JUDGMENT : Ashoke Kumar Dasadhikari, J. 1. This revisional application is filed against the impugned order dated 19th march, 2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fifth Court, Howrah, in Misc. Appeal No. 277 of 2010 rejecting the appeal of the plaintiff/petitioner and also affirming the order under appeal dated 13th September, 2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Fourth Court, Howrah, in T.S. No. 16 of 2004. 2. Plaintiff's/petitioner's case is that the petitioner in terms of an agreement between the plaintiff/petitioner and one Samsul Haque, since deceased, is entitled to develop the property. plaintiff/petitioner entered into such agreement on 1st October, 1993 and thereafter incurred huge expenditure for getting the plan sanctioned and also for various other purposes. Although, plaintiff/petitioner took steps for having the plan sanctioned, there were several difficulties and the plaintiff/petitioner could not get the plan sanctioned till 2004. However, he was trying to get the plan sanctioned by opposite party no.5 being the Howrah Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'). The Development Agreement of the property comprised in Holding Numbers 74, 75, 76, 77, 78 and 80 Pilkhana 2nd Bye Lane, Police Station-Golabari, Dist. - Howrah, contained various clauses stipulating the right and entitlement of the plaintiff/petitioner to construct the multi-storied building without any interruption from the original owner, now substituted by the successors on the demise of the original owner. 3. When the plaintiff/petitioner is taking steps for getting the plan sanctioned, he came to know that the opposite parties were going to dispossess him and they are also trying to develop the property by a different developer. Plaintiff/petitioner filed the suit with a prayer for a decree of declaration that plaintiff/petitioner is entitled to develop the property in terms of agreement. He also made a prayer for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his men and agent from transferring or alienating the suit property to any third party. Plaintiff/petitioner also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for ad interim temporary injunction on 24th February, 2010. 4. Plaintiff/petitioner stated that he was desirous to promote or develop the schedule mentioned properties and he approached the defendants to give their consent and an agreement was made between the plaintiff/petitioner and defendant on 1st October, 2003. 4. Plaintiff/petitioner stated that he was desirous to promote or develop the schedule mentioned properties and he approached the defendants to give their consent and an agreement was made between the plaintiff/petitioner and defendant on 1st October, 2003. In terms of agreement plaintiff/petitioner would construct multi-storied building on the schedule mentioned property. Plaintiff/petitioner would make construction at his own financial capacity and he paid Rs. 3,00,000/- as advance to the defendant i.e. predecessor-in-interest of opposite party nos. 1 to 4 in good faith. The defendant also delivered possession of the entire premises to the plaintiff/petitioner. According to plaintiff/petitioner he shall have right to induct tenant in the newly constructed flat and realise rent from the tenants and also shall have right to recover such rent for a period of ten years. After two years' construction period the property would be vested to the opposite parties. Plaintiff/petitioner has also right to collect rent and premium etc. for ten years from the date of construction work including the period of construction. It was claimed by the plaintiff/petitioner that he had been receiving rent from the old tenants uptil now. It was contended by the plaintiff/petitioner that the Corporation without any lawful reason delaying to sanction plan of the proposed building and, as such, plaintiff/petitioner was unable to construct building. It was also contended that the defendant/owner, since deceased, executed a power of attorney in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner on 1st October, 1993, which is still in force. It was alleged in that petition that defendant no.1 was threatening the plaintiff that the defendant was going to sale out the property to third party. However, plaintiff/petitioner visited the defendant no.1 on different occasions when he was told by the defendant/opposite party that he would sell out the property to third party but defendant refused to pay back the advanced amount to the plaintiff/petitioner. 5. For all those reasons the plaintiff/petitioner made a prayer for granting temporary injunction restraining the defendant no.1 and his men and agents from making any construction on the suit property and from changing the nature and character of the property and from transferring and/or alienating the property by the defendant no.1 in favour of any other third party/developer till disposal of the suit. 6. 