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Gauhati High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 577 (GAU)

Rita Mazumdar v. State of Assam and Ors.

2015-05-14

C.R.SARMA

body2015
1. By this criminal petition, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.), the petitioner, who is one of the accused persons, in Dispur P.S. Case No. 891/2012, under Sections 120(B)/419/468/420/471 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, IPC),has prayed for quashing the FIR, dated 07.05.2012, which has given rise to the said P.S. case. 2. The petitioner, along with her husband, namely, Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, who is also one of the accused persons in the said P.S. case, were the Managing Director and the Director respectively of a Private Limited Company, namely, M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd. The respondent No. 3 i.e. the informant in the said P.S. Case No. 89/2012, as the owner of a plot of land, agreed to offer his said land for development. 3. The said Company, on 02.12.2003, entered into an agreement with the respondent No. 3, for developing a plot of land, as mentioned in the schedule to the said agreement, for the purpose of construction of multi storied building for commercial and residential purpose, as per the terms and conditions of the said agreement and agreed to provide 18% of the constructed area i.e. flats in the proposed multi storied building to the private respondent i.e. the owner of the said land. It was also agreed that the respondent No. 3 i.e. owner of the land, will extend all necessary cooperation for obtaining loan and financial assistance by the said Company for the purpose of construction of the building in question and in selling the flats in the proposed building. The said agreement was signed by Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma i.e. husband of the petitioner, in his capacity as Chairman and Managing Director of the said Company as second party to the agreement and the respondent No. 3 as first party in his capacity as owner of the land. 4. On the basis of the said agreement and the subsequent Power of Attorney, executed by the respondent No. 3, the Company aforesaid proceeded with the construction, after obtaining loan of Rs.1,00,80,000/- from the Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. (for short, HUDCO). The loan was obtained on personal guarantee of Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, Managing Director and the petitioner as Director of the Company. The acceptance letter of the said loan was signed by the petitioner and her said husband. 5. The loan was obtained on personal guarantee of Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, Managing Director and the petitioner as Director of the Company. The acceptance letter of the said loan was signed by the petitioner and her said husband. 5. On 26.03.2012 (Vide DRTG-426 dated 28.03.2012), the Registrar of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short, DRT), Guwahati, in connection with OA No. 63/2012, filed by the HUDCO, issued summons to M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd., Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, Smti Rita Sharma and Md. Masrur Hussain i.e. the private respondent No. 3, indicating that the applicant had filed an application under Section 19 (3) of the Recovery of Debts due to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993 for realization of an amount of Rs.2,67,19,810/-, being the loan amount taken by them. By the said summons, the petitioner and others were summoned to appear and submit show-cause against the prayer of the applicant. 6. After receipt of the said summons, the respondent No. 3 filed the instant FIR, with the Officer-in-Charge, Dispur Police Station, on 07.05.2012. In the said FIR, it has been alleged that, from the summons received in an Application No. 63/2012 ( HUDCO -Vs.- M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd.), he came to know that Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma and the petitioner, in collusion with some unscrupulous bank officials, obtained bank loan fraudulently and dishonestly by preparing false documents by forging his signature and impersonating him before the bank authority. In the said FIR, the informant i.e. the respondent No. 3, who was the owner of the said land, clearly stated that the documents, relating to the loan, were not prepared by him. He further averred that the fact regarding fraudulently obtaining the loan came to his knowledge only after receipt of the said summons in Application No. 63/2012 aforesaid. By filing the said FIR, the informant requested the Police to register a case and investigate into the matter for taking appropriate steps. 7. On receipt of the said FIR, Police registered Dispur P.S. Case No. 891/2012 aforesaid, under Sections 120(B)/419/468/420/471 IPC and launched investigation into the matter. 8. During the pendency of the investigation, the petitioner, by filing the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has approached this Court for quashing the FIR aforesaid on the ground that she was no way involved with the alleged occurrence and that the allegations made against her are false and concocted. 9. 8. During the pendency of the investigation, the petitioner, by filing the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has approached this Court for quashing the FIR aforesaid on the ground that she was no way involved with the alleged occurrence and that the allegations made against her are false and concocted. 9. I have heard Mr. S. P. Roy, learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner and Mr. A.M. Bora, learned Counsel, appearing for the private respondent and perused the materials on record. 