JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal, J. This writ petition by the tenant is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.12.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Lucknow in Rent Appeal No.51 of 2002, whereby the appeal filed the opposite parties no.3 and 4 was allowed and the order dated 26.09.2012 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority in P.A. Case No.16 of 2011 was set aside. Learned appellate Court by allowing the rent appeal also allowed the application for release moved by the opposite parties no.3 and 4 under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 and the petitioner was directed to vacate the premises in his occupation within sixty days from the date of judgment. 2. The dispute relates to a shop situated on the ground floor of House No.215/445, Durga Bhawan, Naka Hindola, Lucknow, in which the petitioner is admittedly a tenant. According to opposite parties no.3 and 4, the petitioner was not paying rent of the shop in his occupation since last about ten years and a portion of the shop had also fallen down due to its old age. The petitioner-tenant had purchased two shops on the ground floor of House No.288/151Ka, Arya Nagar, Lucknow which is only 25 meters away from the shop in question. The aforesaid two shops were purchased by the petitioner-tenant in the year 1993 from Kaushaliya Devi and since then he has been carrying on his business in the said shops. The son of the opposite party no.4, namely, Balvinder Singh had a B.Com Degree and was aged 25 years, but he was still jobless and has no shop to start his own business. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 wanted to set up a new electronic business for Balvinder Singh but on account of non-availability of any accommodation, Balvinder Singh was still jobless and for this reason he was still unmarried. Since the petitioner-tenant had already purchased two shops and had also being carrying on business from the said shops, he had no need of the shop in question. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 also gave an undertaking that after the release of the shop, they will not let out the same to any person but will establish a new business for Balvinder Singh. They also expressed their willingness to pay two years' rent to the petitioner-tenant as compensation. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 also gave an undertaking that after the release of the shop, they will not let out the same to any person but will establish a new business for Balvinder Singh. They also expressed their willingness to pay two years' rent to the petitioner-tenant as compensation. With the aforesaid averments, the opposite parties no.3 and 4 made a prayer for release of the shop. 3. The petitioner-tenant while admitting his tenancy in respect of the shop in question, stated that the shop was previously owned by Smt. Kalawati Devi and late Shri Jhandumal was its tenant. After the death of Smt. Kalawati Devi in the year 1968, the opposite parties no.3 and 4 purchased the building including the shop in question in the year 1989 from the legal heirs of Smt Kalawati Devi. Late Shri Jhandumal was tenant in respect of a shop in question @ Rs.35/- per month and had also been paying rent to the opposite parties no.3 and 4. He died on 28.11.2002 and after his death his sons, namely, Suresh Chandra Agarwal, the petitioner himself, Shri Mukesh Agarwal and Smt. Maya Devi inherited the tenancy rights. The petitioner-tenant had been carrying on business from the shop in dispute while his two brothers, namely Suresh Chandra and Mukesh have been carrying on business from the shop which were purchased from Smt. Kaushaliya Devi in the year 1993. The petitioner-tenant also stated in his written statement that the opposite parties no.3 and 4 have always been trying to evict the petitioner in any way or the other and had stopped accepting the rent, therefore, the rent was deposited in the Court. They had filed a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment in the Court of Judge Small Causes, which was dismissed on 15.02.2011. With regard to Balvinder Singh, it was stated by the petitioner-tenant that Balvinder Singh was engaged in business and had been carrying on his business in the name of "M/s. Music CD Mahel" from the shop which is situated very near to the disputed shop. Apart from this, he was also running a "Max Cafe". It was further stated by the petitioner-tenant that Balvinder Singh was already married and it was absolutely wrong to say that he could not perform his marriage on account of his being jobless. Apart from this, he was also running a "Max Cafe". It was further stated by the petitioner-tenant that Balvinder Singh was already married and it was absolutely wrong to say that he could not perform his marriage on account of his being jobless. The petitioner-tenant further stated that except the shop in question, he had no other accommodation to either shift his business or establish a new business. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 had twelve shops in House No.215/445 and three shops in a building which belongs to Hanuman Mandir Trust. He had already got released seven shops from Smt. Gulab Devi by the Court and in all these seven shops, the opposite parties no.3 and 4 have been carrying on their business. It was also taken as a ground in the written statement that the opposite parties no.3 and 4 did not serve any statutory notice of six months as required under the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. 4. Both the parties led their evidence before the Prescribed Authority, who by the order dated 26.09.2012 dismissed the application on the ground that the opposite parties no.3 and 4 could not establish their bonafide need in respect of the shop in dispute and the release application was barred for want of six months mandatory notice. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of the release application, the opposite parties no.3 and 4 preferred rent appeal in the Court of District Judge, Lucknow and during the pendency of the appeal, they brought on record the copies of notice dated 03.06.2010 and its reply dated 15.07.2010. The learned appellate Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties came to the conclusion that by the notice dated 03.06.2010, the compliance of mandatory provisions of giving six months' notice had already been made and as such the release application could not have been dismissed for want of mandatory notice. With regard to the bonafide need of the opposite parties no.3 and 4, the learned appellate Court after relying upon various pronouncements of this Hon'ble Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded a finding that the tenant-petitioner had already been carrying on his business from the two shops which he purchased in the year 1993 and as such he had no need of the shop in dispute. With the aforesaid findings, the learned appellate court allowed the appeal and consequently allowed the release application giving sixty days time to the tenant-petitioner to vacate the shop in question. 6. I have heard Shri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Shesh Verma, who has argued on behalf of the opposite parties no.3 and 4. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the judgment and order of the appellate court on the ground that even by taking on record the copies of the notice dated 03.06.2010, the learned appellate Court should not have relied upon it because there was no pleading to that effect. He has drawn the attention of the Court towards the contents of the release application in Para-17 of which it was stated that a notice for vacating the shop was sent to the petitioner on 18.01.2011 which was refused by the petitioner and thereafter another notice was issued on 07.03.2011 which too was refused by the petitioner. The release application was moved on 28.03.2011 i.e. within six months from the date of issuance of first notice on 18.01.2011 and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority rightly held that since the release application was moved within six months of the notice, therefore, the release application was not maintainable. Learned counsel has further submitted that there is no pleading to the effect that any notice was ever issued on 03.06.2010 and as such the evidence with regard to the notice dated 03.06.2010 could not have been taken into consideration in the absence of pleading to that effect. It is a settled law that no evidence which is beyond pleadings, can be looked into by the Court. 8. Shri Shesh Verma, learned counsel for the opposite parties no.3 and 4 has submitted that a proper application for taking on record the copy of notice was moved before the appellate Court and the same was allowed on payment of Rs.700/- as cost. The petitioner's then counsel also received the cost and as such the order admitting additional evidence attained finality. The petitioner has not denied that any notice was not issued on 03.06.2010 because a reply to the said notice was also given by him on 15.07.2010. The petitioner's then counsel also received the cost and as such the order admitting additional evidence attained finality. The petitioner has not denied that any notice was not issued on 03.06.2010 because a reply to the said notice was also given by him on 15.07.2010. Thus, the release application was filed much beyond the period of six months and for this reason the learned appellate Court found that the release application was not barred for want of six months statutory notice. 9. So far as the notice is concerned, it is not disputed that a notice dated 03.06.2010 was issued by the landlord and the same was duly replied by the petitioner on 15.07.2010. Although there is no pleading with regard to the aforesaid notice dated 03.06.2010 but the same was admitted in evidence by the appellate Court and the order admitting additional evidence also became final. The said order was never challenged by the petitioner before any forum. Now the petitioner cannot raise this plea before this Court because by accepting costs he waived his right to challenge the order admitting additional evidence. Thus, I find no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned appellate court should not have taken into account the notice dated 03.06.2010 while hearing the rent appeal. 10. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Prescribed Authority had recorded a specific finding on the basis of evidence on record that Balvinder Singh for whose need the release application was moved, had been carrying on business in the name of "M/s. Music CD Mahel" in a shop situated on the ground floor and in front of Hanuman Mandir. The documentary evidence showing business of Balvinder Singh was also placed before the learned Prescribed Authority and on being satisfied that Balvinder Singh is not jobless, the learned Prescribed Authority dismissed the application for release. The learned Appellate Authority without going into the question as to whether Balvinder Singh was carrying on business or not, allowed the appeal and consequently allowed the release application merely on the ground that the petitioner was having alternative accommodation to carry on his business. Moreover, the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority has been reversed by the learned appellate Court without assigning any reason as to why the finding of the Prescribed Authority was not correct. Moreover, the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority has been reversed by