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Uttarakhand High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 512 (UTT)

Rajesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand

2015-10-27

U.C.DHYANI, V.K.BIST

body2015
JUDGMENT : The appellants, hereinabove denoted, have preferred three writ petitions, which were decided by the learned Single Judge vide common judgment and order dated 26.11.2014, whereby the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1132 of 2007 and Writ Petition (M/S) No.1129 of 2007 were dismissed and the Writ Petition (M/S) No.1128 of 2007 was allowed. Aggrieved against the impugned order dated 26.11.2014, whereby the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1132 of 2007 and Writ Petition (M/S) No.1129 of 2007 were dismissed on the ground of maintainability, present Special Appeals have been preferred by the appellants. 2. Learned Single Judge, while dismissing the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1132 of 2007 and Writ Petition (M/S) No.1129 of 2007, gave the following reasons: (a) Appellants/petitioners purchased the land in question on 08.02.2006 after gazette notification dated 07.02.2006 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’), therefore, the appellants have no locus to challenge the validity of the land acquisition proceedings. (b) The appellants had purchased the land in question on the following day of Section 4 gazette notification, therefore, they are not entitled for any relief in pursuance to present acquisition proceedings treating the date of gazette notification to be 07.02.2006 (final date). 3. Therefore, the following points for determination arise in the present Special Appeals: (i) Whether the acquisition of land would lapse in view of Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2013’)? (ii) Whether final date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 would be 21.02.2006? (iii) Whether the appellants can be treated as subsequent purchasers when they purchased the disputed land on 08.02.2006 prior to publication of Section 4 notification in local newspaper? 4. The following points may be noted here: (a) Award in the present case was passed on 02.09.2006 prior to commencement of the Act of 2013. (b) Award was passed more than 5 years ago from commencement of the Act of 2013. (c) The physical possession of the land in dispute was not taken prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, but the same was taken on 18.01.2015, after the dismissal of the writ petitions. (b) Award was passed more than 5 years ago from commencement of the Act of 2013. (c) The physical possession of the land in dispute was not taken prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, but the same was taken on 18.01.2015, after the dismissal of the writ petitions. (d) No compensation has been paid nor deposited in the account of the appellants or their predecessors. 5. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants contended that, as per Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, if an award was passed 5 years ago from the date of applicability of the Act of 2013 and till date possession has not been handed over, then said proceedings would lapse. According to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants, both the conditions have been fulfilled in the instant case and, therefore, land acquisition proceedings have been lapsed. He further contended that in original Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, there was no exclusion clause for non-computation of the period of stay order for the purpose of counting 5 years period; therefore, various High Courts gave judgments to the effect that the acquisition proceedings would lapse. Despite the fact that proceedings were stayed, the Central Government, in order to overcome this situation, decided to amend Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 alongwith certain other amendments. Therefore, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 was passed, which was applicable from 01.01.2015. Thereafter, the second Ordinance was passed, which was again lapsed. (Subsequent thereto, the third Ordinance was passed, but in the absence of replacing Act, the same was allowed to be lapsed). After the existing proviso, Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 was inserted in the Act of 2013 as follows: “Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this Sub-Section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any Court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a Court or in any account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded.” 6. The purpose of aforesaid amendment carried out in the Act of 2013 is that the litigant cannot take benefit of any stay order in computing period of 5 years. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellants cannot take benefit of the period during which stay order was operative. After deducting the period of stay order, the award in the instant case has been passed within 5 years and, therefore, the proceedings under the Act of 1894 would not lapse. 8. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants contended that similar controversy regarding application of Ordinance in pending judicial proceedings has been determined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.4823 of 2011, titled as “M/s Radiance Fincap Pvt. Ltd. & others Vs. Union of India”, in which the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the rights conferred to the landholders/owners of the acquired land under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 are the statutory rights and, therefore, the said rights cannot be taken away by an Ordinance by inserting proviso to the Sub-Section without giving retrospective effect to the same. The Ordinance is prospective in nature and, therefore, it cannot be applied to those cases in which proceedings were decided by the Writ Court prior to the amendment. The Hon’ble Apex Court, therefore, quashed the acquisition proceedings. 