JUDGMENT : Alok Sharma, J. This petition stating to be one under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed against the order dated 15-1-2015 passed by the Newly Constituted Rent Tribunal Jaipur (hereinafter ‘the Tribunal') dismissing the petitioner-non-applicant-tenant's (hereinafter ‘the tenant') application seeking time to vacate the tenanted premises purportedly as a right under Section 15(8) of the Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter ‘the 2001 Act'). 2. The facts of the case are that the respondent-applicant-landlord's (hereinafter ‘the landlord') eviction petition under Section 9 of the 2001 Act was allowed by the Tribunal vide judgment dated 17-8-2011 and certificate of possession of the tenanted premises had been issued in favour of the landlord. Appeal at the instance of the tenant before the Appellate Rent Tribunal was dismissed vide judgment dated 29-11-2014. Thereafter the tenant moved an application before the Tribunal under Section 151 CPC read with Section 113 and 114 seeking extension of time to vacate the tenanted premises or otherwise to state a case and refer it to the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur bench on the question as to whether a tenant having filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against his eviction and having failed was entitled to six months time from the Appellate Tribunal's judgment to vacate the tenanted premises. 3. Counsel for the tenant (petitioner before this court) has submitted that Section 15(8) of the 2001 Act provides that a certificate of possession shall not be executable for a period of three months from the date of decision in case of residential premises and six months from the date of the judgment of the Rent Tribunal in respect of premises rented for commercial purposes. It has been submitted that the judgment dated 17- 8-2011 passed by the Tribunal in respect of commercial premises merged in the judgment of dismissal of appeal on 29-11-2014, therefore the period of six months under Section 15(8) of 2001 Act should be counted from the date of 29-11-2014 on the basis of the doctrine of merger. 4. Mr. It has been submitted that the judgment dated 17- 8-2011 passed by the Tribunal in respect of commercial premises merged in the judgment of dismissal of appeal on 29-11-2014, therefore the period of six months under Section 15(8) of 2001 Act should be counted from the date of 29-11-2014 on the basis of the doctrine of merger. 4. Mr. R.S. Yadav, appearing on behalf of the landlord has submitted that the application filed by the tenant was without any merit and has rightly been dismissed by the Tribunal in view of a judgment and binding precedent of this court in case of Purshottam v. the Appellate Rent Tribunal Sikar [2014(1) WLC (Raj.) 294], wherein it has been held that the provision of Section 15(8) of the 2001 Act do not apply to the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. A perusal of the judgment in case of Purshottam (supra) indicates that this court considering the provisions of Section 15(8) of the 2001 Act has held that the restriction created to the executability of the recovery certificate issued by the Rent Tribunal by sub-section 8 of Section 15 cannot continue to apply to the decision of Appellate Tribunal on the analogy of doctrine of merger in the sense that the judgment of the Tribunal merges in that of the Appellate Tribunal becoming a part thereof. This Court has held that the legislature has not intended such restriction to continue after decision of the appeal. And I may add that the conclusions of the learned Judge in the case of Purshottam (supra) stand buttressed by the "maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum" as while Section 15(8) of the Act of 2001 expressly renders a certificate of possession issued to an appellant inexcusable for prescribed periods set out therein, it is silent on such inexecutability in respect of the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal. 7. In view of aforesaid, I find no error in the impugned order of the Tribunal. There is no merit in the writ petition. Dismissed. Petition Dismissed.