JUDGMENT : Sunita Gupta, J.:-- 1. This is an appeal filed by the complainant under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as ‘Code’) seeking enhancement of sentence under Section 307 IPC imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing the judgment dated 1st September, 2012 whereby respondent No. 2 was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and fine of Rs. 1 lac. 2. Prosecution case, succinctly stated is as follows:-- On 6th April, 2008 on receipt of DD No. 45, ASI Rajender Singh along with Const. Pradeep reached Saroj Hospital, Sector 14, Rohini, Delhi and obtained MLC No. 2130/08 of the complainant where the alleged history was mentioned as stab injury over abdomen and patient was unfit for statement. FIR u/s 307 was registered at PS Prashant Vihar. After the patient was declared fit for statement, her statement was recorded wherein she disclosed that her husband Sandeep Beniwal had been giving her beatings for the last about five years on account of insufficient dowry. On the evening of 6th April, 2008, he inflicted knife blow in her stomach with intention to kill her and thereafter shifted her to Saroj Hospital. Thereafter, he ran away from the hospital by threatening her that in case she informed the police, she would be killed. On the basis of this statement, Section 498A/506 IPC were added in the FIR. 3. After completing investigation, the charge sheet was submitted against the accused. He pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against him u/s 498A/307/506 IPC. 4. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution in all examined 20 witnesses. The case of accused was one of the denial simplicitor. He did not opt to lead any defence evidence. After appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution and hearing submissions of learned counsel for parties, vide judgment dated 28th August, 2012, the accused was acquitted of the offences u/s 498 A/506 IPC. However, he was convicted under Section 307 IPC. Vide impugned order on sentence dated 1st September, 2012, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,00,000- out of which a sum of Rs. 80,000/- was ordered to be given to the injured as compensation, in default of payment of fine he was to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 5. 1,00,000- out of which a sum of Rs. 80,000/- was ordered to be given to the injured as compensation, in default of payment of fine he was to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 5. The findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge were not challenged by the accused and as per the nominal roll, he has served the sentence awarded to him and has also deposited the fine in Court and thereafter he has been released from jail on 21st September, 2014. State has also not preferred any appeal for enhancement of sentence, however, the complainant aggrieved by the order on sentence has preferred this appeal u/s 372 of the Code. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the sentence imposed upon respondent No. 2 is grossly inadequate. The Court has failed to consider the aggravating circumstances of the case and conduct of the accused. The conduct of the accused throughout the trial remained unremorseful, reprehensible and callous who not only committed the crime in cold blood against his own wife without caring for her life and limb but has also further attempted to tamper with the evidence during the investigation of the case which is reflected from the fact that after commencement of the investigation, the accused tried to fabricate the MLC of the victim to cover up the gravity of the offence. Not only that, respondent No. 2 is well educated and a qualified doctor by profession, as such, was very much aware of the consequences and ramification of severe injury caused by him to the victim. Knife blow was inflicted in the stomach of the victim due to which part of small intestine came out of the body and the victim had to be operated upon and had to remain hospitalized for number of days. By placing reliance on State of M.P v. Kashiram & Ors. 2009 (2) JCC 872: (2009) 4 SCC 26 where Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the State of MP v. Salim, (2005) 5 SCC 554 where it was held as under:-- “6. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perutnal etc. v. State of Tamil Naidu, AIR 1991 SC 1463 .” It was submitted that present is a fit case where the sentence of respondent No. 2 deserves to be enhanced. 7. The submissions of learned counsel for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, is two fold:-- (i) Appeal against enhancement of sentence is not covered by the provisions of Section 372 of the Code and, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. (ii) All the aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances were considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while awarding the sentence and, therefore, no interference is called for. 8. It was further submitted that it was a family dispute. Complainant admitted in her cross examination that respondent No. 2 always looked after her and her son. The complainant is a dentist by profession and it was respondent No. 2 who got the clinic opened out of his own expenses. The house was purchased for which loan was taken by respondent No. 2 and instalments were paid by him only. It was he who had removed the injured to hospital. There was not even a single complaint against him by the complainant till this episode. Respondent No. 2 is a respectable person and has already undergone sentence for a period of three years and has also deposited fine. He has the responsibility to look after his father. Moreover, learned Additional Sessions Judge has passed a reasoned order. As such, no interference is called for and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Reliance was placed on State GNCT of Delhi v. Mukesh, 2011 (3) JCC 1569 : 2011(3) CRIMES 111 and Shiv Govind v. State of MP, 1972 (3) SCC 399 . 