6. The defendant no.1 filed written objection against the temporary injunction petition denying all material allegations levelled against him stating inter-alia that the injunction petition as well as the suit is not maintainable. He categorically denied that defendant no.1 ever received any amount as advance from the plaintiff/petitioner as alleged. He never delivered possession of the suit property to the plaintiff and the suit property is still under his possession. It was contended that the plaintiff/petitioner never took any step for development of the suit property by submitting any building plan before the Corporation, in respect of the proposed construction over the suit property. The agreement, which was referred by the plaintiff/petitioner, was a void and manufactured agreement and on that basis the plaintiff/petitioner did not take any step for construction of any multi-storied building. 7. The plaintiff/petitioner failed to perform his duty or obligation arising out of the agreement. Accordingly, the said purported agreement automatically became void and that consequently, the power of attorney, if any, in this respect also became void. The defendant also contended that by suppressing all material facts, plaintiff/petitioner has been able to get an order of injunction from the Court, which is liable to be vacated right now and since, the plaintiff/petitioner has no manner of right, title and interest in respect of the suit property, he has no right to claim any order of injunction. The defendant himself on his own interest obtained a sanctioned plan from Corporation for the purpose of raising multi-storied building over the suit property and not by any developer or promoter. 8. The plaintiff/petitioner did not have any objection or he could not have any objection to this, as such, plaintiff's/petitioner's prayer for temporary injunction is liable to be rejected. The application for temporary injunction was heard by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Fourth Court, Howrah. 9. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff/petitioners in course of his argument before the learned Trial Court submitted that the plaintiff/petitioner is in possession of the suit property and parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement. As per the agreed terms under the agreement, plaintiff/petitioner is the developer who could only construct the multi-storied building without any obstruction by the defendant. As per the agreed terms under the agreement, plaintiff/petitioner is the developer who could only construct the multi-storied building without any obstruction by the defendant. The defendant by violating the terms and conditions of the agreement had been trying to transfer the suit property and, as such, the plaintiff being an interested person is very much entitled to an order of injunction against the defendant no.1, now the successors of opposite party nos. 1 to 4. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the defendant submitted that the plaintiff being a developer/promoter could not claim any order of injunction against the rightful owner of the suit property since he had no right title and interest over the suit property. The plaintiff/petitioner was debarred from any order of injunction. 11. In support of his submissions he referred some judgments. Learned Judge considered the entire matter, the materials available on records as well as the argument advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for both the parties. While considering the matter, learned Trial Judge found that the plaintiff's entire allegation against the defendant/owner, prima facie, indicated that the defendant no.1 had violated the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement and by violating such terms and conditions of agreement, he had been trying to transfer the suit property to third party. Although, there is allegation of violation of the terms and conditions of agreement, the plaintiff did not file the plaint with a prayer for specific performance of contract, he made a prayer for a decree of declaration that he is entitled to develop the suit property in terms of agreement. The learned Judge was of the view that the proper relief which could have been prayed by the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of this case is for specific performance. However, he had reserved his opinion in this respect since that was not the proper time to decide the same. 12. The learned Judge thereafter considered the relevant materials and facts of this case, he found that the plaintiff for a long period of time could not get any building plan sanctioned and this indicated prima facie his inability to perform his part of contract. 13. 12. The learned Judge thereafter considered the relevant materials and facts of this case, he found that the plaintiff for a long period of time could not get any building plan sanctioned and this indicated prima facie his inability to perform his part of contract. 