the learned appellate Court without assigning any reason as to why the finding of the Prescribed Authority was not correct. Learned counsel for the petitioner has brought on record the copy of challan showing payment of Tin E-Tax as well as the receipt issued by the Commercial Tax Department, Lucknow showing payment of commercial tax to the Government. A perusal of these documents clearly indicates that a business under the name of M/s. Music CD Mahel is being carried on in building No.215/415, Durga Bhawan, Naka Hindola, Lucknow which is a proprietorship firm. The name of the person paying E-tax is shown as Balvinder Singh. Thus, it was clearly established from the documents brought on record before the learned Prescribed Authority that Balvinder Singh was carrying on a business and was also married. Therefore, the need established by the opposite parties no.3 and 4 landlords was not bonafide and genuine. It was not the case of the opposite parties-landlords that Balvinder Singh needed any additional accommodation to expand his business. The need set up by the landlords-opposite parties was that they wanted to establish Balvinder Singh in a new business which stood falsified by these documents. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of the Court towards the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties no.3 and 4 before this Hon'ble Court in Para-22 of which it was admitted by them that Balvinder Singh got his firm registered under the name of M/s. Music CD Mahel and they have also admitted the receipts showing Tin E-tax payment and commercial tax payment. However, their case was that in those receipts the income of the firm has been shown NIL. This goes to show that although an attempt was made by the opposite parties no.3 and 4 to set up a business for Balvinder Singh but he could not succeed. Learned counsel submits that after the admission of the opposite parties no.3 and 4 there remains no doubt that a firm is already registered in the name of Balvinder Singh and he has been paying commercial tax as well as the Tin Tax since 2004. It also goes to show that the opposite parties no.3 and 4 have concealed material facts in their release application and did not come before the court with clean hands. It also goes to show that the opposite parties no.3 and 4 have concealed material facts in their release application and did not come before the court with clean hands. The concealment of material facts by the opposite parties no.3 and 4 is such that their release application should have been dismissed on this score only. 11. The learned counsel for the landlords-opposite parties no.3 and 4 has submitted that it is not disputed that the petitioner-tenant purchased two shops in Arya Nagar and these two shops are only few meters away from the disputed shop. In fact, the petitioner has himself shifted his business in those shops and is occupying the shop in dispute only to get premium from the opposite parties no.3 and 4 for vacating the shop. It is clearly established from the evidence on record that the petitioner is in occupation of those two shops and as such his need if any for the shop in dispute has come to end. Learned appellate Court while taking into consideration the alternative accommodation available to the petitioner-tenant, has allowed the appeal and consequently allowed the release application directing him to vacate the shop in question. Learned counsel further submitted that the disputed shop is situated in the main Naka Hindola Market which is well known for electronic goods and every shop has a very high market value. This is the reason that the petitioner-tenant does not want to vacate the shop in dispute and wants to retain the same in any manner. Thus, if the comparative hardship of both the parties is compared, the hardship to the landlord would be much greater because Balvinder Singh has to establish himself in a new business while the petitioner-tenant already has sufficient accommodation to carry on business and is actually carrying on business from his own shop. Even if it is presumed that the opposite parties no.3 and 4 have several other shops, the tenant cannot dictate to his landlords as to which shop should be selected. It is the sweet will and convenience of the landlord to choose the shop of his own choice. It is settled law and the learned appellate court while relying upon the settled principles of law in this regard, has allowed the appeal. It is the sweet will and convenience of the landlord to choose the shop of his own choice. It is settled law and the learned appellate court while relying upon the settled principles of law in this regard, has allowed the appeal. It is also argued on behalf of the opposite parties that this Hon'ble Court while exercising writ jurisdiction cannot disturb the finding of the learned appellate court unless the findings is found to be perverse and without evidence. The scope of writ jurisdiction is very limited so far as the judicial orders are concerned. A writ of certiorari can be issued only if there is gross illegality in the judgment and order passed by the courts below or the judgment and order cause gross injustice to the other side. 12. I have heard rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned judgment and order. I find that the learned appellate court while discussing the need of the opposite parties no.3 and 4 has proceeded on the assumption that since the tenant-petitioner has got alternative accommodation, therefore, the need of the opposite parties no.3 and 4 is genuine. This approach adopted by the learned appellate court does not seem to be correct. In the matter of release under Section 21 of the Act, the landlord has to establish his bonafide need and if he is able to establish his bonafide need, the authority