Sanjay Karol, J. 1. This regular second appeal, filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stands admitted on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the two courts below have erred in not raising a presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act in respect of two sale deeds dated 11.1.1962 and 19.3.1965”? It be only clarified that controversy is only with regard to sale deed dated 19.03.1965. Concurrent findings of fact are challenged by the plaintiffs. 2. Budhi Singh and Jamna alias Jamna Dei as plaintiffs, set up their claim, in the suit land, on the basis of sale deeds dated 11.01.1962 (Ex.PW.1/A) and 19.03.1965 (Ex.PW.1/B), executed by Sh. Longu (defendant No.1). Challenge was laid to the entries, erroneously recording the defendants to be co-owners. Plaintiffs claimed 1/4th share in the suit land, pleading defendant No.1 to be owner only to the extent of 3/16th share and defendant No.2 to be owner of a very negligible share. 3. Suit for declaration and injunction so filed by the plaintiffs was primarily resisted by Longu, who while admitting execution of sale deed dated 11.01.1962, denied execution of any sale deed dated 19.03.1965, categorically pleading the document to have been manipulated by Brehabatu (predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs), who on the pretext of getting the land demarcated, so sold vide earlier sale deed obtained thumb impression on a stamp paper which was supposed to be an application for demarcation, to be presented before the Tehsildar. Bhrehabatu had called Longu to the Tehsil Headquarter for the said purpose. Thus, without disputing the share of the plaintiffs in the land sold vide sale deed dated 11.01.1962, with respect to sale deed dated 19.03.1965 defendants pleaded fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. 4. Based on the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of 7/16th share by way of purchase from defendant No.1, of the suit land by way of sale deeds dated 11.1.1962 & 19.3.1965? OPP. 2. Whether share in the revenue record qua the ownership of plaintiffs are wrongly recorded as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for consequential relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP. 4. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is within time? OPP 5. Whether plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 6. OPP. 2. Whether share in the revenue record qua the ownership of plaintiffs are wrongly recorded as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for consequential relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP. 4. Whether suit of the plaintiffs is within time? OPP 5. Whether plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct? OPD 7. Whether sale deed dated 19.3.1965 is a result of fraud, misrepresentation & undue influence as alleged? OPD 8. Relief. 5. Appreciating the testimonies of the witnesses, trial Court, by answering the material issues, in favour of the defendants, dismissed the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 30.04.2002, passed in CS No. 111 of 2000, titled as Budhi Singh & another Versus Sh. Longu and another. 6. Lower Appellate Court, in the plaintiffs’ appeal affirmed all findings of fact vide judgment and decree dated 06.10.2003 rendered in Civil appeal No.74-D/XIII- 02, titled as Budhi Singh & another Versus Longu & another. 7. Hence the present appeal. 8. There is no dispute with regard to execution of sale deed dated 11.01.1962 (Ex.PW.1/A). Plaintiffs’ share in the suit land, to the extent of the land sold in terms of this sale deed is also not in dispute. 9. Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reads as under:- “90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old.—Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document excluded or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Explanation.—Documents are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable”. 10. Principle behind the aforesaid provision is of necessity and convenience. 10. Principle behind the aforesaid provision is of necessity and convenience. The underline principle being, that if a document, private or otherwise is produced from proper custody and is on its face free from suspicion, the Court may presume that it has been signed or written by the person whose signature it bears or in whose handwriting it purports to be and that it has been duly attested and executed, if it purports to be so. To raise such presumption, prima facie proof is necessary to show that the document is 30 years old. But however, such presumption is rebuttable. Where the party opposing the document disproves it to be so by convincing evidence, the Court is duty bound to call the party, relying on it to prove it. Where the factum of execution is not in dispute, no evidence is necessary to prove its genuineness. Proper custody under the Section would mean the custody of any person, so connected with the deed, that possession thereof, does not raise any suspicion or fraud. 11. The power conferred upon the Court is absolutely discretionary. It may or may not draw the presumption and would depend upon the factual matrix of each case. Even if the document is 30 years old, comes from the proper custody, the Court may still call upon the party to prove the same as also its contents. Court is not, under all circumstances, obliged to draw such presumption, and the Court is duty bound to consider evidence, external and internal of the document, in order to enable it to decide, whether in any particular case, it should or should not presume proper signature and execution. Age alone is not the sole criteria. However, while refusing to draw presumption, Court cannot be capricious in its attitude. But then even in the absence of any objection, taken at the time of admission of the document, Court can refuse to draw the statutory presumption. Mere tendering of a document in evidence cannot be regarded as proof of proper custody. 