10. Mr. Roy, learned Counsel, for the petitioner, referring to the allegations, made in the FIR, has submitted that the petitioner, who was Director of the said Company, resigned from the Company on 11.04.2007 and that her marriage with Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma i.e. the Director of the said Company stood dissolved w.e.f. 12.07.2007 by decree of divorce. 11. In view of the above, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner had no relation with the said Company, after her resignation and dissolution of the marriage and as such, she was no way liable for the act, if any, done by on behalf of the Company aforesaid. 12. Referring to the agreement, dated 02.12.2003, by which the respondent i.e. the owner of the land, had handed over the concerned land in favour of M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd., Mr. Roy has submitted that, by the said agreement, the petitioner allowed the said Company to raise a multi storied building by raising fund in the nature of obtaining loan and financial assistance and that the petitioner had full knowledge about the taking of the loan by the said Company. It is also submitted, by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the letter of offer dated 09.09.2005, issued by the HUDCO to the petitioner and M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd. indicates that the petitioner jointly applied for the loan and that, in the Title Suit No. 40/2007, filed by one Mr. Nazimul Hussain, the respondent No. 3, in the written statement, clearly admitted that M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd. had raised the building over the disputed plot of land by taking loan from various financial institutions including HUDCO. 13. Nazimul Hussain, the respondent No. 3, in the written statement, clearly admitted that M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd. had raised the building over the disputed plot of land by taking loan from various financial institutions including HUDCO. 13. Referring to the Clause-12 of the agreement, dated 02.12.2003, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that both the parties, in the event of any dispute or difference, relating to the construction of the building, agreed to refer the matter to Arbitrators and that the petitioner has no right to approach the criminal Court without resorting to the arbitration proceeding. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had full knowledge about the loan, taken by the said Company, by mortgaging the concerned plot of land and that the petitioner was not a party to the agreement, which was executed between the Company aforesaid and the private respondent. Therefore, it is submitted that the petitioner did not play any role in obtaining the loan and as such the allegations, brought against the petitioner, regarding forgery and impersonation, in obtaining the loan, are false and concocted, for which the FIR is liable to be quashed. 15. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following decisions: (i) Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. and Another -Vs.- P.K. Prathapan and Others, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 212 ; (ii) Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. -Vs.- Anu Mehta, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 103 : 2014 SCC Online SC 848; and (iii) Rajiv Thapar and Others -Vs.- Madan Lal Kapoor, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 . 16. Refuting the said argument, advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. A.M. Bora, learned Counsel, appearing for the private respondent, has submitted that, at the time of executing the agreement and taking the loan by M/s Landmark Establishment Pvt. Ltd., the petitioner was one of the Directors of the said Company and signed acceptance letter, relating to the loan, along with the Managing Director Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, who was her husband at the relevant time and that both Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma and the petitioner stood as guarantor in their capacity as Directors of the Company. 17. 17. In view of the above, the learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner had full knowledge and role in obtaining the loan by the said Company. 18. Referring to the allegations, made in the FIR, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has submitted that the informant, in the said FIR, clearly stated that his signatures were forged in preparing false documents towards obtaining the loan by the said Company and as such, there is prima-facie case for investigation into the matter. It is also submitted that there is nothing, on-record, to show that the petitioner had signed any document as borrower of the said loan and that the loan was obtained by the Managing Director and the petitioner in the name of the said Company by forging his signatures. 19. The learned Counsel for the private respondent also has submitted that in view of the specific allegations, made in the FIR, this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not required to find out the truth in the allegations and that existence of a prima-facie case, is sufficient to proceed with the investigation. It is also submitted that in view of the said allegations and registration of the case, Police has the statutory authority to investigate into the matter and find out the truth and as such no interference, in the investigation, is called for. 20. Referring to the order, dated 26.09.2012, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, in Criminal Petition No. 642/2012, which arose out of the same FIR, the learned Counsel, for the private respondent, has submitted that the Managing Director, who was the husband of the petitioner, by filing an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., approached this Court for quashing the FIR. But, the Court refused to quash the FIR and directed the Police to complete the investigation. In view of the said order, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has submitted that with regard to the prayer for quashing of the FIR, the said order attained its finality and as such there is no scope to take any contrary view at this stage. 