JUDGMENT : A.V. Chandrashekara, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the plaintiff of an original suit bearing O.S. No. 156/1998 which was pending on the file of Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) & JMFC, Nanjangud and confirmed by the Court of Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) and JMFC, Nanjangud in R.A.73/2002. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein were the defendants in the said suit. Concurrent findings of the Courts below are called in question in this appeal. Parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendants as per their ranking in the Trial Court. 2. Plaintiff chose to file a suit for the relief of declaration to the effect that plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are the joint owners of the land measuring 29.7 guntas of land in suit Sy. No. 150/1 of Konanapura Village, Nanjanagud Taluk and consequently to declare that the sale deed dated 23.4.1998 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 does not bind the plaintiff and also award cost. 3. One person by name Subba Setty was the father of the plaintiff and defendants. According to the plaintiff, the entire extent of land in Sy. No. 150/1 measures 33 guntas and out of this, the area measuring 20x20 yards only i.e., 03.03 guntas was sold by his father in favour of his daughter, defendant No. 1 through registered sale deed dated 7.12.1970 and his father was in possession of the remaining extent of land in Sy. No. 150/1 till his death. According to the plaintiff, extent of land sold by his father Subba Setty in favour of his daughter defendant No. 1 was only 20x20 yards and nothing beyond that. According to the plaintiff, name of defendant No. 1 incorporated in the revenue records to the entire extent of 33 guntas of land does not have any legal effect. 4. Defendants have chosen to file a detailed joint written statement. According to them, entire 33 guntas of land was sold by Subba Setty in favour of defendant No. 1 through a registered sale deed dated 7.12.1970 and nothing remained in the said Sy. No. 150/1. On the basis of the above sale deed, name of defendant No. 1 came to be incorporated as kathedar and she was the owner and in lawful possession of the same. No. 150/1. On the basis of the above sale deed, name of defendant No. 1 came to be incorporated as kathedar and she was the owner and in lawful possession of the same. She is stated to have sold the entire extent of 33 guntas of land in favour of her brother, defendant No. 2 through registered sale deed dated 23.4.1998 for valid consideration and she is stated to have put him in possession of 33 guntas of land. According to them, suit is not maintainable either in law or facts. According to the defendants, defendant No. 1 purchased the entire extent of 33 guntas in Sy. No. 150/1 from her father through registered sale deed dated 7.12.1970. With these pleadings, defendants have requested the court to dismiss the suit. 5. On the basis of the above pleadings of the parties, following issues came to be framed by the Trial Court: "1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he and the 2nd defendant are the owners of land in Sy. No. 150/1 measuring 29.7 guntas? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the sale deed dated 23.04.1998 is void to the extent of selling of 29.7 guntas of land in Sy. No. 150/1 is concerned? 3. To what relief the parties are entitled? Additional Issue: Whether the defendants prove the 1st defendant purchased the entire 33 guntas in Sy. No. 150/1 from her father through a registered sale deed dated 07.12.1970? 6. On behalf of the plaintiff, plaintiff himself is examined as PW-1 and two other witnesses have been examined as PWs-2 & 3, and 3 documents have been marked as Exs.P-1 to 3. On behalf of the defendants, both the defendants have been examined as DW-1 and 2 and one more witness has been examined as DW-3 and has produced and got marked 19 documents as Exs.D-1 to 19. 7. Ultimately, the learned Judge of the Trial Court has chosen to answer issues 1 & 2 and additional issue in the negative and consequently dismissed the suit vide order dated 10.4.2002, as against which, an appeal was filed under Section 96 of CPC in R.A.73/2002. On the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court has framed following points for consideration: "1. On the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court has framed following points for consideration: "1. Whether the Trial Court has erred in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff in O.S. No. 156/1998, dated 10.04.2002? 2. Whether the order of the Trial Court is capricious, perverse, illegal and not based on sound reasons and hence calls for interference by this court? 3. To what order? 8. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court has answered points 1 and 2 in the negative. Ultimately, the said appeal has been dismissed on 14.3.2005 confirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. It is this concurrent finding, which is called in question on various grounds as set out in the appeal memo. 9. The present appeal has been admitted on 6.12.2005 by framing following substantial question of law for consideration: "Whether the judgment and decree passed by the courts below on the basis of Ex. P-1 in respect of 33 guntas of land as described in the schedule is perverse and arbitrary and contrary to the material document, Ex. P-1 wherein the property sold is 20 yards x 20 yards, which would be approximately 03 guntas of land ?" 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 11. The scope of the first appellate court is very much limited if the findings are concurrent. The second appellate court can re-appreciate the evidence placed provided the Trial Court and First Appellate Court have wholly misread the evidence of the case or ignored the material evidence. 12. Ex. P-1 is the certified copy of the sale deed dated 7.12.1990 executed by Subba Setty, father of the parties in favour of defendant No. 1 relating to land in Sy. No. 150/1 of Konanapura Village which measures in all 33 guntas of land. Extent of land so conveyed in Ex. P-1 is 20x20 yards and if the extent of land as mentioned in Ex. P-1 is taken into consideration, it would be 3.3 guntas. 13. What is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the light of specific extent being mentioned in Ex. P-1 neither defendant No. 1 nor defendant No. 2 can claim entire extent of land in Sy. No. 150/1. 14. P-1 is taken into consideration, it would be 3.3 guntas. 13. What is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the light of specific extent being mentioned in Ex. P-1 neither defendant No. 1 nor defendant No. 2 can claim entire extent of land in Sy. No. 150/1. 14. Land so conveyed by the plaintiff was bounded on the East by Government Voni, West and South by remaining land of Narayanaswamy and North by Road. If really West and North boundaries in Ex. P-1 were part of Sy. No. 150/1, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, nothing came in the way of the plaintiff to have a surveyor appointed to that effect. Normal presumption is that boundaries prevail over extent. This presumption can be rebutted provided any acceptable evidence is placed on record. In Ex. D-6 RTC of Sy. No. 150/1 measuring 33 guntas, name of defendant No. 1-Rukkamma is shown in column 9 of the RTC and source of acquisition is mentioned as through sale deed. The name of defendant No. 1 is not only mentioned in column 9, but also in column 12, which is earmarked to mention the name of the person in possession. Admittedly the suit is filed in the year 1998. Even prior to that the name of defendant No. 1 had been incorporated in the kathedar column and column earmarked to mention the name of the person in possession. Ex. D-15 is another RTC issued by the concerned Tahsildar of Nanjangud for the period from 1976-77 upto 1980-81 wherein the name of defendant No. 1-Rukkamma, daughter of Subba Setty is shown as kathedar in column 9 and as person in possession in column 12. Similar is the entry in RTC of the subsequent years issued by the concerned Tahsildar, Ex. D-16 and it is for the period 1981-85. Further, the name of defendant No. 1 is found in RTC marked as Exs.D-17 to 19 which are for the periods from 1986-87, 1999-2000. If really defendant No. 1 was not in possession of the entire suit property, her name would have been shown as owner in possession for an area measuring 20x20 yards only. 15. Further, the name of defendant No. 1 is found in RTC marked as Exs.D-17 to 19 which are for the periods from 1986-87, 1999-2000. If really defendant No. 1 was not in possession of the entire suit property, her name would have been shown as owner in possession for an area measuring 20x20 yards only. 15. What exactly should be the approach in regard to backward and forward entries in revenue records has been well dealt by a bench consisting of three Judge of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ambika Prasad Thakur and others etc. v. Ram Ekbal Rai (dead) by his legal representatives and others etc. reported in AIR 1966 SC 605 . Paragraph 15 of the said decision is relevant and the same is extracted herein below--- "15. The survey records of 1892, 1895, 1904 and 1909 disclose that the ancestors of the plaintiffs held some of the frontier plots of Dubha Mal. The High Court was, therefore, asked to draw the inference that their ancestors held those plots during 1845 to 1863 when the Taufir lands accreted. The question is whether such an inference should be drawn. Now, if a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of the continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed in Illustration (d) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognized both in India, see Anangamanjari Chowdhrani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrani, 14 Ind Appellant 101 at p. 110 (PC), and England, see Bristow v. Cormican (1878) 3 AC 641 at PP. 669 670, Doe v. Young (1845) 8 QB 63: 115 ER 798. The broad observation