12. Normally Appellate Court should be loathe in interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing to draw the statutory presumption unless and until the discretion so exercised is arbitrary, capricious, illegal or shocks the conscious of the Court. 13. Mere tendering of a document in evidence cannot be regarded as proof of proper custody. 12. Normally Appellate Court should be loathe in interfering with the discretion exercised by the trial Court in refusing to draw the statutory presumption unless and until the discretion so exercised is arbitrary, capricious, illegal or shocks the conscious of the Court. 13. The apex Court in Gangamma and others Versus Shivalingaiah, (2005) 9 SCC 359 , has held that even if formal execution of a document is proved, the same by itself would not lead to a presumption that recitals contained therein are also correct. Mere execution of a document does not lead to the conclusion that the recitals made therein are correct, and subject to the statutory provisions contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. It is open to the parties to raise a plea contra thereto. Also the presumption enacted under the Section can be raised in relation to the original document and not copies thereof. [Also: Tilak Chand Kureel Versus Bhim Raj, 1969(3) SCC 367 ; Lallan Singh and others Versus State of Bihar, 1969 (3) SC 765; Shiv Lal and others Versus Chet Ram and others, 1970 (2) SCC 773 and Lakhi Baruah and others Versus Padma Kanta Kalita and others, 1996(8) 357] 14. Section 90 of the Evidence Act is based on the legal maxims: nemo dat qui non habet (no one gives what he has not got); and nemo plus juris tribuit quam ipse habet (no one can bestow or grant a greater right, or a better title than he has himself). This section does away with the strict rules, as regards the requirement of proof, which are enforced in the case of private documents, by giving rise to a presumption of genuineness, in respect of certain documents that have reached a certain age. The period is to be reckoned backward from the date of the offering of the document, and not any subsequent date i.e. the date of decision of suit or appeal. [See: State of Andhra Pradesh and others Versus Star Bone Mill and Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 .] 15. The period is to be reckoned backward from the date of the offering of the document, and not any subsequent date i.e. the date of decision of suit or appeal. [See: State of Andhra Pradesh and others Versus Star Bone Mill and Fertiliser Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319 .] 15. The apex Court in Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Ray and another Versus Narendra Nath Sen and others, AIR 1953 SC 431 , had the occasion to deal with Book of Accounts which undoubtedly were 30 years old and came from the possession of its keeper. Yet Court held that:- “3. … … … Exhibit 32 series as noticed by the High Court, consists of loose sheets of papers. They have not the probative force of a book of account regularly kept. Being old documents, naturally, the writer is not called and barring the fact that they were produced from the Receiver's possession there is nothing to show their genuineness. Section 90, Evidence Act, does not help the appellants because this is not a case where the signature of a Particular person is in question or sought to be established. … …”. 16. The apex Court in Harihar Prasad Singh and another Versus Deonarain Prasad and others, AIR 1956 SC 305 , the Court has observed as under:- “8. Strong reliance was placed by the respondents on Exhibits F-1 and F-1(1) which are khatians relating to the suit lands published on 7-12-1909 recording them as in the possession of the defendants of the second party as 'kaimi' and on the presumption under S. 103-B that entry is correct. This presumption, it is contended, is particularly strong in the present case, because the predecessors-in-title of the plaintiffs were parties to the proceedings and contested the same, and that the record of rights was made after considering their objections. The plaintiffs, however, denied that they were parties to the proceedings, and contended that they were taken behind their back by the mortgagees and the second party defendants acting in collusion with a view to defeat their rights. Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) are certified copies of the objection petitions stated to have been filed by the mortgagors under S. 103-A of the Act, and they purport to have been signed by one Chulai Mahto as karpardaz of some of the mortgagors. Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) are certified copies of the objection petitions stated to have been filed by the mortgagors under S. 103-A of the Act, and they purport to have been signed by one Chulai Mahto as karpardaz of some of the mortgagors. The plaintiffs deny the genuineness of the signatures in Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) and also the authority of Chulai Mahto to represent the mortgagors. There is no evidence that the signatures on Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) are true, but the defendants rely on the presumption enacted in S. 90, Evidence Act, in favour of their genuineness. But Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) are merely certified copies of the objection petitions filed before the Survey Officer and not the originals, and it was held in - 'Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh', AIR 1935 PC 132 (C) that the presumption enacted in the section can be raised only with reference to original documents and not to copies thereof. There is the further difficulty in the way of the respondents that the documents are signed by Chulai Mahto as agent, and there is no proof that