13. On the other hand, the plaintiff issued an objection letter on 7th October, 2005 addressed to Chairman, Borough Committee-II of Corporation which prima facie indicated that another sanction plan in respect of the suit holding had already been got sanctioned by the Corporation. Thus, the learned Trial Court came to a conclusion with a prima facie view that the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession over the suit holding. The learned Trial Court also recorded that no where in the plaint or in the temporary injunction petition it had been categorically mentioned as what appropriate steps the plaintiff had taken for getting the building plan sanctioned. The learned Trial Court was not satisfied, since, the plaintiff could not satisfy, as to why such a long period of time was taken for getting his building plan sanctioned although till the day of disposal of the injunction application the plan was not sanctioned. Accordingly, learned Trial Court was of the view that this inaction on the part of the plaintiff, prima facie, indicated that he was also not performing his part of agreement properly. It was also his finding that the plaintiff could not even file any rent receipt, although he claimed in his pleading that he had been receiving rent from the tenants of the suit premises. It was also recorded by the learned Court below that no document had come forward to satisfy the learned Court that the plaintiff had been in exclusive possession over the suit property. The learned Trial Court was of the view that the execution of the alleged agreement, even if it was accepted as a valid agreement, the plaintiff did not become the owner of the suit property. However, the learned Trial Court concluded in his findings that no right, title and interest was created in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of the alleged power of attorney and the agreement. Therefore, he was of the view that the plaintiff had not been able to prove any prima facie case in his favour. However, the learned Trial Court concluded in his findings that no right, title and interest was created in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of the alleged power of attorney and the agreement. Therefore, he was of the view that the plaintiff had not been able to prove any prima facie case in his favour. He was of further view that the plaintiff had also failed to prove that in the event of refusal of his prayer of interim order, he might suffer irreparable loss and injury because admittedly no construction work had yet been started over the suit property at his option. Learned Trial Court also did not find balance of convenience and inconvenience in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, he refused to pass any temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff and that was how the injunction application filed by the plaintiff/petitioner dismissed. 14. Being aggrieved by the order impugned passed by the learned Trial Court on 13th September, 2010 dismissing the application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff/petitioner, the plaintiff/petitioner moved one Miscellaneous Appeal before the learned Fifth Court of Additional District Judge, Howrah, being Misc. Appeal No. 277 of 2010. The learned Appeal Court heard the appeal on merit and dismissed the appeal by his order dated 19th March, 2013. 15. Learned Appellate Court heard the learned advocates for both sides and considered the entire matter taking note of the development agreement on which the plaintiff/petitioner claimed his right of development and his entitlement to enjoy the rents for a period of ten years including the period fixed for construction i.e. two years. The learned Appellate Court recorded the contentions of the plaintiff that the plaintiff in terms of the agreement incurred huge expenditure and he had prepared a building plan and submitted the same before the Corporation for sanction. He also negotiated with some old tenants. Corporation was delaying to sanction the plan. Plaintiff came to know that the defendant was to sale out the property to the third party without consent of the plaintiff depriving the plaintiff from his legitimate claim of development of the building and the defendant started to avoid the plaintiff and the defendant stated that he would not develop the property by the plaintiff as per development agreement. Plaintiff came to know that the defendant was to sale out the property to the third party without consent of the plaintiff depriving the plaintiff from his legitimate claim of development of the building and the defendant started to avoid the plaintiff and the defendant stated that he would not develop the property by the plaintiff as per development agreement. The learned Appellate Court while considering the matter tested the order passed by the learned Trial Court and considered whether the order passed in Misc. Appeal was lawful and valid. Whether the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the application for temporary injunction. 16. While considering the appeal, the Appellate Court held that in terms of provisions contained in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982, the agency to give effect to agreement for development, does not create interest over property. It was recorded that in terms of Clause 7 of the agreement dated 1st October, 1993, developer viz. the plaintiff/appellant had been given possession of the suit property, but admittedly the developer i.e. plaintiff failed to get the plan sanctioned from the Corporation during long 11 years. It was found by the learned Appellate Court that by a letter dated 27th January, 2010, the developer addressed to S.P., Howrah, and others including the Chairman, Borough Committee-II that Shamsul Haque since deceased was making construction of the multi-storied building on the suit property through another Developer after obtaining sanctioned plan from the Corporation and that is how he concluded that the plaintiff/appellant is no longer in physical possession of the suit property. However, reference of two different Division Bench decisions of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court was made. One is reported in (2002) 2 W.B.L.R. Cal. 519 [M/s. Satguru Nirman Private Ltd. v. Sree Narayan Chandra Paul] and the other one reported in 2006 (2) C.H.N. 396 : 2003 (3) ICC (Cal.) (D.B.) [Vipin Bhimani and Anr. v. Sunanda Das Anr.]