JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—Present writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, arises out of a judicial order passed by Civil Court. At the very outset, attention of this Court has been invited to a reference answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2015(3) ADJ 210 (SC), wherein, it has been held as under in para 25 : “25. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows : “(i) Judicial orders of Civil Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.” 2. Since large number of writ petitions, in the nature of certiorari and prohibition, arising out of judicial orders passed by Civil Courts, have been entertained by this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, many of which are pending, apart from the fact that such petitions are being regularly filed and entertained, as such, the issue assumes significance. Apart from learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, other learned members of Bar have advanced considerable arguments in support of their contention that being a superior Court, the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari and prohibition, to the inferior Civil Courts, situated within its territorial jurisdiction. Historical development of law of writs, particularly in the nature of certiorari, in England, and its application by the Courts in India, especially, after coming into being of the Indian Constitution has been placed. Attention of this Court has been invited to Constitution Bench decisions of the Apex Court, which, according to them, have not been placed before their Lordships in Radhey Shyam (supra), and on the strength of such decisions of Larger Benches, it is contended, that ratio laid down in Radhey Shyam (supra) is not binding. 3. The Civil Courts in State of Uttar Pradesh have been constituted, pursuant to Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and its provisions were extended and made applicable upon Courts constituted under Oudh Courts Act, 1925, vide amending Act No. II of 1956. Section 18 of the Act of 1887 defines original jurisdiction of District or Civil Judge, whereas Section 19 provides the extent of jurisdiction of a Munsif. Section 18 of the Act of 1887 defines original jurisdiction of District or Civil Judge, whereas Section 19 provides the extent of jurisdiction of a Munsif. The jurisdiction of Civil Court, thus, is limited and defined. By virtue of Section 9 of the Act of 1887 and subsequently by virtue of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, such Courts function under the superintendence of High Court, which is a superior Court of record. Whether a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable, arising out of judicial orders/proceedings of Civil Courts, after the judgment in Radhey Shyam (supra), is the question involved in this petition. 4. Tracing evolution of law of certiorari, Sri Salil Kumar Rai and Sri Manish Kumar Nigam, Advocates, submit that writ of certiorari was initially issued by superior Courts against bodies, which were Courts, inferior to it, in strict sense, and had duty to act judicially. Its expanse over a period of time included other bodies as well, which were not Courts in strict sense, but were required to act judicially by law. The test to determine whether such authority had duty to act judicially, depended upon existence of law enjoining such obligation upon it, but so far as Courts are concerned, they were held to be clearly under duty to act judicially. The development of the law so as to include administrative and quasi-judicial bodies within the writ jurisdiction started by holding that the concerned authorities should have the ‘trappings of the Court’. Submission is that while broadening the scope of certiorari, to include bodies beyond Courts, in strict sense, jurisdiction with the superior Court to issue writ of certiorari to inferior Courts, in strict sense, have not been abrogated. 5. Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and others, 1950 SCR 621 , has been relied upon. At page 630 to 631 of the report, following observations were made : “A distinction between the nature of the two acts has been noticed in a series of decisions. This Irish case is one of the very early decisions. At page 630 to 631 of the report, following observations were made : “A distinction between the nature of the two acts has been noticed in a series of decisions. This Irish case is one of the very early decisions. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that as stated by Chief Justice May, whenever there is the determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, that determination is a quasi-judicial decision and, if so, a writ of certiorari will lie against the body entrusted with the work of making such decision. As against this, it was pointed out that in several English cases emphasis is laid on the fact that the decision should be a judicial decision and the obligation to act judicially is to be found in the Act establishing the body which makes the decision. This point appears to have been brought out clearly in The King v. The Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 KB 171, where Lord Justice Atkin (as he then was) laid down the following test: “Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these’ writs.” This passage has been cited with approval in numerous subsequent decisions and accepted as laying down the correct test. A slightly more detailed examination of the distinction is found in The King v. London County Council, [1931] 2 KB 215, 233, where Scrutton L.J. observed as follows :—”it is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense in which this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of certiorari.” Lord Justice Slesser in his judgment at page 243 separated the four conditions laid down by Atkin L.J. under which a rule certiorari may issue. They are: wherever any body of per- sons (1) having legal authority (2) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects and (3) having the duty to act judicially (4) act in excess of their legal authority—a writ of certiorari may issue. He examined each of these conditions separately and came to the conclusion that the existence of each was necessary to determine the nature of the act in question. In The Ryots of Garabandho and other villages v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (70 I.A. 129) Viscount Simon L.C., in delivering the judgment of the Board, accepted the test of these four conditions to determine the nature of the act. He stated: “This writ does not issue to correct purely executive acts but, on the other hand, its application is not narrowly limited to inferior ‘Courts’ in the strictest sense. Broadly speaking, it may be said that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from being a ministerial act, certiorari will lie.” 6. It is submitted that High Courts in India are not bound by technical restrictions of English law, and that writ of certiorari is a supervisory writ. Elaborating such submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and another, 1955 (1) SCR 250 , wherein following passages at pages 256 to 257 are reproduced : “The language used in articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be ‘considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law. One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari is, that the writ can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression “ judicial acts “ includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts. Atkin L. J. thus summed up the law on this point in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners : “Whenever any body or persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling Jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.” The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. .....” 7. Learned counsel has also referred to a judgment of 7 Hon’ble Judges’ Bench in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, 1955 (1) SCR 1104 , wherein it was held that a writ of certiorari is issued to the cause, whereas a writ of prohibition is issued to the Court, and therefore, the nature of the authority deciding the case may not be relevant, and what is to be seen is as to whether the authority deciding the lis had to act judicially or not. In Hari Vishnu Kamath’s case, while answering the question as to whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be issued against the decision of the election tribunal, the Bench considered the evolution of law of certiorari and it was observed that certiorari is a high prerogative writ issued by the Court of the King’s Bench or Chancery to inferior Courts or tribunals in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction with a view to ensure that they acted within the bounds of their jurisdiction. To this end, they were commanded to transmit the records of a cause or matter pending with them to the superior Court to be dealt with. Following passages at pages 1114 to 1115 of the judgment have been relied upon, and are reproduced : “According to the common law of England, certiorari is a high prerogative writ issued by the Court of the King’s Bench or Chancery to inferior Courts or tribunals in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction with a view to ensure that they acted within the bounds of their jurisdiction. To this end, they were commanded to transmit the records of a cause or matter pending with them to the superior Court to be dealt with there, and if the order was found to be without juirsdiction, it was quashed. The Court issuing certiorari to quash, however, could not substitute its own decision on the merits,, or give directions to be complied with by the Court or the tribunal. Its work was destructive; it simply wiped out the order passed without jurisdiction, and left the matter there. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, [1955] SCR 250, Mukherjea, J. dealing with this question observed: “In granting a writ of ‘certiorari’ the superior Court does not exercise the power of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own view for those of the inferior tribunal. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the deteriment of any person. vide per Lord Cairns in Walsall’s Overseers v. L. and N. W. Ry. Co., [1879] 4 A.C.30, 39)”. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the deteriment of any person. vide per Lord Cairns in Walsall’s Overseers v. L. and N. W. Ry. Co., [1879] 4 A.C.30, 39)”. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 14 at page 123 the nature of a writ of certiorari for quashing is thus stated: “It is not a proceeding against the tribunal or an individual composing it; it acts on the cause or proceeding in the lower Court, and removes it to the superior Court for reinvestigation”. The writ for quashing is thus directed against a record, and as a record can be brought up only through human agency, it is issued to the person or authority whose decision is to be reviewed. If it is the record of the decision that has to be removed by certiorari, then the fact that the tribunal has become functus officio subsequent to the decision could have no effect on the jurisdiction of the Court to remove the record. If it is a question of issuing directions, it is conceivable that there should be in existence a person or authority to whom they could be issued, and when a certiorari other than one to quash the decision is proposed to be issued, the fact that the tribunal has ceased to exist might operate as a bar to its issue. But if the true scope of certiorari to quash is that it merely demolishes the offending order, the presence of the offender before the Court, though proper, is not necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction or to render its determination effective.” Distinction between law of prohibition and certiorari was also explained in following words at page 1117 of the said judgment : “Now, if a writ of prohibition could be issued only if there are proceedings pending in a Court, it must follow that it is incapable of being granted when the Court has ceased to exist, because there could be then no proceeding on which it could operate. But it is otherwise with a writ of certiorari to quash, because it is directed against a decision which has been rendered by a Court or tribunal, and the continued existence of that Court or tribunal is not a condition of