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2015 DIGILAW 565 (PAT)

Suthri v. Munilal Singh

2015-04-07

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2015
MUNGESHWAR SAHOO, J.:–This First Appeal has been filed by the defendant No.1 and 2 against the Judgment and Decree dated 26th March, 1977 passed by learned 3rd Addl. Subordinate Judge, Siwan in Title Suit No.12 of 1971/178 of 1975 whereby the Court below decreed the plaintiff respondent’s suit for partition. 2. The plaintiff respondent filed the aforesaid suit claiming partition of his share to the extent of 8 bigha 7 katha 12.5 dhur in Schedule I land and half share in Schedule II land. 3. The plaintiff claimed the aforesaid relief for separate share alleging that Sri Sahay Mahto had two sons, namely, Abhilakh Mahto and Rajai Mahto. Abhilakh Mahto had two sons, Swarup Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto. The plaintiffs are the sons of Swarup Mahto being the son of Munnilal Singh who was only son of Swarup Mahto. The defendants represented the branch of Parmeshwar Mahto. Rajai Mahto had two sons, Balak Mahto and Uchhant Mahto. Uchhant Mahto had one son Pitambar Mahto. Parmeshwar Mahto had two sons, Ramdeo Singh and Ram Dihal Singh. Ramedeo Singh is defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 is son of defendant No.1 whereas the defendant No.3 to 5 are the maternal grand son of Ram Dihal Singh. The further case is that Ram Dihal Singh died in state of separation from Ramdas Singh in the year 1966 leaving behind his daughters and son who was defendant No.3 to 5. Abhilakh and Rajai Mahto were separate from each other but there was no partition by metes and bound. After death of Abhilakh Mahto, Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto also separated from each other prior to cadastral survey. The two sons of Rajai Mahto were also separate. In spite of separation, the entire lands belonged to Sri Sahay Mahto was in joint possession of the parties. There was only 10 bigha 13 katha 1 dhur land in C.S. khata No.15. After separation, Balak Mahto acquired 1 bigha 9 dhur through settlement. Balak Mahto gifted his share in favour of Pitambar Mahto, i.e., son of Uchhant Mahto. In the land of C.S. khata No.15, Pitambar Mahto had half share and Parmeshwar and Swaroop had half share. This share has been noted in C.S. Khatiyan. Pitambar Mahto died in the life time of Balak Mahto, therefore, the entire share of Rajai Mahto was inherited by Balak Mahto. In the land of C.S. khata No.15, Pitambar Mahto had half share and Parmeshwar and Swaroop had half share. This share has been noted in C.S. Khatiyan. Pitambar Mahto died in the life time of Balak Mahto, therefore, the entire share of Rajai Mahto was inherited by Balak Mahto. Thereafter, he gifted his half share in all the lands in favour of Swaroop Mahto. However, in R.S. khatiyan, the share of Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar had wrongly been noted. The name of Parmeshwar Mahto had wrongly been noted in R.S. khata No.337. Parmeshwar Mahto had no concern with the gifted land. On 29.11.1956, the defendant No.1 executed two sale deeds in favour of Munnilal Singh, plaintiff No.1. The plaintiff and defendant also sold 5 katha 5 dhur land to Kari Singh. Therefore, this land is not included in this partition suit. 4. The defendant No.1 and 2 filed contesting written statement. Besides taking various legal and ornamental please, mainly contended that Abhilakh Mahto and Rajai Mahto were separate prior to cadastral survey but Parmeshwar Mahto and Ram Swaroop Mahto were joint and they remained joint till 1966. Swaroop @ Ram Swaroop was the karta and after his death, Munnilal Singh, plaintiff No.1 became the karta. Although defendant No.1 is elder to plaintiff No.1. Ram Balak Mahto and Uchhant Mahto were also members of joint Hindu family. Uchhant Mahto died in jointness with Balak Mahto. Balak Mahto never executed gift deed in favour of Pitamabar Mahto. After death of Pitambar, Balak Mahto came in possession of the land of Rajai Mahto. Ram Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto were member of the joint Hindu family and they used to serve Balak Mahto. So Balalk Mahto desired to execute deed of gift of his share in favour of Parmeshwar Mahto and Swarop Mahto. However, Swaroop Mahto was the karta, therefore, he got executed the deed of gift in his name only. After gift deed, both the brothers came in joint possession of the gifted property. The gifted lands were blended in the joint lands. Parmeshwar Mahto died in the state of jointness with Ramswaroop leaving behind his sons, Ram Dihal and Ramdeo. They also remained in joint. Ram Dihal died issueless in the year 1967. Thereafter, the defendant No.1 and 2 separated from the plaintiff in mess and residence and got their half share defined but the lands remained joint. Parmeshwar Mahto died in the state of jointness with Ramswaroop leaving behind his sons, Ram Dihal and Ramdeo. They also remained in joint. Ram Dihal died issueless in the year 