21. In view of the above, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has submitted that there is no merit in this petition and as such the same is liable to be dismissed. 22. 21. In view of the above, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has submitted that there is no merit in this petition and as such the same is liable to be dismissed. 22. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the private respondent has relied on the following decisions: (i) Union of India and Others -Vs.- B.R. Bajaj and Others, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 277 ; (ii) Mosst. Simrikhia -Vs.- Smti Dolley Mukherjee alias Smti Chabbi Mukherjee and Another, reported in AIR 1990 SCC 1605 (1); (iii) State of U.P. and Others. -Vs.- Surendra Kumar, reported in (2005) 9 SCC 161 ; and (iv) Mahesh Chaudhury -Vs.- State of Rajasthan and Another, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 439 . 23. Having heard the learned Counsel, appearing for both the parties, I have carefully perused the allegations, made in the FIR, the averments, made by the petitioner, in this petition as well as the additional affidavits. There is no dispute that the owner of the land i.e. the informant, by entering into an agreement dated 02.12.2003, gave his land to the said Company for raising multi storied building for construction of flats. The petitioner also authorized the said builder to raise fund and obtain financial assistance from various financial institutions and bank. There is no dispute that loan was taken by the said Company for the purpose of construction of the building. As the loan taken by the said Company was not fully repaid, the bank authority approached the DRT which on 26.03.2012, issued notice to the said Company, its Managing Director Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, the Director i.e. petitioner and respondent No. 3 i.e. the owner of the land asking them to appear. As indicated in the said summons, the owner was also liable to repay the loan along with the Company and its Directors. After receipt of the said summons, as stated by the informant, he came to know that the loan was obtained by forging his signatures. 24. Mr. S.P. Roy, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner, being the Director of the said Company, in whose favour, the loan was taken, was not liable for the act, done by the Company, inasmuch as no authority to take loan on behalf of the Company was given to her by adopting any resolution by the Board of Directors of the Company. 25. 25. In support of his said contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision held in the case of Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. and Another (supra). As held in the said case, an individual Director has no power to act on behalf of the Company unless by some resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company specific power is given to such Director. The said case related to unauthorized transfer of additional shares. 26. In the present case, the allegations, brought against the petitioner is that she, along with her husband, who was the Managing Director of the said Company, in collusion with some officials of the bank, had fraudulently obtained the loan by preparing false documents, by forging the signatures of the petitioner and impersonating him. There is nothing, on record, to conclusively hold that the informant, as borrower, had obtained the loan by signing the relevant papers. The petitioner has specifically denied execution of any documents executed towards obtaining the loan as a borrower. Whether the allegations aforesaid are true or false, is a question to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be collected by the Investigating Agency. Hence, the said decision, held in the case of Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. and Another (supra) will not help the petitioner. 27. In the case of Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. -Vs.- Anu Mehta (supra), the Supreme Court held that in a case under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (for short, N.I. Act), it is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 of the N.I. Act, that at the time of the offence, the accused person was in charge and responsible for conduct of business of the Company. The Supreme Court further observed that merely being a Director of a Company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act and that the Director in a Company can not be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. 28. In the case at hand, the informant, in the FIR, has specifically alleged that the petitioner, along with others, with a common intention, has forged his signature in respect of the loan documents and impersonated him in obtaining the loan by preparing false document. 28. In the case at hand, the informant, in the FIR, has specifically alleged that the petitioner, along with others, with a common intention, has forged his signature in respect of the loan documents and impersonated him in obtaining the loan by preparing false document. Hence, it is found that there is specific averment of committing the said offence by the petitioner. Therefore, in view of the said allegations, brought against the petitioner, the principle laid down in the above referred case, will not be applicable in the present case. 29. In the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others -Vs.