9. It is, therefore, the submission of the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants that the Ordinances, being prospective in nature, have no bearing upon the present controversy because the rights of the parties, which are substantive in nature, have to be decided in the light of un-amended provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and, therefore, the present Special Appeals are liable to be allowed. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellants also relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Civil Appeal No.2592 of 2015, titled as “Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others Vs. Jagjit Singh and others” decided on 27.02.2015, Civil Appeal No.2464 of 2015, titled as “Bathinda Development Authority Vs. Iqbal Singh and others” decided on 26.02.2015, Civil Appeal No.7424 of 2013, titled as “Smt. Karnail Kaur and others Vs. State of Punjab and others” decided on 22.01.2015, Civil Appeal No.5054 of 2008, titled as “M/s Competent Automobiles Company Ltd. Vs. Jagjit Singh and others” decided on 27.02.2015, Civil Appeal No.2464 of 2015, titled as “Bathinda Development Authority Vs. Iqbal Singh and others” decided on 26.02.2015, Civil Appeal No.7424 of 2013, titled as “Smt. Karnail Kaur and others Vs. State of Punjab and others” decided on 22.01.2015, Civil Appeal No.5054 of 2008, titled as “M/s Competent Automobiles Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others” decided on 26.02.2015, Civil Appeal No.3872 of 2010, titled as “Ram Kishan and others Vs. State of Haryana and others” decided on 27.11.2014 and Civil Appeal No.8785 of 2013, titled as “Rajiv Chowdhrie HUF Vs. Union of India” decided on 10.12.2014 to emphasize that the land acquisition proceedings would lapse and the Ordinances will have no bearing upon the case of the appellants. It would be pertinent to mention herein that although the appellants challenged the validity of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, but they did not press the same before the Writ Court. 10. So far as the point nos. (ii) & (iii) for determination, as framed above, are concerned, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants contended that the last date of publication is to be treated as the last date of notification, not the date of gazette notification, therefore, the first ground taken by the learned Single Judge, for the purpose of dismissing the writ petitions, was not tenable. The appellants purchased the land in dispute prior to publication of Section 4 gazette notification in local newspaper, inasmuch as, the publication was made on 21.02.2006; while the appellants purchased the land in dispute on 08.02.2006. The judgments reported in SCC 2013 (3) Apex Court Decisions 572 “V.K.M. Katha Vs. State of Haryana”, AIR 1993 Madras 1 (F.B.) “Seethalakshmi Ammal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu”, AIR 1996 Kerala 130 “M.Syed Mohammed Shafi Vs. State of Kerala”, AIR 2003 S.C. 3817 “Bihar State Housing Board Vs. State of Bihar” and AIR 2007 S.C. 1675 “Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) Vs. State of U.P.” were submitted in support of such contention. Where any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then that act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefore in the Act, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants concluded. 11. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent nos. State of U.P.” were submitted in support of such contention. Where any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, then that act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefore in the Act, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants concluded. 11. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent nos. 3 & 5, on the other hand, submitted that a plea on behalf of the appellants that the land acquisition proceedings would lapse in view of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 is contrary to the prayers made in the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1132 of 2007 and Writ Petition (M/S) No.1129 of 2007, in which the vires and constitutionality of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 was challenged. The petitioners are estopped from raising a plea of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 in the instant Special Appeals. 12. According to the respondents, the decisions of M/s Radiance Fincap Pvt. Ltd. (SUPRA) and Smt. Karnail Kaur and others (SUPRA) are not applicable to the instant case. The notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published on 07.02.2006. Notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 19.07.2006. The award was passed by S.L.A.O., Udham Singh Nagar on 02.09.2006. The petitioners (appellants herein) had full knowledge of the award dated 02.09.2006, which is evident from the fact that on 30.10.2006, the counsel for the applicant made a statement that in pursuance of notification dated 29.10.2006, which was published in a daily newspaper, respondents were taking possession of the property in question. On 30.10.2006, the Hon’ble Court directed that the petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the property in dispute. Notification dated 29.01.2006 was passed under Section 12 (2) of the Act of 1894. The same is passed only after an award is published. The petitioners/ appellants were well aware of the award dated 02.09.2006. Since 2006 till 2014, the appellants never challenged the award dated 02.09.2006 passed by the S.L.A.O., Udham Singh Nagar. 