1967. Thereafter, the defendant No.1 and 2 separated from the plaintiff in mess and residence and got their half share defined but the lands remained joint. The defendant No.1 had incurred some loan, therefore, a suit was filed against defendant No.1 by Sheobhajan Singh being Money Suit No.515 of 1956. The plaintiff No.1 being the karta instigated the defendant No.1 to execute the deed of relinquishment (Ladabhi deed) in the garb of saving the gifted property. Accordingly, the defendant No.1 executed a deed of Ladabhi to save the family property. Therefore, the Ladabhi deed and the sale deed dated 29.11.1956 are the farji sale deed and transaction. In fact plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 and 2 remained joint upto year 1956. The defendants have got no objection, if the plaintiffs gave half share in the suit lands. 5. The defendant No.3 to 5 filed a supporting written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the learned Court below framed the following issues :— (i) Is the suit, as framed, maintainable? (ii) Have the plaintiffs got any valid cause of action and right to sue? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation? (iv) Is the suit bad for defect of parties or for partial partition? (v) Whether Swarup Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto were members of the joint Hindu Mitakshara family in the year 1903 and whether the land gifted by Balak Mahto in deed of gift dated 8.7.1903 were joint property of Swarup Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto? (vi) Whether defendant Nos.3 to 5 have got any joint title with the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 and 2 with respect to the suit lands? (vii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to get a decree for partition as claimed for and if so to what extent of share? (viii) To what other relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 7. The learned Court below on the basis of evidences came to the conclusion that the defendants have adduced no oral evidence or documentary evidences in support of the fact of blending the gifted property in the common hoch-poch. (viii) To what other relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 7. The learned Court below on the basis of evidences came to the conclusion that the defendants have adduced no oral evidence or documentary evidences in support of the fact of blending the gifted property in the common hoch-poch. The gifted property exclusively belong to Swaroop Mahto, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to 3/4th share in the entire suit land. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s suit was decreed. 8. The learned counsel, Mr. Mahesh Prasad, appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned Court below has not properly appreciated the evidence, and therefore, wrongly recorded the findings that the gifted property was not blended in the common hoch-poch. According to the learned counsel, the gift deed itself is not acted upon because the plaintiff never produced any evidence in support of his separate possession of the gifted property. In such circumstances, on the basis of gift deed only the plaintiff is not entitled for declaration of his title with respect to the gifted property unless he proved his exclusive possession. Moreover the property was joint, therefore, Balak Mahto could not have gifted the joint family property. The learned counsel further submitted that there was intersee transaction also which clearly proved the fact that there had already been partition. If there had already been partition, then there is no question of second partition arises. The learned counsel further submitted that the brothers, Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto separated in the year 1966 and prior to that, all the parties were in joint possession of the gifted land and in fact Balak Mahto expressed his desire to gift the land in favour of both the brothers but Swaroop Mahto being the karta got the gift deed in his name only. The learned counsel further submitted that in the year 1903, Parmeshwar Mahto and Rameshwar Mahto were joint and the gift deed was executed on 8.7.1903. The learned counsel further submitted that in the year 1903, Parmeshwar Mahto and Rameshwar Mahto were joint and the gift deed was executed on 8.7.1903. During this long period from 1903 to 1966, there is no evidence of the plaintiff to prove the fact that the plaintiff were in separate possession of the gifted land, therefore, on the basis of gift deed, they are not entitled to inherit the share of Balak Mahto, it will be deemed that the property gifted in the year 1903 was blended into the common hoch-poch, as such both the parties were in joint possession of the property. 