Judgment S.G. Shah, J. 1. Rule. Learned advocate Mr. Dipak R. Dave waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent. 2. Heard learned advocate Mr. T.R. Mishra for the petitioners and learned advocate Mr. Dipak R. Dave for the respondent for final disposal. 3. Perused the record. Petitioner herein has challenged the judgment and order dated 17.09.2014 in Complain No. 4 of 2013 to 27 of 2013 in Reference (IT) No. 84 of 2001, so far as denial of the daily allowance and transport allowance are concern. Petitioners have also prayed for a declaration to held that they are entitled for payment of daily allowance and traveling allowance and thereby seeking directions to the respondent to pay the same, along with 12% interest thereon with similar mandatory relief for a direction to immediately comply with such award. 3.1 Such complaint is filed by the petitioners under Section 33A of the I.D. Act, 1947 in a pending Reference (IT) Case No. 84 of 2001. Such original reference is referred by the Labour Commissioner, before the Industrial Tribunal regarding confirmation of legality and validity of one circular dated 21.05.1990 read with circular No. 44 dated 04.02.1994 with circular No. 511 of 1997 regarding transfer policy and more particularly legality and validity of circular dated 04.05.2000 on the same issue with contentions that pursuant to previous three circulars, the circular dated 04.05.2000 is illegal and against employees and, therefore, it cannot be implemented. As reference is pending since the year 2001, when respondent - employer has issued certain transfer orders under the pretext of deputation, the petitioners have filed the complaint contending that pursuant to provisions of Section 33A of the I.D. Act, conditions of service etc. of the employees shall remain unchanged during pendency of such reference. 4. It is true that Section 33 of the Act protects the service conditions during pendency of certain proceedings and, thereby, pending any industrial dispute with reference to any workman, the workman will get immunity in service as a protected workman, so far as, service conditions are concerned, whereby no employer shall, without express permission in writing from the authority before which any such proceedings are pending, can alter any service condition so as to prejudice the workman in such dispute. However, Section 33 is providing several conditions and options and does not confirm and mandate that once any reference is pending, employer could not take any steps irrespective of exigency or necessity of the employer and irrespective of the attitude and behavior or misconduct by the employee. When it is stated that any such condition cannot be stayed without permission of the authority, thereby it is clear and obvious that the provisions of Section 33 do not impose the permanent ban on alteration of service conditions or in other words from taking appropriate work from the employee. However, at present it is not disputed that pursuant to order of deputation of the petitioners without express permission i.e. approval by the Industrial Court where reference is pending, petitioners are deputed to another place. Therefore, petitioners have filed a complaint under Section 33A of the I.D. Act. The concerned Labour Court has allowed the application by holding that orders dated 18.02.2013 regarding deputation of the petitioners are illegal and thereby the same was cancelled. 4.1 But unfortunately petitioners are not satisfied with the simple declaration of legality of such order on deputation and, therefore, they have filed such petition claiming ancillary benefits because of such order declaring the order of deputation, illegal. 5. If we peruse the petition, it becomes clear that petitioner is relying upon the provisions of Chapter VI of the Service Rules applicable to them, wherein it is stated that if posting is beyond 8 kms. from Head Quarter, daily allowance and travelling allowance are to be paid. However, it is admitted position that specific provisions are there under the service rule with regard to deputation. Petitioner is also relying upon the judgment and order dated 17.09.2003 in SCA No. 1319 of 2003 as well as judgment and order dated 25.06.2009 in SCA No. 2940 of 2009 and 30.11.2009 in SCA 11241 of 2009 as well as order dated 29.05.2000 below exhibit 6 and 11 in Reference (IT) No. 84 of 2001. 5.1 So far as judgment of SCAs referred herein above are concerned, it is in favour of the petitioners, whereas judgment and order dated 29.05.200 is restraining the execution and implementation of circular No. 04.05.2000 regarding transfer of employee of class III and IV by the respondent. 5.1 So far as judgment of SCAs referred herein above are concerned, it is in favour of the petitioners, whereas judgment and order dated 29.05.200 is restraining the execution and implementation of circular No. 04.05.2000 regarding transfer of employee of class III and IV by the respondent. Thereby the sum and substance of the petitioner's case is to the effect that pursuant to pendency of such Reference No. 84 of 2001 challenging the legality and validity of the circular dated 04.05.2000, the subsequent order of deputation or transfer is also illegal and thereby irrespective of its legality when petitioners were subjected to deputation till 17.09.2014, the respondents are liable to pay daily allowance and transport allowance as claimed by them. 6. Respondent has filed an affidavit - in - rejoinder contending that present petition is filed by one Mr. J.M. Patel whereas Reference (IT) No. 84 of 2001 is filed by the union and, therefore, unless it is clear and certain that petitioner is entitled to the benefit through the union, this petition cannot be entertained. However, such issues have already been decided by the Labour Court. 