its decision being annulled. But it is otherwise with a writ of certiorari to quash, because it is directed against a decision which has been rendered by a Court or tribunal, and the continued existence of that Court or tribunal is not a condition of its decision being annulled. In this context, the following passage from Juris Corpus Secundum, Volume 14, page 126 may be usefully quoted: “Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it........ is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower Court and not to the Court itself, while prohibition is a preventive remedy issuing to restrain future action and is directed to the Court itself”.” Since their Lordships were considering issue regarding issuance of a writ of certiorari against a decision of the election tribunal, it relied upon the Constitution Bench in Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, 1954 SCR 565 , to hold that a writ of certiorari was maintainable, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The following passage at pages 1120 to 1121, therefore, are reproduced : “We are also of opinion that the Election Tribunals are subject to the superintendence of the High Courts under article 227 of the Constitution, and that superintendence is both judicial and administrative. That was held by this Court in Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, [1954] SCR 565, where it was observed that in this respect article 227 went further than Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which the superintendence was purely administrative, and that it restored the position under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. It may also be noted that while in a certiorari under article 226 the High Court can only annul the decision of the Tribunal, it can, under article 227, do that, and also issue further directions in the matter. We must accordingly hold that the application of the appellant for a writ of certiorari and for other reliefs was maintainable under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for the issue of certiorari in the present case. There was considerable argument before us as to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it could be issued. Then the question is whether there are proper grounds for the issue of certiorari in the present case. There was considerable argument before us as to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in Parry & Co. v. Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras, [1952] SCR 519, Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. and others, [1952] SCR 583, Ibrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General, [1952] SCR 696 and quite recently in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1955] SCR 250. On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to re-hear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in certiorari. These propositions -are well-settled and are not in dispute.” 8. The observations of the Constitution Bench judgment in Province of Bombay (supra) that power to issue a writ of certiorari to an inferior Court was reiterated by subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in Shri Radeshyam Khare and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 1959 SCR 1440 . These propositions -are well-settled and are not in dispute.” 8. The observations of the Constitution Bench judgment in Province of Bombay (supra) that power to issue a writ of certiorari to an inferior Court was reiterated by subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in Shri Radeshyam Khare and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 1959 SCR 1440 . The observations at pages 1456 to 1457 of the reports are reproduced : “In Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, this Court has discussed at considerable length the nature of the two kinds of act, judicial and administrative, and has laid down certain tests for ascertaining whether the act of a statutory body is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act. It will, therefore, suffice to refer to the celebrated definition of a quasi- judicial body given by Atkin L. J. as he then was, in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners and which now holds the field. It runs as follows: “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Beneh -Division exercised in these writs.” This definition was accepted as correct in Rex v. London County Council, [1931] 2 KB 215 and many subsequent cases both in England and in this country. It will be noticed that this definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be said to be quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a Court or a quasi-judicial body, it would follow that the real and determining test for ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition in the definition given by Atkin L. J. Therefore in considering whether in taking action under Section 53-A the State Government is to be regarded as functioning as a quasi-judicial body or a mere administrative body it has to be ascertained whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the State Government a duty to act judicially.” Though Hon’ble Subba Rao, J. dissented from the majority judgment on the conclusions, yet the following passage at page 1499 was inconformity with the majority view, which held that Court had a duty to act judicially, and is reproduced : “The true view, as it seems to us, is that the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it would be impossible, and, indeed, inadvisable, to attempt to define exhaustively. Where’ the decision is that of a Court, then, unless, as in the case, for instance, of justices granting excise licences, it is acting in a purely ministerial capacity, it is clearly under a duty to act judicially. When, on the other hand, the decision is that of an administrative body and is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if, in order to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, then there is the duty to act judicially in the course of that inquiry.........” 9. Reliance has also been placed upon a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, 1964 (4) SCR 409 , wherein while referring to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Hon’ble Bench made following observations at pages 425 to 426 of the reports : “This supervisory power of the High Court under the English Law is not to be confused with visitorial power of the High Court exercisable by the writ of Mandamus. Mandamus issues to Courts only when justice is delayed and is a command to them to hear and dispose of the case. There is also the writ of Prohibition which issues to a Court to stop it from taking upon itself to examine a cause and to decide it without legal authority. The writ of Mandamus was evolved much later than the writ of Certiorari’ and by Mandamus the Courts were not directed to give any particular judgment but merely to give Judgment. An erroneous judgment could be set aside on appeal or quashed by Certiorari’. Prohibition lay to prevent assumption of jurisdiction but only before an order was passed. Certiorari’ to quash lay in a completed case on a question of jurisdiction and an error of law apparent on the face of the record. As Lord Sumner observed in Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., [1922] 2 AC 128, 156 : “Its jurisdiction is to see that the inferior Court has not exceeded its own, and for that very reason it is bound not to interfere in what has been done within that jurisdiction, for in so doing it would itself, in turn, transgress the limits which its own jurisdiction of supervision, not of review, is confined. That supervision goes to two points; one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise”. From the above discussion it is apparent that interference with a case before an inferior Court by Prerogative writs could take place under the English Law: (a) by stopping proceedings before the case was decided by a writ of Prohibition; (b) ordering the trial of a case and the delivery of judgment by Mandamus. (c) quashing an order in a completed case for want of jurisdiction or for an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The power given by s. 115 of the Code is clearly limited to the keeping of the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction It does not comprehend the power exercisable under the writs of Prohibition or Mandamus. It is also not a full power of Certiorari in as much as it arises only in a case of jurisdiction and not in a case of error. It is also not a full power of Certiorari in as much as it arises only in a case of jurisdiction and not in a case of error. It has been ruled by the judicial Committee and also by this Court that the section is concerned with jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone involving a refusal to exercise jurisdiction where one exists or an assumption of jurisdiction where none exists and lastly acting with illegality or material irregularity. Where there is no question of jurisdiction in this manner the decision cannot be corrected for it has also been ruled that a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. But once a flaw of jurisdiction is found the High Court need not quash and remit as is the practice in English Law under the writ of Certiorari but pass such order as it thinks fit.” 10. Again a Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 , is relied upon, wherein following is held in Para 7 : “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had. erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was’ insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, MANU/SC0095/1954: [1955] 1 SCR 1104, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, MANU/SC/0101/1958: [1958] SCR 1240, and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, MANU/SC/0219/1959: AIR 1960 SC 1168 .” 11. A Constitution Bench in Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and others, AIR 1958 SC 398 , considered the distinction between Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in following words in paras 41 and 44 : “41. A Constitution Bench in Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and others, AIR 1958 SC 398 , considered the distinction between Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in following words in paras 41 and 44 : “41. ......The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial powers, do not exercise their powers in excess of their statutory jurisdiction, but correctly administer the law within the ambit of the statute creating them or entrusting those functions to them. 44. It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Hence, interference by the High Court, in these cases, either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, was not justified.” 12. Reliance has also been placed upon paras 31 to 37 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Prabodh Verma and others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1984 (4) SCC 251 , and upon para 6 of the Constitution Bench judgment in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, 2002 (4) SCC 388 , which are reproduced : “31. A writ of certiorari can never be issued to call for the record or papers and proceedings of an Act or Ordinance and for quashing such Act or ordinance. The writ of certiorari and the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto were known in English common law as “prerogative writs”. “Prerogative writs,’ are to be distinguished from “writs of right” also known as “writs of course”. Writs issued as part of the public administration of justice are called “writs of right” or “writs of course” because the Crown is bound by Magna Carta of 1215 to issue them., as for instance, a writ to commence an action at common law. “Prerogative writs,’ are to be distinguished from “writs of right” also known as “writs of course”. Writs issued as part of the public administration of justice are called “writs of right” or “writs of course” because the Crown is bound by Magna Carta of 1215 to issue them., as for instance, a writ to commence an action at common law. Prerogative writs are (or rather, were) so called because they are issued by virtue of the Crown’s prerogative, not as a matter of right but only on some probable cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Court why the extraordinary power of the Crown should be invoked to render assistance to the party. The common law regards the Sovereign as the source. Or fountain of justice, and certain ancient remedial processes of an extraordinary nature, known as prerogative writs, have from the earliest times issued from the Court of King’s Bench in which the Sovereign was always present in contemplation of law. (See Jowitt’s “Dictionary of Law” vol.2, p. 1885, and Halsbury’s “Laws of England”, 4th ed., vol. 11, para. 1451, f.n.3). 