13. Notification dated 29.01.2006 was passed under Section 12 (2) of the Act of 1894. The same is passed only after an award is published. The petitioners/ appellants were well aware of the award dated 02.09.2006. Since 2006 till 2014, the appellants never challenged the award dated 02.09.2006 passed by the S.L.A.O., Udham Singh Nagar. 13. The Amending Ordinance No.9 of 2014 came into force on 01.01.2015, which speaks as below: “Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a court or in any account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded.” The said Ordinance was promulgated again on 03.04.2015 and 30.05.2015. 14. The Hon’ble Court had stayed the dispossession of the petitioners vide order dated 30.10.2006 after publication of the award and the interim order continued up till November, 2014. The compensation for the land is still lying in the Treasury. The same was not paid to the petitioners/appellants, inasmuch as, the dispossession was stayed by the Hon’ble Court and, therefore, all the consequential proceedings were stayed. The Collector, Udham Singh Nagar could not take possession of the property in question under Section 16 of the Act of 1894 because of interim order dated 30.10.2006. Therefore, the period from 30.10.2006 (i.e. date of stay of dispossession) upto 26.11.2014 (i.e. when the interim stay on dispossession was vacated) would be excluded in determining the period of 5 years under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The learned Senior Advocate for the respondents would, therefore, emphasize that in view of the amendment to Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, the land acquisition proceedings would not lapse. The aforesaid ground was never raised by the petitioners during the pendency of the writ petitions. 15. On 20.01.2015, the appellants took the ground that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. On 01.01.2015, proviso to Section 24 came into force and, therefore, the appellants cannot avail the benefit of Section 24 (2), as it stood prior to amendment by means of an Ordinance. 16. 15. On 20.01.2015, the appellants took the ground that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. On 01.01.2015, proviso to Section 24 came into force and, therefore, the appellants cannot avail the benefit of Section 24 (2), as it stood prior to amendment by means of an Ordinance. 16. Smt. Karnail Kaur’s case (SUPRA) would not be applicable to the instant case, inasmuch as, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down that the amendment by means of Ordinance would not be applicable under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013, in case the plea was taken prior to the date of amendment to Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. The Ordinance, insofar as insertion to proviso to Section 24 (2), by way of amendment, is prospective. According to the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, this clearly means that in case the plea of lapse of proceedings was taken subsequent to the amendment, then the amendment would be applicable and the proviso would come into play. In the instant case, the plea of Section 24 (2) was taken for the first time on 20.01.2015; whereas Section 24 (2) stood amended on 01.01.2015. The period, during which proceedings for acquisition of land were stayed, was therefore to be excluded. 17. As regards points no. (ii) & (iii) for determination are concerned, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents quoted a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of “Mohan Singh and others Vs. International Airport Authority”, reported in 1997 SCC Vol. 9 page 132, that although compliance with publication of three steps, as required under Section 4(1), is mandatory, but when the appropriate government invokes the urgency clause under Section 17 (4), then it is not mandatory to publish the notification under Section 4 (1) in the newspapers. Since in the instant case, notification under Section 4 was issued alongwith notification under Section 17 (4) on 07.02.2006, therefore, the notification would be said to be issued on 07.02.2006 itself. As regards the rights of subsequent purchaser after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents submitted that the gazette notification under Section 4 was published on 07.02.2006. Admittedly, the land in question was purchased on 08.02.2006. In a decision of “V. Chandra Shekharan and another Vs. As regards the rights of subsequent purchaser after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents submitted that the gazette notification under Section 4 was published on 07.02.2006. Admittedly, the land in question was purchased on 08.02.2006. In a decision of “V. Chandra Shekharan and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others”, reported in SCC 2012 (12) 133, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down that a person, who purchases land subsequent to issuance of Section 4 notification, is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground. The Hon’ble Apex Court has used the word ‘issued’ and not ‘published’ in relation to notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. Learned Single Judge, in the judgment under challenge, has also given a finding that the appellants were aware of the acquisition proceedings. On 25.05.2001, the erstwhile owner of the land wrote to Secretary, Mandi Samiti, Gadarpur that they were willing to sell their land. On 29.08.2001, the Land Acquisition Committee inspected the spot. On 07.12.2001, the Secretary, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti wrote to the erstwhile owners regarding