. 17. In case of Satguru Nirman (supra) the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court had been pleased to hold that in case of contract for construction and development, Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1965 is applicable and the position of the developer is that of a licensee and he has no right to the property. v. Sunanda Das Anr.]. 17. In case of Satguru Nirman (supra) the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court had been pleased to hold that in case of contract for construction and development, Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1965 is applicable and the position of the developer is that of a licensee and he has no right to the property. It was also held that the contract of this nature is not specifically enforceable in view of bar created under Section 14 Clause (3)(C) of Specific Relief Act, 1965. The Division Bench also held that the developer was not entitled to temporary injunction. Learned Judge also recorded a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court cited on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant reported in (2005) 1 W.B.L.R. (SC) 201 in which it was held that when learned District Judge by an order dated 6th October, 2010 granted ad-interim order of status quo based on appellant's petition under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C., the same order should require to be maintained till disposal of the Title Suit No. 16 of 2004 now pending before the learned Civil Judge, Jr. Division, 4th Court, Howrah. However, the Appellate Court considering the entire matter was of the opinion that the Trial Court made no error in its order in refusing to grant temporary injunction. 18. That is how the Misc. Appeal was dismissed on contest and the order dated 13th September, 2010 passed by the learned Trial Court was affirmed and the interim order of status quo passed by an order dated 7th October, 2010 was also vacated. 19. Now this revisional application was filed by the plaintiff/petitioner alleging that both the learned Courts below did not apply their mind properly in the facts and circumstances of the case. Both the learned Courts below did not consider the relevant and important clauses of agreement entered into by and between the parties. Both the learned Courts below also failed to appreciate that the plaintiff/petitioner has made out a triable case. Therefore, they ought not to have held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. 20. Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ petitioner submits that relevant clauses being clause nos.7, 9, 10 and 15 are very important. 21. Mr. Therefore, they ought not to have held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. 20. Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/ petitioner submits that relevant clauses being clause nos.7, 9, 10 and 15 are very important. 21. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the total period of raising construction and also enjoyment of the rents of the constructed premises was settled by both parties is of 12 years. It is true that 11 years were passed but in the meantime the plaintiff/petitioner took several steps and invested huge amount of money for obtaining sanctioned building plan. 22. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that as per agreement, petitioner being the developer has exclusive right to develop the property without any interruption by the first party or his legal heirs. 23. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that as per clause 10 of the agreement the second party would allot rooms with common privy in the 3rd or 4th floor to the old tenants of any one side on the said multi-storied building hereto, after execution another agreement between second party and old tenants. 24. Mr. Bhattacharya submits there is also a clause in the agreement (clause 15) that the agreement shall cease to operate and the second party shall transfer his right, title and interest and privileges whatever existed by virtue of this agreement. But there is another clause that this agreement may be extended by mutual consent of the parties i.e. first party and second party for any indefinite period. 25. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the plaintiff/petitioner was entitled to collect rents from the old tenants and he was also entitled to get rents from the tenants. Therefore, it is not at all an agreement for construction but also enjoyment of the benefits. Therefore, Mr. Bhattacharya submits that there is ample scope of interpreting the agreement. He submits that simply because eleven years passed the learned Court below ought not to have rejected the application for temporary injunction. According to Mr. Bhattacharya still there was one year left within which his client could have obtained the sanctioned plan. 26. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that both the judgments of this Court delivered in case of (M/s. Satguru Nirman Private Limited) (supra) as well as (Vipin Bhimani & Anr.) (supra) are no longer good law. According to Mr. Bhattacharya still there was one year left within which his client could have obtained the sanctioned plan. 26. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that both the judgments of this Court delivered in case of (M/s. Satguru Nirman Private Limited) (supra) as well as (Vipin Bhimani & Anr.) (supra) are no longer good law. In view of two contradictory views of two Hon'ble Division Bench matter was referred before the Hon'ble Special Bench constituted by this Court and the Hon'ble Special Bench was pleased to hold that development agreement of this kind is not the agreement simpliciter for the construction of any building or for execution of any work on any land; it is much more than that in it also being an agreement for sale of a part of the land to the developer etc. It was also held as to whether or not specific performance is to be granted and as to whether or not any interlocutory order in aid of the ultimate relief of specific performance may be issued will depend, inter alia, on the nature of the agreement, the conduct of the parties, the surrounding circumstances and other relevant considerations and ultimately it was held that a suit at the instance of developer (where the developer is the non-owner party to a development agreement of the kind that is referred to in this judgment) is not prohibited by Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 27. Therefore, Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the view taken by the Appellate Court on the basis of two aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court is of no consequence and has no manner of application in the instant case. 28. However, Mr. Bhattacharya submits the view expressed by the Appellate Court is contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Special Bench, reported in 2014 (1) C.L.J. 654 : 2014 (2) ICC (Cal.) (F.B.) 1 (Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar). Therefore, the finding is not sustainable. 29. Mr. Bhattacharya then submits that Section 14(c) cannot debar developer to file a suit and to make a prayer for injunction in his favour. 30. Mr. Bhattacharya submits in the instant case there is still one year left and unless twelve years are complete the plaintiff/petitioner cannot file any suit for specific performance. The plaintiff has filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 30. Mr. Bhattacharya submits in the instant case there is still one year left and unless twelve years are complete the plaintiff/petitioner cannot file any suit for specific performance. The plaintiff has filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction. Therefore, there is nothing wrong nor there is any defect in the suit. 31. Mr. Bhattacharya then referred provisions under Section 202 as well as Section 204 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972 and he submits that uptil now there is no revocation of the agreement. 32. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that in view of the provisions under Section 202 the defendants have no right to revoke the agreement. He submits that the suit filed by the petitioner is also not a bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. He submits the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. Therefore, the learned Court below ought to have looked into the facts and to find out whether the plaintiff has made out a triable issue or arguable case on the basis of his averments made in the plaint as well as in the petition and also the materials available on record. 33. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that in case the plaintiff/petitioner is denied interim order of injunction, the defendants/opposite parties would transfer the property and create third party interest and the petitioner would not only be deprived of his right of development but he will also be deprived of realising rents which he is entitled to realise in terms of the agreement. 34. Mr. Bhattacharya also referred Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and according to him, the suit filed by the plaintiff under no circumstances is barred by the Section. 35. Mr. Bhattacharya further submits that the injunction petition should not be disposed of on the ground of delay only. He submits that the orders impugned passed by the Appellate Court as well as the trial Court both are illegal and not sustainable in law and therefore, both the orders should be set aside. 36. Mr. Bhuddadeb Ghoshal, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties submits that this Hon'ble Court in exercising of its revisional jurisdiction can scrutiny the legality and propriety of the order passed. This Court is not an appellate court. 37. Mr. Ghoshal submits that both the learned Courts below considered the agreement and there is concurrent finding of facts. 36. Mr. Bhuddadeb Ghoshal, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties submits that this Hon'ble Court in exercising of its revisional jurisdiction can scrutiny the legality and propriety of the order passed. This Court is not an appellate court. 