32. We are concerned here with the writ of certiorari “Certiorari’ is a Late Latin word being the passive form of the word “certiorari” meaning `inform’ and occurred in the original Latin words of the writ which translated read “we. being desirous for certain reasons, that the said record should by you be certified to us,’. Certiorari was essentially a royal demand for information; the king, wishing to be certified of some matter, orders that the necessary information be provided for him. We find in DeSmith’s “Judicial Review of Administrative Action”, 4th edition, page 587, some interesting instances where writs of certiorori were so issued. Thus, these writs were addressed to the escheator or the sheriff to make inquisitions: the earliest being for the year 1260. Similarly, when Parliament granted Edward II one foot-soldier for every township, the writ addressed to the sheriffs to send in returns of their townships to the Exchequer was a writ of certiorari. Very soon after its first appearance this writ was used to remove to the King’s Court at Westminster the proceedings of inferior Courts of record: for instance, in 1271 the proceeding., in an assize of darrein presentment were transferred to Westminster because of their dilatoriness. Very soon after its first appearance this writ was used to remove to the King’s Court at Westminster the proceedings of inferior Courts of record: for instance, in 1271 the proceeding., in an assize of darrein presentment were transferred to Westminster because of their dilatoriness. This power was also assumed by the Court of Chancery and in the Tudor an early Stuart periods a writ of certiorari was frequently issued to bring the proceedings of inferior Courts of common law before the Chancellor. Later, however, the Chancery confied its supervisory functions to inferior Courts of equity. In “A New Abridgement of the Law”, Seventh Edition, Volume II at pages 9 and 19, Matthew Bacon has described a writ of certiorari in these words: “A certiorari is an original writ issuing out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, directed in the King’s name, to the judges or officers of inferior Courts, commanding them to return the records of a cause pending before them, to the end the party may have the more sure and speedy justice before him, or such other justice as he shall assign to determine the cause.” 33. By the time of King Charles II, however, applications for certiorari as also for habeas corpus and prohibition came to be made usually in the Court of King’s Bench. 34. The different functions of the prerogative writs of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus have been thus described in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume I, in para 80: “Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal Courts of common law prohibited other Courts from entertaining matters falling within the jurisdiction of the common law Courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior Court into the King’s Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that Court, mandamus was directed to inferior Courts and tribunals, and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty, All three were called prerogative writs. ...During the seventeenth century certiorari evolved as a general remedy to quash the proceedings of inferior tribunals and was used largely to supervise justices of the peace in the performance of their criminal and administrative functions under various statutes. In 1700 (in R.v. Glamorganshire Inhabitants(1) and Groenvelt v. Burwell, (1700)1 Ld. ...During the seventeenth century certiorari evolved as a general remedy to quash the proceedings of inferior tribunals and was used largely to supervise justices of the peace in the performance of their criminal and administrative functions under various statutes. In 1700 (in R.v. Glamorganshire Inhabitants(1) and Groenvelt v. Burwell, (1700)1 Ld. Raym 454, it was held that the Court of King’s Bench would examine the proceedings of all jurisdictions erected by Act of Parliament, and that, if under pretence of such an Act they proceeded to arrogate jurisdiction to themselves greater than the Act warranted, the Court would send a certiorari to them to have their proceedings returned to the Court, so that the Court might restrain them from exceeding that jurisdiction. If bodies exercising such jurisdiction did not perform their duty, the King’s Bench would grant a mandamus. Prohibition would issue if anything remained to prohibit. The ambit of certiorari and prohibition was not limited to the supervision of functions that would ordinarily be regarded as strictly judicial, and in the nineteenth century the writs came to be used to control the exercise of certain administrative functions by local and central Government authorities which did not necessarily act under judicial forms.” 35. By the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous provisions) Act, 1938 (I and 2 Geo. 6 c.63) a more expenditious procedure was introduced under which instead of writs, orders of mandamus prohibition and certiorari are to be issued and the writ of quo warranto was abolished and its place an injunction is to issue against the usurper to the office in question restraining him from acting in that office and, if the case so requires, declaring that office to be vacant. These were, however, procedural changes only. By order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1965, substituted for the old order 53 by Rules of Supreme Court (Amendment No. 3), 1977 (S.1. 1977 No. 1955), far reaching changes, not merely in the form but in the substance of procedural law, were introduced whereby reliefs by way of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, declaration and injunction have been joined together under the general head of ‘judicial review’ for which an application can be made for any or all of these reliefs in the alternative or in addition to other reliefs arising out of the same matter and the Court is also conferred the power to award damages. An application, however, cannot be made without leave of the Court and unless the Court “considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates”. The expression ‘sufficient interest’ has enabled the Court in England to enlarge the rule of locus standi by giving to that expression a liberal interpretation. 36. In India, prior to the Constitution, the power to issue prerogative writs was vested only in three High Courts, that is, the High Courts established by Letters Patent issued by Queen Victoria under authority given by the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict c, 104) for the establishment of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and at Madras and at Bombay for these three presidencies, namely, the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Hence this Act is generally called the Charter Act and the High Courts established there under the Chartered High Courts. These High Courts were the successors so far as their original jurisdictions were concerned of the Supreme Courts which were established in these three Presidency- towns and inherited from those Courts the powers of the Courts of King’s Bench which included the power to issue prerogative writs, Apart from these three High Courts none of the other High Courts in India possessed this power. The position was changed when the Constitution of India came into force. Article 225 continues the jurisdiction of existing High Courts. Article 226, however, confers upon every High Court the power to issue to any person or authority, including in proper cases, any Government, within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, “directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose”. It may be mentioned that under Article 32 of the Constitution, the same power as has been conferred upon the High Courts is conferred upon this Court without any restriction as to territorial jurisdiction but, unlike the High Court, restricted only to the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, namely, the Fundamental Rights. Referring to Article 226, this Court in Dwarka nath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income Tax officer, Special Circle. Referring to Article 226, this Court in Dwarka nath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income Tax officer, Special Circle. Kanpur and another(1) said: “This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression `nature’, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them, That apart High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the high Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government in to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure, such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through the defined channels.”(Emphasis supplied) 37. The fact that the High Courts and a fortiori this Court have power to mould the reliefs to meet the requirements of each case does not mean that the draftsman of a writ petition should not apply his mind to the proper relief which should be asked for and throw the entire burden of it upon the Court. An Advocate owes a duty to his client as well as to the Court a duty to his client to give of his best to the case which he has undertaken to conduct for his client and a duty to assist the Court to the utmost of his skill and ability in the proper and satisfactory administration of justice. An Advocate owes a duty to his client as well as to the Court a duty to his client to give of his best to the case which he has undertaken to conduct for his client and a duty to assist the Court to the utmost of his skill and ability in the proper and satisfactory administration of justice. In our system of administration of justice the Courts have a right to receive assistance from the Bar and it is the duty of the advocate who drafts a writ petition or any other pleading to ask for appropriate reliefs. The true nature of a writ of certiorari has been pointed out this by Court In several decisions. We need refer to only one of them, namely, Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar,(1) In that case Subba Rao. J. as he then was, speaking for the Court, said: Certiorari lies to remove for the purpose of quashing the proceedings of inferior Courts of record or other persons or bodies exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to notice the distinction between a writ of certiorari and a writ in the nature of certiorari: in either case the High Court directs an inferior tribunal or authority to transmit to itself the record of proceedings pending there in for scrutiny and, if necessary, for quashing the same.” * * * * “6. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court enforces the fundamental rights by issuing appropriate directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, it may be useful to refer to, in brief, the characteristics of the writs in general and writ of certiorari in particular with which we are concerned here. In English law there are two types of writs: (i) judicial procedural writs like writ of summons, writ of motion etc. which are issued as a matter of course; these writs are not in vogue in India, and (ii) substantive writs often spoken of as high prerogative writs like writ of quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition etc.; they are frequently resorted to in Indian High Courts and the Supreme Court. “103. which are issued as a matter of course; these writs are not in vogue in India, and (ii) substantive writs often spoken of as high prerogative writs like writ of quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition etc.; they are frequently resorted to in Indian High Courts and the Supreme Court. “103. Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal Courts of common law prohibited other Courts from entertaining matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law Courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior Court into the King’s Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that Court; mandamus was directed to inferior Courts and tribunals and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs.” In England while issuing these writs, at least in theory, the assumption was that the King was present in the King’s Court. The position regarding the House of Lords is described thus, “of the Court of Parliament, or of the King in Parliament as it is sometimes expressed, the only other supreme tribunal in this country” in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh, (1836) 1 Moo PC 117. They are discretionary writs but the principles for issuing such writs are well defined. In the pre-constitutional era the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writs was enjoyed only by three chartered High Courts in India but with the coming into force of the Constitution, all the High Courts and the Supreme Court are conferred powers to issue those writs under Article 226 and Article 32, respectively, of the Constitution. In regard to the writ jurisdiction, the High Courts in India are placed virtually in the same position as the Courts of King’s Bench in England. It is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in English law have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. It is, however, important to note that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by a superior Court to an inferior Court which certifies its records for examination. “109. It is, however, important to note that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by a superior Court to an inferior Court which certifies its records for examination. “109. Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior Court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court for review so that the Court may determine whether they should be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior Court or tribunal or public authority which forbids that Court or tribunal or authority to act in excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are employed for the control of inferior Courts, tribunals and public authorities.” 13. Learned counsel also submits that the distinction between a tribunal and inferior Court of civil jurisdiction in Radhey Shyam (supra) has not taken note of the Larger Bench judgments of the Apex Court. Submission is that ‘tribunal’ is a generic word, which includes Courts. It is stated that judicial power vests in the sovereign State, and therefore, the authority or body, if, is conferred power by the State under the statute or statutory rule to decide lis between the parties, then such power is subject to exercise of writ of certiorari. In a Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and another, 1965 (2) SCR 366 , at pages 372 to 373, following observations have been relied upon, for the present purposes, and are, thus, reproduced : “The expression “Court” in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the State’s inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary Courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of Courts and to their adjudication are normally. ,entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These Courts can be described as ordinary Courts of civil judicature. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of Courts and to their adjudication are normally. ,entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These Courts can be described as ordinary Courts of civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these Courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. In every State there are administrative bodies or authorities which are required to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner and their decisions are described as administrative decisions. In reaching their administrative decisions, administrative bodies can and often to take into consideration, questions of policy. It is not unlikely that even in this process of reaching administrative decisions, the administrative bodies or authorities are required to act fairly and objectively and would in many cases have to follow the principles of natural justice; but the authority to reach decisions conferred on such administrative bodies is clearly distinct and separate from the judicial power conferred on Courts, and the decisions pronounced by administrative bodies are similarly distinct and separate in character from judicial decisions pronounced by Courts. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one common characteristic: both the Courts and the tribunals are “ constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions.” (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and others) ( 1955 1 SCR 267 ). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State’s inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State’s inherent judicial function which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; -but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.” Again at pages 378 to 380 of the said judgment, the Bench was pleased to observe as under : “The majority decision in the case of the Bharat Bank ([19501 SCR 459), to which we have just referred was adopted unanimously by this Court in the case of Durga Skankar Mehta ([1955] 1 SCR 257). Speaking for the Court, Mukherjea, J., observed that it was now well-settled by the majority decision of the Court in the case of Bharat Bank that the expression “Tribunal” as used in Article 136 does not mean the same thing as “Court” but includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions, subject, of course, to the exception specifically provided for by Article 136(2). In M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunj-hunwala and others ([1962] 2 SCR 339, 352), the question which arose for decision of this Court was whether the Central Government, while it exercises its appellate power Under Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 (No. 1 of 1956), was a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1). In considering this question, the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act was examined, the earlier decisions bearing on the point were taken into account and it was held that s. 111(3) required that the Central Government, while acting as an appellate authority, had to act judicially and was entrusted with the judicial powers of the State to adjudicate upon rights of the parties in civil matters when there is a lis between the contesting parties, and so, the conclusion was inevitable that it acts as a tribunal and not as an executive body. In that connection, Shah J., who spoke for the majority of the Court, observed that the proceedings before the Central Government have all the trappings of a judicial tribunal; and by way of illustration, he referred to the fact that pleadings had to be filed, evidence had to be led, and the disputes had to be decided according to law after considering the representations made by the parties. Hidayatullah J., differed from the majority decision on the question as to the final order which should be passed in the said appeals. He held that there was no reason for the Central Government to have passed the impugned order, and so, he wanted the appeals to be allowed. Accordingly, he directed that the impugned order should be set aside and appeals should be allowed with costs. On the preliminary question as to whether the appeals were competent, the learned Judge agreed with the majority decision that the Central Government was a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136(1). Construing Article 136(1), the learned Judge observed that Courts and tribunals act judicially in both senses which he had earlier discussed, and in the term “Court” are included the ordinary and permanent tribunals and in the term “tribunal” are included all others, which are not so included. Among the powers of the State, said Hidayatullah J., is included the power to decide controversies between parties. Among the powers of the State, said Hidayatullah J., is included the power to decide controversies between parties. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different (pp. 362-63). Thus, it would be noticed that all the learned Judges who heard this case, were agreed in taking the view that the essential power which was exercised by the Courts and tribunals alike was the judicial power of the State.” 14. Observations of the Supreme Court in S.D. Joshi and others v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2011 (1) SCC 252 , contained in paras 29 to 31 is also reproduced: “29. This question need not detain us any further, as the law in this regard is no more res integra and stands finally stated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1 669. Justice Hidayatullah, as His Lordship then was, while giving his own reasons concurred with other Judges in allowing the appeal setting aside the order of the Central Government. While commenting upon the maintainability of the appeals, he drew a distinction between a `Court’ and a `Tribunal’ and dealt with the question as to whether the Central Government, while hearing this appeal, was a Tribunal and held as under : (AIR pp. 1680-81, paras 32-33 & 36) “32. With the growth of civilization and the problems of modern life, a large number of Administrative Tribunals have come into existence. These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of civil judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of “Courts” in Article 136, 227 or 228 or in Articles 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of civil judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of “Courts” in Article 136, 227 or 228 or in Articles 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of civil judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Articles 136 and 227. By “Courts” is meant Courts of civil judicature and by “tribunals”, those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of civil judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that Courts have “an air of detachment”. But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many tribunals, in recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make this test insufficient. Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Company of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation observed: “The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court, which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power.... In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners” 33. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners” 33. In my opinion, a Court in the strict sense is a tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of civil judicature maintained by the State under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by law from their jurisdiction. The word “judicial”, be it noted, is itself capable of two meanings. They were admirably stated by Lopes, L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson in these words: “The word `judicial’ has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a Judge or by Justices in Court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in Court, but in respect of which it is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind — that is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration.” That an officer is required to decide matters before him “judicially” in the second sense does not make him a Court or even a tribunal, because that only establishes that he is following a standard of conduct, and is free from bias or interest. * * * 36. Now, in its functions the Government often reaches decisions, but all decisions of the Government cannot be regarded as those of a tribunal. Resolutions of the Government may affect rights of parties, and yet, they may not be in the exercise of the judicial power. Resolutions of the Government may be amenable to writs under Articles 32 and 226 in appropriate cases, but may not be subject to a direct appeal under Article 136 as the decisions of a tribunal. The position, however, changes when Government embarks upon curial functions, and proceeds to exercise judicial power and decide disputes. In those circumstances, it is legitimate to regard the officer who deals with the matter and even Government itself as a tribunal. The position, however, changes when Government embarks upon curial functions, and proceeds to exercise judicial power and decide disputes. In those circumstances, it is legitimate to regard the officer who deals with the matter and even Government itself as a tribunal. The officer who decides, may even be anonymous; but the decision is one of a tribunal, whether expressed in his name or in the name of the Central Government. The word “tribunal” is a word of wide import, and the words “Court” and “tribunal” embrace within them the exercise of judicial power in all its forms. The decision of the Government thus falls within the powers of this Court under Article 136.” It was held that all tribunals are not Courts though all Courts are tribunals. 