- Madan Lal Kapoor (supra), the Supreme Court, while laying down the principle of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., observed that High Court is to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal proceeding for preventing abuse of process of the Court and secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court has delineated the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.: “30. 1. Step one: Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? “30. 2. Step two: Whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges leveled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? “30. 3. Step three: Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? “30. 4. Step four: Whether the proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?” 30. Step three: Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? “30. 4. Step four: Whether the proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?” 30. In support of her contention, the petitioner has relied on the agreement, dated 02.12.2003, the Power of Attorney, the written statement filed by the informant in the civil suit, the sanction letter issued by the bank to show that the informant also a party to the loan and that he had full knowledge about the taking of the said loan by mortgaging the concerned land. 31. The respondent, in the FIR, has clearly stated that his signatures were forged by the petitioner and others. Whether the respondent was a signatory to the execution of the relevant papers towards obtaining the loan, by the Company aforesaid is a disputed question of fact. There is nothing, on-record, to show that the respondent had signed the relevant papers as borrower of the loan. The fact that the respondent had allowed the Company to raise fund from various financial institutions, including bank, for raising the building does not conclusively indicate that he also stood as a borrower of the said loan. On the other hand, the admitted execution of the agreement and the signing of the acceptance letter by the petitioner as guarantor of the said loan, prima-facie, indicate that the petitioner was also a party to the said loan and that the loan was obtained with her knowledge and participation. Therefore, the aforesaid documents referred to by the petitioner can't be accepted as material of sterling and impeccable quality. 32. The question whether the informant i.e. the owner of the land had signed the documents as borrower of the loan, can be determined on the basis of the result of the investigation. Therefore, it can't be held that the documents aforesaid are sufficient to refute the allegations, made in the FIR. At this stage, without proper investigation, it can't be concluded that proceeding with the investigation of the case would result in abuse of process of the Court and would not serve the ends of justice. 33. Therefore, it can't be held that the documents aforesaid are sufficient to refute the allegations, made in the FIR. At this stage, without proper investigation, it can't be concluded that proceeding with the investigation of the case would result in abuse of process of the Court and would not serve the ends of justice. 33. In the case of Union of India and Others -Vs.- B.R. Bajaj and Others (supra), the Supreme Court, referring to the following guidelines, laid down in the case of State of Haryana -Vs.- Ch. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, has observed that at the stage of FIR Courts should refrain from interfering when the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory power of Police to investigate can't be interfered with the exercise of the inherent power of the Court. 34. The guidelines laid in the case of State of Haryana -Vs.- Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra) are as under: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within at he purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 35. In the case of Janata Dal -Vs.- H.S. Chowdhary, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36, the Supreme Court exhaustively dealting with the scope of inherent powers, conferred by Section 482 Cr.P.C., held thus: “This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings.” The guidelines laid down in the case of Ch. Bhajanlal (supra) have already been stated in the earlier discussion. 36. In the case of Mahesh Chaudhury -Vs.- State of Rajasthan and Another (supra), the Supreme Court observed: “12. Bhajanlal (supra) have already been stated in the earlier discussion. 36. In the case of Mahesh Chaudhury -Vs.- State of Rajasthan and Another (supra), the Supreme Court observed: “12. It is also well settled that save and except in very exceptional circumstances, the Court would not look to any document relied upon by the accused in support of his defence. Although allegations contained in the complaint petition may disclose a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. For the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, the superior courts are also required to consider as to whether the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint petition fulfill the ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused.” In the said case, the Supreme Court further observed that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and the Court at that stage would not embark upon appreciation of evidence. 37. In the case of Kamaladevi Agarwal -Vs.- State of W.B., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 555 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 200, the Supreme Court observed: “7. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or inherent powers of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage should be exercised sparingly and only where the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction.” 38. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction.” 