is under obligation to compare the hardship of both the parties and only after that a release application can be allowed. The Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority does not get jurisdiction to allow a release application unless it is found that the need of the landlords is bonafide and genuine. A perusal of the release application filed by the opposite parties no.3 and 4 clearly shows that the need set up by the opposite parties-landlords was in respect of Balvinder Singh, who was said to be jobless and unmarried. When the petitioner-tenant filed his written statement and brought the evidence on record with regard to his marriage and business then the landlords-opposite parties no.3 and 4 said that although the firm is registered in the name of Balvinder Singh but there is virtually no income from the firm. When the petitioner-tenant filed his written statement and brought the evidence on record with regard to his marriage and business then the landlords-opposite parties no.3 and 4 said that although the firm is registered in the name of Balvinder Singh but there is virtually no income from the firm. This is material concealment of fact on the part of the landlords and it is a settled law that if it is found that the landlord has not come to the Court with clean hands or has concealed material fact then it should be held that his need is not bonafide. The language used in Section 21 of the Act clearly indicates that the need of the landlord must be bonafide. The word "bonafide" used in Section 21 of the Act has a great importance which expects from the landlord to come before the Court with clean hands and not to conceal any material fact. In this case, the landlords-opposite parties no.3 and 4 have undoubtedly concealed the material fact that Balvinder Singh was already carrying on business under the name and style of M/s. Music CD Mahel which is a proprietorship firm. It is also not in dispute that the firm is carrying on business since 2004. The arguments put forwarded on behalf of the landlords-opposite parties that the firm has no income, cannot be believed. The receipts showing the income of the firm as NIL, appears to have been manipulated to evade commercial tax. If Balvinder Singh has already a shop in which there is a registered firm then there could be a need for additional accommodation but the need set up by the opposite parties-landlords saying that he was jobless cannot be taken as bonafide need. 13. A perusal of the impugned judgment of the learned appellate court indicates that the learned appellate court on the basis of various pronouncements came to the conclusion that a tenant cannot dictate the terms to his landlord and the petitioner-tenant had been carrying on business in another shop but the learned appellate court has nowhere recorded a finding that Balvinder Singh was jobless and the shop in dispute was needed for setting up of a new business for him. In the absence of such finding, the appellate court could not have allowed the appeal or the release application. In the absence of such finding, the appellate court could not have allowed the appeal or the release application. No reason has been indicated in the judgment as to how the finding arrived at by the Prescribed Authority was not correct and why those findings were being reversed. A tenant may have several shops but the release application of a landlord cannot be allowed only on the ground that the tenant has alternative accommodation unless the landlord proves beyond doubt that he has bonafide need of the accommodation sought to be released. The findings of the learned appellate court, therefore, suffer from errors of law for the simple reason that without coming to the conclusion that Balvinder Singh was not having any job and the opposite parties no.3 and 4 have bonafide and genuine need to set up Balvinder Singh in a new electronic business, the appellate Court could not have allowed the appeal and the release application. 14. In the case of Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad, 1981 (3) SCC 103 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the need of the landlords pleaded by him must not only exist on the date of filing of the release application but must subsist till the final order for release is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligation of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. 15. The appellate court in the present case has not taken into account the fact that after filing of the release application Balvinder Singh has married and has been carrying on business of proprietorship firm under the name of M/s. Music CD Mahel. The need of the opposite parties no.3 and 4 landlords has been found to be bonafide only on the ground that the tenant has alternative accommodation. The need of the opposite parties no.3 and 4 landlords has been found to be bonafide only on the ground that the tenant has alternative accommodation. This approach adopted by the learned appellate court is not correct. Therefore, in this case, it appears just and proper that the judgment and order passed by the learned appellate court be set aside and the matter be remanded back to the Court to rehear the appeal in the light of the observations made above. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 19.12.2013 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.8, Lucknow is set aside. The matter is sent back to the appellate court again with a direction to restore the appeal at its original number and decide the appeal considering the need of the landlords in the light of the observations made hereinabove. It will be open for the parties to bring on record the subsequent developments, if any, before the appellate court by way of additional evidence. 17. No order as to costs.