7. So far as factual details are concerned, it is contended that Uttaran Thermal Power Station is in reserved shut down condition, since no gas is received by it and, therefore, they cannot allow the employees to sit ideal and to pay them salary when other power plant is working and there is a requirement of men power. It is thereby submitted that there is no change in conditions of services of the petitioners and other employees when they are directed to serve at Ukai Thermal Power Station, where they are paid more perks as well as additional remuneration for overtime than actual amount received by them at their original place before such dispute. 7.1 It is also submitted by the respondent that there cannot be a situation whereby respondent shall pay the regular salary to the petitioners at their original place where there is no work and engage new employees at the Ukai plant, where there is enough work. Such submission is substantiated by the fact that at Ukai, petitioners should have got an additional work by way of overtime for which they have paid a substantial good amount. 8. Such submission is substantiated by the fact that at Ukai, petitioners should have got an additional work by way of overtime for which they have paid a substantial good amount. 8. As against that, it is contended by the petitioners that staff at Ukai may be promoted and that even at Uttaran in their absence, respondent has promoted lower grade of staff to do their job and sufficient work is there and they are not disclosing the true facts. 8.1 Whereas learned advocate for the respondent has pointed out that calling upon the lower grade staff at Uttaran to work on the place of petitioners is not for regular working of the plant, but it is only for keeping the plant in order by its cleaning and getting it on and off so as to avoid technical jam of the plant. 9. Similarly an issue is raised by both the parties about the supply of gas. Learned advocate for the petitioners is contending that gas is available at Uttaran whereas respondent has contended that sufficient gas supply is not available at Uttaran and it is sufficiently available at Ukai and, therefore, it cannot be said that it is selective step by the respondent so as to harass the petitioners. 10. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the entire record as well as previous orders wherein, ultimately it is held that deputation cannot be treated as a punishment or change in service condition, so as to attract the provisions of Section 30 of the I.D. Act. 11. Moreover, though decision in original Reference (IT) Case No. 84 of 2001 is subsequent development after filing the impugned petition, it cannot be ignored that now by judgment and order dated 25.03.2015, the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad has rejected such reference and vacated the stay against the implementation of order dated 04.05.2000 as well as any interim relief in favour of any employee has been vacated. Thereby now when even transfer is permitted, unless such judgment is modified by the competent authority, it cannot be said that petitioners have any case in their favour. 12. So far as relief in present petition is concerned, it is practically limited to claim of daily allowance and transport allowance. Thereby now when even transfer is permitted, unless such judgment is modified by the competent authority, it cannot be said that petitioners have any case in their favour. 12. So far as relief in present petition is concerned, it is practically limited to claim of daily allowance and transport allowance. However, said issue has been dealt with properly by the trial Court in impugned judgment and order dated 17.09.2014 in Complaint (IT) No. 4 of 2013 to 27 of 2013 in Reference (IT) No. 84 of 2001. 13. Learned advocate for the petitioners is relying upon following decisions: "(1) Umapati Choudhary v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in (1994) 4 SCC 659 , wherein while dealing with the service law and more particularly concept of deputation, Honourable the Supreme Court has held that deputation means assignment of an employee of one department /cadre/organization to another department/cadre/organization in public interest and thereby the word 'deputation' has been used by the respondent while placing the services of the petitioner from Uttaran to Ukai is not deputation at all but it is simple transfer since both the places are within control of the respondent and therefore it is violative of Section 30 of the I.D. Act. However, petitioners fail to realize that the cited judgment is not deciding or confirming the definition of deputation in any limited perception as being published in its head-note A by the publisher. Since issue before the Honourable Apex Court was regarding repatriation of a person, who was on deputation and then absorbed permanently at the place of deputation. What is emphasized by the petitioner is the observations by the Honourable Apex Court that; "Deputation can be aptly described as an assignment' of an employee (commonly referred to as the deputationist) of one department or cadres or even an organization (commonly referred to as the parent department or lending authority) to another department or cadre or organization (commonly referred to as the borrowing authority). The necessity for sending on deputation arises in public interest to meet