ORDER Z.K. Saiyed, J. 1. By filing present petition, the petitioner, uncle of detenu, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has prayed to quash and set aside the order of detention dated 8-4-2015 passed by the respondent No. 3 in exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short "PASA Act"). The detenu is branded as "dangerous person". The detenu has been arrested on 8-4-2015 and the grounds of detention have been served upon him on the very same day. The detenu has been detained on the ground that he is a dangerous person inasmuch as he was involved in an offence punishable under Sections 323,504, 506(2), 507, 327, 141, 143 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code which is registered as CR No. III of 2015. The said offence is alleged to have taken place on 7-2-2015. It appears that against the detenu, two NC complaints being Complaint No. 3 of 2014 and Complaint No. 49 of 2014 for non-cognizable offence and five anonymous statements were made. The detenu is in Central Jail, Lajpor. 2. Heard Mr. Anand Yagnik, learned Advocate for the petitioner. He has contended that present order of detention is a punishment for being involved in 03 litigations stated in the present petition in direct or indirect manner. The order is passed only to teach a lesson. He has contended that the detenu is not a threat to the public order but the corporate house in question. The detenu is not a dangerous person. The detenu is a social activist who fights for the rights of his village people and confront those who jeopardize the constitutional and statutory rights of the villagers. He has contended that the detenu has been made history sheeter deliberately and out of predetermined design. He has contended that the impugned order of detention is suffering from mala fide in law and on facts. The order of detention is in colourable exercise of powers. 3. He has contended that the impugned order of detention is a classic case of corporate arrogance and subversion of constitution from within by the respondent public servant particularly the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 at the instance of Adani Port and SEZ Ltd., who wants complete hegemony within the SEZ area which is "deemed foreign territory". Unfortunately the respondent Nos. He has contended that the impugned order of detention is a classic case of corporate arrogance and subversion of constitution from within by the respondent public servant particularly the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 at the instance of Adani Port and SEZ Ltd., who wants complete hegemony within the SEZ area which is "deemed foreign territory". Unfortunately the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 rather than being a Collector of a District has become a Collector of Adani Port and SEZ Ltd., in passing the impugned order of detention. He has contended that the impugned order of detention is mala fide in fact because the respondent No. 3 has passed an order of detention on account of the fact that detenu has refused to accept the direction of respondent No. 3 of accepting 17 acres of land as against 967.5 acres, that detenu as a Sarpanch should give in writing that entire land has been received by the Gram Panchayat. The respondent No. 3 has passed the detention order as the detenu refused to agree to act contrary to the order passed by this Court. 4. In support of his submissions he has relied on citations in the case of (1) Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 740 (2) Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal (Law and Order v. Public Order), (1969) 1 SCC 10 : ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ) (3) Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration (Law and Order v. Public Order), (1982) 2 SCC 403 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1143 ) (4) Salimkhan alias Choote Jabbar Hanifkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 2000 (2) GLH 184 (5) Darpan Kumar Sharma v. State of T.N., (2003) 2 SCC 313 : ( AIR 2003 SC 971 ) (6) Kalavatiben Indravadan Rana v. Commissioner of Police, 2003(3) GLH (UJ) 1 (7) Sandip Omprakash Gupta v. State of Gujarat, 2004(1) GLR 864 (8) Bhupat Pithabhai Katariya v. State of Gujarat, 2005 (2) GLH (UJ) 4 (9) Virendra Nandlal Jaiswal v. Commissioner of Police, 2009 (2) GLH (UJ) 4 (10) Dr. Punja Fogal v. District Magistrate Rajkot, 1988 (1) GLR 313 : (1989 Cri LJ 233 (Guj)) (11) Ayub Pappukhan Nanabkhan Pathan v. S.N. Sinha and others, AIR 1990 SC 2069 (12) Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police and others, (1995) 3 SCC 237 (13) Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad (Vekaria) v. State of Gujarat, 2000 (3) GLR 2696 (14) Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1999 SC 2197 (15) Sohanlal Surajaram Visnoi v. State of Gujarat and others, 2004 (2) GLR 1051. 