rates. On 22.12.2001, the owners quoted their rates to Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti. The petitioners/ appellants purchased the land adjacent to the present piece of land on 09.12.2005. An application for mutation was dismissed on the ground that the acquisition proceedings of the land were in progress. The said order was passed in January, 2006 by Tehsildar, Gadarpur. The appellants were, therefore, well aware of the fact that acquisition proceedings were going on and Section 4 notification has already been issued. Purely for the sake of obtaining material gains, they purchased the land. The decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Teeka Ram Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh”, reported in 2009 10 SCC 689 , clearly reiterates the doctrine laid down in the case of V. Chandra Shekheran, in which the words ‘issuance of Section 4 notification’ and not ‘publication of Section 4 notification’ are used. ‘Establishment of Mandi is in supreme public interest’ was also highlighted by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents. 18. In order to attract Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the following ingredients must be satisfied. ‘Establishment of Mandi is in supreme public interest’ was also highlighted by the learned Senior Advocate for the respondents. 18. In order to attract Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the following ingredients must be satisfied. (i) An award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 must have been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013. (ii) Physical possession of the land has not been taken; or (iii) The compensation has not been paid. 19. If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the Act of 2013. 20. In the instant case, the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published on 07.02.2006, notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 19.07.2006, the award was passed by S.L.A.O., Udham Singh Nagar on 02.09.2006. Interim stay was granted on dispossession on 30.10.2006, interim stay of dispossession was vacated on 26.11.2014 and thereafter, the possession of the said land was taken by the respondents. The period from 30.10.2006 to 26.11.2014 would, therefore, be excluded in determining the period of five years under Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. Since the physical possession has already been taken by the respondents, therefore, land acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question shall not be deemed to have lapsed, notwithstanding the fact that the deposit was made in Treasury. 21. It is on account of this reason that the appellants shall not be entitled to any benefit of the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Civil Appeal No.2592 of 2015, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others Vs. Jagjit Singh and others, the acquisition would, therefore, not lapse for the reason that the physical possession of the land has already been taken by the respondents. Peculiarity of this fact, distinguishes the instant case from the facts of other cases. 22. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants are subsequent purchasers of the land. They purchased the land after notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was made. Peculiarity of this fact, distinguishes the instant case from the facts of other cases. 22. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants are subsequent purchasers of the land. They purchased the land after notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was made. When the appellants approached Tehsildar for mutation, they were told that the land was already acquired. The appellants would, therefore, not be entitled to argue that Section 4 notification was not published as per the requirement of law. The distinguishing features are that the appellants were not the owners when Section 4 notification was issued and the respondents are in actual physical possession of the land in question. 23. It will be apt to reproduce herein below paragraph nos. 8, 9, 10 & 11 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satyendra Prasad Jain and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in 1987 ALL.L.J.965, for convenience: “8. The question herein is whether the State was justified in dispensing the requirements of enquiry contemplated under S. 5-A. It could be taken judicial notice of, that in regard to agricultural produce there were no proper market facilities. There were innumerable charges, levies and exactions which the agriculturist were required to pay without having any say in the proper utilization of the amount paid by them. The Government of India and the various committees and commissions appointed to study the condition of agricultural markets in the country had stressed the need to provide proper market yards for the sale and purchase of agricultural produce. The Planning Commission also stressed long ago in this regard. The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 has been enacted to provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of agricultural produce and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets therefore, in Uttar Pradesh. The Proposed construction of market and market yard by the Mandi Samiti is, therefore, a step forward to ameliorate the conditions of producers with due representation to them in the Mandi Samities for the fair settlement of disputes relating to their transactions. It is a long felt need which is said to have been included in the planned Development Scheme. 9. It is a long felt need which is said to have been included in the planned Development Scheme. 