9. So far as the State is concerned, the stand was one of noncommittal. State has not preferred any appeal for enhancement of sentence. Reliance was placed on State GNCT of Delhi v. Mukesh, 2011 (3) JCC 1569 : 2011(3) CRIMES 111 and Shiv Govind v. State of MP, 1972 (3) SCC 399 . 9. So far as the State is concerned, the stand was one of noncommittal. State has not preferred any appeal for enhancement of sentence. As such, it was left to the judicial discretion of the Court to pass any order as deemed appropriate. 10. Rebutting the submissions of learned counsel for respondent No. 2 regarding the maintainability of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Jagmohan Bhola v. Dllbagh Rai Bhola & Ors., 2011 (2) JCC 777 for submitting that an appeal preferred by the victim under Section 372 is akin to the State’s appeal for enhancement of sentence u/s 377 and, therefore, the same is maintainable. 11. I have given my considerable thoughts to the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 12. As regards first limb of argument of learned counsel for respondent No. 2 regarding the maintainability of the appeal for enhancement of sentence, various provisions have been provided for appeals under the Code. Prior to the introduction of the proviso to Section 372 a victim did hot have a right of appeal. At that point of time, the appeals could be filed either by the convict against an order of conviction under Section 374 or by the State for enhancement of sentence under Section 377 or by the State or the complainant, as the case may be, against acquittals under Section 378 of the Code. Section 372 of the Code provided that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Court or by any other law for the time being in force. By virtue of Act 5 of 2009 which came into force w.e.f. 31 sl December, 2009, a proviso was appended to Section 372 of the Code whereby a right was conferred on the victim to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or against imposition of inadequate compensation. 13. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, submitted that there are only three eventualities in which a victim can approach the Court by preferring, an appeal u/s 372 of the Code and the same are:- (i) Acquittal of the accused. (ii) Conviction for a lesser offence. (iii) Imposition of inadequate compensation. 14. It was submitted that no right has been conferred upon the victim to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence which right has been conferred upon the State u/s 377 of the Code. Admittedly, State has not come in appeal u/s 377 of the Code. 15. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether the victim has the right to approach the Court for enhancement of sentence. 16. In Jagmohan Bhola (supra) although the issue was whether leave to appeal was required to be obtained by a victim for preferring an appeal u/s 372 of the Code but the observations of Division Bench of this Court are material which are as under:-- “...The proviso to Section 372 is a special provision and it deals with three different situations, namely, appeals against acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence and inadequacy of compensation. The proviso to Section 372 is not limited to appeals against acquittals. All the appeals, whether they are against acquittal or conviction for a lesser offence or inadequate compensation, have been placed on the same footing. So, while a parallel is sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents between an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378, it cannot be forgotten that the appeal under the proviso to Section 372 is not limited to appeals against acquittals but also concerns itself with appeals against conviction for lesser offence which is akin to the State’s appeals for enhancement of sentence under Section 377 which, in turn, does not require any leave of the High Court to be taken. Similarly, there is no requirement under the statute for leave to be taken in respect of an appeal in respect of inadequate compensation. Similarly, there is no requirement under the statute for leave to be taken in respect of an appeal in respect of inadequate compensation. All these three circumstances have been placed on the same footing under the proviso to Section 372 and, therefore, no limitation with regard to the requirement of taking leave or special leave of the High Court before an appeal is presented to it by a victim can be read into the proviso to Section 372.”(emphasis supplied) 17. In view of these observations, an appeal filed by the complainant victim against conviction for enhancement of sentence being akin to the State’s appeal for enhancement of sentence u/s 377 is maintainable. 18. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the sentence imposed upon respondent No. 2 is so grossly inadequate that it calls for interference. 19. Needless to say, a sentence is a judgment on conviction of a crime. It is resorted to after a person is convicted of the offence. It is the ultimate goal of any justice-delivery system. Parliament, however, in providing for a hearing on sentence, as would appear from Subsection (2) of Section 235, Sub-section (2) of Section 248, Section 325 as also Sections 360 and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has laid down certain principles. The said provisions lay down the principle that the court in awarding the sentence must take into consideration a large number of relevant factors; sociological back drop of the accused being one of them. Although a wide discretion has been conferred upon the court, the same must be exercised judiciously. It would depend upon the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and his mental state. Age of the accused is also relevant. 