he was an agent, and S. 90 does not authorize the raising of a presumption as to the existence of authority on the part of Chulai Mahto to represent the mortgagors. It is again to be noted that the objection on the merits raised in Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) that the lands are bakasht lands in the possession of mortgagees is not one which it was to the interests of the mortgagors to put forward, as, if accepted, it would preclude them from admitting tenants in respect of them, without conferring on them the status of settled raiyats and occupancy rights under S. 21 of the Act. It was only if the lands were private lands that the proprietor would be entitled to cultivate them personally, and that was the claim which they had been making consistently from 1893 onwards. The claim put forward in Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) is destructive of the rights claimed all along by the mortgagors, and amounts to an admission that the lands are not private and raises the doubt that the petitions were not really inspired by them. The claim put forward in Exhibits A-1 and A-1(1) is destructive of the rights claimed all along by the mortgagors, and amounts to an admission that the lands are not private and raises the doubt that the petitions were not really inspired by them. It should also be mentioned that at the hearing of the petition, no evidence was adduced by the mortgagors, and the decision of the Survey Officer was given practically 'exparte'. The mortgagees were parties to the proceedings, and they did not appear and produce the mortgage deeds, Exhibits 2 and 3, under which they got into possession, and which described the lands as sir.' It was to the interests of the mortgagees that the lands should be held to be 'sir', and it was further their duty to defend the title of the mortgagors as against the claim made by the tenants that they were raiyati lands. Why then did they not produce Exhibits 2 and 3 at the hearing? The recitals in the lease deed, Exhibit 2(a) which was executed by the defendants of the second party, were inconsistent with their claim that the lands were raiyati. Why did they not produce it at the hearing? There is, therefore, must to be said for the contention of the appellants that the proceedings evidenced by Exhibits A-1 and A-1 (1) were collusive in character. 9. But even assuming that they were real, that would not materially affect the result, as the true effect of a record of rights under S. 103- A is not to create rights where none existed but simply to raise a presumption under S. 103-B that such rights exist, and that presumption is one liable to be rebutted. There is a long line of authorities that a person who attacks a record made under S. 103-A as incorrect discharges the burden which the law casts on him under S. 103-B by showing that it was not justified on the materials on which it is based. Vide - 'Bagha Mowar v. Ram Lakham', AIR 1918 Cal 807 (D) and - 'Eakub Ali v. Muhammad Ali', AIR 1929 Cal 450 (E). And where, as here, no evidence was placed before the authorities who made the record, he has only to produce evidence which satisfies the Court that the entry is erroneous. Vide - 'Bagha Mowar v. Ram Lakham', AIR 1918 Cal 807 (D) and - 'Eakub Ali v. Muhammad Ali', AIR 1929 Cal 450 (E). And where, as here, no evidence was placed before the authorities who made the record, he has only to produce evidence which satisfies the Court that the entry is erroneous. Whether the question is considered with reference to the presumption under S. 120(2) or S. 103-B, the position is the same. The plaintiffs who claim that the lands are kamat have to establish it by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the evidence adduced by them is sufficient, as we have held it is, to establish it, the presumption under S. 103-B equally with that under S. 120(2) becomes displaced. In the result, we are of opinion that the suit lands are the private lands of the proprietor”. 17. In Madamanchi Ramappa and another Versus Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 , Court was dealing with a case where admissibility of certified copy of public document was an issue. Sale deed even if registered under the Registration Act, was not held to be a public document. 18. The apex Court in Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale Versus Shalinibai Nagappa Sabale and others, (2009) 12 SCC 101 , has only held that there is a presumption with regard to valid execution of a registered document. 19. A private document produced from the custody from a private party, though 30 years old, cannot have the same weight as a public document. [See: Pavitri Devi and another Versus Darbari Singh and others, (1993) 4 SCC 392 .] 20. The apex Court in Union of India Versus Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , has held that:- “85.3. ……..Presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act in respect of 30 years’ old document coming from proper custody relates to the signature, execution and attestation of a document i.e. to its genuineness but it does not give rise to presumption of correctness of every statement contained in it. That the contents of the documents are true or it had been acted upon, have to be proved like any other fact………”. 21. That the contents of the documents are true or it had been acted upon, have to be proved like any other fact………”. 21. It is also a settled principle of law that a Will is required to be proved in terms of the provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 65/68 of the Indian Evidence Act and no presumption can be drawn with regard to the said document. [See: Sital Das Versus Sant Ram and others , AIR 1954 SC 606 ; Kalidindi Venkata Subbaraju and others Versus Chintalapati Subbaraju and others, AIR 1968 SC 947 ; Bharpur Singh and others Versus Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 and M.B. Ramesh (Dead) By LRs. Versus K.M. Veeraje Urs (Dead) By LRs., (2013) 7 SCC 490 .] 