JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Matter is taken in the revised cause list. 2. None appeared from the side of the respondents. Heard Sri Subhash Vidyarthi, learned counsel for revisionist, and perused the record. 3. Facts in brief as submitted by learned counsel for revisionist are that Smt. Divya Shahi and Dr. Tej Pratap Shahi have filed a suit for partition in respect to House No. C-215, situated at Mohalla Civil Lines, Baraabani registered as Regular Suit No. 645 of 2006 in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) Barabanki. 4. Later on in the said matter an application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC has been moved for compromise between the parties, which has been signed by all the parties, duly verified, as such as such the Court has accepted the same by an order dated 21.4.2009. 5. In view of the said facts, an execution proceeding has been filed registered as Execution proceeding No. 7 of 2009, Divya Shahi v. Kunwar Suresh Singh, in the Court below/Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Barabanki in which Kunwar Umesh Singh and Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh who are the defendants in the suit and signed the compromise, filed an objection under Section 47 CPC, allowed by order dated 6.4.2010, which is under challenge in the present revision. 6. During the pendency of the present revision Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh has died, substituted by his legal heirs, namely, Smt. Beena Singh and Smt. Shaumya Singh as respondent Nos. 2/1 and 2/1. Learned counsel for revisionist while challenging the impugned order submits that once Kunwar Umesh Singh and Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh who are the respondents in the partition Suit No. 645 of 2006 have entered into a compromise, duly signed by them, thereafter by order dated 21.4.2009 on the basis of the compromise, the partition suit has been decreed, so the impugned order dated 6.4.2010 passed by Court below thereby allowing the objection under Section 47 CPC filed by them in execution proceeding is without jurisdiction and contrary to law. In support of his argument placed reliance on the judgment namely, Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others, 1970 (1) SCC 670 and Vedic Girls Senior Secondary School, Arya Samaj Mandir, Jhajjar v. Rajwanti (Smt. And others, 2007 (5) SCC 97 . 7. In support of his argument placed reliance on the judgment namely, Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others, 1970 (1) SCC 670 and Vedic Girls Senior Secondary School, Arya Samaj Mandir, Jhajjar v. Rajwanti (Smt. And others, 2007 (5) SCC 97 . 7. It is further submitted by learned counsel for revisionist that one of the reasoning given by the Court below while allowing the application under Section 47 CPC in an execution proceeding that the land in question is a krishi yogya bhoomi, so for the partition of the same, Civil Court has got no jurisdiction, the said finding is totally incorrect and wrong as in this regard no pleadings whatsoever has been taken by them in the suit for partition, and once they have entered into the compromise, then bound to the terms of compromise decree and in execution proceeding if objection under Section 47 CPC, as such they have no locus or sought to take said defence once the same has not been pleaded in the execution proceeding by way of objection under Section 47 CPC, in support of said argument reliance placed on law as laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Manish Mohan Sharma and others v. Ram Bahadur Thakur Ltd. and others, 2006 (4) SCC 416 : “Furthermore, the order dated 19th August, 1999 was a consent order. Its terms and conditions were contained in the MOFA and the Transfer Document which expressly formed an integral part of the order itself. A consent decree has been held to be a contract with the imprimatur of the Court superadded. It is something more than a mere contract and has the elements of both a command and a contract. (See: Wentworth v. Bullen, 141 ELR 769; C.F. Angadi v. Y.S. Hirannayya, (1972) 1 SCC 191 , 197). As was said by the Privy Council as early as 1929, “The only difference in this respect between an order made by consent and one not so made is that the first stands unless and until it is discharged by mutual agreement or is set aside by another order of the Court; the second stands until and unless it is discharged on an appeal (See: Charles Hubert Kinch v. Edward Keith Walcott and others, AIR 1929 Privy Council 289). The effort of the executing Court must be to see that the parties are given the fruits of the decree. The mandate is reinforced when it is a consent decree and doubly reinforced when the consent decree is a family settlement. Clauses 3.1 and 3.6 of the MOFA make it clear that the agreements were arrived at between the parties to resolve finally long pending disputes between the family members relating to jointly owned assets. The clauses read as follows : “For the sake of resolving the disputes of the Sharma Family and the Companies owned by them and to regain the harmony, peace, love and affection amongst the two groups and for the welfare and prosperity of the Sharma Family and the Companies owned by them; The Memorandum of Family Arrangement will also take into its fold and include the Transfer Document Relating to the Assets of Ram Bahadur Thakur Ltd. (RBTL), executed as per the directions of the CLB, Annexed hereto and marked as Schedule 5. The above mentioned Transfer Document Relating to the Assets of Ram Bam Bahadur Thakur Ltd. is in implementation of and forms an integral part of this Memorandum of Family Arrangement.” It has been repeatedly emphasized in several decisions that family settlements are governed by a special equity and are to be enforced if honestly made. This would be so “even if the terms may have been agreed to on the basis of an error of the parties or originate in a mistake or ignorance of fact as to what the rights of the parties actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend”. This is because the object of an arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn out litigation, and to bring about harmony and goodwill in the family (see Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1976 (1) SCR 202, 122, 123, 125). The Courts lean heavily in favour of family arrangements and, “matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements”. This view has been reiterated recently in Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh and others, (2006) 1 SCC 148 .” 8. Accordingly, Sri Subhash Vidhyarthi, learned counsel for revisionist submits that the order dated 6.4.2010 passed in Execution Case No. 7 of 2009 by Civil Judge (Sr. This view has been reiterated recently in Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh and others, (2006) 1 SCC 148 .” 