20. In Sevaka Perumal and another v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1991) 3 SCC 471 , after referring to the decision in Mahesh v. State of M.P., (1987) 3 SCC 80 , the Court observed that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under serious threats. The Court further observed that if the courts do not protect the injured, the injured would then resort to private vengeance and, therefore, it is the duty of every Court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. 21. In Ravji alias Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 2 SCC 175 , the Court while giving emphasis on relevance of imposition of adequate sentencing in the social context observed thus:-- “10. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should “respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminal”. In our view, if for such heinous crimes the most deterrent punishment for wanton and brutal murders is not given, the case of deterrent punishment will lose its relevance.” 22. In State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa, 2000 (1) JCC (SC) 372 : AIR 2000 SC 1470 , a three-Judge Bench, while discussing about the purpose of imposition of adequate sentence, opined that protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence and the sentencing Courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. 23. In Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, 2012 (4) JCC 2515 : (2012) 8 SCC 734 , the Court, discussing about the sentencing policy, had to say this:-- “33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored.” 24. It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored.” 24. In Rattiram v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1485 , though in a different context, it is stated that:-- “64. ... the criminal jurisprudence, with the passage of time, has laid emphasis on victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a trial from the viewpoint of the criminal as well as the victim. Both are viewed in the social context. The view of the victim is given due regard and respect in certain countries.... it is the duty of the court to see that the victim’s right is protected.” 25. In Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 77 , it has been ruled that primarily it is to be borne in mind that sentencing for any offence has a social goal. Sentence is to be imposed regard being had to the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence has been committed. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based on the principle that the accused must realize that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in his life but also a concavity in the social fabric. The purpose of just punishment is designed so that the individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the collective do not suffer time and again for such crimes, for it serves as a deterrent. The Court observed, true it is, on certain occasions, opportunities may be granted to the convict for reforming himself but it is equally true that the principle of proportionality between an offence committed and the penalty imposed are to be kept in view. It has been further opined that while carrying out this complex exercise, it is obligatory on the part of the court to see the impact of the offence on the society as a whole and its ramifications on the immediate collective as well as its repercussions on the victim. 26. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Najab Khan and others, (2013) 9 SCC 509 was an appeal preferred by State against the order of High Court. 26. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Najab Khan and others, (2013) 9 SCC 509 was an appeal preferred by State against the order of High Court. While maintaining the conviction under Section 326 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, High Court had reduced the sentence to the period already undergone, i.e., 14 days. In that context, the Court, after referring to number of authorities and reiterating the principles, stated that in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. After so stating the sentence imposed by the High Court was set aside and that of the trial Judge, whereby he had convicted the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years, was restored. Similar principle has been assertively reiterated in Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar and others, (2013) 9 SCC 516 . 27. In Mukesh (supra), where the appeal was preferred by the State for enhancement of sentence, it was observed as follows:-- “12. Penology and sentencing in our country has remained an underdeveloped concept. In several jurisdictions across the world, sentencing choices are guided not only by the subjective “facts of the case” but a whole variety of factors, such as social investigation of the offender.