Hon'ble RANKA, J.—Instant writ petition by the petitioner-tenant is directed against order dt.26/11/2014 by which the petitioner's applications under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and Order 8 Rule 1(3) CPC have been dismissed by the lower appellate court. 2. It is an admitted position that a decree of eviction was passed against the petitioner-tenant on the ground of bonafide & reasonable necessity by the trial court on 20/10/2008 and a regular civil appeal, preferred by the petitioner-tenant, is pending for adjudication before the lower appellate court. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that certain subsequent events have developed during the pendency of the appeal, which ought to be brought on record and for such purposes, the petitioner-tenant moved two applications, one under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amending the written statement and the other under Order 8 Rule 1(3) CPC for taking certain documents on record. The subsequent events, as claimed by the petitioner-tenant, are that Mahesh Sharma, son of the respondent-landlord, on whose necessity the suit was decreed, during the pendency of the appeal, had been posted as Marketing Manager in M/s. Varrsana Ispat Ltd., Ahmedabad Unit and has built his own residential house in Ahmedabad and hence according to the petitioner-tenant, the necessity of Mahesh Sharma no more survives. 4. The petitioner-tenant claims that the subsequent development has a material bearing on the issue in dispute and hence the petitioner was entitled to amend his written statement by incorporating such facts. To support his contention, the petitioner also moved an application to place on record certain documents downloaded through internet from the face book account of Mahesh Sharma, which, according the the petitioner amply demonstrates about Mahesh Sharma's working status. Both these applications of the petitioner were rejected by the lower appellate court. Hence the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the order impugned passed by the lower appellate court. 5. Ld. counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that the case involved the issue of bonafide & reasonable necessity of Mahesh Sharma and the subsequent events have a material bearing on the issue and the court below committed gross error in law by rejecting the applications of the petitioner. 5. Ld. counsel for the petitioner vehemently contends that the case involved the issue of bonafide & reasonable necessity of Mahesh Sharma and the subsequent events have a material bearing on the issue and the court below committed gross error in law by rejecting the applications of the petitioner. He submits that the matter relates to the period prior to amendment made in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and hence the lower appellate court committed serious mistake in dismissing his application for amendment. He further argues that mere delay is no ground to reject the application for amendment and the lower appellate court ought to act liberally while dealing with the amendment of the written statement though at the appellate stage. In support of his contention, ld. Counsel relies upon judgments rendered in the case of Radheyshyam Sharma vs. Additional District Judge & ors.: 2010(4) WLC 669; Nirmal Kumar Rara vs. PO, Rent Tribunal & ors.: 2010 WLC (UC) 608 and Radhey Shyam Soni vs. Sumer Mal Phophalia & anr.: 2006 WLC (UC) 493. He further contends that all subsequent events having a material bearing on the ground of personal necessity ought to be looked into and to strengthen this proposition, he relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Murlidhar vs. Nandkishore & ors.: 2006(3) WLC 264 and Sushil Kumar vs. Lrs. Of Late Ranjana Ben: 2012 WLC (Raj.) UC 13. 6. Per-contra, ld. counsel for the respondent-landlord strongly contends that the order impugned was just and proper in the facts/situation of the case and the applications moved by the petitioner-tenant were nothing but a device to prolong life of the litigation. He further asserts that the lis on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity was initiated by the respondent-landlord in the year 2001 and the suit was finally decreed in the year 2008 against which regular appeal preferred by the petitioner-tenant is pending since 2008 and to delay the final hearing of the appeal, the petitioner-tenant is moving one application after another. He further contends that several applications have been moved just to delay disposal of the appeal which is pending for last about more than 6 years. He further contends that several applications have been moved just to delay disposal of the appeal which is pending for last about more than 6 years. He further contends that necessity of Mahesh Sharma has not vanished and although he is working privately but that is only a stopgap arrangement and he is not expected to sit idle and wait for the ultimate decision of the lis and submits that certainly Mahesh Sharma would do something in the meanwhile. 7. Heard the contentions of the rival parties, carefully perused the material available on record including the judgments cited. 8. In the case of Nirmal Kumar Rara vs. PO, Rent Tribunal & ors. (supra), an amendment application was moved by the tenant at the trial stage and the subsequent event alleged was vacation of premises on first floor and the landlord asserted that the first floor premises were commercial in nature and as such, the amendment application of the tenant was allowed. 