the exigencies of public service. The concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It also involves the consent of the employee to go on deputation or not. The concept of deputation is consensual and involves a voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee and a corresponding acceptance of such services by the borrowing employer. It also involves the consent of the employee to go on deputation or not. In the case at hand all the three conditions were fulfilled. The University, the parent department or lending authority, the Board, the borrowing authority and the appellant the deputationist, had all given their consent for deputation of the appellant and for his permanent absorption in the establishment of the borrowing authority." Thereby, it is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners that their consent was not taken for sending them on deputation and, therefore, also it is not a deputation and transfer. However, fact remains that the issue before the Honourable Supreme Court is not to decide difference between deputation and transfer, but regarding consideration of the appellant before it as a permanent employee of the institution where he was deputed and absorbed permanently. Though concept of deputation has been discussed by the Honourable Supreme court, even if we rely on relevant observations, it becomes clear that assignment of an employee to one department to another department can also be treated as deputation and, hence, because of this judgment alone, right of the petitioners to get travelling allowance and daily allowance is not substantiated. At the most, because of such judgment deputation may be held to be illegal but it does not confirm the right of an employee to get either daily allowance or transport allowance in a given situation as it is discussed herein above. (2) Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. reported in 2002 (1) LLJ 834 , wherein while dealing with provisions of Sections 31, 33(2)(b) and 33-A of the I.D. Act, it is held that order of punishment though approved by the competent authority may be ineffective from its date itself." However, such judgment is on the merits of that case but nowhere it confirms the right of the deputationist to get transport allowance and daily allowance. 14. 14. As against that learned advocate for the respondent is relying upon following judgments: (1) Cipla Limited v. Jayakumar R reported in 1997 (1) SCC 300, wherein Honourable the Supreme Court has held that transfer is not amount to alteration of service conditions and that even standing orders do not refer or prohibit transfer of workman from one establishment of appellant to another establishment and, therefore, application under Section 33-A is not maintainable. Thus while allowing the appeal, Honourable Apex Court has set aside the impugned decision by the High Court and the Labour Court restraining the transfer of the employee. It is not disputed fact that letter of appointment of the present petitioners also contains that petitioner can be transferred at any place and, therefore, contention that order of transfer is passed with ulterior motive has been rejected. (2) State of U.P. And Ors. v. Gobardhan Lal reported in 2004 (3) GLH 317, wherein Honourable Supreme Court has held that transfer of an employee is incident inherent in terms of appointment and that it is an essential condition of service and thereby a Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot place an embargo on the rights of a competent authority to transfer an employee. (3) P.D. Patel Ayurveda Hospital v. Director of Primary Education reported in 2002 JX (Guj) 49, wherein also Honourable Supreme Court has while allowing the petition held that Labour Court cannot interfere in the order of transfer. (4) Union of India v. Janardhan Debanath reported in AIR 2004 SC 1632 , wherein Honourable Supreme Court has held that for the purpose of avoiding transfer, what is needed is that the prima facie satisfaction of the authority concerned and whether employee can be transferred to a different division is a matter for the employer to consider depending upon administrative necessities and even to the extent of solution for the problems faced by the administration and thereby allowed the appeal by the employer by dismissing the petition by the employee." 15. I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment, which confirms that petitioners are not entitled to transport allowance and daily allowance because of their deputation and, therefore, I do not see any reason to interfere in the judgment. I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment, which confirms that petitioners are not entitled to transport allowance and daily allowance because of their deputation and, therefore, I do not see any reason to interfere in the judgment. Even otherwise the jurisdiction of this Court is of supervisory nature and unless there is absolute illegality or irregularity which amount to injustice, re-appreciation of entire evidence is not advisable in such jurisdiction so as to give effect to alternative decision because of filing of such petition. 16. In view of such facts and circumstances, Special Civil Application Nos. 16916 of 2014 and 18066 of 2014 are dismissed, whereas Special Civil Application Nos. 1174 of 2015 to 1197 of 2015 are allowed in terms of para 8(C) of Special Civil Application No. 1174 of 2015. Rule is discharged qua Special Civil Application Nos. 16916 of 2014 and 18066 of 2014. Rule is made absolute qua Special Civil Application Nos. 1174 of 2015 to 1197 of 2015.