JUDGMENT K.R. MOHAPATRA, J. - In this appeal, the plaintiff as appellant assails the judgment and decree dated 07.09.2001 and 03.10.2001 respectively passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Phulbani in T.S. No.15 of 1998 dismissing the suit for extension of six months time for performance of contract executed between the plaintiff and the defendants or in the alternative for grant a compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- towards the value of timbers remained un-lifted from the coupe and for cost. 2. Plaintiff was ‘A’ Class Contractor and he being the highest bidder in an auction for sale, Coupe No.16/2 DL-5-1979-80 was knocked down in his favour for a consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-. The auction amount was to be paid in four equal instalments by 15.10.1979, 15.03.1980, 15.10.1980 and 15.02.1981. He was allowed eighteen working months for cutting and lifting of logs in the said coupe beyond the intervening three non-working months from July to September. As the Coupe was situated in the midst of forest, there was inaccessibility to the area and because of the labour problem, the plaintiff could not lift the cut down logs within the stipulated time for which he sought for extension of time to workout the contract. He further submitted that there was no route map provided to him for which there was problem in shifting the cut down logs. All the difficulties were wellknown to the forest authorities. His representation for extension of time was kept in cold storage and no action was taken on the same. It is only after a direction of this Court in OJC No.2787 of 1996, the defendant no.3, namely, Conservator of Forests, Berhampur Circle rejected his representation without considering the recommendations of the concerned Divisional Forest Officer (Defendant No.1) for extension of time. Thus, he filed the suit for the aforesaid relief. 3. The respondents as defendants filed their written statement refuting the assertions made in the plaint. It was specifically contended by the defendants that time was the essence of contract and there was no exceptional circumstances existed beyond the control of the plaintiff in operation of the coupe within the stipulated period. It was further contended that defendants had never issued any direction to the plaintiff to engage local Adivasis as labourers. It was specifically contended by the defendants that time was the essence of contract and there was no exceptional circumstances existed beyond the control of the plaintiff in operation of the coupe within the stipulated period. It was further contended that defendants had never issued any direction to the plaintiff to engage local Adivasis as labourers. On the other hand, the plaintiff before submitting his bid for the coupe had inspected the area and on being satisfied with the terms and conditions of operation of the coupe, he had filed his bid. As such, he could not raise any objection with regard to the labour problem and inaccessibility as alleged by him. Moreover, a route map was attached to the agreement, which clearly described the connectivity of the coupe area to the main road. The defendant further contended that his representation for extension of time to operate the coupe was rightly rejected by the Conservator of Forests, as there existed no exceptional circumstance to extend the same. As such, the defendants submitted that the plaintiff had no cause of action to file the suit and the suit was not maintainable. Hence, they prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost. 4. Taking into consideration the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following four issues out of which Issue Nos. 1 to 3 are relevant for discussion in this appeal. “1. Whether the time is essence of the contract or the plaintiff is entitled to get extension of time? 2. Whether the plaintiff has violated the conditions of the agreement? 3. Whether the suit is maintainable? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief?” 5. In order to substantiate their respective cases, the plaintiff examined four witnesses including himself as P.W.1 and exhibited documents out of which Ext.1 is the original agreement for the suit coupe, Exts. 20 and 21 are the orders of this Court in OJC No. 14070 of 1996 and OJC No.2787 of 1996, Ext.22 is the letter dated 04.10.1996 rejecting the representation of the plaintiff and Exts.38 and 39 are the recommendations of defendant no.1 for extension of time for operation of the coupe. The defendants examined only one witness and exhibited different applications submitted by the plaintiff at the time of deposit of money in instalments, i.e., Exts. A to E, and Exts. The defendants examined only one witness and exhibited different applications submitted by the plaintiff at the time of deposit of money in instalments, i.e., Exts. A to E, and Exts. F to P are nine notices served upon the plaintiff. Ext.Q is the original Gazette Notification dated 29.06.1979 for auction sale of the coupe. 6. The learned trial Court while answering Issue Nos. 1 and 2 held that time is the essence of contract and the plaintiff has not made out any exceptional ground for extension of time and answered Issue No.3 in negative holding the suit is not maintainable. Hence, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal. 7. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the appellant at the outset submitted that the written statement was only signed and verified by defendant oo.1, who was not authorized by defendant Nos. 2 to 4 to sign and verify the written statement on their behalf. He further submitted that none of the defendants had been examined as witnesses to state their case on oath. In fact, the only witness who could have been examined was defendant No.1 and chose not to come to the witness box to depose in support of the plea taken in the written statement. He also placed reliance on a decision in the case of Bidyadhar Vs. Mankikrao and another, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1441 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “15. It was defendant No. 1 who contended that the sale deed, executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff, was fictitious and the whole transaction was a bogus transaction as only Rs. 500 were paid as sale consideration to defendant No. 2. He further claimed that payment of Rs. 4,500 to defendant No. 2 at his home before the registration of the deed was wholly incorrect. This plea was not supported by defendant No. 1 as he did not enter into the witness box. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the Trial Court and avoided the witness box so that he may not be cross examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the transaction of sale between defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff was a bogus transaction. 16. He did not state the facts pleaded in the written statement on oath in the Trial Court and avoided the witness box so that he may not be cross examined. This, by itself, is enough to reject the claim that the transaction of sale between defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff was a bogus transaction. 16. Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and Anr. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and Ors. AIR (1930) Lahore 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR (1931) Bombay 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh’s case (supra). The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath and Anr. held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an inference adverse against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand and Ors. , drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act against a party who did not enter into the witness box.” 8. Miss Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that there is no dispute with regard to the point of law raised by the appellant, but, in the case at hand, D.W.1, who is the Forester of the concerned Range, on oath supported the contentions made in the written statement. She also submitted that no suggestion was put to D.W.1 regarding his competence to lead evidence on behalf of the defendants. Hence, D.W.1 can very well be treated to be competent witness examined on behalf of the defendants. As it appears, none of the defendants were examined as witnesses in the suit. The written statement filed by the defendants was signed and verified by the defendant no.1 only. Hence, D.W.1 can very well be treated to be competent witness examined on behalf of the defendants. As it appears, none of the defendants were examined as witnesses in the suit. The written statement filed by the defendants was signed and verified by the defendant no.1 only. Though the Collector, Phulbani has signed the written statement, but he has not verified the same. Thus, it can at best be treated to be a written statement filed by defendant nos.1 and 5. Law is well-settled that where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, the presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. Admittedly, D.W. 1 was not a party to the suit. D.W.1 also does not explain whether he is competent to stand as witness on behalf of defendants or was so authorized. In view of the settled position of law referred to (supra), there is no force in the submissions of learned Additional Standing Counsel to the effect that no suggestion was put to D.W.1 with regard to his competence to depose on behalf of the defendants. In view of the above, it is to be held that the contention raised by the plaintiff is not traversed. Be that as it may, the plaintiff has to prove his own case and cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendants. Thus, this case has to be examined in the light that the plaintiff has to prove his case in preponderance of probabilities. 