30. This view has been reiterated by this Court, more particularly, in relation to drawing a distinction between a tribunal and a Court. A tribunal may be termed as a Court if it has all the trappings of a Court and satisfies the above stated parameters. Every Court may be a tribunal but every tribunal necessarily may not be a Court. The essential features of ‘Court’ have been noticed by us above and once these essential features are satisfied, then it will have to be termed as a ‘Court’. The statutory provisions of the Family Court squarely satisfy these ingredients and further Presiding Officers of Family Courts are performing judicial and determinative functions and, as such, are Judges. 31. ‘Judge’ is a generic term and other terms like, Umpire, Arbiter and Arbitrator are only species of this term. A Judge, primarily, determines all matters of disputes and pronounces what is law now, as well as what will be the law for the future and acts under the appointment of the Government. Pollock C.B. in Ex parte Davis [(1857) 5 W.R.523] said, “judges are philologists of the highest orders. They are not mere administrative officers of the Government but represent the State to administer justice.” Thus, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Family Court constituted under Section 3 of the Act has all the trappings of a Court and, thus, is a Court and the Presiding Officer, that is, Judge of the Family Court is a ‘Judge’ though of limited jurisdiction.” 15. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid decisions rendered by Larger Benches have not been noticed in para -12 of the judgment in Radhey Shyam (Supra). Much emphasis has been laid upon the judgment of the larger benches of the Apex Court in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra and others, 1966(3) SCR 744 (hereinafter referred to as Mirajkar’s case) and Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 (1) SCR 778, which have been relied upon in Radhey Shyam’s (supra). Sri Rai submits that the matter was referred to a Bench of seven Hon’ble Judges in Smt. Ujjam Bai (Supra), pursuant to a reference made by a Bench of 5 Hon’ble Judges vide order dated 28.4.1961, delivered by Hon’ble Venkatarama Aiyar, J. Last page of the referring order, appearing at page 821 of the report, is reproduced : “These decisions have no bearing on the point now under consideration, which is not whether a writ of certiorari will lie under the general law against decisions of Courts - on that, there could be and has been no controversy- but whether, on the terms of Article 12, that will lie against an order of a Court or Tribunal. The above is a resume of the arguments addressed by both sides in support of their respective contentions. The question thus rebated is of considerable importance on which there has been no direct pronouncement by this Court. It seems desirable that it should be authoritatively settled. We accordingly direct that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench for deciding the two following questions : 1. Is an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute which is intra virus, open to challenge as repugnant to Article 19(1)(g), on the sole ground that it is based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder ? 2. Can the validity of such an order be questioned in a petition under Article 32, of the Constitution ? “. 16. Relying upon the observation of the referring order, extracted above, in Ujjam Bai (supra), learned counsel submits that the question as to whether a writ of certiorari will lie under the general law, against the decision of the Courts, could be and has been found to be not in controversy. “. 16. Relying upon the observation of the referring order, extracted above, in Ujjam Bai (supra), learned counsel submits that the question as to whether a writ of certiorari will lie under the general law, against the decision of the Courts, could be and has been found to be not in controversy. It is submitted that Ujjam Bai’s case arose out of an assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. As it had been observed in referring order that there was no controversy about a writ of certiorari being available against an order of Court, the only question for consideration was as to whether, in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, such a writ would lie against an order of Tribunal. The question answered in Ujjam Bai case, therefore, was as to whether an order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute, which is intra virus, was open to challenge as repugnant to Article 19(1) (g), by filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed upon the following observations of Hon’ble M. Hidayatullah,J. at pages 936 and 937 of the report to contend that Courts are amenable to writ jurisdiction : “The right to move this Court being guaranteed, the petition may lie, but there are other thing to consider before it can be said in what cases this Court will interfere. I shall now consider in what kind of cases the powers under Article 32 will be used by this Court. Since this case arises under a taxing statute, I shall confine myself to taxing laws, because other considerations may arise in other circumstances and the differing facts are sometimes so subtle as to elude one, unless they are before him. The challenge on the ground of a breach of fundamental rights may be against a law or against executive action. I am leaving out of account action by the Courts of civil judicature, and am not pausing to consider whether the word “ State” as defined in Article 12 includes the ordinary Courts of civil judicature. That question does does not arise here and must be left for decision in a case in which it properly does. I am leaving out of account action by the Courts of civil judicature, and am not pausing to consider whether the word “ State” as defined in Article 12 includes the ordinary Courts of civil judicature. That question does does not arise here and must be left for decision in a case in which it properly does. Whether or not be word ‘State’ covers the ordinalry Courts, there is authority to show that tribunals which play the dual role as deciding issues in a quasi judicial way and acting as the instrumentalities of Governments are within the word “State” as used in Part-II of the constitution”. 17. Argument is that observation made at page 973 of the report which has been noticed in para-12 of the judgment in Radhey Shyam’s case (Supra), suggesting that the Tribunals are different from the Courts and there is no substantial identity between the two, according to the learned counsel, has to be viewed in the context of the referring order. Para-5 of the judgment delivered by Hon’ble N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., which has been relied upon, is reproduced below : “(5) That the reference to the Government and the Legislatures is to them as institutions and is not to be understood as a reference to their functions, viz., to bodies performing executive and legislative functions is perhaps forcefully brought out by the “State”. It is obvious that municipal and local Board authorities going under various descriptions in the several State would be comprehended within that term. Now municipal councils exercise, as is well known, legislative, executive as well as quasi judicial functions. They frame Rules and bye-laws which are subordinate legislation and would fall within the description of “laws” as defined by Article 13. Municipal Councils are vested with administative functions and they also exercise quasi-judicial functions when assessing taxes, hearing taxation appeals, to mention only a small fraction of the quasi-judicial power which they possess and exercise in the discharge of their functions as the local administration. If the “ local authority” as a whose is a “State” within the definition there is no canon of construction by which any part of the action of that authority could be designated as not falling within State action for the purpose of giving rise to violation of a fundamental right. (6) There is only one other matter which need be referredto in this connection. (6) There is only one other matter which need be referredto in this connection. Both this Court, as well as the High Court have vested in them the power to make rules, and it cannot be disputed that such rules would be “laws” within the definition of the expression in Article 13. If so, it is manifest that such rules might violate the fundamental rights, i.e., their validity would depend inter alia on their passing the test of permissible legislation under Part-III. This would directly contradict any argument that Courts and quasi-judicial authorities are outside the definition of State in Article 12. “In the face of these deductions following from the Constitution itself, I find it wholly impossible to accede to the submission that what is termed as judicial power of the State which, it is submitted, would include quasi-judicial authorities created under statute do not fall within the definition of the “State” and that their actions therefore are not to be deemed “State” action against which the Constitution has provided the rights guaranteed under Part-III”. “Before concluding it is necessary to advert to one matter which was just touched on in the course of the arguments as one which might be reserved for consideration when it actually arose, and this related to the question whether the decision or order of a regular ordinary Court of law as distinguished from a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority constituent or created under particular statutes could be complained of as violating a fundamental right. It is a salutary principle that this Court should not pronounce on points which are not involved in the questions raised before it and that is the reason why I am not dealing with it in any fulness and am certainly not expressing any decided opinion on it. Without doing either however, I consider it proper to make these observations. There is not any substantial identity between a Court of law adjudicating on the rights of parties in the lis before it and designed as the High Courts and this Court are to investigate inter alia whether any fundamental rights are infringed and vested with power to protect them, and quasi judicial authorities which are created under particular statutes and with a view to implement and administer their provisions. I shall be content to leave the topic at this.” 18. I shall be content to leave the topic at this.” 18. Relying upon the aforesaid passage, Sri Rai, submits, that the Hon’ble Court while discussing the question as to whether Courts and tribunal are state within Article 12 of the Constitution of India, did observe that a quasi-judicial authority, in certain circumstances, violate fundamental rights, but no such conclusion was expressed regarding Courts and that is why it was clarified that so far as violation of fundamental rights are concerned, the Courts and tribunals or quasi-judicial authority stand on different footing and there is no substantial identity between the two. 19. Learned counsel then submits that the judgment in Mirajkar’s case (supra), relied upon in Radhey Shyam (supra), had to be looked into in its entirety. Paras-16 to 18 of the judgment in Mirajkar’s case (supra) also reported in AIR 1961 SC 1 , which is reproduced below : “16. We have referred to these respective arguments just to indicate the extent of the field which has been covered by learned counsel who assisted us in dealing with the present petitions. As this Court has frequently emphasised, in dealing with constitutional matters, it is necessary that the decision of the Court should be confined to the narrow Points which a particular proceeding raises it. Often enough, in dealing with the very narrow point raised by a writ petition, wider arguments are urged before the Court; but the Court should always be careful not to cover ground which is strictly not relevant for the purpose of deciding the petition before it. Obiter observations and discussion of problems not, directly involved in any proceeding should be avoided by Courts in dealing with all matters brought before them; but this requirement becomes almost compulsive when the Court is dealing with constitutional matters. That is Why we do not propose to deal with the larger issues raised by the learned counsel in the present proceedings, and we wish to confine our decision to the narrow points which these petitions raise. 