ORDER : ” A very short question is involved in the present writ application which has already been decided by this Court in three earlier decision, reported in 1985 PLJR 15 (Ramanand Singh v. Bidayapati Devi), 1986 PLJR 222 (Bettiah Estate v. Pushpa Devi) and 1989 PLJR 536 (Smt. Jai Kala Devi v. Nalini Ranjan Prasad Singh). Admittedly, there is a private mosque over Khati homestead land which is being dragged in, for the purpose of consolidation scheme under the provisions of Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956. 2. From the impugned orders, I find that there is no dispute over the fact that the land in dispute is being used as mosque and there are shops around such mosque. Even the Revenue Authorities have not disputed this fact. In the background of this admitted fact, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30-11-1987 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Nasriganj (Rohtas), in Consolidation Case No. 135/67 of 1986-87. The petitioner had preferred appeal against the order of Consolidation Officer being Appeal Case No. 1092 of 1987-88 before the Assistant Director of Consolidation which was allowed in his favour. The Revisional Authority i.e. Director, Consolidation in Revision Case No. 3605/89, setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority has affirmed the order of the Consolidation Officer by an order dated 7-11-1992 which is under challenge in the present case. 3. Mr. A. B. Ojha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has referred to the decision of this Court in case of (Bettiah Estate v. Pushpa Devi) and had relied upon paragraph No. 16 of the said decision to contend that the land in queation having no nexus to agriculture, the consolidation proceeding could not be maintained with respect to the said land. He has also placed reliance upon the decision in case of Ramanand Singh v. Bidayapati Devi (supra) and has submitted that in the absence of any finding that the said land is/was being used for agriculture purposes, no proceeding under the Consolidation Act could be maintained. He has also relied on another decision of this Court in case of Smt. Jai Kala Devi v. Nalini Ranjan Prasad Singh (supra) in respect of said submission. 4. Despite service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of the private respondent though they have entered appearance by way of Vakalatnama. 5. He has also relied on another decision of this Court in case of Smt. Jai Kala Devi v. Nalini Ranjan Prasad Singh (supra) in respect of said submission. 4. Despite service of notice, there is no representation on behalf of the private respondent though they have entered appearance by way of Vakalatnama. 5. I find substance in submission made by Mr. A. B. Ojha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the land in question is not covered by the definition of land within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Act which reads thus :” ' 2(9). ' Land' means agricultural land, and includes horticultural land. Kharaur land, land with bamboo clumps, pasture land, cultivable waste land homesteads, tanks, wells and water channels.' 6. A Division Bench of this Court in case of Bettiah Estate v. Pushpa Devi (supra) in most uncertain terms held that the said Act will have no application with respect to the lands having no nexus to agriculture. Relevant portion of paragraph No. 13 of the said decision is relevant and is being quoted hereinbelow :” ' A close analysis of the aforesaid would show that the definition is in two parts. The basic limitation imposed is that the land is to mean agricultural land. However, this basic concept is extended by expressly including therein certain things, which though may be co-related to agriculture, are not strictu sensu land as such, for example, homesteads, tanks, wells and water channels which in ordinary parlance, are not understood as land simpliciter or agricultural land as such. However, the second part of the definition brings those things also within the definition of land, by an inclusive definition. I am inclined to hold that though the inclusive portion of the definition may be interpreted somewhat widely and liberally, yet they have still to be read as ejusdem generis to the basic definition of ' land” as agricultural land. Therefore, the over-all meaning of ' land” and ' agricultural land” , cannot be either wholly eroded or evaporated. The inclusive part of the definition does not liberate it from the corner stone of the land being agricultural in nature or co-related to the same. Therefore, the subject-matter of consolidation has still to be ' land” as defined in section 2(9) and the re-arrangement of the parcels thereof for the purpose of rendering the holding more compact. The inclusive part of the definition does not liberate it from the corner stone of the land being agricultural in nature or co-related to the same. Therefore, the subject-matter of consolidation has still to be ' land” as defined in section 2(9) and the re-arrangement of the parcels thereof for the purpose of rendering the holding more compact. The Mirza Sulaiman Beg v. Harihar Mahto” s case ( AIR 1985 Pat 227 ) (supra), therefore, cannot be extended or expanded to mean that any or every thing dehors its relationship to either land or agriculture can come within the definition of Section 2(9). This view is also in consonance with the earlier Division Bench judgment in Ram Pratap Mahto v. Diplal Mahto ( 1979 BBCJ 738 ).' 7. The view has been reiterated by this Court in case of Ramanand Singh v. Bidayapati Devi (supra) where Court held in paragraph No. 6 that house connected with non-agricultural activities, cannot be covered by the provisions of the Act. 8. Similar view has been taken by this Court in case of Smt. Jai Kala Devi v. Nalini Ranjan Prasad Singh (supra). 9. In view of the submission as above and view of the pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove, the order dated 7-11-1992 passed by the Director, Consolidation. Bihar, Patna in writ petition No. 3605/89 is quashed. The order passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. the Assistant Director, Consolidation dated 13-9-1989 passed in Appeal No. 1092 of 1987-88 admittedly stands quashed. 10. This application is allowed accordingly. Petition allowed.