9. For convenience, learned trial Court took Issue Nos. 1 and 2 simultaneously and answered that time is the essence of contract and the plaintiff could not make out any exceptional case to seek for an extension of time to operate the coupe. Learned trial Court while considering Issue Nos. 1 and 2 has taken note of Clause (5) of the agreement, which prescribes that the forest contract shall be subject to the Forest Contract Rules in force at the time of the agreement and the plaintiff being a ‘A’ Class Contractor is aware of such condition of the agreement. Learned trial Court while considering Issue Nos. 1 and 2 has taken note of Clause (5) of the agreement, which prescribes that the forest contract shall be subject to the Forest Contract Rules in force at the time of the agreement and the plaintiff being a ‘A’ Class Contractor is aware of such condition of the agreement. Further, Rule-7 of the Forest Contract Rules reads as follows:- “Time to be the Essence of Forest Contracts:- Whereby the terms of any forest contract, it is agreed that the extraction of the forest produce purchased under the contract may be carried out only during a specified period, time shall be deemed to be the essence of such contract and upon the completion of the specified period, the contractor’s right under the contract shall seize, and any forest produce not removed across the boundaries of the contract area shall became the absolute property of Government. Provided that the Chief Conservator of Forests and the Divisional/District Forest Officer, as the case may be for special reasons to be recorded in writing grant an extension term, as he may decide, for a total period (inclusive of original lease period) not exceeding the period for which he is employed to sanction contracts on payment of a monthly extension fee of one per cent of the consideration money of the contract for the actual working period needed which will be decided by him, if full consideration money of the contract has been paid.” 10. From a plain reading of the above provision, it is manifest that time is the essence of contract. However, the Chief Conservator of Forests, Conservator of Forests or the Divisional/District Forest Officer for the special reason to be recorded in writing can grant extension of time as he may decide on certain terms and conditions. Paragraph-4 of the Gazette Notification dated 29.06.1979 (Ext. Q) in which the auction notice was published makes it clear that no extension of time for working will be allowed except in exceptional circumstances. Thus, the plea of the appellant that the time was not the essence of contract is not correct. However, it is to be examined whether any special reason/exceptional circumstance existed for extension of time of the contract period. 11. Mr. Thus, the plea of the appellant that the time was not the essence of contract is not correct. However, it is to be examined whether any special reason/exceptional circumstance existed for extension of time of the contract period. 11. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the coupe area was not connected with the road and it existed in the midst of the forest. It remained damp for most of the period of contract. The plaintiff had to drag the cut down logs by the help of labourers or bullocks to bring out the same from the coupe area. P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 in their evidence deposed that there was no accessibility to the coupe area. However, P.W. 2, the driver of P.W.1, has admitted in his cross-examination that about half kilometer from coupe area was inaccessible. Referring to Exts.38 and 39, he submitted that the coupe area was within the hill terrine and it was inaccessible as observed by the DFO while recommending the case of the plaintiff for extension of time. Ext.22 is the letter rejecting the representation dated 20.10.1981 of the defendant no.3, the Conservator of Forests. It is apparent from Ext.22 that while considering the representation of the plaintiff for extension of time, the defendant no.3 did not at all take into consideration the recommendation of the DFO for extension of time observing that the coupe area was in the hill terrine and it was inaccessible. It would not be out of contest to take note of the fact that the representation of the plaintiff was submitted as early as 28.07.1981 and 20.10.1981. Those representations remained un-disposed of by the Conservator of Forests till a direction from this Court in OJC No.2787 of 1996 (Ext. 21) was made. Thus, the Conservator of Forests took more than 15 years for disposal of the representations of the plaintiff. The representations were disposed of pursuant to the direction of this Court (Ext.21). It is also apparent from the discussion made in the said letter (Ext.22) that the Conservator of Forests has not applied his mind though he has stated in the said letter that he has examined the case of the plaintiff thoroughly well. As such, no weightage should be given to Ext.22. 12. It is also apparent from the discussion made in the said letter (Ext.22) that the Conservator of Forests has not applied his mind though he has stated in the said letter that he has examined the case of the plaintiff thoroughly well. As such, no weightage should be given to Ext.22. 