in Manmatha Nath v. Girish Chandra Roy, 38 Cal WN 763 at p. 770: (AIR 1935 Cal 702 at p. 704), that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. The broad observation in Manmatha Nath v. Girish Chandra Roy, 38 Cal WN 763 at p. 770: (AIR 1935 Cal 702 at p. 704), that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances. In the present case the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference from the state of things during 1892 and 1909 that the ancestors of the plaintiffs held frontier plots of Dubha Mal in 1863. The High Court pointed out that even during 1894 to 1905 the ownership of some plots had changed, and also that the frontier Mal plots and the corresponding Taufir plots were not always held by the same person. In 1845, part of the Mal lands was under water. The frontier Mal lands reformed between 1845 to 1863 were subject to annual inundation. It is well known that settlements of Char lands are seasonal and temporary. There is a considerable gap of time between 1892 and 1845. it is not safe to assume that the state of things during 1894 to 1905 existed during 1845 to 1863." 16. If the name of either plaintiff or defendant No. 2's name had appeared in the revenue records for maximum number of years and name of defendant No. 1 had entered only for few years, then it would have been something different. Plaintiff is a knowledgeable person and he knew very well about the incorporation of the name of his sister i.e., defendant No. 1 for quite a long time. He did not raise his little finger about incorporating the name of defendant No. 1 as kathedar in respect of entire extent of land in Sy. No. 150/1. 17. As already discussed, illustration (d) to Section 114 of Evidence Act speaks about the presumption of conveyance of backward entries. Illustration (d) to Section 114 of Evidence Act is extracted hereinbelow. "Section 114:.................. (d) That a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence;" 18. Illustration (d) to Section 114 of Evidence Act is extracted hereinbelow. "Section 114:.................. (d) That a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence;" 18. Consequent upon the execution of sale deed dated 23.4.1998 in favour of defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1, the name of defendant No. 2 has been incorporated in column No. 9 and column No. 12 of RTC. The initial burden was upon the plaintiff to prove that the sale deed executed by the father in favour of defendant No. 1 does not bind to the extent of remaining land. He has kept quiet for a long time without raising his little finger. It is not as though he was unaware of the incorporation of the name of defendant No. 1 as kathedar to the entire extent of land of 33 guntas in Sy. No. 150/1. Apart from that, defendant No. 1 is none other than the sister of plaintiff and defendant No. 2. 19. DW-1 has specifically deposed that her father had already sold the entire land in Sy. No. 150/1 in her favour to meet his family necessities. Apart from this, she had been paying tax to the entire extent of land. It is in this regard, she has furnished the tax paid receipts dated 13.4.1998 and 25.6.1994. If the incorporation of her name to the entire extent of land in Sy. No. 150/1 was not based on any valid documents of conveyance as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, much credence could not have been attached to the revenue entries. Revenue entries so found in the records have been in existence for quite long time and they are based on registered sale deed. 20. As rightly pointed out, boundaries prevail over the extent in regard to the agricultural lands. The initial burden cast upon the plaintiff is not effectively discharged. Therefore, the inconsistencies if any in the case of adversary cannot be taken as an advantage as per Section 102 of Evidence Act. Both the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court have assessed the entire evidence in right perspective and that too after testing the evidence on the touchstone of intrinsic probabilities. Therefore, the inconsistencies if any in the case of adversary cannot be taken as an advantage as per Section 102 of Evidence Act. Both the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court have assessed the entire evidence in right perspective and that too after testing the evidence on the touchstone of intrinsic probabilities. Both the Court have adopted right approach to the real state of affairs. No illegality or infirmity is found in the approach adopted by both the Courts. Hence, the substantial question of law is answered in the negative. Consequently, appeal will have to be dismissed. ORDER Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed in original suit bearing O.S. No. 156/1998 which was pending on the file of Addl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) & JMFC, Nanjangud and confirmed by the Court of Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) and JMFC, Nanjangud in R.A.73/2002 is dismissed. Parties to bear their costs.