22. In view of the aforesaid legal position, plaintiffs’ case is considered. 23. In the instant case, there is no dispute with regard to the signature of predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and thumb impression of the defendant on document in issue. What is argued is its execution by exercising fraud and misrepresentation. 24. It is a settled principle of law that whenever a party wants to put forth contention of fraud, it is to be specifically pleaded and proved, which in the instant case stands established by leading credible evidence, in line with the ratio of law laid down in Saradamani Kandappan Versus S. Rajalakshmi and others, (2011) 12 SCC 18 ; Gayatri Devi and others Versus Shashi Pal Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 527 and Saheb Khan Versus Mohd. Yosufuddin and others, (2006) 4 SCC 476 . 25. Sale deed dated 19.03.1965 cannot be said to have been proved, in accordance with law. At the time of the document being exhibited, defendants have rightly objected to the same. This view is supported by the ratio of law laid down in Sait Tarajee Khimchand and others Versus Yelamarti Satyam and others, AIR 1971 SC 1865 . 26. With regard to sale deed in issue, plaintiff has neither pleaded nor proved as to how the consideration was paid; who was the Deed Writer; before whom the document was executed. No evidence, worthy of credence, proving the sale deed, stands led by the plaintiffs. Document was executed between the plaintiffs’ father and defendant No.1. Even the handwriting was not proved nor was anyone called from the office of the Registrar. 27. No evidence, worthy of credence, proving the sale deed, stands led by the plaintiffs. Document was executed between the plaintiffs’ father and defendant No.1. Even the handwriting was not proved nor was anyone called from the office of the Registrar. 27. On the other hand, defendant No.1 (DW.1), in Court, has categorically deposed that in the year 1965, he was called by Brehabatu for moving an application before the Tehsildar. The land sold in the year 1962 was sought to be demarcated. With this understanding, on the asking of Brehabatu, he put his thumb impression on the documents. Neither did he receive any sale consideration nor had he any intention of selling the land, subject matter of sale deed dated 19.03.1965. His testimony is worthy of credence and inspiring in confidence. Hence, findings returned by the Courts below, with respect to issue No.7, cannot be said to be illegal or erroneous, more so, in the light of principles reiterated by this Court in Bhop Ram Versus Dharam Das, Latest HLJ 2009(HP) 560. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussions, entries recording the plaintiffs to be owners, in the revenue record, would also not reflect any title of ownership to the extent of land sold in terms of sale deed dated 19.03.1965. 29. On the issue I deem it appropriate to deal with certain decisions referred to by Sh. G.D. Verma, learned Senior counsel, for the plaintiffs. 30. In Dalip Kumar Versus Rajesh Sahani and others, Latest HLJ 2004 (HP) 1030, Court was dealing with a case pending before the Tribunal, unlike Civil Courts, which distinction the court itself drew, with regard to the statutory restrictions and limitation, so imposed upon Civil Courts by virtue of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act. 31. Ratio in Rajni Tandon Versus Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar and another, (2009) 14 SCC 782 , is misconceived as it deals with the object of the registration of the document. In the said case no plea of fraud unlike the instant case was taken. 32. Shyamal Kumar Roy Versus Sushil Kumar Agarwal, AIR 2007 SC 637 , deals with the impounding of the document and also where document not proved, in accordance with law, can be looked into or not. In the said case no plea of fraud unlike the instant case was taken. 32. Shyamal Kumar Roy Versus Sushil Kumar Agarwal, AIR 2007 SC 637 , deals with the impounding of the document and also where document not proved, in accordance with law, can be looked into or not. This was so done in the given facts and circumstances unlike the present case, where objection with regard to the admissibility of the document was taken at the initial stage. 33. Reliance on the decision rendered by the apex Court in Union of India and others Versus A. Nagamalleshwar Rao, AIR 1998 SC 111 , is misconceived as it pertains to departmental proceedings. Also reliance on Madamanchi Ramappa and another Versus Muthaluru Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 is misconceived. 34. Appellants have filed an application, seeking permission to lead additional evidence to prove sale deed dated 19.03.1965. In the given facts and circumstances, no case for interference is made out by the appellants. The alleged sale deed, is an act of fraud and misrepresentation as has been concurrently held by the Courts below. As such, reliance on the decision rendered by the apex Court in Lachhman Singh (Deceased) Through legal representatives and others Versus Hazara Singh (Deceased) Through legal representatives and others, (2008) 5 SCC 444 and Shalimar Chemical Works Limited Versus Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) and others, (2010) 8 SCC 423 is misconceived in law. 35. Consequently, I do not find any reason or ground sufficient enough to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. It cannot be said that learned Courts below erred in correctly and completely appreciating the testimonies of the witnesses or that findings returned are illegal, erroneous or perverse in any manner which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. Substantial question of law is answered accordingly. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.