9. In the case of Murlidhar vs. Nandkishore & ors (supra), the subsequent event alleged were starting of business in two independent shops by the landlord and in such facts and situation, the court allowed the documents in that respect to be taken on record but the application under Order 6 Rule 17 was disposed of permitting the parties to file affidavits and providing opportunity to cross-examine as per Order 19 Rule 1 CPC. 10. In the case of Sushil Kumar vs. Lrs. Of Late Ranjana Ben (supra), the court allowed the facts alleged in application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to be raised and considered at the time of final disposal of the case. 11. In the case of Radhey Shyam Soni vs. Sumer Mal Phophalia & anr. (supra), the landlord obtained vacant possession of another shop and this fact was permitted to be raised by way of counter affidavits and providing opportunity of cross examination to the rival parties. 12. In the case of Radheyshyam Sharma vs. Additional District Judge & ors. (supra), it was propounded that the amendment in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC brought about by CPC (Amendment) Act, 2007 shall not apply to the pleadings filed before commencement of the Amendment Act. 13. 12. In the case of Radheyshyam Sharma vs. Additional District Judge & ors. (supra), it was propounded that the amendment in Order 6 Rule 17 CPC brought about by CPC (Amendment) Act, 2007 shall not apply to the pleadings filed before commencement of the Amendment Act. 13. There cannot be any doubt about the proposition laid down in the above authorities but each case involving the issue of bonafide and reasonable necessity of a landlord or his family member has to be appreciated in the light of the peculiar facts emerging from the facts of such case. There is no strait jacket formula of universal application. In all the authorities, relied upon by counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the subsequent development alleged was the availability of alternative premises to the landlord, whereas in the instant case, it is not such availability but the petitioner-tenant alleges that Mahesh Sharma has joined certain private service. This court feels that the fact of joining service by Mahesh Sharma is wholly insignificant and irrelevant for the decision on the issue of bonafide necessity. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale and others vs. M/s. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co.: (Supreme Court & Full Bench Rent Cases) :1999 Page 440 (SCFBR) has categorically held that joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises and one cannot imagine that a landlord, who is in service, should first resign from his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long drawn litigation and if he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. It would be fruitful to quote relevant Para 9 of the said judgment, which reads ad-infra:- “It will be seen that the trial Court and the appellate Court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of "need or requirement" to be equivalent to "dire or absolute or compelling necessity". According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lock-out or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner in which the courts have gone into the meaning of "lock-out" in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was mere design to evict the tenant. It is not necessary for the landlord to adduce evidence that he had money in deposit in a Bank nor produce proof of funds to prove his readiness and willingness as in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property. So far as experience is concerned, one would not think that a grocery business was one which required extraordinary expertise. It is, therefore, clear that the entire approach of both the Courts was absolutely wrong in law, and perverse on fact. Unfortunately the High Court simply dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 227 stating that the findings were one of fact. That is why we think that this is an exceptional case calling for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 14. The respondent herein has categorically taken a stand that the joining of service by Mahesh Sharma is merely a temporary stopgap arrange-ment and was necessary to earn livelihood to see that both ends meet and the same has not diluted his intention to start business in the tenanted premises. 15. 14. The respondent herein has categorically taken a stand that the joining of service by Mahesh Sharma is merely a temporary stopgap arrange-ment and was necessary to earn livelihood to see that both ends meet and the same has not diluted his intention to start business in the tenanted premises. 15. In such facts and circumstances of the case, this Court feels that the alleged subsequent development is insignificant and irrelevant for decision on the issue of bonafide and reasonable necessity. Only those subsequent events, which completely eclipses the alleged need of the landlord, ought to be taken on record, either by way of amendment of written statement or filing of counter affidavits with the opportunity to cross examine. Occurrence of each and every event during the course of final settlement of the lis cannot demolish the bonafide need of a landlord. Besides, the applications have been moved by the petitioner at the appellate stage and the appeal is stated to be pending for the last about seven years and the suit was instituted in the year 2001 and Mahesh Sharma was alleged to have joined service five years back. All these facts and circumstances, cumulatively displays that the applications preferred by the petitioner was nothing but a device to prolong the litigation. Hence, this Court is not inclined to interfere under its supervisory powers conferred under Article 226/227 of the Constitution 16. Consequently, the instant writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. All applications, moved by the petitioner, stand dismissed by dismissal of the writ petition. 17. Having considered the submission of counsel for the respondent, this Court also thinks it appropriate to direct the lower appellate court to decide the Civil Regular Appeal No.279/2008 expeditiously and not later than four months of the receipt of certified copy of this order.