17. Let us, therefore, indicate clearly the scope of the enquiry in the present proceedings. That is Why we do not propose to deal with the larger issues raised by the learned counsel in the present proceedings, and we wish to confine our decision to the narrow points which these petitions raise. 17. Let us, therefore, indicate clearly the scope of the enquiry in the present proceedings. The impugned order has been passed by the learned Judge in the course of the trial of a suit before him after hearing the parties; and having regard to the circumstances under which the said order was passed, and the reasons on which it is presumably based, we are inclined to hold that what the order purports to do is to prohibit the publication of Mr. Goda’s evidence in the Press during the progress of the trial of the suit. We do not read this order as imposing a permanent ban on the publication of the said evidence. 18. On these facts, the question which arises for our decision is whether a judicial order passed by the High Court prohibiting the publication in newspapers of evidence given by a witness pending the hearing of the suit, is amenable to be corrected by a writ of certiorari issued by this Court under Article 32(2). This question has two broad facets; does the impugned order violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(a), (d) and (g); and if it does, is it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32(2)? Thus, in the present proceedings, we will limit our discussion and decision to the points which have a material bearing on the broad problem posed by the petitions before us”. 20. While discussing the issue as to whether the order passed by Hon’ble Tarkunde, J. while hearing the original proceedings, pending before the Bombay High Court, had contravened the fundamental rights of the citizen under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India, it was examined as to whether such an order could be subjected to the challenge under Article 32 of the Constitution of India ? 21. In view of the aforesaid, learned counsel submits that no further question arose for consideration in the matter. It was also noticed, by the Hon’ble Bench, in para-59 that High Court is a superior Court of record, in following words : “59. There is yet another aspect of this matter to which it is necessary to refer. 21. In view of the aforesaid, learned counsel submits that no further question arose for consideration in the matter. It was also noticed, by the Hon’ble Bench, in para-59 that High Court is a superior Court of record, in following words : “59. There is yet another aspect of this matter to which it is necessary to refer. The High Court is a superior Court of Record and under Article 215, shall have all powers of such a Court of Record including the power to punish contempt of itself. One distinguishing characteristic of such superior Courts is that they are entitled to consider questions of their jurisdiction raised before them. This question fell to be considered by this Court in Special Reference No. I of 1964 [(1965) 1 SCR 413 at p 499]. In that case, it was urged before this Court that in granting bail to Keshav Singh, the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and as such, the order was a nullity. Rejecting this argument, this Court observed that in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the Court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a Court of limited juris- diction, the superior Court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. That is why this Court did not accede to the proposition that in passing the order for interim bail, the High Court can be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction with the result that the order in question was null and void. That is why this Court did not accede to the proposition that in passing the order for interim bail, the High Court can be said to have exceeded its jurisdiction with the result that the order in question was null and void. In support of this view, this Court cited a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England where it is observed that “prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior Court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular Court [Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 9, p.349].” If the decision of a superior Court on a question of its jurisdiction is erroneous, it can, of course, be corrected by appeal or revision as may be permissible under the law; but until the adjudication by -a superior Court on such a point is set aside by adopting the appropriate course, it would not be open to be corrected by the exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court”. 22. After examining the contention of the parties, the Hon’ble Bench speaking through Hon’ble Gajendragadkar, J. held in para-60 that the order of Hon’ble Single Judge of Bombay High Court did not affect the fundamental rights of the petitioner, which is reproduced : “60. The basis of Mr. Setalvad’s argument is that the impugned order is not an order inter-partes, as it affects the fundamental rights of the strangers to the litigation, and that the said order is without jurisdiction. We have already held that the impugned order cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of the petitioners and that though it is not inter- partes in the sense that it affects strangers to the proceedings, it has been passed by the High Court in relation to a matter pending before it for its adjudication and as such, like other judicial orders passed by the High Court in proceedings pending before it, the correctness of the impugned order can be challenged only by appeal and not by writ proceedings. We have also held that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass such an order”. 23. We have also held that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass such an order”. 23. It is submitted that in view of this, it was clear that no writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was maintainable against an order passed by the High Court, as it is a superior Court of record. Observation, thereafter, made in paras 62 and 63, which is relied upon in Radhey Shyam (supra), is reproduced : “62. Whilst we are dealing with this aspect of the matter, we may incidentally refer to the relevant observations made by Halsbury on this point. “In the case of judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction,” says Halsbury in the footnote, “it has been suggested that certiorari might be granted to quash them for want of jurisdiction [Kemp v. Balne (1844), 1 Dow. & L. 885, at p. 887], inasmuch as an error did not lie upon that ground. But there appears to be no reported case in which the judgment of an inferior Court of civil jurisdiction has been quashed on certiorari, either for want of jurisdiction or on any other ground.”(1) The ultimate proposition is set out in the terms: “Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction.” These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by Civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari. 63. In Rex. v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsburry and Ipswich Diocese Ex parte White (1945) 1 KBD 195 at pp 205-206 the question which arose was whether certiorari would lie from the Court of King’s Bench to an ecclesiastical Court; and the answer rendered by the Court was that certiorari would not lie against the decision of an ecclesiastical Court. In dealing with this question, Wrottesley, L. J. has elaborately considered the history of the writ jurisdiction and has dealt with the question about the meaning of the word “inferior” as applied to Courts of law in England in discussing the problem as to the issue of the writ in regard to decisions of certain Courts. In dealing with this question, Wrottesley, L. J. has elaborately considered the history of the writ jurisdiction and has dealt with the question about the meaning of the word “inferior” as applied to Courts of law in England in discussing the problem as to the issue of the writ in regard to decisions of certain Courts. “The more this matter was investigated,” says Wrottesley, L. J., “the clearer it became that the word “inferior” as applied to Courts of law in England had been used with at least two very different meanings. If, as some assert, the question of inferiority is determined by ascertaining whether the Court in question can be stopped from exceeding its jurisdiction by a writ of prohibition issuing from the King’s Bench, then not only the ecclesiastical Courts, but also Palatine Courts and admiralty Courts are inferior Courts. But there is another test, well recognised by lawyers, by which to distinguish a superior from an inferior Court, namely, whether in its proceedings, and in particular in its judgments, it must appear that the Court was acting within its jurisdiction. This is the characteristic of an inferior Court, whereas in the proceedings of a superior Court it will be presumed that it acted within its jurisdiction unless the contrary should appear either on the face of the proceedings or aliunde.” Mr. Sen relied upon this decision to show that even the High Court of Bombay can be said to be an inferior Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction by this Court under Article 32(2) to issue a writ of certiorari in respect of the impugned order passed by it. We are. unable to see how this decision can support Mr. Sen’s contentions”. 24. Learned counsel submits that the observation in para-63 of the judgment was not the ratio laid down in the case, in view of the observation made in paras 16 to 18 of the said decision itself, as it was a judgment only on two issues, specified therein. 25. Learned counsel has invited attention of the Court to a passage of the third edition of Seervai’s Constitution of India, contained in para 7.49 which refers to the fact that a supplement to Halsbury’s third edition had already come in 1965, wherein it was clearly held that writ of certiorari lay by Queen’s Bench to quash an order of the inferior Court. Relevant portion of para 7.49 and footnote 11 is quoted below : “7.49 Unfortunately the attention of the Court was not called to the supplement to Halsbury (1965) which showed that the statement quoted above was not correct and that a writ to quash the decision of an inferior Court did lie. In any event, the question is put beyond doubt by R. v. Worthington Evans, Kemp v. Balne, Colonial Bank of Australasia v. William and R. v. Hurst.” 11 (1960) 2 Q.B. 133 (The Queen’s Bench issued a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the country Court and it was issued notwithstanding the provisions of the Country Courts Act, 1959, which provided only for a limited removal on matters by certiorari to the High Court. Lord Parker C.J. Said:” I am quite satisfied that certiorari will lie against a country Court judge if he has acted without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions of the Country Courts Act, 1959, to which I have referred.” (ibid. p. 143) See also d Smith, p. 323: “ ‘No certiorari’ clauses . . . . It has been held that certiorari would issue notwithstanding the presence of words taking away the right to apply for it . . .if the inferior tribunal . . . lacked or exceeded jurisdiction . . . “ citing, inter alia : R. v. Hurst and R. v. Worthington Evans in support.” 26. Learned counsel also submits that the observation in T.C. Basappa (supra) since has been endorsed in Mirajkar’s case, therefore, the proposition in Mirajkar’s case could not be construed as laying down a proposition that a writ would not lie against an order of the inferior Court. Submission is that the enunciation of law in Radhey Shyam (supra) is in conflict with the law laid down in para-52 of the judgment, wherein the view expressed in T.C. Basappa (supra) has been endorsed and relied upon. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the views expressed in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai, ( 2003 (6) SCC 675 ) in para-17, already noticed in Radhey Shyam’s case, is not incorrect. 27. Learned counsel submits that the observation in paras-62 and 63 of Mirajkar’s case, therefore, was at best an obiter and was not laying down the proposition, as is sought to be culled out in Radhey Shyam (supra). 27. Learned counsel submits that the observation in paras-62 and 63 of Mirajkar’s case, therefore, was at best an obiter and was not laying down the proposition, as is sought to be culled out in Radhey Shyam (supra). Learned Counsels have extensively addressed the Court on the issue to submit that what is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, upon this Court is the ratio laid down by the Apex Court, and not any incidental observation. It is submitted that the observations in paras- 62 and 62 was made in the context of the facts appearing therein, which were entirely distinct, and at best were incidental observations, and cannot be treated as binding precedent. 28. Learned members of the bar also submitted that as larger bench judgments, referred to above, particularly Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani and others, Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, Shri Radeshyam Khare and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and others, and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and another, have not been taken into consideration, therefore, the judgment of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam’s case is not binding. For such purposes, reliance has been placed upon the judgments in Krishena Kumar v. Union of India and others, (1990) 4 SCC 207 (Paras-19 and 20), Union of India and others v. Dhanwanti Devi and others, (1996) 6 SCC 44 (Paras-9 and 10), Orient Papers and Industries Ltd. and another v. State of Orissa and others, 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 81 (Para-19), and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., (1992) 4 SCC 363 (Para-39), which are extracted hereinafter : (1990) 4 SCC 207 : “19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain “propositions wider than the case itself required”. This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker’s Trustees2 and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem 3. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain “propositions wider than the case itself required”. This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker’s Trustees2 and Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem 3. Sir Frederick Pollock has also said : “Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision.” 20. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury (4th edn., Vol. 26, para 573) “The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal’s duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.” * * * * * * * (1996) 6 SCC 44 : 9. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.” * * * * * * * (1996) 6 SCC 44 : 9. Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Hari Krishan Khosla case2 is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per se per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates—(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. 10. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. It would, therefore, be necessary to see whether Hari Krishan Khosla case2 would form a binding precedent. Therein, admittedly the question that had arisen and was decided by the Bench of three Judges was whether solatium and interest are payable to an owner whose land was acquired under the provisions of the Central Act? On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the previous precedents bearing on the topic, the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. On consideration of the facts, the relevant provisions in the Central Act and the previous precedents bearing on the topic, the Court had held that solatium and interest are not a part of compensation. It is a facet of the principle in the statute. The Central Act omitted to provide for payment of solatium and interest since preceding the acquisition the property was under requisition during which period compensation was paid to the owner. The position obtained and enjoyed by the Government during the period of requisition continued after acquisition. The same principle was applied without further elaboration on entitlement to payment of interest of an owner. It is true that the decisions relied on by Shri Vaidyanathan on the principle of payment of interest as part of compensation in respect of land acquired were brought to the attention of this Court for discussion. What would be its purport would be considered a little later. Suffice it to say for the present that the finding that solatium and interest are not payable for the lands acquired under the Central Act as part of compensation is a binding precedent. Obviously, therefore, this Court followed the ratio therein in Distt. Judge case1. The contention, therefore, that Hari Krishan Khosla case2 cannot be treated as a binding precedent since therein there is no ratio but a conclusion without discussion, is not tenable and devoid of force. In that view, it is not necessary to discuss in extenso the effect of the decisions cited by Shri Vaidyanathan. Equally, the contention of Shri Vaidyanathan that the ratio in Hari Krishan Khosla case2 is in conflict with the ratio in Satinder Singh case3 which was neither distinguished nor overruled and that the decision of a coordinate Bench cannot have the effect of overruling decision of another coordinate Bench, cannot be given countenance. The effect of the ratio in Satinder Singh case3 will be considered a little later; suffice it to state that there is no conflict in the ratio of these two cases if the facts in Satinder Singh case3 are closely analysed and the principle laid down therein is understood in its proper perspective. Therefore, Hari Krishan Khosla case2 cannot be held to be per incuriam nor has it the effect of overruling the ratio decidendi of Satinder Singh case3. * * * * * * * 1991 Supp. (1)SCC 81: 19. Therefore, Hari Krishan Khosla case2 cannot be held to be per incuriam nor has it the effect of overruling the ratio decidendi of Satinder Singh case3. * * * * * * * 1991 Supp. (1)SCC 81: 19. The authority of Titaghur1 is confined to matters which were directly and substantially in issue in that case. It is neither precedent nor res judicata for any other matter. “What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it.” (SCR p. 162) [Per Hegde, J., State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra4.] As stated by one of us (Saikia, J.) in Krishena Kumar v. Union of India5: (SCC pp. 226 & 233, paras 19 & 33) “The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain ‘’propositions wider than the case itself required’.... A deliberate and solemn decision of Court made after argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent ....” In the words of Lord Halsbury, L.C. (Quinn v. Leathem6): “... there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” (emphasis supplied) * * * * * * * (1992) 4 SCC 363 : 39. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” (emphasis supplied) * * * * * * * (1992) 4 SCC 363 : 39. ........It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete ‘’law’ declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India24 this Court cautioned: “It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment.”” 29. Learned counsel has also referred to the commentaries by different authors in support of his contention that the writ in the nature of certiorari is available against the judicial orders passed by the Civil Court. Reliance has been placed upon ninth edition administrative law by Wade and Forsyth from pages 602 to 614, fifth edition of administrative law by P.P. Craig at page 765 and 6th edition and judicial review by D. Smith in paras-15-014. 30. Learned counsel submits that a writ of certiorari, which started of, as a remedy against the orders passed by the inferior Courts, has been extended to include administrative act vide judgment of the Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others, (1967) 2 SCR 625 , which has been followed by the Constitution Bench in A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, (1969)2 SCC 262 . (Miss) Binapani Dei and others, (1967) 2 SCR 625 , which has been followed by the Constitution Bench in A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, (1969)2 SCC 262 . The submission, therefore, is that the Civil Courts while exercising their judicial function are amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the view taken in Radhey Shyam (supra) is since contrary to larger bench judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, which have not been considered, as such, the same is per incurium. 31. Sri Rai has also submitted that scope of a writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is separate and distinct from a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, before the Supreme Court. He submits that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts can issue directions, orders or writs for enforcement of fundamental rights, and for other purposes. It is submitted that the scope is wider under Article 226 of the Constitution of India than the scope of prerogative writs issued in England. Reliance has been placed upon T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (supra), Dwarika Nath v. I.T.O., 1965 (3) SCR 536 (at page 540), and para 6 in Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra). It is submitted that in State of Orissa v. Dr. Ms. Binapani Dei (supra), it was held that High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not precluded from entering upon a decision, on questions of fact raised by the petitioner. Relying upon para 38 in Prabodh Verma (supra), it is contended that High Courts under Article 226 can mould reliefs and issue writs other than prerogative writs, directions or other writs and have powered to give declarations and also consequential reliefs including relief by way of injunction. Submission is that with the advancement of law of writs under Article 226 by the High Court, the High Court has power to grant consequential reliefs including those in the nature of injunction etc. 32. Further submission is that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a writ can be issued not only to a Court or tribunal but can be issued to any person or authority. Reliance is placed upon the judgment in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., 1963 Supp. (1) SCR 625. 32. Further submission is that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a writ can be issued not only to a Court or tribunal but can be issued to any person or authority. Reliance is placed upon the judgment in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., 1963 Supp. (1) SCR 625. It is contended that although the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A of I.D. Act, 1947 was held not to be a Court or tribunal, and was not an instrumentality or agency of State within the meaning of Article 12, but still the arbitrator was held amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226. Para 9 of the judgment in Rohtas Industries Ltd. and another v. Its Union, (1976) 2 SCC 82 , has also been relied upon to contend that power under Article 226 can affect even a private individual and it be issued for any purpose. Attention of the Court has also been invited to Anadi Mukti Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 , to submit that it has been held in paras 17 to 22 that writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued even to a private individual for enforcing a duty arising out of a contract. Para 17 of the judgment in Director of Settlement A.P. and others v. M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638, is also relied upon in this regard, to contend that High Courts can issue appropriate writs, order or directions to even private individuals, and injunction consequent to quashing of an order of Civil Court can also be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and there is no prohibition upon the High Court from entertaining civil disputes between private parties provided they are arising out of proceedings of the Civil Court. 