9. So far the execution of Ladabhi deed is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that the money suit was filed against Ramdeo and Munnilal Singh asked Ramdeo Singh to execute deed of Ladabhi with respect to gift deed and also asked to execute two sale deeds dated 29.11.1956 to save the family property, therefore, in fact both the transaction, i.e., deed of Ladabhi and the sale deeds are the farji transaction but the learned Court below wrongly discarded the case of the defendant and relied upon the deed of Ladabhi, ext.8 and these two sale deeds, ext.2A and 2B. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned Judgment and Decree are liable to be set aside. 10. The learned senior counsel, Mr. S. S. Dwivedi, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff respondent submitted that the defendant did not raise any dispute regarding the separation between the two brothers namely, Abhilakh and Rajai Mahto. It is also not the case of the defendant appellant that there was partition by metes and bounds. The defendants appellant also did not dispute the execution and registration of the gift deed by Balak Mahto in favour of Swaroop Mahto. Therefore, in fact the defendants admitted the case of the plaintiff that there was no partition by metes and bounds and Balak Mahto gifted his share in favour of Swaroop Mahto alone. The defendant appellant claimed that gift deed was made in favour of both the brothers, i.e, Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto but in support of this case, no evidence has been produced and moreover oral evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of the registered gift deed. Admittedly, gift deed is in the name of Swaroop Mahto only. The defendant appellant claimed that gift deed was made in favour of both the brothers, i.e, Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto but in support of this case, no evidence has been produced and moreover oral evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of the registered gift deed. Admittedly, gift deed is in the name of Swaroop Mahto only. Now, therefore, it is the burden on the defendant appellant to prove the assertion that the property was gifted to both the brothers but the appellant failed. Likewise so far blending in the common hoch-poch is concerned, also except the pleading, no evidence has been produced. The learned counsel further submitted that merely because also properties were transacted between the parties, there cannot be any presumption that there had been partition between the parties, particularly when it is the specific case of both the parties that there was no partition and the defendants also in the pleading claimed that if all the properties are partitioned they have got no objection. When both the parties are claiming jointness, the Court cannot make third case and say that there had already been partition. The learned counsel submitted that only pleading of the defendant is that the parties were separate in mess and residence. Therefore, the property were joint and there was no partition by metes and bounds. In such circumstances, the learned Court below has rightly allowed the suit for partition. So far the Ladabhi deed, ext.8, and registered sale deed, ext.2/A and 2/B, are concerned, the defendants never challenged the genuineness or otherwise of the said deeds. Admittedly, all these deeds are registered deeds, therefore, there is presumption that the deeds have been validly executed. It is for the defendants to rebut the presumption by proving the fact that the deeds are farji transaction but no such evidence has been adduced in the present case. 11. The learned senior counsel further submitted that till the partition is affected by metes and bounds, the presumption will be that there had been no partition by metes and bounds although the parties were living separate. Here it is admitted by the parties that the parties were living separately, therefore, since they separated in mess and residence, the co-parcenery family seized and they became the tenants in common who were enjoying the property jointly. Here it is admitted by the parties that the parties were living separately, therefore, since they separated in mess and residence, the co-parcenery family seized and they became the tenants in common who were enjoying the property jointly. In such circumstances, Balak Mahto had gifted his share only because there was no partition by metes and bounds. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Girijanandini Devi Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) and also the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyani Vs. Narayanan ( AIR 1980 SC 1173 ). 12. The learned counsel further submitted that in the Ladabhi deed, the defendant No.1 clearly admitted the fact that the gift deed was executed only in favour of Swaroop Mahto. This being the admitted position, now the defendant cannot be allowed to say that the property was gifted jointly to Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the First Appeal is liable to be dismissed with cost. 13. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, the points arises for consideration in the First Appeal is as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get their land gifted by Balak Mahto in favour of Swaroop Mahto separated along with their share in the other ancestral property and whether the Judgment and Decree passed by the Court below is sustainable in the eye of law. 14. The specific case of the defendants as pleaded in the written statement is that Abhilakh Mahto and Rajai Mahto were separate from each other prior to cadastral survey and Parmeshwar Mahto and Swaroop Mahto were joint till there was partition between heirs of Parmeshwar Mahto and Swaroop Mahto in the year 1966. Now, therefore, it is admitted case that Abhilakh Mahto and Rajai Mahto were separate. It is also admitted fact as has been pleaded by the parties that the share of Rajai Mahto was inherited by Balak Mahto after the death of Paitambar Mahto. The defendant appellant also admitted that Balak Mahto executed a registered gift deed in the year 1903. The only dispute raised by the defendant is that Balak Mahto expressed his desire to gift his share in favour of both the brothers, i.e., Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto. The defendant appellant also admitted that Balak Mahto executed a registered gift deed in the year 1903. The only dispute raised by the defendant is that Balak Mahto expressed his desire to gift his share in favour of both the brothers, i.e., Swaroop Mahto and Parmeshwar Mahto. It is admitted fact that this gift deed is in favour of Swaroop Mahto only. The defendants have examined many witnesses. D.W.6 is on the question of selling the property measuring 5 katha jointly. The evidence has been adduced in support of the registered sale deed, ext.2. D.W.8, D.W.11, D.W.12 have all stated that the brothers Ramswaroop and Parmeshwar were joint. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have examined witnesses in support of the fact that there was separation between branch of Parmewhswar and Swaroop. So far this separation or no separation is concerned, it may be mentioned here that it is not the case of defendant also that there had been partition of the joint family property by metes and bounds. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Girijanandini Devi Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) has held that ‘in a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law, no individual member of that family, while it remains undivided, can predicate that he has a certain definite share in the property of the family. The rights of the coparceners are defined when there is partition. Partition consists in defining the shares of the coparceners in the joint property, actual division of the property by metes and bounds is not necessary to constitute partition. Once the shares are defined, whether by agreement between the parties or other-wise, partition is complete. The parties may thereafter choose to divide the property by metes and bounds, or may continue to live together and enjoy the property in common as before. If they live together, the mode of enjoyment alone remains joint, but not the tenure of the property.’ 16. In the present case as has been pleaded by the parties, Abhilakh and Rajai were separate. There is no specific pleading by either of the party that there was partition by metes and bounds. Therefore, the co-parcenery family ceased to exist since both the brothers were separate. In the present case as has been pleaded by the parties, Abhilakh and Rajai were separate. There is no specific pleading by either of the party that there was partition by metes and bounds. Therefore, the co-parcenery family ceased to exist since both the brothers were separate. In such circumstances, if there was no co-parcenery property and the shares have been defined, both the brothers who were enjoying the property jointly as tenants in common, it cannot be said that Balak Mahto who represent the half share of Rajai Mahto had no authority to execute gift deed. Moreover, in this case it is also admitted fact that Balak Mahto has in fact executed the gift deed in 1903. The only contention of the defendant appellant is that the properties gifted were neither defined nor were in exclusive possession of the donee. So far this case of the defendant appellant is concerned, as stated above since there was no partition, the share was only gifted by Balak Mahto. It is settled principle of law that a coparsenery cannot execute gift deed and gift his share to another but here in this case, there is no coparsenery family. The shares were defined but parties were enjoying jointly. In my opinion, therefore, Balak Mahto had the right to execute the gift deed with respect to his share. Here, it will not be out of place to mention that execution and right to execute the gift deed by Balak Mahto had not been challenged by defendant. In such circumstances, now it cannot be said that only because the donee did not claim partition immediately, the property was blended in the joint common hoch-poch. In my opinion, there cannot be any such presumption in law. It is not the case of the defendant that plaintiff did not come in possession of the property. It is only case pleaded by the defendant that the defendant were also in possession of the property. The question is whether merely because the defendant also came in possession of the share of the land of Swaroop gifted by Balak, the title of the donee will be divested, the answer will be ‘no’. 