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2015 DIGILAW 527 (ALL)

Santosh Kumar Singh v. State of U. P.

2015-03-20

ARUN TANDON, SHAMSHER BAHADUR SINGH

body2015
JUDGMENT 1. The issue raised in this appeal is as to whether the Committee of Management can make ad-hoc appointment against a short term vacancy even after rescission of Removal of the Difficulties Orders vide Section 33-E of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') as introduced on 25th January, 1999 merely because the process of selection had been initiated by the Committee of Management prior to the introduction of Section 33-E of the Act or not. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the division Bench judgment passed in writ petition No.70271 of 2010 Subhash Chandra Tripathi vs. State of U.P. and others decided on 14.07.2014. Following two questions have been answered by the Division Bench in the case of Subhash Chandra Tripathi (Supra): "(a) Whether in respect short term vacancy, appointment can be made by the Committee of Management subsequent to 25th January, 1999 when the power to make ad-hoc appointment by the Committee of Management itself has been withdrawn by addition of Section 33-E to U.P. Act No.5 of 1982? (b) Whether initiation of process by an advertisement prior to 25th January, 1999 can lead to suggest that even after statutory withdrawal of the substantive power of the Committee of Management to make ad-hoc appointment against short term vacancy, it still retains the same after 25th January, 1999, merely because the process of selection was initiated earlier?" 3. The Division Bench has held in paragraph 16 of its judgment as follows: "(a) A short term vacancy for which the process of appointment was started to fill it up by the ad-hoc appointment by the Committee of Management of the College prior to 25.1.1999 can be filed up and the appointment can be made by the Committee of Management even after the rescission of the Removal of Difficulties orders by inserting Section 33-E to the U.P. Act, No.5 of 1982. (b) The initiation of process by an advertisement prior to 25.1.1999 by the Committee of Management to fill up a short term vacancy by adhoc appointment can be continued and concluded and appointment letters issued even after initiation of Section 33E to the U.P. Act No.5 of 1982 w.e.f. 25.01.1999. 4. (b) The initiation of process by an advertisement prior to 25.1.1999 by the Committee of Management to fill up a short term vacancy by adhoc appointment can be continued and concluded and appointment letters issued even after initiation of Section 33E to the U.P. Act No.5 of 1982 w.e.f. 25.01.1999. 4. We find it difficult to accept the judgment of the Division Bench inasmuch as it is settled law that even selection confers no right of appointment which stage is much after the initiation of the process of selection. The lawin that regard has been well settled under the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shankersan Dash vs. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 1612 , and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & another vs. S. G. Kotturappa & another (2005) 3 SCC as well as in the recent judgment of the Apex Court in case of Deshraj Singh Negi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others 1995 AWC 1035. 5. Once it has been held that mere selection confers no right upon the selected person, how can mere initiation of process of selection result in retention of the power of appointment by the authority concerned even when such power of appointment has been withdrawn especially, under an statutory provision (in the facts of the case under Section 33-E of the Act No.5 of 1982). 6. We may further record that although under the judgment of the division bench in the case of Rakesh Chandra Misra Vs. State of U.P. and others (2004) 3 UPLBEC 2671 , it has been held that the Committee of Management retains the power to make ad-hoc appointment under the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act 1921, but it appears that the Division Bench has not taken note of Section 16E(11) of the Act of 1921 where such power to make ad-hoc appointment against a short term vacancy under the Intermediate Education Act is confined to a particular period i.e. till the end of academic session, in which the vacancy was caused. 7. 7. In our opinion the Division Bench in the case of Subhash Chandra Tripathi, (Supra) has ignored Section 16 E(11) of the Intermediate Education Act while making the observation that the Committee of Management retains the power to make ad-hoc appointment against the short term vacancy under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, even after rescission of the Removal of Difficulties order Under the Section 33-E. 8. We may record that section 16 of U.P. Act 5 of 1982 prohibits making of appointment except in accordance with the provision of the Act. This prohibition has also not been taken note by the Division Bench in its order dated 14.7.2014. 9. We feel that following issues need to be examined by a larger bench of this Court: (a) whether even after the rescission of Removal of the Difficulties Order under Section 33-E of U.P. Act No.5 of 1982, w. e. f. 25th January 1999, the Committee of Management retains the power to make ad-hoc appointment against the short term vacancies only because it had published an advertisement for the purpose prior to 25.1.1999. (b) whether on enforcement of section 33-E of the Act No.5 of 1982 rescinding the Removal of Difficulties orders issued earlier, the Committee of Management has lost all powers to make ad-hoc appointment against the short term vacancies. (c) whether under Section 16 E of the Intermediate Education Act, there is a power with the Committee of Management to make ad-hoc appointment against short term vacancies and if so then for what period. (d) Whether the Division Bench in the case of Subhash Chandra Tripathi (Supra) has laid down the Correct law. 10. Let the records be laid before Hon'ble The Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench for examination of the issues as indicated above. 11. Since the decision may reflect on large number of such ad-hoc appointments, we feel, it appropriate to propose that the larger bench may be constituted at the earliest possible.