JUDGMENT : Ali Mohd. Magrey, J. 1. This civil revision is directed against an order dated 20th August, 2015, hereinafter 'impugned order' passed by learned City Munsiff, Srinagar, in an application seeking restoration of the civil suit titled Asif Nazir Mir v. Nazir Ahmad Mir & Ors., which was dismissed in default on 30th May, 2015, restoring the suit to its original number with its all interim orders. The grievance projected by the petitioners is that the learned trial judge has erred in law to consider and grant the restoration, for, i) the objections filed against such application were not considered; ii) in view of dismissal of application filed in terms of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for short Code, the trial court was not competent to order revival of the interim direction dated 16.9.2013; iii) Ex parte interim direction dated 16.9.2013 ceased to be in operation for non-compliance of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code. 2. Heard learned counsel for parties and considered the submissions. 3. Mr. Manzoor Ahmad Dar, learned counsel for petitioners, would submit that it was not open for the trial court to order restoration of the interim order passed in ex parte because it had outlived its life. He further contends that since the remedy of appeal is not available to the petitioners, therefore, the instant revision petition has been filed. It is further submitted that the order impugned has caused failure of justice; therefore, the case of falls under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code which provides for interference of this Court through a revision petition if the order has caused failure of justice. He further submits that if the order impugned is allowed to withstand it will surely cause irreparable loss to the petitioners who were not heard on revival of the interim direction upon restoration of a suit dismissed in default. He would further submit that since the application filed in terms of Section 151 of the Code has been rejected by the trial court, therefore, there was no occasion for the trial court to restore the ex-parte interim order. He would further submit that since the application filed in terms of Section 151 of the Code has been rejected by the trial court, therefore, there was no occasion for the trial court to restore the ex-parte interim order. He further submits that in case this Court reaches to the conclusion that revision is not maintainable against the order impugned, the revision petition may be treated as a petition having been filed in terms of Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K State. In support of his submissions learned counsel for petitioner refers to and relies upon law laid down by this Court in a case bearing C. Revision No. 27/2015 titled Mohammad Rajab Dar v. Gh. Mohammad Dar, decided on 2nd September, 2015 : JKJ Soft JKJ/30368. 4. On the other hand learned senior counsel for respondent submits that it is unheard of that an interlocutory order passed on an application seeking restoration of suit dismissed in default can be questioned through a civil revision. He submits that it does not make any sense that restoration can be destructive and would not serve the ends of justice. He further submits that an emergent situation arises when a suit is dismissed in default and in such a situation application in terms of Section 151 of the Code is available. He further submits that on restoration of the suit dismissed in default, all interlocutory orders get revived unless during the Interregnum between the dismissal of the suit and restoration, there is any alienation in favour of a third party. In support of his arguments learned senior counsel refers to and relies upon law laid down in Taj Mohi-ud-Din v. State Financial Corporation, J&K 1980 SLJ J&E 115: JKJ Soft JKJ/7 and SCC 2004 Vol. VI p. 378. 5. Considered the submissions made and perused the record. 6. The suit that is restored by virtue of impugned order has been filed way back in 2013 on 14th September, and on 16th September, 2013, the ad interim relief has been granted in favour of respondent/plaintiff and against the petitioners/defendants. The petitioners have filed written statement on 27th April 2015. Thereafter on 30th May, 2015, the suit has been dismissed in default a month after the written statement was filed and by virtue of impugned order dated 20th August, 2015, the suit was restored to its original number along with all interim orders. 7. The petitioners have filed written statement on 27th April 2015. Thereafter on 30th May, 2015, the suit has been dismissed in default a month after the written statement was filed and by virtue of impugned order dated 20th August, 2015, the suit was restored to its original number along with all interim orders. 7. Whether remedy of civil revision is available to the petitioners in view of interlocutory nature of impugned order and whether the plea that it may be treated to be a petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K, is to be considered in light of the submissions of learned appearing counsel for the parties. 8. The plea that the revision petition may be treated as a petition having been filed under and in terms of Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K in alternative, is supported by the judgment of Coordinate Bench delivered in case titled Mohammad Rajab Dar v. Gh. Mohamad Dar in a civil revision being C. Revision No. 27/2015. The learned counsel for petitioner has referred to the said case to show that a civil revision has been treated as a petition having been filed in terms of Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K. The power to treat a civil revision as a petition in terms of Section 104 is not disputed and in the present case a ground for invoking such jurisdiction is made out. Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K, for facility of reference, is reproduced as under:- "104. Superintendence and control of subordinate courts.- (1) The High Court shall have superintendence and control over all courts for the time being subject to its appellate or revisional jurisdiction and all such courts shall be subordinate to the High Court. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts; (c) Prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such court. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts; (c) Prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such court. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor." 9. The learned counsel for petitioner probably seeks refuge in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 104 when he makes a prayer for treating the revision petition as a petition in terms of Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K. 10. Clause (b) is the only clause in Section 104 which can be pressed into service for regulating the practice and proceedings of subordinate Courts. However, in such case satisfaction has to be derived as regards the irregularity having been committed by the subordinate court which warrants invoking of superintendence jurisdiction. Admittedly, in terms of Order dated 20.8.2015, passed by the trial court (City Munsiff Srinagar), application seeking restoration of the civil suit has been allowed resultantly the suit was restored to its original number with its all interim orders. Revision against such orders is barred by proviso to Section 115 of the Code. After amendment to Section 115 of the Code, the revisional powers of the High Court have been curtailed but such curtailment would not control powers of the Court exercisable under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Article 227 corresponds to Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K State. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down principles governing exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the judgment rendered in case Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387. In this connection, paragraph 62 of the judgment is relevant to be reproduced: "62. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down principles governing exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the judgment rendered in case Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 6387. In this connection, paragraph 62 of the judgment is relevant to be reproduced: "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Court is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this court. In Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence -can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it "within the bounds of their authority". (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence -can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & others, reported by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo moto. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo moto. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 12. The present case has to be considered in light of paragraphs e.g., J&K. As has been said that trial court has committed illegality which has resulted in miscarriage of justice, therefore, there is no option but to take recourse to Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K and treat the revision petition as a petition filed in terms of said Section. 13. For all what has been said hereinbefore the prayer made for treating the revision petition as a petition filed in terms of Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K is accepted and the impugned order is quashed to the extent it orders reviving the interim ex parte order dated 16th September, 2013, while restoring the suit to its original number. Parties are at liberty to approach the Court below for passing of appropriate orders in the matter on merits. Parties are at liberty to approach the Court below for passing of appropriate orders in the matter on merits. Trial Court shall proceed ahead in the matter without getting overawed or influenced by the observations made in this order. Return the trial court records.