JUDGMENT : This is the plaintiff's appeal challenging the order passed by the District Judge, Dharwad in R.A. No. 206 of 2003, dated 13-4-2004. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed O.S. No. 664 of 1995 for recovery of Rs. 43,835/- from the defendants and also for consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendants from withdrawing the compensation amount deposited in C.C.D. No. 17, dated 26-8-1995 of the Principal Civil Judge, Chikkodi. The respondents/defendants appeared and denied the claim of the appellant/plaintiff. Written statement were filed. Plaintiff examined one witness as P.W. 1 and Exs. P. 1 to P. 8 were marked. Ex. D. 2 was examined as a witness and Ex. D. 1 was marked. The Trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants have agreed to pay the fee of Rs. 35,000/- for conducting the LAC No. 50/89 pending before the Civil Judge Court, Chikkodi and executed an agreement to that effect as on 20-8-1988? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that, the defendants are liable to pay the Advocate fee of High Court of Karnataka in MFA No. 1871 of 1990 and SLP No. 22754 of 1994 and the expenses spent upon? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that, he is entitled to claim the suit claim amount of Rs. 43,835/- from the defendants? 4. Whether the defendant proves that, plaintiff has obtained their signatures on blank papers and prepared the false documents? 5. What order or decree? 3. After considering the evidence and the material on record, the suit filed by the plaintiff was partly decreed with costs. It was ordered and decreed that defendants 1 to 3 shall jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of Rs. 35,000/- to the plaintiff towards the legal fees. 4. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the respondents filed R.A. No. 206 of 2003 before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court after elaborately considering the case of the appellant as well as the respondents, allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff against which the appellant has filed this appeal. 5. 5. At the time of admitting the above appeal, this Court has framed the following substantial question of law which reads as under: "Whether the finding of the First Appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and consequently dismissing the suit of the plaintiff towards recovery of lawyers fee is contrary to the material on record and for non-consideration of the reason assigned by the Trial Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff?" 6. Heard Sri Bahubali A. Danawade, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Smt. Hemalekha, learned Counsel for the respondents. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the plaintiff is a practicing Advocate and an agreement was executed by the respondents with the plaintiff to avail the legal services to conduct the case of the respondents with respect to acquisition proceedings initiated by the Government to acquire their lands situated at Ankaligrama and as per the said agreement, the respondents were liable to pay a sum of Rs. 35,000/- towards the legal fee along with other expenses totally amounting to Rs. 43,835/-. The Trial Court having rightly considered the agreement which is marked as Ex. P. 3, has decreed the suit of the plaintiff. On the contrary, the Appellate Court erroneously set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, totally discarding the evidence of P.W. 1 and not considering Ex. P. 3 in the right perspective. It is further contended that the appellant/plaintiff being a legal Practitioner is entitled to avail the legal fee which the respondents have agreed to pay and a well-considered order passed by the Trial Court cannot be disturbed by the First Appellate Court in a frivolous manner and prayed to interfere with the order passed by the First Appellate Court and to allow this appeal. 8. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the Trial Court without properly examining the exhibits more particularly Ex. P. 3, has decreed the suit in part directing the respondents to make payment of Rs. 35,000/- to the appellant which was totally against the material on record. Plaintiff being a practicing Advocate has taken the signature of the respondents on a blank paper and the contents of Ex. P. 3 were not known to the illiterate respondents and moreover, the averments in the agreement-Ex. 35,000/- to the appellant which was totally against the material on record. Plaintiff being a practicing Advocate has taken the signature of the respondents on a blank paper and the contents of Ex. P. 3 were not known to the illiterate respondents and moreover, the averments in the agreement-Ex. P. 3, though not admitted shows that it was to engage the services of the Counsel/plaintiff to conduct the case before the Court of Chikkodi and the plaintiff has also collected 50% of the amount deposited in the acquisition proceedings and as such, he is not entitled for payment of any legal fee and further argued that Ex. P. 3, set up by the plaintiff is not enforceable in law and placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court In the matter of Mr. 'G' a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court AIR 1954 SC 557 and supported the order passed by the First Appellate Court. 9. I have perused Ex. P. 3 which reads thus: VERNACULAR MATTER OMITTED 10. This agreement is dated 20-8-1988 and the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 14-12-1995 for recovery of Rs. 43,835/-. The First Appellate Court has observed that the said suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation since, the same was not pleaded by the respondents in the suit proceedings, has not expressed any view on this point of limitation. It is noticed from Ex. P. 3 that the scribe of this exhibit is Sri B.H. Chalavadi and there are two witnesses. The plaintiff has not stepped into the witness-box, neither examined the scribe nor the attesting witnesses. The plaintiff has examined-P.W. 1 who is a clerk in his office, a stranger to the agreement and has not uttered a word that Ex. P. 3 was executed in his presence. The respondents have admitted their signatures on Ex. P. 3 but have disputed the contents of Ex. P. 3. A careful perusal of Ex. P. 3 and the evidence of P.W. 1 and D.W. 1 makes it clear that Ex. P. 3 is clouded with suspicion, the circumstances warrants to analyse Ex. P. 3 with the normal fee structure of a legal Practitioner to conduct a case before Chikkodi Court. P. 3. A careful perusal of Ex. P. 3 and the evidence of P.W. 1 and D.W. 1 makes it clear that Ex. P. 3 is clouded with suspicion, the circumstances warrants to analyse Ex. P. 3 with the normal fee structure of a legal Practitioner to conduct a case before Chikkodi Court. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the legal fee was so structured, keeping in mind the fees for conducting the case before High Court and Apex Court, cannot be accepted in the absence of exact quantum of compensation amount awarded/enhanced and the probabilities of conducting the case before the Higher Courts. Moreover, recitals in Ex. D. 3 demonstrates that the fees was for handling the case before Chikkodi Court and not before the Higher Courts. Thus, the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the execution of Ex. P. 3. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove Ex. P. 3 and the burden cannot be shifted to the respondents to prove that they have not executed Ex. D. 3. 11. The case on hand is a peculiar case where an agreement-Ex. P. 3 is said to have been entered between the Advocate and his client-respondents. The respondents have argued that the agreement-Ex. P. 3 is not enforceable. In the judgment of Mr. G.'s case, it is held as follows: "Mr. G. argued the matter at length, and to his credit be it said, objectively and with restraint, but it is not necessary to cover the wide field he did because we are not concerned with ordinary rights of contract, nor with ordinary legal rights, but with the special and rigid rules of professional conduct expected of and applied to a specially privileged class of persons who, because of their privileged status, are subject to certain disabilities which do not attach to other men and which do not attach even to them in a non-professional character. To use the language of the Army, an Advocate of this Court is expected at all times to comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an "officer and a gentleman". In the army it is a military offence to do otherwise (see Section 45 of the Army Act, 1950) though no notice would be taken of ungentlemanly conduct under the ordinary law of the land, and none is the same of a civilian. In the army it is a military offence to do otherwise (see Section 45 of the Army Act, 1950) though no notice would be taken of ungentlemanly conduct under the ordinary law of the land, and none is the same of a civilian. So here, he is bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action. Now it can be accepted at once that a contract of this kind would be legally unobjectionable if no lawyer was involved. The rigid English rules of champerty and maintenance do not apply in India, so if this agreement had been between what we might term third parties, it would have been legally enforceable and good. It may even be that it is good in law and enforceable as it stands though we do not so decide because the question does not arise; but that was argued and for the sake of argument even that can be conceded. It follows that there is nothing morally wrong, nothing to shock the conscience, nothing against public policy and public morals in such a transaction 'per se' that is to say, when a legal practitioner is not concerned. But that is not the question we have to consider. However much these agreements may be open to other men what we have to decide is whether they are permissible under the rigid rules of conduct enjoined by the members of a very close professional preserve so that their integrity, dignity and honour may be place above the breath of scandal. That is part of the price one pays for the privilege of belonging to a kind of close and exclusive "club" and enjoying in it privileges and immunities denied to less fortunate persons who are outside its fold. There is no need to enter its portals and there is no need to stay, but having entered and having elected to stay and enjoy its amenities and privileges, its rules must be obeyed or the disciplinary measures which it is entitled to take must be suffered. There is no need to enter its portals and there is no need to stay, but having entered and having elected to stay and enjoy its amenities and privileges, its rules must be obeyed or the disciplinary measures which it is entitled to take must be suffered. The real question therefore is whether this kind of conduct is forbidden to the elect or whether, if it was once forbidden, the ban has since been removed, either directly or by implication, by legislative action". 12. This was a case dealing with the professional misconduct of the Advocate, the agreement therein specified that the Advocate has entered into an agreement with the client to take 50% of the amount recovered out of the recoveries made on the claim. There is no such bar to claim the legal fees, what is prohibited is that the "lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting". The evidence on record of the defendants/respondents is that the appellant has secured their signatures, withdrawn the compensation amount deposited before the Court, retained Rs. 30,000/- and has paid the balance amount to the respondents. 13. Thus, it is clear that the legal practitioner is entitled to enter into an agreement towards payment of legal fees for rendering legal services for his client and is entitled to file a suit for recovery of the same provided it is duly executed and vaid in the eye of law. In the present case, it is categorically denied by the defendants/respondents that they have entered into any agreement to pay the legal fee of Rs. 35,000/- to the plaintiff for conducting the case at Chikkodi and on the other hand, it is the case of the respondents that the plaintiff has secured their signatures on the blank paper and has created the document besides drawing 50% of the compensation amount deposited in the Court. In such circumstances, Ex. P. 3 is not proved. The Trial Court placing reliance on this document has decreed the suit which is rightly set aside by the First Appellate Court. In the background of these circumstances, the substantial question of law raised in this appeal is answered in the negative holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove Ex. In such circumstances, Ex. P. 3 is not proved. The Trial Court placing reliance on this document has decreed the suit which is rightly set aside by the First Appellate Court. In the background of these circumstances, the substantial question of law raised in this appeal is answered in the negative holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove Ex. D. 3 and the First Appellate Court is right in reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dismissing the appeal.