- his family background, his social environment, behaviour, tendencies, etc. These are apart from the more “traditional” factors such as the history of previous offences or convictions, subjective facts pertaining to the offender, such as age. gender, gravity of the offence, circumstances leading to the offence, etc. More often than not, these are factored into a set of codified rules or regulations, which in some cases, prescribe great details, and even mandate separate hearings, where the judge is obliged to consider evidence presented in that regard. Sadly, courts in this country do not have the benefit of such specialized assistance. More often than not, these are factored into a set of codified rules or regulations, which in some cases, prescribe great details, and even mandate separate hearings, where the judge is obliged to consider evidence presented in that regard. Sadly, courts in this country do not have the benefit of such specialized assistance. As a result, courts have to fall back on judicially evolved standards and ad-hoc notions of penology and theories while exercising discretion in relation to offences where sentencing choices span a wide spectrum of penalties and prison terms. Here, the courts have to strike a balance between the need to impose an “adequate” sentence even while keeping in mind that the choice has to ultimately sub serve a larger public purpose, and not be one merely given for the ritualistic satisfaction of notions like public justice. An offender found to have committed a crime has to suffer conviction, and also a punishment. However, if sentencing choices are dominated by notions like popular justice or popularity demanded sentences or punishments, it is ultimately the cause of justice, and rule of law which suffers. A French philosopher and mystic (Simone Weil (1909-43), in her “Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations) said that: “Whenever a human being, through the commission of a crime, has become exiled from good, he needs to be reintegrated with it through suffering. The suffering should he inflicted with the ‘aim of bringing the soul to recognize freely some day that its infliction was just.” 28. In Shlv Govind (supra) while commenting upon the powers of the High Court to enhance sentence imposed 17 the Trial Court, Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision rendered in Bed Raj v. State of UP, AIR 1955 SC 778 where it was observed at pages 588 and 589:-- “A question of a sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate court should not interfere to the detriment of an accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment; See for example the observations in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 S.C.R. 146, 156 and Nar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1955(1) S.C.R. 238 , 241. In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called for when it is manifestly inadequate. In our opinion, the lease principles have not been observed. It is impossible to hold in the circumstances described that the Sessions Judge did not impose a substantial sentence, and no adequate reason has been assigned by the learned High Court Judges for considering the sentence manifestly inadequate. In the circumstances bearing all the considerations of this case in mind, we are of opinion that the appeal (which is limited to the question of sentence) should be allowed and that the sentence imposed by the High Court should be set aside and that of the Sessions Court restored”. 29. In view of the aforesaid principles, it is required to be seen whether the sentence imposed upon respondent No. 2 by learned Additional Sessions Judge is so grossly inadequate so as to call for interference. The aggravating circumstances emphasised by learned counsel for the appellant are:-- (i) The appellant and respondent No. 2 got married about 10 years back from the date of incident which took place on 6th April, 2008. Out of the wedlock, one son was born. On the fateful day, respondent No. 2 quarrelled with the complainant, took out a bottle of ‘All out’ and threw on her left eye. Thereafter, he picked up a kitchen knife and stabbed in her stomach with the result, her small intestine came out. She was profusely bleeding. At the time of inflicting injury, he threatened her to kill in case she informs the police. She had to be operated upon and remained hospitalized for a period of 15 days. Respondent No. 2 himself is a doctor by profession and, therefore, was well aware of the consequences of stabbing near abdomen and in fact intended to commit her murder. (ii) During the course of investigation, he tried to tamper with the MLC of complainant by mentioning the injury as simple which reflects that even alter committing such a serious crime, he was not remorseful. 30. The mitigating circumstances relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No. 2 are:-- (i) Complainant was a dentist and it was accused who provided all the finances for opening her dental clinic at B-3/89, Sector 11, Rohini. (ii) After marriage, the parties lived at Pitampura. 30. The mitigating circumstances relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No. 2 are:-- (i) Complainant was a dentist and it was accused who provided all the finances for opening her dental clinic at B-3/89, Sector 11, Rohini. (ii) After marriage, the parties lived at Pitampura. Thereafter they shifted to a rental accommodation and then Flat No. 360, SFS, Sector 11, Rohini was purchased admittedly by respondent No. 2 who took the loan for purchase of the flat and instalments were also paid by him through his salary account. (iii) Respondent No. 2 used to pay all the expenditure of the house including rent. (iv) Although it was alleged by the complainant that accused used to beat her, however, no complaint was made by her to any of the authorities. (v) Complainant used to attend social functions and social gatherings along with the accused and accused used to look after the child well. (vi) The dental clinic was closed and accused used to bear all expenses. (vii) Accused got the complainant admitted in hospital. (viii) Accused/respondent No. 2 is regularly paying a sum of Rs. 10,000-per month as maintenance towards child. 31. Learned Additional Sessions Judge besides relying on the aforesaid circumstances also considered the fact that the allegations of the complainant regarding subjecting her to cruelty or harassment by the accused were not substantiated with the result he was acquitted u/s 498A IPC. The antecedents of the accused were clean. He remained in custody for about 4 months and 12 days. 32. Learned Additional Sessions Judge also relied upon following judgments in support of his reasoning:-- (i) Kishan Lal and Anr. v. State of Delhi and Sunder @ Bobby v. State, Crl. Appeal 226/2004 and Crl. Appeal 265/2004. decided on 30th April, 2012 where while convicting the accused for offence u/s 307/34IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo RI for a period of three years and fine of Rs. 5000/- is default to undergo SI for six months. The substantive sentence awarded to them was reduced to the period already undergo while enhancing the sentence. (ii) Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Crl. A. No. 1626/2008 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 48/2008) decided on 17th October, 2008, where also the sentence of three years RI was reduced to the period already undergone. (iii) Robil Shah & Ors. (ii) Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Crl. A. No. 1626/2008 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 48/2008) decided on 17th October, 2008, where also the sentence of three years RI was reduced to the period already undergone. (iii) Robil Shah & Ors. v. State, 2005 Cri.L.J. 2630 where the main accused stabbed the injured with knife on his stomach and hit while others inflicted lathi injuries to him. Injured remained hospitalized for 13 days. Trial Court sentenced the accused to three years RI and fine of Rs. 500/- each. High Court in appeal did not interfere with the order. (iv) Karamjlt Singh v. State of Punjab, Crl. A. Nos. 958 and 959 of 2004 (SC), the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant u/s 307 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1500/- in default of payment of fine to further RI for one year. High Court reduced the sentence from three years to one year but enhanced the fine of Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 15000/-. Supreme Court did not interfere with the order. (v) Rajendra Harakchand Bhandari & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2011 Cri. L.J. 2891 where Hon’ble Supreme Court reduced the substantive sentence to the period already undergone as the appellant had already undergone the sentence of more than 21½ years. 33. The Court took into consideration all the facts and circumstances appearing in the case. It also considered the offender’s age as well his previous (lack of) record. The respondent remained as undertrial prisoner for 4-1/2 months. After impugned judgment was delivered, he was incarcerated and having completed his sentence, was set free. Neither the appellant nor State dispute that the factors cited by the Trial court when it chose to impose sentence that it did, actually existed. As observed in Mukesh (supra), Shiv Govind (supra) and Ravindra Tukaram Hiwate v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 253 , interference of the appellate Court on the quantum of sentence should be rare and only -in exceptional cases. Appellate Court would exercise and interfere with sentencing discretion of the Trial Court in a given case where the “inadequacy” of sentence is gross or glaring or shocks the Court’s conscience. Appellate Court would exercise and interfere with sentencing discretion of the Trial Court in a given case where the “inadequacy” of sentence is gross or glaring or shocks the Court’s conscience. Observations in Kashiram’s case (supra) relied upon by counsel for complainant regarding inadequacy of sentence came in view of the factual scenario of that case where despite serious allegations of chopping of the leg from the body and injuries were opined to be grievous in nature, High Court reduced the punishment to the period already undergone which ranged from as less as 4 months to 2 years. Under these circumstances, while observing that the punishment to be awarded to a crime must not be irrelevant but it should confirm to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, sentence imposed by High Court was set aside and that of Trial Court restored. 34. Things are entirely different in the instant case. After considering all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and various pronouncements of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, a reasoned order was passed which does not warrant interference. 35. The only question which remains to be considered whether the appellant is entitled to compensation u/s 357 of the Code over and above the compensation awarded to her out of the fine imposed upon respondent No. 2. 36. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 contained a provision for restitution in the form of Section 545, which stated in sub-clause 1(b) that the Court may direct “payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence when substantial compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court”. 