JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. Heard Mr. Desai, learned advocate for the petitioner and Ms. Manisha Shah, learned Government Pleader with Ms. Shruti Pathak, learned Assistant Government Pleader. 2. In present petition, the petitioner has prayed, inter alia, that :- "6(A) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or directions quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 12.03.2015 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Stamp and Registration Department, State Gujarat, Gandhinagar in Appeal File No. 262 of 2015 at Annexure-A to this petition; (B) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Gujarat State, Stamp and Registration Department, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar to accept the Challan dated 04.02.2015 filed by the petitioner and decide the Appeal File No. 262 of 2015 on merits and in accordance with law. (C) Pending hearing and final disposal of the petition, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, implementation and operation of the order dated 12.03.2015 passed by the chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Stamp and Registration Department, Gujarat State, Gandhinagar in Appeal File No. 262 of 2015 at Annexure-A to this petition." 3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 12.03.2015 passed by the competent authority, whereby the revision application filed by the petitioner on 16.12.2014 is treated as barred by limitation prescribed under the Act on the ground that the application is not filed within prescribed period of 90 days. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that considering from any angle, the appeal/revision application filed by the petitioner could not have been treated as barred by limitation because for the purpose of calculating delay, the relevant date would be the date of communication of the order to the concerned person. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that if the period is calculated from the date of the receipt of the order by the petitioner or even from the date of communication of the order to the petitioner, then it would be clear that though the application is filed within prescribed period of 90 days, the authority rejected the petitioner's application preferred against the order passed by the first adjudicating authority. 5. 5. Per contra, learned Government Pleader submitted that the authority has not committed any error in rejecting petitioner's appeal. The petitioner filed the appeal/revision application after prescribed period of limitation and that therefore, appeal/revision application is treated as barred by limitation. 6. Learned Government Pleader relied on Section 53 of the Act and submitted that said provision expressly provides of 90 days "from the date of the order" for filing the application, whereas the petitioner filed the application on 16.12.2014 and he was also obliged to deposit 25% amount out of the adjudicated amount on or before 04.02.2015 in view of the provisions of the Act, and that therefore, the authority has not committed any error in not entertaining the appeal. 7. Aggrieved by the order passed by the first adjudicated authority under the provisions of the Gujarat Stamp Act, 1958, the petitioner, a cooperative Society filed revision application under Section 53 of the Act before the revisional authority. However, the said authority treated the application as barred by limitation and accordingly rejected the revision (on the said ground) vide order dated 12.03.2015. The petitioner feels aggrieved by the said order. Hence, present petition. 8. So as to appreciate rival contentions raised by the contesting parties, it is necessary and appropriate to take in the account relevant dates. A. The petitioner entered into a transaction and purchased a property by executing sale-deed 27.08.2013. The said sale-deed was presented for registration. B. The concerned authority registered the sale-deed at Serial No. 5561 on 27.08.2013. C. After the deed was registered, the competent authority issued show cause notice dated 24.06.2014 and called upon the petitioner to pay deficit stamp duty because according to the authority, adequate stamp duty was not paid while getting the documents registered. The petitioner submitted reply to the said notice, and thereafter, the authority conducted the proceedings to asses and determine the stamp duty payable by the petitioner. D. After concluding the hearing, the first adjudicating authority passed order dated 03.11.2014. E. It is not in dispute that the concerned first adjudicating authority dispatched the said order dated 03.11.2014 only on 05.11.2014. F. The petitioner received the said order dated 07.11.2014. G. After receiving the order on 07.11.2014 and thereby deriving knowledge that such order is passed, the petitioner filed appeal against the said order dated 03.11.2014 (received on 07.11.2014) on 16.12.2014. F. The petitioner received the said order dated 07.11.2014. G. After receiving the order on 07.11.2014 and thereby deriving knowledge that such order is passed, the petitioner filed appeal against the said order dated 03.11.2014 (received on 07.11.2014) on 16.12.2014. G(i) At this stage, it is relevant to take into account provision under Section 53 of the Act. The said provision reads thus:- "53. Control of and statement of case to Chief Controlling Revenue Authority." (1) The powers exercisable by a Collector under [Chapter III], Chapter IV and Chapter V] and under clause (a) of the first proviso to section 27 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority: (Provided that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority shall not entertain an application made by a person under sub-section (1) unless (a) such application is presented (within a period of ninety days) from the date of order of the Collector. (b) Such person deposits twenty-five percent of the amount of duty or as the case may be, amount of difference of duty payable by him in respect of subject matter of the instrument for which application has been made." G (ii) It emerges from the said provision that it postulates that if a person feels aggrieved by any order of adjudicating authority and intends to file revision application, he should file such revision application within 90 days and should also deposit 25% of the deficit stamp duty adjudicated/determined by the first adjudicating authority under its order. G (iii) Thus, the petitioner was required to deposit 25% of the amount adjudicated by the first adjudicating authority i.e. 20,33,500/-. (H) However, the petitioner requested the authority to waive the said requirement. (I) The authority rejected the petitioner's request for waiver of said condition vide its condition/order dated 29.12.2014. (J) It appears that despite the said communication by the authority, the petitioner pursued the request and on 16.01.2015, the petitioner again requested the authority for waiver. (K) The competent authority, vide communication dated 31.01.2015, again rejected the petitioner's request and informed that statutory requirement cannot be waived. (L) In this view of the matter and upon having received said communication dated 31.01.2015, the petitioner deposited 25% of Rs.20,33,500/- on 04.02.2015. (M) It is not in dispute that the petitioner deposited the said amount on 04.02.2015, whereas the application was filed on 16.12.2014. 9. (L) In this view of the matter and upon having received said communication dated 31.01.2015, the petitioner deposited 25% of Rs.20,33,500/- on 04.02.2015. (M) It is not in dispute that the petitioner deposited the said amount on 04.02.2015, whereas the application was filed on 16.12.2014. 9. Thus, so far as crucial and relevant dates are concerned i.e. the date on which adjudicated authority passed the order, the date on which the petitioner filed appeal and the date on which the petitioner deposited the amount, are not in dispute. Even the date on which the authority dispatched the order and the date on which the petitioner received the order are also not in dispute. 10. It is in light of the said relevant dates that the petitioner's grievance against the decision of the revisional authority treating its revision application as barred by limitation is required to be considered divorced from Section 53 and Rule 7 and the said words cannot be read in isolation. 11. When the matter is examined in light of the facts that:- (i) the first adjudicating authority dispatched the order (dated 03.11.2014) on 05.11.2014; and (ii) the petitioner received the order on 07.11.2014, and (iii) having regard to the provision under Section 53 of the Act and the Rules framed under the Act, particularly Rule 7 which obliges the authority to serve the order "to the person" or to "Some elder member of family" or by "registered post with acknowledgement due" and (iv) the fact that in this case, the revision is undisputedly filed on 16.12.2014, and (v) in light of the fact that the petitioner deposited the amount @ 25% on 04.02.2015; and when said Section 53 and Rule 7 are read conjointly then the intention of legislation emerges clearly. From the fact that the order is required to be served "to the person" or it has to be forwarded by "Registered Post with acknowledgement due", it becomes clear that the expression "from the date of the order" cannot be construed and read to mean "from the date of knowledge about the order" or when it is served or communicated or conveyed in accordance with Rule. 12. 12. From the said details, it emerges that both the requirements are complied with by the petitioner before expiry of 90 days i.e. before period of limitation expired inasmuch as the application was filed on 16.02.2014 and the amount @ 25% was deposited on 04.02.2015 whereas the order was served to the petitioner on 07.11.2014 (after it was dispatched from the office on 05.11.2014) 13. However, the authority proceeded on the premise that for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation the date of the order i.e. the date on which the authority passed/signed the order is the relevant date and not the date of communication. 14. The stand of the respondent authority is not sustainable. 15. The relevant date for the purpose of calculating the amount would be the date of communication of order/date of knowledge i.e. the date when the order is served or conveyed/communicated. 15.1 In this context, it would be appropriate at this stage to take into account observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case between D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India ( AIR 2003 SC 2502 ) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court, while considering provision under Section 48-AA of Advocates Act observed, inter alia, that:- "9. So far as the commencement of period of limitation for filing the review petition is concerned we are clearly of the opinion that the expression 'the date of that order' as occurring in Section 48AA has to be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the review petitioner. Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so constructed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilised for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart". 15.2 A profitable reference also may be made to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Housing Board Haryana v. Housing Board Colony welfare association ( 1995 5 SCC 672 ) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed inter alia that:- "8. 15.2 A profitable reference also may be made to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Housing Board Haryana v. Housing Board Colony welfare association ( 1995 5 SCC 672 ) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed inter alia that:- "8. Before considering the merits of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant it would be appropriate first to look into the relevant provisions relating to the limitation. Section 15 of the Act makes a provision for appeal and prescribes the limitation for the same. It reads as under:- "15. Appeal. - Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of an order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed. Provided further that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there were sufficient cause for not finding it within that period. 11. From the scheme of the Act it becomes apparent that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has been enacted with object to provide for better protection of the interest of the consumers, as a measure for economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of their disputes and matters connected therewith. It is with this object in view that Rule 4(10) has also been made. It provides for communication of the order of the District Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining the certified copy. If the rule itself enjoins a duty for communicating the order of the District Forum duly signed and dated to the parties free of charge, there will hardly be an occasion for the parties to make an application for obtaining a certified copy thereof. If the rule itself enjoins a duty for communicating the order of the District Forum duly signed and dated to the parties free of charge, there will hardly be an occasion for the parties to make an application for obtaining a certified copy thereof. Thus, Section 15 of the Act cannot be read in isolation but it has to be read along with Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Rules and a combined reading of Section 15 and the Rules reproduced above gives an impression that the purpose, object and intention of these statutory provisions is to protect of the parties before the District Form to provide a copy of the order duly signed and dated by the members of the Bench and the period of limitation prescribed with regard to the filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from the date of communication of the order in the manner laid down in sub rule (10) of the Rule 4. 12. In the facts and circumstances stated above, the date of pronouncement of the order in the open Court by itself cannot be the starting point for determining the period of limitation under Section 15 of the Act. It has also to be shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was duly signed and dated by the members of the District Forum so pronounced was duly signed and dated by the members of the District Forum constituting the Bench and the same was communicated to the parties free of change. That being so, it has to be appreciated that mere pronouncement of an order in the open Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the Rules a copy of the said order has also to be communicated to the parties affected by the said order so that the party adversely affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of knowing the text, the reasons and contents so as to formulate grounds of attack before the appellate or higher forum. In the absence of such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order so as to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the higher forum. In the absence of such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order so as to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the higher forum. 15.3 In the decision in case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika ( AIR 1966 SC 1313 ), wherein the subject matter for consideration by Hon'ble Apex Court was with reference to order of dismissal passed by the competent authority against the respondent. In the said case and in that context Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that :- "11. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the 28th May 1951, the said order must be deemed to have taken effect as from the 3rd June, 1949 when it was actually passed. The High Court has rejected this contention; but Mr. Bishan Narains' argument. It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify fell that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? These and other complications would inevitably arise if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period; but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. When a public officer is removed from service, his successor would have to take charge of the said office; and except in cases where the officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties would arise if it is held that an officer who is actually working and holding charge of his officer, can be said to be effectively removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the appropriate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was plainly right in holding that the order of dismissal passed against the respondent on the 3rd June 1949 could not be said to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it on the 28th May, 1951. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was plainly right in holding that the order of dismissal passed against the respondent on the 3rd June 1949 could not be said to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it on the 28th May, 1951. 15.4 What emerges, on conjoint reading of the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court, is that for an order to become effective and operational, the order and decision should be informed to the concerned person i.e. person against whom the order is passed and he should be aware about the decision of the authority and also about the direction. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court an authority may pass and sign an order and such order may be retained on file without communicating and forwarding it to the concerned person. The knowledge that the order is passed as well as knowledge and effect of the decision are imperative for enforcing the limitation prescribed (for filing application under Section 53 of the Act) by the Act. 15.5 In this view of the matter, the decision of the authority to take the date of the order (and the date on which the order was served or communicated to the concerned person) as the relevant date cannot be sustained. The decision is contrary to the object of the provisions and militates against the scheme of the Act and the rules. The said view of decision of the authority ignores that for real practise and actual operation of Section 53 of the Act, the relevant factor is "Knowledge about the order". Therefore, the relevant date for finding the answer to the question viz. Whether the application (revision) is filed expiry of prescribed period of limitation (i.e. 90 days) or not, would be the date on which the decision is served-committed to the concerned person. The expression ".... from the date of the order" mean "from the date of knowledge about the order" meaning thereby the date when the order is communicated. Any other construction will defeat the purpose of objecting the provision. 16. When the order was dispatched on 05.11.2014 and was received on 07.11.2014, the date of the order i.e. 03.11.2014 could not have been taken into account. 17. Any other construction will defeat the purpose of objecting the provision. 16. When the order was dispatched on 05.11.2014 and was received on 07.11.2014, the date of the order i.e. 03.11.2014 could not have been taken into account. 17. If the period of limitation is calculated from 07.11.2014 i.e. the date when the petitioner received order or even from 05.11.2014 i.e. the date on which the order was dispatched, then it would emerge that the revision application was filed and the amount was deposited before expiry of 90th day and that it cannot be said that the petitioner has not complied with the statutory requirements and/or the submission of revision application is not within prescribed period of limitation. 18. The above mentioned fact brings out that the respondent authority has proceeded on erroneous premise and that authority's decision is incorrect and unsustainable and that therefore, the order is vitiated. 19. Consequently, the impugned order/communication dated 12.03.2015 deserves to be set-aside and is accordingly set aside. 20. The matter is remitted to the revisional authority who will consider the petitioner's case in light of the foregoing discussion for maintainability of the revision application will proceed to hear and decide the revision application on merits and pass appropriate order after hearing the petitioner and after taking material available on record in accordance with law. With the aforesaid observations, present petition is disposed of. Petition disposed of.