5. Heard Mrs. Manisha Lovekumar Shah, learned Government Pleader with Ms. Hansa Punani, learned AGP for the respondent Nos. 1 and 5. She has contended that there are two offences registered against the detenu i.e. one in Mundra Police Station CR No. I-II of 2015 dated 7.2.2015 under Sections 323, 504, 506(2), 507, 327, 141, 143, 147and 341 of the Indian Penal Code and another offence in Mundra Police Station being CR No. II-3099 of 2012 dated 26-9-2012 under Sections 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The detenu has been arrested in connection with the aforesaid offence on 13-3-2015, thereafter he was released on bail on 13-3-2015 and the order of PASA is passed on 8-4-2014. She has contended that against the detenu, more than 12 cases are registered at Mundra Police Station. The detenu is a headstrong person and only because he is elected as Sarpanch it cannot be considered that he has not committed any alleged offence. She has contended that detenu has indulged in the antisocial activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, there is sufficient material to arrive at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu is a dangerous person and he is indulging in the activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. She has contended that there is no malice, no vindictiveness or no mala fide action on the part of respondent authority. The order of detention is passed strictly on the objective material based on subjective satisfaction. She has lastly contended that it is prima facie established that detenu is a dangerous person and if he is released from the custody, law, order and peace of the society can be damaged due to his presence. She has prayed to dismiss the petition. 6. She has lastly contended that it is prima facie established that detenu is a dangerous person and if he is released from the custody, law, order and peace of the society can be damaged due to his presence. She has prayed to dismiss the petition. 6. I have gone through the grounds of detention and considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Pleader. I have perused contents of the affidavit filed by the respondent authority. It is true that against the detenu two NC complaints for the offence of non-cognizable are filed. As per Section (2)(c) of the Act "dangerous person" is extracted as under: "Section (2)(c) "dangerous person" means a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang 2(xxx) habitually commits, commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V or the Arms Act, 1959." On bare perusal of the definition of "dangerous person" and on the basis of the material placed before the detaining authority and from the grounds of detention placed before me it becomes clear that only one FIR and two NC complaints are registered against the present detenu. The above FIR and two NC complaints cannot make the detenu a dangerous person as defined in Section (2)(c) of the Act. Therefore when the authority has not disclosed and not produced any iota of evidence to show that present detenu is dangerous person within the meaning of definition of "dangerous person" as provided under Section (2)(c) of the Act, he cannot be detained in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the authority has erroneously passed the order of detention against the petitioner-detenu under the Act. 7. Except the general statements, there is no material on record which shows that the detenu is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order. There are number of decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court on this point. 7. Except the general statements, there is no material on record which shows that the detenu is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order. There are number of decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court on this point. In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (i) District Collector, Ananthapur v. V. Laxmanan, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 663 : ( AIR 2005 SC 2802 ) (ii) Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1999 SC 2197 ; and (iii) Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 237 , this Court is of the opinion that the activities of the detenu cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenance of public order. In the case of Ashokbhai Jivraj alias Jivabhai Solanki v. Police Commissioner, Surat, reported in 2000 (1) GLH 393 , having considered the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1996 SC 740 , this Court held that the cases wherein the detention orders are passed on the basis of the statements of witnesses fall under the category of maintenance of "law and order" and not "public order". 8. Applying the ratio of the above decisions, it is clear that before passing an order of detention, the detaining authority must come to a definite finding that there is threat to the 'public order' and it is very clear that the present case would not fall within the category of threat to a public order. In that view of the matter, when the order of detention has been passed by the detaining authority without having adequate grounds for passing the said order, it cannot be sustained and, therefore, it deserves to be quashed and set aside. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 8-4-2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Kutch-Bhuj, is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted. Petition Allowed