37. The Law Commission of India in its 41st Report submitted in 1969 discussed Section 545 of the Cr. P.C. of 1898 extensively and stated as follows: “46.12. Under clause (b) of sub-sections (1) of Section 545, the Court may direct “payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence when substantial compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court.” The significance of the requirement that compensation should be recoverable in a Civil Court is that the act which constitutes the offence in question should also be a tort. The word “substantial” appears to have been used to exclude cases where only nominal damages would be recoverable. We think it is hardly necessary to emphasise this aspect, since in any event it is purely within the discretion of the Criminal Courts to order or not to order payment of compensation, and in practice, they are not particularly liberal in utilizing this provision. We propose to omit the word “substantial” from the clause.” 38. On the basis of the recommendations made by the Law Commission in the above report, the Government of India introduced the Criminal Procedure Code Bill, 1970, which aimed at revising Section 545 and introducing it in the form of Section 357 as it reads today. The Statement of Objects and Reasons underlying the Bill was as follows: “Clause 365 [now s.357] which corresponds to section 545 makes provision for payment of compensation to victims of crimes. At present such compensation can be ordered only when the Court imposes a fine the amount is limited to the amount of fine. Under the new provision, compensation can be awarded irrespective of whether the offence is punishable with fine and fine is actually imposed, but such compensation can be ordered only if the accused is convicted. The compensation should be payable for any loss or injury whether physical or pecuniary and the Court shall have due regard to the nature of injury, the manner of inflicting the same, the capacity of the accused to pay and other relevant factors.” 39. The Cr. P.C. of 1973 which incorporated the changes proposed in the said Bill of 1970 states in its Objects and Reasons that s.357 was “intended to provide relief to the proper-sections of the community” and that the amended Cr. PC empowered the Court to order payment of compensation by the accused to the victims of crimes “to a larger extent” than was previously permissible under the Code. The changes brought about by the introduction of s.357 were as follows: “(i) The word “substantial” was excluded. (ii) A new sub-section (3) was added which provides for payment of compensation even in cases where the fine does not form part of the sentence imposed. (iii) Sub-section (4) was introduced which states that an order awarding compensation may be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision.” 40. (iii) Sub-section (4) was introduced which states that an order awarding compensation may be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision.” 40. The amendments to the Cr. P.C. brought about in 2008 focused heavily on the rights of victims in a criminal trial, particularly in trials relating to sexual offences. Though the 2008 amendments left Section 357 unchanged, they introduced Section 357A under which the Court is empowered to direct the State to pay compensation to the victim in such cases where “the compensation awarded under Section 357 is not adequate for such rehabilitation, or where the case ends in acquittal or discharge and the victim has to be rehabilitated.” Under this provision, even if the accused is not tried but the victim needs to be rehabilitated, the victim may request the State or District Legal Services Authority to award him/her compensation. This provision was introduced due to the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its 152nd and 154th Reports in 1994 and 1996 respectively. 41. In Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2127 , it was observed that Section 357 of the Cr. P.C. is an important provision but Courts have seldom-invoked it. It empowers the Court to award compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to conviction, the Court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to the victim who has suffered by the action of the accused. This power of Courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system and, therefore, it was recommended to all Courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. 42. In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770 ; Mohd. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system and, therefore, it was recommended to all Courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. 42. In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770 ; Mohd. Haroon v. UOI, (2014) 5 SCC 252 ; Laxmi v. UOI, (2014) 4 SCC 427 ; Abdul Rashid v. State of Odisha & Ors., (2014) 1 ILR Cri. LJ 202 and Suresh v. State of Haryana, 2015 (1) JCC 457 ; 2015 (1) RCR (Criminal) 148, it was impressed upon that the provisions incorporated under Section 357 and 357A of the Code should be resorted to while awarding sentence. 43. Keeping in view the fact that respondent No. -2 himself being a doctor stabbed on the vital part of the body of complainant, with the result she had to be operated upon and had to remain hospitalized for a number of days, it is a fit case where appellant is entitled for compensation. As such, in addition to the compensation awarded to the injured, out of fine of Rs. 1 lac, a further sum of Rs. 1,50,000- is awarded as compensation, which be paid by respondent No. 2 within a period of six weeks from today by way of demand draft, failing which, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four, months (vide K.A. Abbas H.S.A, versus Sabu Josepn and another, 2010 (3) JCC [NI] 256 : 2010 (6) SCC 23). 44. The appeals stands disposed of accordingly. Trial Court record along with the copy of the judgment be sent back.