37. Mr. Ghoshal submits that both the learned Courts below considered the agreement and there is concurrent finding of facts. He submits both the learned Courts below have held that the plaintiff/petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case and there is no balance of convenience and inconvenience in favour of the plaintiff and refusal of interim order would not cause any serious prejudice to the plaintiff/petitioner and generally revisional court should not interfere in the findings arrived at both by the learned Trial Court as well as by the learned Appellate Court. 38. Mr. Ghoshal submits admittedly the agreement is of October, 1993. A plain reading of clauses of agreement would clearly show that construction period was fixed for two years and the benefit of rent to be enjoyed for ten years including of two years construction period. 39. Mr. Ghoshal submits that the suit was filed only in 2004 i.e. after about eleven years and there is no averment either in the plaint or in the petition by the plaintiff disclosing the reasons for delay in obtaining sanctioned plan from the Corporation. 40. Mr. Ghoshal submits that there is inherent defect in the suit filed by the plaintiff. He drew attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that plain reading of the plaint and the petition would show that there is allegation of the violation of the terms of the agreement. Therefore, in normal course one has to file a suit for specific performance not for declaration. According to Mr. Ghoshal, the suit is inherently defective. He submits that the suit filed for declaration and consequential relief for injunction is in effect of no value in the eye of law. Suit for declaration is not an executable one. 41. Mr. Ghoshal submits the suit is not for specific performance nor for damages. Therefore, he submits about the maintainability which would be a serious question to be adjudicated at the time of final hearing of the suit. However, prima facie these are the inherent defects in the suit. 42. Mr. Suit for declaration is not an executable one. 41. Mr. Ghoshal submits the suit is not for specific performance nor for damages. Therefore, he submits about the maintainability which would be a serious question to be adjudicated at the time of final hearing of the suit. However, prima facie these are the inherent defects in the suit. 42. Mr. Ghoshal submits that from the report of the Special Officer it would reveal that the defendants/opposite parties are in actual physical possession of the suit property and they have already obtained a sanctioned plan from the Corporation. They have already started construction. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the findings arrived at by both the learned Courts below that the defendants/opposite parties being the owners of the property are in possession of the suit property. 43. Mr. Ghoshal submits that the defendants/opposite parties are the owners in Khas possession of a portion of the property and some portion partially by tenants. He submits that it was specifically stipulated in the agreement that construction period is of two years. But eleven years passed, no sanction plan is available. In effect there is no serious effort on the part of the plaintiff/petitioner to get the sanctioned plan. The purpose of agreement even though the agreement is void according to his client's opinion, was never acted upon. He submits that we are in 2015, starting from 1993 till 2015 i.e. 20 years there is no injunction. Therefore, today there is nothing new which has come out or reflected in the plaint and petition or anywhere in the materials in the record which would impress this Court to pass an order of injunction after 22 years. 44. Mr. Ghoshal submits from two letters issued by the owners/defendants it was revealed that in 2009 the defendants obtained sanctioned plan and they have started construction. 45. Mr. Ghoshal submits till today there is no material to show any sanction by the Corporation. Defendants/opposite parties being the owners are in actual physical possession of the property and as per Special Officer report they have already started construction. 46. Mr. Ghoshal submits that the important features of the matter are to be taken into consideration i.e. the delay in obtaining sanctioned plan and the conduct of the parties and the owners' lawful right. 47. Mr. 46. Mr. Ghoshal submits that the important features of the matter are to be taken into consideration i.e. the delay in obtaining sanctioned plan and the conduct of the parties and the owners' lawful right. 47. Mr. Ghoshal submits that in similar such circumstances this Court refused the prayer for temporary injunction. He also cited one judgment in support of his submissions reported in 2010 (4) C.H.N. (CAL) 679 (Imraj Ali Molla v. Madan Mohan Saha & Ors.). 48. Mr. Ghoshal submits that in similar way the Hon'ble Division Bench have held that the plaintiff has not prayed for decree of specific performance of contract in the suit, the suit as it framed, in the prima facie view of the Appellate Court is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. If that be so, then the plaintiff possibly cannot get any relief for injunction for restraining defendants from dealing with the suit property. 49. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties extensively. This Court considered both the orders passed by the learned Court below as well as the learned Appellate Court and also the materials available on record. The basic requirement for granting an interim order of injunction or temporary order of injunction depends on three things, which is by this time settled both before this Court as well as before the Hon'ble Apex Court whether the plaintiff has made out any prima facie case in his favour, whether balance of convenience or inconvenience is in favour of the plaintiff, whether plaintiff would suffer any irreparable loss or prejudice in case no interim order is granted and urgency. It is true that while considering the prima facie case, if made out by the plaintiff/petitioner, one has to look into the facts of the case and of course to take note of the arguability of the issues raised but definitely the Court at the first blush is required to look at what case the plaintiff has made out in his plaint and petition. Here in this case plain reading of the plaint and petition would show that there is allegations of violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into 1st October, 1993. Construction period was fixed for two years from the date of agreement. Here in this case plain reading of the plaint and petition would show that there is allegations of violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into 1st October, 1993. Construction period was fixed for two years from the date of agreement. The plaintiff/petitioner was allowed ten more years to enjoy the benefit of rents to be realised by him from the tenants of the multi-storied building to be constructed. Twelve years period have long passed. Plaintiff in his plaint could not disclose any material fact or could give any explanation what steps he has taken during this eleven years period for obtaining the sanctioned plan. Only a bare allegation was made that he made request to the Chairman, Borough Committee but that was refused. This Court is of the view that is not at all sufficient explanation on the part of the plaintiff who himself agreed to construct the premises within two years. Plaintiff filed the suit in 2004 after eleven years of the agreement with an allegation that he is in possession but fact remains that possession is remaining with the defendants/opposite parties. It is revealed that the defendants/opposite parties already obtained sanctioned plan and they have already started construction. As per Special Officer report defendants/opposite parties are in possession over the suit property. Therefore, claim and contention of the plaintiff that he is in possession is not correct. The defendants/opposite parties who admittedly are in possession and started construction upon obtaining the sanctioned plan being the owners under no circumstances could be prevented or restrained to carry out with their construction work. 50. Both the learned Courts below specially the learned Trial Court found that the claim and contention of the petitioner to the effect that he is realising rent is not correct and there is nothing on record to show that any rent was ever realised. Therefore, the statement made by the plaintiff/petitioner in this regard is also not correct. It is admitted position that the plaintiff/petitioner could not get his plan sanctioned within two years within which construction is to be completed. Till today there is no sanctioned plan. Petitioner is not in possession of the suit property. Plaintiff/petitioner filed the instant suit in 2009 after about eleven years. The plaintiff/petitioner failed to enjoy interim order for about last twenty-two years. Till today there is no sanctioned plan. Petitioner is not in possession of the suit property. Plaintiff/petitioner filed the instant suit in 2009 after about eleven years. The plaintiff/petitioner failed to enjoy interim order for about last twenty-two years. Plaintiff/petitioner could not substantiate his averments made in the plaint or petition in his favour before both the courts below. Therefore, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the plaintiff/petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. So far balance of convenience and inconvenience is concerned, the defendants/opposite parties are in progress of development work after obtaining sanctioned plan and the plaintiff practically did nothing in regard to development. Therefore, balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of the defendants/opposite parties. However, plaintiff/petitioner who is not in possession instituted the instant suit for declaration and the consequential injunction but he did not make any prayer for specific performance or damages. 51. Therefore, this Court is of the prima facie view that the suit is hit by Section 34 of the Special Relief Act but that issue would be decided at the time of final disposal. 52. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case this Court is of the view that no prejudice should be suffered by the plaintiff/petitioner in case interim order is not granted in his favour. There is also no urgency either since already 22 years have passed without interim order. 53. There is no material irregularity or illegality in the orders passed by both courts below. Accordingly, this revisional application is of no merit. Therefore, this revisional application is dismissed. However, there would be no order of costs. 54. The learned Court below would not be prejudiced by any of the observations made by this Court.