17. From perusal of the evidences produced by the defendant, it appears that in fact no reliable evidence at all has been produced by the defendant in support of the blending of the gifted property in common hoch-poch. 17. From perusal of the evidences produced by the defendant, it appears that in fact no reliable evidence at all has been produced by the defendant in support of the blending of the gifted property in common hoch-poch. The witnesses examined have only stated that both the brothers, i.e., Swaroop and Parmeshwar were joint. Even if now it is held that both the brothers were joint in the year 1903, there cannot be any presumption that the property was gifted to both the brothers or that the property gifted to Swarop was blended in the common hoch-poch. 18. So far the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that both the brothers, i.e., Swaroop and Parmeshwar continued joint till 1966 and in the year 1966, there was partition is concerned the allegation of partition pleaded by the defendant is not specific as to whether the gifted property was also partitioned between the parties treating the property as joint family property. There is no specific pleading by the defendant that which of the gifted property fell in the share of which of the party. Only general allegations have been made that there was partition in the year 1966. On the contrary, according to the case of the plaintiff, the brothers were separate. But the property was joint. In absence of the pleading that there was partition by metes and bounds of the property, the tenure of the property will never change. The view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Girijanandini Devi (supra) is again reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyani (dead) by L.Rs., Vs. Narayanan ( AIR 1980 SC 1173 ). In this case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that ‘to constitute a partition all that is necessary is a definite and unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family. What from such intimation, indication or representation of such interest should take would depend upon the circumstances of each case. A further requirement is that this unequivocal indication of intention to separate must be to the knowledge of the persons affected by such declaration. A review of the decisions shows that this intention to separate may be manifested in diverse ways. It may be by notice or by filing a suit. A further requirement is that this unequivocal indication of intention to separate must be to the knowledge of the persons affected by such declaration. A review of the decisions shows that this intention to separate may be manifested in diverse ways. It may be by notice or by filing a suit. Undoubtedly, indication or intimation must be to members of the joint family likely to be affected by such declaration. Partition is a word of technical import in Hindu Law. Partition in one sense is a severance of joint status and coparcener of a coparcenary is entitled to claim it as a matter of his individual volition. In this narrow sense all that is necessary to constitute partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severally. Such an unequivocal intention to separate brings about a disruption of joint family status, at any rate, in respect of separating member or members and thereby puts an end to the coparcenary with right of survivorship and such separated member holds from the time of disruption of joint family as tenant-in-common. Such partition has an impact on devolution of share of such member. It goes to his heirs displacing survivorship. Such partition irrespective of whether it is accompanied or followed by division of properties by metes and bounds covers both a division of right and division of property. A disruption of joint family status by a definite and unequivocal indication to separate implies separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by a de facto actual division of the subject-matte. This may at any time, be claimed by virtue of the separate right. A physical and actual division of property by metes and bounds follows from disruption of status and would be termed partition in a broader sense. 19. In view of the settled proposition of law laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it becomes clear that although this parties were separate in mess and residence, there was no partition of the property by metes and bounds. It is the case of the defendant appellant also in the written statement that they have no objection if the property is divided. It is the case of the defendant appellant also in the written statement that they have no objection if the property is divided. It will not be out of place to state here that it is not their case that there was partition by metes and bounds but the defendants are ready to reopen the partition. 