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court was approved by the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Ainthu Charan Parida (supra). 6. Be it noted that the aforesaid decision of the Calcutta High Court was approved by the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Ainthu Charan Parida (supra). 6. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the apex Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Sarma (supra), the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ainthu Charan Parida (supra) has been impliedly overruled, the same being contrary to the enunciation of law laid down by the apex Court. Thus the logical sequitur of the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs is that an appeal filed along with an application for condonation of delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on refusal to condone the delay is a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the ultimate analysis the petition fails, as the same is not maintainable. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.