8. Accordingly, Sri Subhash Vidhyarthi, learned counsel for revisionist submits that the order dated 6.4.2010 passed in Execution Case No. 7 of 2009 by Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Barabanki thereby allowing the objection under Section 47 CPC filed by Kunwar Umesh Singh and Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh is totally without jurisdiction, liable to be set aside. 9. I have heard learned counsel revisionist and perused the record. 10. In order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, it is appropriate to go through the provisions as provided under Section 47 CPC : “Section 47 CPC—Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree—(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. [29]* * * * (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. [Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. Explanation II.—(a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.]” 11. From the bare peruse of the said Section, the position which emerged out that the conditions necessary for application of this section are (1) the question must relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and (2) it must arise between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives. 12. From the bare peruse of the said Section, the position which emerged out that the conditions necessary for application of this section are (1) the question must relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and (2) it must arise between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives. 12. Under Section 47 all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree have got to determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The powers of Court under Section 47 are quite different and much narrower than its powers of appeal revision or review. 13. The exercise of powers under Section 47 is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. The executing Court can allow objection under Section 47 to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and nullity, apart from the ground that decree is not capable of execution under law either because the same was passed in ignorance of such a provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing (Dhurandar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, AIR 2001 SC 2552 (2560): (2001) 6 SCC 534 ; Government of Orissa v. Ashok Transport Agency, (2002) 9 SCC 28 (50, 51). 14. A distinction exists between a decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the Court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by a law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity or procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable by the executing Court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior Court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attach or in incidental proceedings. (Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Walidduin, (2004) 1 SCC 287 (291, 292) 15. A decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attach or in incidental proceedings. (Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Walidduin, (2004) 1 SCC 287 (291, 292) 15. Further, the executing Court cannot go behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by a Court having inherent lack of jurisdiction which would make it a nullity as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhawarlal Bhandari v. Universal heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, 1991(1) SCC 558, 562. 16. As per undisputed facts in the present case in respect to House No. C-215, situated at Mohall Civil Lines, K.D. Singh Babu Marg, Barabanki the suit for partition has been filed by Smt. Divya Shahi and Dr. Tej Pratap Shahi in which Kunwar Umesh Singh and Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh alongwith the co-sharer have been impleaded as defendants, later on a compromise has been entered between the parties to the suit which hav been signed and verified all the parties including Kunwar Umesh Singh and Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh on the basis of the said compromise and an order dated 21.4.2009 has been passed, thereafter, an application for execution of the compromise decree has been filed in which objection under Section 47 CPC has been filed by Kunwar Umesh Singh and Kunwar Ravindra Pratap Singh, allowed by order dated 21.4.2009 passed by Court below in allowing the application under Section 47 CPC is an illegal exercise rather without jurisdiction as it is well-settled law (as stated above) that the very object of Section 47, CPC is to prevent multiplicity of litigations and to decide the objections at the beginning stage of an Execution Proceeding. 17. The compromise decree in the instant matter is very clear and unambiguous, and that too the same has attained finality. It is well-settled in law that an executing Court cannot traverse beyond the decree unless the same is a nullity or without jurisdiction. In a proceeding under Section 47, CPC. 17. The compromise decree in the instant matter is very clear and unambiguous, and that too the same has attained finality. It is well-settled in law that an executing Court cannot traverse beyond the decree unless the same is a nullity or without jurisdiction. In a proceeding under Section 47, CPC. an executing Court is only required to deal with the questions relating to discharge or satisfaction of the decree, so in view of the reasoning on the basis of which the Court below has allowed the objection under Section 47 CPC is an exercise which is contrary to law rather beyond the scope of Section 47 CPC, as in this regard a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in respect to the suit which has been decreed on the basis of compromise, later on in an objection under Section 47 CPC filed by a party who was already entered into a compromise, in the case of Smt. Gyan Devi v. Smt. Leela Devi and others, AIR 2007 Del 240 , has held as under : “We have considered the aforesaid prayer giving due consideration thereof. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that we are not in a position to accept the said submission. The parties have settled the matter on terms and conditions specifically recorded in a settlement deed. Compromise decree has been passed on the said terms and conditions. Intention of the parties and the terms and conditions of settlement now stand incorporated in a decree passed by this Court. The settlement decree passed must be executed and should not be interfered with, by modifying the decree or going behind the decree. This Court cannot go behind the decree and pass an order which is not contemplated by the terms and conditions of the settlement arrived at amongst the parties. A decree that has become final and binding cannot be reopened.” 18. For the foregoing reasons, the revision is allowed, the impugned order dated 6.4.2010 passed by civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Court No. 20, Barabanki in Execution Case No. 7 of 2009 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the executing Court to proceed and decide expeditiously. ——————