38. In view of the above principles, laid down by the Supreme Court, the FIR or the complaint can be quashed in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. if the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at their face value do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, justifying by an investigation by the Police and where no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. Such power can also be exercised if the allegations are found to be absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can reach a just conclusion that there is ground for proceeding against the accused or where there is any legal bar and/or if the proceeding is manifestly attended with melafide or where the proceeding is instituted with ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 39. In the present case, there is nothing, on-record, to show that the respondent, who had entered into an agreement with the said Company, in respect of which the petitioner was a Director, had any grudge against or reason to wreak vengeance on the petitioner. 40 Admittedly, there was an agreement between the said Company and the informant and by the said agreement, the informant had given his land to the Company for raising building. It was also agreed that the Company would be at liberty to raise fund by taking financial assistance and loan etc. There is nothing, on-record, to show that the informant agreed to stand as a borrower to the said loan. No admitted document or material has been produced in this regard. 41. From the notice, issued by the bank and the averments made by the petitioner, it appears that the petitioner also participated as a borrower and the loan was taken during the period when the petitioner was the Director of the Company and wife of the Managing Director of the Company. In the present case, the informant has categorically denied that he had signed the relevant papers as borrower of the loan. In the present case, the informant has categorically denied that he had signed the relevant papers as borrower of the loan. He specifically alleged that the petitioner, along with others, by entering into a conspiracy, had fraudulently obtained the loan by preparing the relevant documents by forging the respondent's signatures and impersonating him. 42. The allegations aforesaid are specific and serious in nature. Nothing substantive has been shown to refute the said allegation. The said allegations, made in the FIR, at its face value, reveal a prima facie case constituting the offences of forgery, cheating and impersonation and conspiracy. Whether the allegations aforesaid are true or false is a question to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be collected by the Investigating Agency. This Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not required to make a roving enquiry to find out the truth in the said allegations. The existence of a prima-facie case is sufficient for continuance with the investigation to unearth the truth. 43. In view of the above facts and circumstances, I find no sufficient material to restrain the Investigating Agency i.e. Police from continuing with the investigation to unearth the truth. The quashing of the proceeding at this stage will amount to giving a premature decision in a case where evidence is yet to be collected. There is nothing to substantive to negate the prima-facie case, which has been disclosed by the FIR. That apart, the same FIR was, earlier, challenged by the Managing Director of the Company i.e. Sri Pranab Kumar Sharma, who was the husband of the petitioner, by filing an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A learned Single Judge of this Court, while rejecting the prayer, observed: “ ………It is a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the FIR dated 7.5.2012 registered as Dispur P.S Case No. 891 of 2012 under Section 120(B)/419/ 468/420/471 of IPC……………… ………..Since on the face of the FIR, this Court is of the opinion that it requires investigation by the police, therefore, the prayer for quashing First Information Report cannot be maintained. In view of this, the present petition stands rejected. Before parting with the records, the Investigating Agency is directed to complete the entire investigation within a period of three months from today without fail and to furnish the report to the appropriate Court. In view of this, the present petition stands rejected. Before parting with the records, the Investigating Agency is directed to complete the entire investigation within a period of three months from today without fail and to furnish the report to the appropriate Court. This direction has been made to ensure that nobody suffers in the hands of law. Accordingly, this petition stands disposed of.” 44. In view of the decisions, held in the case of Union of India and Others - Vs.- B.R. Bajaj and Others (Supra), Mosst. Simrikhia -Vs.- Smti Dolley Mukherjee alias Smti Chabbi Mukherjee and Another, (supra) and State of U.P. and Others. -Vs.- Surendra Kumar, (supra), the question regarding quashment of the same FIR being decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction by exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., no review in the grab of filing another application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by another person, who was also the Director of the same Company of which the earlier petitioner was the Managing Director, can be permitted. The learned Single Judge specifically directed the Investigating Agency to complete the entire investigation within a period of three months and to submit report to the appropriate Court. 45. In the teeth of the said decision, the present petition is not maintainable. In view of what has been discussed above, I find no merit in this petition requiring interference with the investigation, in respect of the FIR aforesaid. 46. Accordingly, this criminal petition is dismissed. The Investigating Agency is directed to complete the investigation and submit report to the appropriate authority.