9. As stated in Para 17 of the counter affidavit the land in dispute has been found to be most suitable for construction of the market yard and it was selected by the Committee consisting of very senior officers of the Government. There is also a report by the Collector regarding the urgency in acquiring the land in question. The Government was informed about the shortage of godowns and insufficiency of the existing market yards which are almost in a shabby state. It is stated and indeed not disputed, before us that the existing market yard was constructed about a century ago and it has outlived its utility and unable to cope with the growing need of the agriculturists. 10. In Para 23 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated that in the peak hours there is not even place to stand what to say of parking of the vehicles etc. It is impossible to have access to the market yard on account of arrival of the goods and rush of the people and it has rather rendered the task impossible for the Mandi Samiti to supervise the sale and purchase. There are no platforms. There are no places for grading and cleaning the produce and get the produce sold through auction. 11. Looking at these conditions it cannot be said that there is no urgency in the matter of acquiring the land in question. It is an acknowledged fact that the farmers need protection against the exploiters. They need remunerative price for their produce. They should be provided with all facilities for sale of their produce. The proper market yard, is, therefore, indispensable for them. We should not look leisurely at everything. The need of the farmers requires everybody’s concern and attention. Their need is no less urgent than housing accommodation. The Supreme Court in a recent decision pertaining to the case of Meerut Development Authority, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi, has observed that acquisition proceedings for the housing scheme could be taken by dispensing with the compliance of S. 5-A of the Act. It was observed at page 2028:- “The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. It was observed at page 2028:- “The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke S. 17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance of S. 5-A of the Act.” 24. V. Chandra Shekharan’s case (SUPRA) has laid down preposition of law regarding the rights of the subsequent purchaser after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. To sum up, the three questions posed in paragraph no.3 of the judgment are answered as below: (i) The land acquisition would not lapse in the instant case. (ii) In the instant case, notification under Section 4 was issued alongwith notification under Section 17 (4) on 07.02.2006. Therefore, in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Singh and others Vs. International Airport Authority, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 132 , the notification would be said to have been issued on 07.02.2006. (iii) The appellants shall be treated as subsequent purchasers, as they purchased the land after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 25. Lastly, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of The Working Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. Vs. The State of Punjab & others, decided on 12.10.2015, was cited by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellants to emphasize that where the compensation was not tendered to the appellant but was deposited in the Treasury, it will be non-compliance of the Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 and also prayed that the constructions raised on behalf of the respondents during the pendency of present Special Appeals be directed to be demolished and the possession be restored to the appellants. The decision of The Working Friends Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. (SUPRA) is distinguished from the facts of the instant case because of the following reasons: (i) The appellants were not in possession of the aforesaid land and the respondents had already taken physical possession thereof. (ii) Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 was, therefore, not applicable and the land acquisition proceedings shall not be deemed to have lapsed. (ii) Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 was, therefore, not applicable and the land acquisition proceedings shall not be deemed to have lapsed. (iii) Period of grant of stay would be excluded retrospectively for computing period of five years referred to in Section 24 (2) of the Act. The Ordinance which purported to take away such an accrued right would have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent was clearly to give it retrospective effect. (iv) There is no doubt that the appellants are not in physical possession of the aforesaid land and it is more than clear that the respondents are in physical possession of the aforesaid land. 26. The learned Single Judge, therefore, committed no mistake in holding that the petitioners had no interest or title on the property on the date Section 4 notification issued. Learned Single Judge, therefore, dismissed the Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1132 of 2007 and Writ Petition (M/S) No.1129 of 2007 being not maintainable. The learned Single Judge, however, was of the view that the petitioners in Writ Petition (M/S) No.1128 of 2007 are required to be heard in the interest of fair play and natural justice, as the only question before the Writ Court was that the petitioners were liable to be heard before the said acquisition. 27. This Court has no reason to take a view different from what was taken by the learned Single Judge while delivering the judgment under challenge. 28. The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed.