JUDGMENT : B.S. Walia, J. 1. Petitioner's prayer is for the issuance of a writ of:- (i) Certiorari for quashing Annexure J. i.e. order No. NER/13736133/LC-2 dated 03.01.2013 as also Annexure M i.e. order No. NER/13736133/LC-2G) dated 20.03.2014 passed by respondent No. 4 whereby the claim of the petitioner for grant of service pension with respect to the service rendered by him in the Defence Security Corps has been rejected; (ii) Certiorari for quashing communications dated 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 placing an embargo for exercising power of condonation of shortfall in minimum qualifying service under Regulation 134 of the Army Pension Regulations, 1961 for the second time; (iii) Mandamus commanding the respondents to count period of 05 days treated as non-qualifying service while computing the petitioner's total service in the Defence Security Corps with a further prayer for directing the respondents to thereafter grant service pension to the petitioner in respect of services rendered by him in the Defence Security Corps or in the alternative. (iv) Mandamus commanding the respondents to grant condonation of shortfall in minimum qualifying service of one day to the petitioner in respect of the services rendered by him in the Defence Security Corps with a further direction to the respondents to grant him service pension in respect of the services rendered by him in the Defence Security Corps. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the matter in the instant petition are that the petitioner was recruited in the J & K Rifle of the Indian Army on 23.03.1974 and retired on 31.03.1989 on completing 15 years and 03 months of service. Thereafter, the petitioner was re-employed in the Defence Security Corp on 27.11.1989 and was discharged on 30.11.2004. At the time of re-enrollment in the Defence Security Corp on 27.11.1989 and till 2003 the petitioner was certified medically fit by the Medical Board of DSC/AFMS. Unfortunately, the petitioner developed Gangrene in his right leg requiring amputation of the same in the year 2003 by the Army Medical authorities. Pursuant to amputation of his right leg, the petitioner was placed in low medical category w.e.f. 18.09.2003 by diagnosing him as a case of peripheral vascular disease with amputation of right leg below knee with disability of 60%. Pursuant to amputation of his right leg, the petitioner was placed in low medical category w.e.f. 18.09.2003 by diagnosing him as a case of peripheral vascular disease with amputation of right leg below knee with disability of 60%. After the amputation of his leg, the petitioner was given the option either to continue in service or to opt for discharge on account of disability and get disability pension. 2. Vide Annexure R-1 dated 01.11.2003 the petitioner opted not to continue in service beyond 26.11.2004. Pursuant to the option exercised, the petitioner was discharged from service on 30.11.2004. However, it was only after discharge from service that the petitioner was informed that he was not entitled to grant of service pension in view of being short of one day of qualifying service from the required 15 years on account of treating 05 days absence period w.e.f. 17.01.1991 to 21.01.1991 as non-qualifying service. Copy of the communication dated 24.11.2005 whereby the petitioner was informed about rejection of his case for grant of pension is Annexure-A. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 21.04.2006 seeking condonation of deficiency of one day in the total qualifying service of 15 years inasmuch the petitioner's service had been calculated as 14 years and 364 days by treating 05 days' absence as non-qualifying service. However, the petitioners request was rejected by the respondents vide communication Annexure B dated 31.05.2006. 3. Petitioner's grievance is that he had already been punished for absence of five days by awarding imprisonment in military custody in 1991, besides at the time of processing his pension case, the respondents had treated five days' period as non qualifying service even without passing any order to that effect. The petitioner, on receipt of rejection i.e. Annexure B dated 31.05.2006, submitted representation dated 09.06.2006 for relief but the same was also rejected vide communication Annexure C dated 05.08.2006 while informing the petitioner that he was not entitled to receive pension on account of non-qualifying of service as stipulated under Rule 132 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961. The petitioner submitted an appeal against the rejection order dated 05.08.2006 on 30.11.2006 but the same was also rejected vide communication Annexure D dated 19.12.2006. The petitioner submitted an appeal against the rejection order dated 05.08.2006 on 30.11.2006 but the same was also rejected vide communication Annexure D dated 19.12.2006. Subsequent representations of the petitioner met with the same fate as is evident from Annexure-E dated 23.06.2007 & 10.08.2007 respectively, thereby compelling the petitions, to serve a Legal Notice on the respondents to release service benefit in his favour. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondents had rejected the petitioner's claim for grant of pension without considering Regulation 134 despite the same empowering the competent authority to condone deficiency of service in a particular rank not exceeding three months except on voluntary retirement. Learned counsel contended that admittedly the petitioner not having sought voluntary retirement and requiring condonation of only one day of qualifying service for fulfilling the minimum qualifying service of 15 years, the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Regulation 134. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in response to SWP No. 2285/2009, the stand of the respondents was that the petitioner already having availed condonation of 49 days' deficiency in qualifying service for grant of pension at the time of his discharge from J & K Rifles, was not entitled to condonation of deficiency of one day of qualifying service on his discharge from the Defence Security Corps for grant of service pension. 6. Aforementioned writ petition was disposed of vide order Annexure-F dated 26.12.2011 with a direction to the respondents to accord consideration to the petitioner's prayer for condoning one day's shortfall in the minimum period prescribed for grant of pension within four weeks from the date, copy of the order was served on the respondents. 7. On inaction on part of the respondents, the petitioner filed COA (SW) No. 88/2012 and during the course of the proceedings, the respondents placed on record a copy of order dated 03.01.2013 holding the petitioner ineligible for grant of service pension on account of service rendered in Defence Security Corps not fulfilling the requirement of minimum qualifying service prescribed under Regulations. The stand of the petitioner is that reference in the aforementioned order dated 03.01.2013 to letter dated 23.04.2012 issued by respondent No. 1 whereby respondent No. 1 is stated to have taken a decision for not granting condonation for award of second service pension is without taking into account Regulation 134 of the Army Pension Regulations, 1961. 8. Eventually, vide Annexure-K i.e. order dated 13.11.2013, this Court directed the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner sympathetically as per directions in SWP No. 2285/2009 within a period of six weeks and report compliance. Subsequently vide Annexure-L i.e. order dated 03.02.2014, this Court while taking into account amputation of both legs of the petitioner (one while in service and the other after discharge from service) directed the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner in terms of Regulation 131 of the Army Pension Rules. 9. Pursuant to order dated 03.02.2014, the respondents while holding Regulation 134 of Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961 (Part-I) inapplicable passed Annexure-M i.e. order dated 20.03.2014 again rejecting the petitioner's case for grant of service pension. Grievance of the petitioner is that no reasons were given by the respondents for holding Regulation 134 of Pension Regulation for the Army, 1961 inapplicable. However, as per stand of the respondents, the claim of the petitioner was rejected in the light of letters dated 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 whereby decision was taken by respondent No. 1 not to grant condonation of deficiency in qualifying service for the second time. 10. However, as per stand of the respondents, the claim of the petitioner was rejected in the light of letters dated 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 whereby decision was taken by respondent No. 1 not to grant condonation of deficiency in qualifying service for the second time. 10. The petitioner has challenged orders dated 03.01.2013 & 20.03.2014 passed in alleged implementation of the judgment in SWP No. 2285/2009 besides orders passed from time to time in COA (SW) No. 158/2012 refusing to condone one day's short fall in the minimum qualifying service for grant of pension on the ground that the petitioner had already availed condonation at the time of his discharge from the J & K Rifles by contending that the impugned action was the result of an arbitrary exercise of power besides being in derogation of Regulation 134 of Army Pension Regulations 1961 which provided for condoning deficiency in qualifying service up to three months, that order dated 03.01.2013 had been passed regardless of the provisions of Regulation 134 which provided for condonation of deficiency of service in a particular rank not exceeding three months except on voluntary retirement and the petitioner not having voluntarily retired and being short of only one day of qualifying service, therefore being entitled to condonation in deficiency of qualifying service, that reliance on letters dated 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 issued by respondent No. 1 placing an embargo on condonation of shortfall in qualifying service for the second time was misplaced inasmuch as the same was contrary to the statutory provisions of Army Pension Regulations, 1961 as no such exception had statutorily been provided for under the aforesaid Regulations, therefore, the respondents could not be permitted to add exceptions to the aforesaid provision. 11. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that even otherwise, the impugned action of the respondents was operating very harshly upon the petitioner as only one day's condonation was required, the petitioner had already been punished for aforesaid absence of five days, besides no order had been passed treating the period of five days as non qualifying service and it was only at the time of processing the pension case of the petitioner that the respondents treated the period of five days as non qualifying service without passing any order to that effect and that too without compliance with the principles of natural justice, that after suffering disability, the petitioner was given an option to retire with disability pension or to continue in service, the petitioner continued in service and was discharged on completion of fifteen years and four days' service in Defence Security Corps in view of his disability with the assurance that in view of his having minimum qualifying service of 15 years, he would be retired with pension and at no point of time the petitioner was informed that his service was short of the minimum qualifying service required by one day after deducting 05 days period of non qualifying service and that had that fact been brought to the notice of the petitioner, he would have rendered one more day of service before agreeing to being discharged. 12. In the aforementioned background, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the respondents had dealt with the matter very casually without caring for the rights of the petitioner and without appreciating the enormous prejudice to the petitioner on account of shortfall in qualifying service, that too of one day only, without taking into account that the petitioner being a disabled person having lost both legs, grant of pension would enable him to lead a life of dignity and provide for his sustenance and medical expenses without his being dependent on anybody else. 13. 13. In terms of the objections filed by the respondents, learned counsel for the respondents contends that on completion of initial term of engagement, the petitioner was granted extension of service from 27.11.1999 to 26.11.2004, that he was unwilling for extension of service beyond 26.11.2004 and was, accordingly, discharged from Defence Security Corps on 30.11.2004 (A.N.) under the provisions of Army Rule 13(3) item III(i) and that he had rendered 14 years and 364 days' qualifying service after deducting five days' non-qualifying service, for which, he was paid service gratuity and retirement gratuity. It is further contended that the petitioner's prayer for grant of second service pension under the provisions of Regulation 134 of Army Pension Regulations (Part-I) lacked substance as the ibid para was applicable for condonation of deficiency of service in a particular rank not exceeding three months, prescribed as ten months as per Regulation 133 to the individuals having minimum 15 years pensionable service, ineligibility of the petitioner for condonation of deficiency in qualifying service had already been well explained to him vide order dated 20.03.2014 and the petitioner was not entitled for condonation of deficiency in service under the provisions of Government of India, Ministry of Defence, letter No. IHQ of MoD (Army VAG's Branch letter No. 82370/AG/PS4(a) dated 07.12.1962, and Govt., of India, Ministry of Defence, vide letter No. 14(2)/2011/D(Pen) Pol dated 23.04.2012 for the grant of second service pension and the ambiguity regarding condonation of deficiency in qualifying service under the provisions of IHQ of MoD(Army) letter No. 46453K/Misc/AG/PS-4(L)BC dated 14.07.2011 had already been removed by the originator itself by cancelling letter dated 03.05.2012. 14. The entire controversy revolves around shortage of one day of qualifying service for grant of second pension on account of period of 5 days service having been treated as non qualifying service at the time of processing of the petitioners case in the year 2004-05 for grant of second pension on account of petitioners absence from duty for 5 days in 1991. Option Annexure R-I obtained from the petitioner on 01.11.2003 regarding his unwillingness to continue in service is relevant and has to be considered in the light of the circumstances in which the unwillingness dated 01.11.2003 to continue in service beyond 26.11.2004 was given and the intention in unwillingness to continue in service from a prospective date one year after the exercise of option. The question with regard to the implications if any explained to the petitioner in terms of clause 4 of the option at the time of the petitioner expressing his unwillingness on 01.11.2003 to continue in service w.e.f. 26.11.2004 is also relevant. Equally important is the interpretation to Regulation 134 providing for condonation in deficiency as also the effect of communications dated 07.12.1962, 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 denying exercise of power for condonation in deficiency in qualifying service for grant of second pension in the light of statutory provision providing for grant of condonation to deficiency in qualifying service subject to the cap of 3 months. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and after considering their submission I am of the view that for the reasons mentioned hereunder, the claim of the petitioner is to be allowed. 16. Five days' absence in the year 1991 was treated as non qualifying service at the time of processing of the petitioners case in the year 2004-05 for grant of second pension. It is not the case of the respondents that any order was passed treating the said period as non qualifying service for grant of pension or that the petitioner was made aware in respect of the said period being treated as non qualifying service for grant of pension. In the circumstances it is not at all clear from clause 4 of the option Annexure R-l at the time of the petitioner expressing his unwillingness on 01.11.2003 to discontinue in service w.e.f. 26.11.2004 as to what were the implications if any explained to the petitioner. 17. It is obvious that the petitioner, whose one leg had been amputated in 2003, found it difficult to continue in service and therefore, was unwilling to continue in service. In the circumstances the petitioner gave his unwillingness to continue in service. However the unwillingness was prospective i.e. w.e.f. 26.11.2004 i.e. a period of close to one year from the date of exercise of option. Obviously the intention to discontinue in service w.e.f. 26.11.2004 was with a view to complete 15 years service so as to earn the second pension, therefore in the aforementioned circumstances, the unwillingness dated 01.11.2003 to continue in service beyond 26.11.2004. The authorities discharged the petitioner not w.e.f. the date sought i.e. 26.11.2004 but a few days later thereafter i.e. on 30.11.2004. The authorities discharged the petitioner not w.e.f. the date sought i.e. 26.11.2004 but a few days later thereafter i.e. on 30.11.2004. The question arises whether the authorities explained at the time of exercise of option that in case the petitioner discontinued service w.e.f. 26.11.2004/30.11.2004, he would be short of a few days from the required 15 years of qualifying service for grant of pension. This aspect appears not to have been addressed by the authorities or for that matter brought to the notice of the petitioner for had the same been done, I see no reason as to why the petitioner who had given his option to discontinue in service w.e.f. a period of one year after the exercise of option would not have extended his service for a period of one more day. In view of the above, the reasoning by the respondents in paragraph No. 4 of the paragraph wise reply "Being well aware of the fact of his aforesaid non qualifying service, the petitioner submitted his unwillingness for further extension of service.", does not commend to logic and is accordingly devoid of merit. 18. Regulation 133 & 134 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 read as under: Regulation 133: Rank and Group for assessment of service pension: Service pension is assessed on the basis of the rank actually held by an individual regardless of whether it is held in a substantive or paid acting capacity, and the lowest group for which he is paid during the last ten months of his service qualifying for pension. Regulation 134: Condonation of deficiency of service in a particular rank: A competent authority may condone a deficiency of service in a particular rank not exceeding three months except on voluntary retirement. 19. Communications dated 07.12.1962, 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 prohibit exercise of power for condonation in deficiency in qualifying service for grant of second pension. However, the said prohibition is not traceable to a statutory mandate, rather is contrary to the statutory mandate provided for in Regulation 134 providing for condonation in deficiency in service subject to the cap of 3 months. 19. Communications dated 07.12.1962, 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 prohibit exercise of power for condonation in deficiency in qualifying service for grant of second pension. However, the said prohibition is not traceable to a statutory mandate, rather is contrary to the statutory mandate provided for in Regulation 134 providing for condonation in deficiency in service subject to the cap of 3 months. Admittedly, earlier condonation of deficiency in qualifying service for grant of pension at the time of discharge from J & K Rifles was for 49 days, whereas now the condonation sought is only of one day thereby raising the total condonation if granted working out to 50 days i.e. well within the outer statutory limit of 3 months upto which deficiency can be condoned. Besides, the petitioner has not taken voluntary retirement. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the denial of condonation of short fall in qualifying service for the second time on the basis of communications dated 07.12.1962, 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 is contrary to the statutory provisions of Army Pension Regulations 1961 and that no such exception had statutorily been provided for under the aforesaid Regulations, therefore, respondents could not be permitted to add exception to the aforementioned proviso. The submission by learned counsel for the petitioner merits acceptance for it is settled law as laid down in Teroz Ahmad v. Delhi Development Authority and others' reported in (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 399 that "A statutory rule, it is trite, cannot be supplemented by an executive order". 21. No doubt, it - is also the law as laid down in case titled 'Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh v. S.K. Dubey and another' reported in 2012 (4) SCC 578 that executive instructions can fill gaps not covered by rules but the said executive instructions cannot be in derogation of rules. In the instant case, the matter is squarely covered by Regulation 134, which provides for condonation of deficiency in qualifying service. Therefore what is provided for by the Regulations cannot be whittled down by executive order. 22. In the instant case, the matter is squarely covered by Regulation 134, which provides for condonation of deficiency in qualifying service. Therefore what is provided for by the Regulations cannot be whittled down by executive order. 22. Once Regulation 134 of the Army Pension Regulations, 1961 empowers the competent authority to condone deficiency of service in a particular rank not exceeding three months except on voluntary retirement, it is not open to the respondents to deny condonation of deficiency of qualifying service in terms of Regulation 134 on the basis of an executive order except in accordance with Regulation 134 where the condonation sought exceeds the statutory limit of three months or where the employee concerned has taken voluntary retirement. It is settled law that an administrative order etc. cannot prevail over statutory rules. Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled 'General Manager, Uttaranchal Lal Sansthan v. Laxmi Devi and others' reported in (2009) 7 Supreme Court Cases 205 wherein it was observed as under:- 31. Reliance has been placed on a purported circular issued by Uttaranchal Public Works Department dated 21st Mach, 2002, assuming that the same can be taken into consideration, is in our opinion wholly irrelevant. Apart from the fact that such a contention had not been raised by the respondents before the High Court, we fail to understand how a mere circular letter which has no force of law shall prevail over the statutory Rules. The respondents themselves have relied upon the decision of this Court in DDA v. Joginder S. Monga, (2004) 2 SCC 297 , wherein it was held that executive instructions cannot run contrary to the statutory provisions. 23. In K. Kuppusamy and another v. State of T.N.' reported in (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 469, it was held as under:- 3. The short point on which these appeals must succeed is that the Tribunal fell into an error in taking the view that since the Government had indicated its intention to amend the relevant rules, its action in proceeding on the assumption of such amendment could not be said to be irrational or arbitrary and, therefore, the consequential orders passed have to be upheld. We are afraid this line of approach cannot be countenanced. The relevant rules, it is admitted, were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. We are afraid this line of approach cannot be countenanced. The relevant rules, it is admitted, were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. They are statutory rules. Statutory rules cannot be overridden by executive orders or executive practice. Merely because the Government had taken a decision to amend the rules does not mean that the rule stood obliterated. Till the rule is amended, the rule applies. Even today the amendment has not been effected. As and when it is effected ordinarily it would be prospective in nature unless expressly or by necessary implication found to be retrospective. The Tribunal was, therefore, wrong in ignoring the rule. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of 'Ashok Kumar Uppal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir' reported as 1998 (4) SCC 179 . Relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced below:- "27. In State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyut Karandikar, AIR 1989 SC 1133 : 1989 (1) SCR 947 : (1989) Supp. 1 SCC 393, it was held as under:- "The power to relax the conditions of the rules to avoid undue hardship in any case or class of cases cannot now be gainsaid. It would be, therefore, futile for the respondents to make any grievance." 28. In J.C. Yadav and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1990) SCC 189, it was held as under:- "The relaxation of the rules may be to the extent the State Government may consider necessary for dealing with a particular situation in a just and equitable manner. The scope of rule is wide enough to confer power on the State Government to relax the requirement of rules in respect of an individual or class of individuals to the extent it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. The power of relaxation is generally contained in the Rules with a view to mitigate undue hardship or to meet a particular situation. Many a time strict application of service rules create a situation where a particular individual or a set of individuals may suffer undue hardship and further there may be a situation where requisite qualified persons may not be available for appointment to the service. In such a situation the government has power to relax requirement of rules. Many a time strict application of service rules create a situation where a particular individual or a set of individuals may suffer undue hardship and further there may be a situation where requisite qualified persons may not be available for appointment to the service. In such a situation the government has power to relax requirement of rules. The State Government may in exercise of its powers issue a general order relaxing any particular rule with a view to avail the services of requisite officer. The relaxation even if granted in a general manner would ensure to the benefit of individual officers." 29. This decision was followed in Sandeep Kumar Sharma v. State of Punjab and others, (1997) 10 SCC 298 , in which Hon'ble Punchhi, J. (as His Lordship then was), observed as under:- "The power of relaxation even if generally included in the service rules could either be for the purpose of mitigating hardships or to meet special and deserving situation. Such rule must be construed liberally, according to the learned Judges. Of course arbitrary exercise of such poor must be guarded against. But a narrow construction is likely to deny benefit to the really deserving case. We too are of the view that the rule of relaxation must get a pragmatic construction so as to achieve effective implementation of a good policy of the Government." 30. In view of the above, the Government can exercise the power to relax the Rules in all those cases in which hardship is caused in the implementation of those Rules to meet a particular situation or where injustice has been caused to either individual employee or class of employees. Of course, this power cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily to give undue advantage or favour to an individual employee." It is therefore clear that a competent authority can exercise power to relax Rules in all those cases in which hardship is caused in the implementation of the Rules in order to meet a particular situation or to remedy injustice wherever caused whether to an individual employee or class of employees. The instant case is a fit case for exercise of power of condonation of deficiency in qualifying service for grant of service pension in terms of Regulation 134. 25. The instant case is a fit case for exercise of power of condonation of deficiency in qualifying service for grant of service pension in terms of Regulation 134. 25. The grievance of the petitioner that the action of the respondents refusing to grant of condonation of one day's shortfall in the minimum qualifying service of 15 years requisite for grant of second service pension is arbitrary and illegal, appears to be justified. The refusal to grant pension is based primarily on letters dated 07.12.1962, 14.07.2011 and 23.04.2012 wherein an embargo has been placed on condonation of short fall in qualifying service for the second time. However, the same is contrary to the statutory provisions contained in Regulation 134 of Army Pension Regulations, 1961. Aforementioned Regulation does not provide for the exception as sought to be created by the respondents in terms of the aforementioned letters. 26. In the circumstances, respondents cannot be permitted to add exception to the aforementioned Regulation. Regulation 134 of the Army Pension Regulations, 1961 provides for condonation of deficiency in qualifying service upto 3 months in a particular rank except on voluntary retirement. Admittedly, the petitioner has not retired voluntarily, therefore, being short of qualifying service of only one day, is entitled to the condonation in terms of Regulation 134 subject to the maximum gap of three months. Even if the earlier condonation of 49 days granted to the petitioner for award of service pension on completion of his term in the J & K Rifles is taken into account, even then the total condonation would work out to be 50 days, which is less than the maximum period of three months stipulated therein. Even otherwise, the petitioner had given his unwillingness to continue in service after 26.11.2004 vide his option exercised on 01.11.2003 on account of amputation of one of his legs in September, 2003. The intention of the petitioner in giving an option applicable prospectively after expiry of one year from the date of exercise of such option obviously was with a view to earn pension by completing fifteen years of service. In the circumstances, the respondents were under duty to inform the petitioner about the implication of his opting to discontinuance service w.e.f. 26.11.2004 namely that he would not be qualifying 15 years of service on account of excluding five days' period of absence in the year 1991 from the qualifying service. In the circumstances, the respondents were under duty to inform the petitioner about the implication of his opting to discontinuance service w.e.f. 26.11.2004 namely that he would not be qualifying 15 years of service on account of excluding five days' period of absence in the year 1991 from the qualifying service. This requirement of explaining the aforementioned implication was mandatory for the respondents in terms of clause (4) of the option (Annexure R-1). Had that exercise been carried out and the petitioner made aware that he would not be qualifying 15 years of service as on 26.11.2004/30.11.2004, I see no reason as to why the petitioner would not have continued in service for one more day so as to enable him to satisfy the requirement of serving for fifteen years in order to enable him to earn pension. The petitioner has already been punished for aforementioned absence of five days in the year 1991, besides no order was passed treating the period of five days as non qualifying service and in any case none has been referred to or shown by learned counsel for the respondents and it was only at the time of processing the pension case of the petitioner that the respondents treated the period of five days as non qualifying service without passing any order to that effect and that too without complying with the principles of natural justice. Apparently, the respondents have dealt with the matter very casually without caring for the rights of the petitioner and without appreciating the enormous prejudice caused to the petitioner on account of shortfall in qualifying service of one day especially in view of the petitioner being a disabled person having lost both legs. Respondents lost sight of the fact that in the circumstances, grant of pension to the petitioner by condoning one day's deficiency in qualifying service would enable the petitioner to lead a life of dignity and provide for his sustenance, medical expenses and other needs without being dependent on anybody else. 27. In view of what has been noted above, the writ petition is allowed. Orders dated 03.01.2013 i.e. Annexure - J and order dated 20.03.2014 Annexure-M as also communications dated 14.07.2011 & 23.04.2012 are held to be contrary to the mandate of Regulation 134 and are, accordingly, quashed. 27. In view of what has been noted above, the writ petition is allowed. Orders dated 03.01.2013 i.e. Annexure - J and order dated 20.03.2014 Annexure-M as also communications dated 14.07.2011 & 23.04.2012 are held to be contrary to the mandate of Regulation 134 and are, accordingly, quashed. Respondents are directed to pass fresh orders condoning one day's deficiency for qualifying service of fifteen years requisite for the award of pension in terms of Regulation 134 of Army Pension Regulations, 1961. Needful be done and monetary benefits admissible on account of second service pension as a consequence thereto be paid to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from today along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f. one month after the date the petitioner was discharged i.e. 01.12.2004 and became entitled to pension and till the date of payment. In case the needful is not done within the stipulated period of time, interest would be payable on the monetary benefits @ 9% instead of 6%. However, in that eventuality, enhanced amount on account of higher rate of interest would be payable by the officer concerned responsible for non compliance in time with the order of the Court. Writ Petition is allowed in the aforementioned terms.