12. Miss Mishra, learned Additional Standing counsel, on the contrary, submitted that the discussion made in Ext.22 makes it clear that he has taken into consideration the recommendations made by the DFO. Moreover, when P.W.2, the driver of P.W.1 deposed categorically that only a half kilometer of the road connecting the coupe was inaccessible, the representations of the plaintiff were rightly rejected by the Conservator of Forests. She also submitted that inaccessibility cannot be an exceptional circumstance for the plaintiff to seek for extension of time. The road map (Schedule-3) attached to the agreement clearly shows the connectivity of the coupe. Further, the plaintiff had never raised any objection with regard to inaccessibility of the coupe during tenure of the contract. Thus, she strenuously urged that the representations of the plaintiff for extension of time were rightly rejected under Ext. 22. The DFO while recommending the case of the plaintiff for extension of time has observed in Ext.38, i.e., the letter No.6599 dated 10.05.1984, that the coupe was situated in the difficult hill terrine and there was extraction difficulty to work out the coupe. Further, in Ext.39, i.e., the letter No.11452 dated 17.06.1983, the DFO observed that the forest contractor could not operate the coupe in time due to inaccessibility and other difficulties as stated in his representation. Though Ext.22 refers to some inspection report, the same never came to light for being scrutinized by the Court. Thus, no weightage can be given to such inspection report when it does not form a part of the record. Learned trial Court while considering the evidence of the witnesses came to the conclusion that there is contradiction in the stand taken by the DFO in Exts.38 and 39. While in one hand, it is observed that the coupe was situated in hill terrine; on the other hand, it says that the coupe was inaccessible. On going through Exts. 38 and 39, i.e., recommendations of the DFO, it is clear that the coupe was situated in hill terrine and it was inaccessible to some extent and there appears no contradiction in Exts. On going through Exts. 38 and 39, i.e., recommendations of the DFO, it is clear that the coupe was situated in hill terrine and it was inaccessible to some extent and there appears no contradiction in Exts. 38 and 39. Further, the plaintiff had made grievance with regard to the labour problem redressing that he had to engage local labourers who are Adivasis and were not regulated. Though learned trial Court has accepted the difficulties of the plaintiff to some extent while discussing Issue Nos. 1 and 2 holding that it is natural that he has to engage labourers or bullocks or employees or some other method to carry the grounded trees up to the road for transportation purpose, but he refused to accept it to be an exceptional circumstance for extension of time of the contract. Considering the matter in its totality, it can be reasonably presumed that the plaintiff had to face difficulties to transport the cut down trees either for labour problem or for inaccessibility. The Conservator of Forests ought to have considered the representations of the plaintiff taking into consideration the grievance made therein vis-à-vis the recommendation of the DFO in Exts.38 and 39 in their proper perspective. In that view of the matter, it can be safely said that learned trial Court did not at all take into consideration all these material aspects while adjudicating Issue Nos. 1 and 2. Hence, the plaintiff was entitled to an extension of time to work out the coupe knocked down in his favour, more particularly when there is nothing on record to suggest that the defendants would have been prejudiced or suffered loss for such extension of time. 13. While answering Issue No. 3, the trial Court held that the suit is not maintainable. Section 9 of the C.P.C. prescribes that the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Thus, while deciding the question of maintainability of the suit, the Court has to look into the pleadings made in the plaint to determine the maintainability of the suit. If on the plain reading of the pleadings in the plaint, it makes out a case and that the relief sought for is neither expressly nor impliedly barred under law, then the suit is held to be maintainable. If on the plain reading of the pleadings in the plaint, it makes out a case and that the relief sought for is neither expressly nor impliedly barred under law, then the suit is held to be maintainable. It is no more res integra that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit depends upon the averments contained in the plaint or in the claim application and not on the defence taken by the adversary. If the averments on the basis of which the Court has assumed jurisdiction are not established, the Court may dismiss the suit or proceeding, but it cannot be held that the suit is not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanwarmal Kejriwal Vs. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., reported in (1990) 2 SCC 288 , in paragraph 24 held as under: “But the Jurisdiction of the Court in which the action is originated must be determined on the averments in the plant or claims application and not on the defense taken by the adversary party”. The said decision has been followed subsequently in Mani Nariman Daruwala and Bharucha (Deceased) through LRs. And others Vs. Phiroz N.Bhatena and others, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1494 . In the case at hand, the trial Court proceeded on a misconception that since he has held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought for, the suit was not maintainable, which cannot be accepted on the face of it. On a plain reading of the pleadings of the plaintiff, it is manifest that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the same. As such, the suit is held to be maintainable. The vital issue to