20. The further case of the defendant that the Ladabhi deed and the sale deeds ext.2 series are Farji transaction. So far this case of the defendant appellant is concerned, it will suffice to state here that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prem Singh Vs. Birbal ( 2006 (5) SCC 353 ), has held that ‘there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof thus would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption.’ Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated this settled law in the case of Vimal Chand Ghevar Chand Jain and others Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo (2009) 5 SCC 71. Here, in the present case, no reliable evidence has been produced by the defendant appellant as to how the Ladabhi deed which is registered document is sham transaction or is a Farzi transaction. Except the bald statement, no reliable evidence has been produced. 22. From perusal of Ladabhi deed, ext.8, it appears that the defendant No.1 admitted that Balak Mahto has executed the deed of gift in favour of Swaroop Mahto. This is the statement of the defendant No.1. It is settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi ( AIR 1960 SC 100 ) that ‘admission is the best evidence unless it is explained satisfactorily.’ In this case, except the statement as aforesaid that this Ladabhi deed is farji transaction, no other circumstances has been shown. The money suit was admittedly filed against Ramdeo Singh. Therefore, there is no question of execution of this Ladabhi deed in favour of the plaintiffs arises as the gifted property was not the subject matter of the said money suit. Therefore, the defendant No.1 in ext.8 specifically admitted the fact that the gift deed was executed in favour of Swaroop Mahto only. Therefore, there is no question of execution of this Ladabhi deed in favour of the plaintiffs arises as the gifted property was not the subject matter of the said money suit. Therefore, the defendant No.1 in ext.8 specifically admitted the fact that the gift deed was executed in favour of Swaroop Mahto only. In such circumstances, now he cannot be allowed to aprobate and reprobate. This Ladabhi deed is also a registered deed. Therefore, the presumption of its genuineness is in favour of the plaintiffs. So far the admission made by defendant No.1 in this Ladabhi deed is concerned, there is no satisfactory explanation. Therefore, the case of the plaintiff that the share of Balak was gifted by Balak to Swaroop Mahto only stands admitted. 23. So far the learned counsels for the appellant’s contention that there is intersee transaction between the parties which clearly proves that there was partition between the parties is concerned, it may be reiterated here that it is not the case of the defendant appellant that there was partition by metes and bounds. Admitted case of the parties is that Parmeshwar and Swaroop were separate in mess and residence. Further the claim of the appellant is that both the brothers were joint. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel that there was partition is not acceptable which is contrary to the pleading. Both the parties came to the Court with the case that parties were separate. No case is there that there had been partition by metes and bounds. In such circumstances, the Court is required to find out the case pleaded by the parties and the Court cannot make a third case. Here, the specific case of the plaintiff is that both the brothers were separate. On the contrary, the case of the defendant appellant is that both the brothers remained joint and there was partition in the year 1966. Therefore, the defendant appellant now cannot be allowed to say that there was partition between Parmeshwar and Ram Swaroop which is contrary to the pleading of the defendant appellant. I had discussed this matter in the preceding paragraphs also and held that even if both the brothers were joint prior to 1966 then also there cannot be presumption of blending or making the gift deed in favour of both the brothers, particularly when there is no case of partition by metes and bounds. 24. I had discussed this matter in the preceding paragraphs also and held that even if both the brothers were joint prior to 1966 then also there cannot be presumption of blending or making the gift deed in favour of both the brothers, particularly when there is no case of partition by metes and bounds. 24. In view of my above discussion, I find that the plaintiffs have been able to prove their case as pleaded, therefore, the findings of the Court below on the point is confirmed. The point formulated is answered against the appellant and in favour of the plaintiff respondents. Accordingly, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment and Decree. 25. In the result, this First Appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.