33. Sri Rai, submits, lastly, that the observation in Radhey Shyam (supra) that Civil Courts are not inferior Courts, is not based upon correct appreciation of law, inasmuch as Civil Courts have been constituted by the State, by law, conferring jurisdiction, which was limited and defined, and in view of the law laid down by larger benches are under a duty to act judicially, and therefore, are inferior Courts. Since such Civil Courts are exercising judicial power of the State, as such, they are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Since such Civil Courts are exercising judicial power of the State, as such, they are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. It is submitted that thousands of writ petitions of such nature are pending before this Court, after having been entertained, and many more have already been entertained and decided, therefore, a position settled since long would be unsettled by the view taken in Radhey Shyam (supra). 34. Sri Suresh Chandra Tripathi and Sri C.K. Parekh, learned counsels, have also advanced their submission on similar lines. It has been submitted that the opinion expressed in Radhey Shyam’s case (Supra) cannot be treated as law on the point inasmuch as the issue involved therein was a substantial question of law, relating to interpretation of the Constitution, and therefore, by virtue of Article 145 (3) of the Constitution of India, it ought to have been heard by a minimum number of five Hon’ble judges. It has also contended that since the view expressed in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and others, 2003 (6) SCC 675 , had been followed in three subsequent decisions of larger benches, which have been noticed in Radhey Shyam’s case (supra), as such, the issue could have been decided only by a Bench of five Hon’ble Judges. 35. It is then submitted that the power to issue writs can be exercised by the High Court, both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel submits that Article 227 confers supervisory powers upon this Court, which is similar to issuance of writ of certiorari and judgment in Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), recognising authority in the High Court to issue writs under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has been clearly accepted, therefore, the orders of inferior Courts can always be assailed by filing writs under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel also submits that petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are not being entertained by Registry of this Court, on account of an erroneous assumption that only a writ under Article 226 lies against the judicial orders passed by the Civil Courts and, therefore, direction be issued to the registry, to entertain petitions arising out of judicial orders/proceedings of Civil Courts, in petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, subject to the scope of such jurisdiction. 36. 36. Sri Parekh has also addressed this Court, at length, on the scope of power, which is available to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, as the law on the issue has been settled by the Apex Court in Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, AIR 1954 SC 215 , which has been consistently followed and reiterated in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shanker Patil, (2010)8 SCC 329 , and lastly in Radhey Shyam’s case, therefore, I am not required to deal with such submissions, particularly, as present petition has not been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 37. Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Advocate, Sri B.B. Jauhari, Advocate, Sri Bharat Pratap Singh, Advocate, Sri Ramendra Asthana, Advocate, have also substantially adopted the arguments advanced by Sri Salil Kumar Rai, Sri S.C. Tripathi and Sri C.K. Parekh, Advocates, to contend that writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against the judicial orders passed by the Civil Court. Sri Atul Dayal and Learned Standing Counsel Sri Siddharth Singh, on the other hand, have contended that writ petition is not maintainable as the judgment in Radhey Shyam (supra) is clearly binding upon this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 38. I have heard learned counsels, at length, and have perused the judgments, which have been cited before me. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam’s case conclusively expresses opinion of the three member bench, upon a reference made in Radhey Shyam’s case, that judicial order of the Civil Court is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. After having noticed large number of earlier decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, particularly, nine judges bench in Mirajkar’s case and seven judges bench in Ujjam Bai’s case, the Bench came to a definite opinion that the limited jurisdiction which a High Court has arising out of the judicial orders passed by the Civil Court, is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which are distinct. 39. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner essentially are based on the assumption that judgments rendered by larger benches have not been considered. This argument is not acceptable. 39. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner essentially are based on the assumption that judgments rendered by larger benches have not been considered. This argument is not acceptable. Judgment delivered in Mirajkar’s case is by nine Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court, which has been interpreted and relied upon in Radhey Shyam (supra), after taking note of the judgment in Ujjam Bai (supra), which was a judgment delivered by 7 Hon’ble Judges. None of the decisions relied upon by learned counsels is by a bench of more than nine judges. The judgment in Hari Vishnu Kamath, delivered by 7 Hon’ble Judge has also been considered in Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra), which has been taken note of and relied upon in Radhey Shyam. 40. The arguments advanced by learned counsels do not merit any consideration by this Court, once a conclusive opinion has been delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam (supra), which is clearly binding upon this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise, under the constitutional scheme, this Court exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is required to honour well established principles of judicial discipline, which forbids this Court form indulging in any act of judicial adventurism. Once the Apex Court has laid down law, after interpreting nine judges bench in Mirajkar’s case, no contrary submission in the matter is liable to be entertained. Paras- 21 to 25 of the judgment in Radhey Shyam’s case (supra) is reproduced : “21. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King’s Court in India and of all other Courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King’s Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All Courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or Courts other than judicial Courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate Courts. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or Courts other than judicial Courts. There are no precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to subordinate Courts. Control of working of subordinate Courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence under Article 227. Orders of Civil Court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or Courts other than judicial/Civil Courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression “inferior Court” is not referable to judicial Courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another, MANU/SC/0121/1954: AIR 1954 SC 2015 : 1954 SCR 656, Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, MANU/SC/0718/2001 : 2001 (1) SCC 319, Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, MANU/SC/0508/2010 : 2010 (8) SCC 329 and Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, MANU/SC/0555/2013 : 2013 (9) SCC 374 . In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court observed : “64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court observed : “64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of late there is a growing trend amongst several High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute between landlord and tenant and also in a case of money decree and in various other cases where disputed questions of property are involved, writ Courts are entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are treated as writ petitions. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law referred to above in cases of property rights and in disputes between private individuals writ Court should not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it can be shown that a private individual is acting in collusion with a statutory authority. 66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding the High Court’s power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon’ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal Courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon’ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, the Hon’ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.” (emphasis added) 23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 24. We may also deal with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the view in Surya Dev Rai stands approved by larger Benches in Shail, Mahendra Saree Emporium and Salem Advocate Bar Assn and on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into by this Bench. In Shail, though reference has been made to Surya Dev Rai, the same is only for the purpose of scope of power under Article 227 as is clear from para 3 of the said judgment. There is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a petition under Article 226. In Mahendra Saree Emporium, reference to Surya Dev Rai is made in para 9 of the judgment only for the proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle down the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. Similarly, in Salem Bar Assn. in para 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai is for the same purpose. We are, thus, unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent. 25. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows : “(i) Judicial orders of Civil Court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; (ii) Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction from jurisdiction under Article 226. Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.” 41. The Apex Court has also taken note of Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, AIR 1991 (All) 114 , which has taken note of the previous Full bench Judgment of this Court in Jupiter Chit Funds Pvt. Ltd v. Dwarka Dhiesh Dayal, AIR 1979 (All) 218 . The Apex Court has also taken note of Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge, AIR 1991 (All) 114 , which has taken note of the previous Full bench Judgment of this Court in Jupiter Chit Funds Pvt. Ltd v. Dwarka Dhiesh Dayal, AIR 1979 (All) 218 . Mere fact that large number of writ petitions, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have been entertained by this Court, arising out of judicial orders passed by Civil Courts, is not a relevant consideration, once it is held by the Apex Court that such petitions are not maintainable. 42. In such view of the matter, following the law laid down in Radhey Shyam (supra), it is held that a writ petition, arising out of proceedings or judicial orders of Civil Courts is not maintainable, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 43. However, following the ratio laid down in Radhey Shyam (supra), it is held that supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is available in matters, arising out of proceedings/judicial orders of Civil Courts, subject to its limited scope, elucidated in Radhey Shyam (supra), relying upon Waryam Singh’s case and Shalini Shyam Shetty’s case, (supra), and the Registry of this Court is directed to act, accordingly. 44. Since the present petition is filed, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the judicial order passed by the Civil Court, therefore, the same is not maintainable, and is, accordingly, dismissed. 45. No order is passed as to costs. ——————