be decided, therefore, remains whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief. 14. In view of the discussion made above, I am of the opinion that the defendant no. 3 ought to have extended the period of contract taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case. At this stage, such a relief would redundant due to efflux of time. Thus, it has to be decided whether the plaintiff can be compensated in terms of money and if so, what would be the amount? The plaintiff has prayed for a decree of specific performance of contract by extending the period of time and in the alternative, he has prayed for compensation to the tune of Rs. Thus, it has to be decided whether the plaintiff can be compensated in terms of money and if so, what would be the amount? The plaintiff has prayed for a decree of specific performance of contract by extending the period of time and in the alternative, he has prayed for compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/-. Therefore, it leaves no scope of doubt that in view of the inaction as well as mechanical rejection of the representation of the plaintiff, he has not only been made to suffer but also the same can be compensated in terms of money. 15. By order dated 28.11.2014, this Court directed Mr. Aditya Chandra Rout, who was the then A.C.F., Phulbani Division, Phulbani and was present in Court, to file an affidavit indicating therein the matured value of the security deposit and the value of sale proceeds of un-lifted timbers of the appellant. Pursuant to such direction, an affidavit has been filed before this Court on 13.05.2015 indicating therein that the total value of unlifted timbers is Rs. 92,290/-. However, a sum of Rs. 25,401/- was assessed to be the compensation amount to be paid by the plaintiff for illegal felling of trees and irregularities done by him. The plaintiff also filed an objection to the said affidavit stating that the calculation/determination presented by the A.C.F. is neither reasonable nor acceptable because the same is not supported by any document. He also stated in the said affidavit that a sum of Rs. 21,215/- has been deposited before this Court in compliance to the order dated 16.12.1996 passed in OJC No. 14070 of 1996 (Ext.20). On perusal of Ext. 20, it appears that this following order was passed vide order dated 16.12.1996, in OJC No. 14070 of 1996 as well as Misc. Case No. 12316 of 1996. “OJC No. 14070 of 1996 Heard learned counsel for both the parties. This writ application is admitted subject to the condition that the petitioner will deposit the assessed amount of Rs. 21,250/- in this Court by January 10, 1997, in default, the writ petition will stand dismissed without further reference to the Bench. Issue notice to the opposite parties. Mr. J. Behera, learned Addl. Government Advocate undertakes to appear on behalf of the opp. Parties. Three extra copies of the writ application along with Annexures be handed over to the learned Addl. Issue notice to the opposite parties. Mr. J. Behera, learned Addl. Government Advocate undertakes to appear on behalf of the opp. Parties. Three extra copies of the writ application along with Annexures be handed over to the learned Addl. Government Advocate by tomorrow, as undertaken. The deposit made by the petitioner shall be without prejudice to the rights and contention of the parties. Misc. Case No. 12316 of 1996 As the writ petition has been admitted on the condition that the petitioner will have to deposit the entire assessed amount in this Court, the opposite parties are restrained from realizing that amount from the petitioner till disposal of this writ petition. The misc. case is accordingly disposed of.” 16. In view of the direction made above, the plaintiff is not liable to pay the amount of compensation as referred to in the said affidavit. Realization of the same is always subject to the result of the said writ petition. However, in view of the inaction of the defendants in disposing of the representation and redressing the grievance of the plaintiff within a reasonable period, the plaintiff had to move this Court in OJC No. 2787 of 1996 and in obedience to the order dated 16.5.1996 passed therein, the representation of the plaintiff was disposed of after a long lapse of 15 years. Had the extension of time been allowed within a stipulated time, the plaintiff would have enjoyed the value of Rs. 92,290/- by lifting the grounded logs. As I have already held that extension of time ought to have been granted to the plaintiff to perform the contract he is entitled to the aforesaid amount along with interest at the prevailing market rate. He is also entitled to the amount of Rs. 50,000/- deposited by him towards security deposit together with interest accrued thereon. 17. In view of the above, the appeal be and the same is allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 07.09.2001 and 03.10.2001 respectively passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Phulbani in T.S. No.15 of 1998 and directing that the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 92,290/- together with interest at the rate of 8.5% per annum and also the amount of Rs. 50,000/- together with interest accrued thereon. Parties are directed to bear their own cost. Appeal allowed.