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2015 DIGILAW 578 (ORI)

Satyajit Sahoo v. State of Orissa

2015-10-08

B.R.SARANGI

body2015
JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The appellant, who is working as a Lecturer in English (1st post) in Indira Gandhi (Junior) Mahavidyalaya, Nimapara in the district of Puri, which is an aided educational institution within the meaning of Section 3 of the Orissa Education Act and Rules framed thereunder, files this appeal seeking to quash the order dated 29.2.2012 passed by the learned State Education Tribunal in GIA Case No. 36 of 2010 vide Annexure-5 dismissing his application for release of grant-in-aid in respect of the post held by him. 2. The short fact of the case in hand is that Indira Gandhi (Junior) Mahavidyalaya, Nimapara in the district of Puri was established as a Junior college with +2 wing in the year 1989. On completion of five years of its establishment, as per the Grant-in-aid Order, 2004, the college came within the fold of grant-in-aid. At the time of opening of the college, one Choudhury Ramakanta Das was appointed as Lecturer in English against 1st post in the year 1989 and he continued up to 15.12.1992. Respondent No. 4, Smt. Swapna Mohanty was appointed against 2nd post of Lecturer in English on 25.11.1991 by the Governing Body. Due to resignation of Choudhury Ramakanta Das, the holder of 1st post, the Governing Body vide its resolution dated 16.12.1991 elevated the respondent No. 4 to the 1st post of Lecturer in English. Taking into account the work load, warranting the 2nd post of Lecturer in English in +2 wing, the Governing Body following due procedure of selection appointed the appellant pursuant to which he joined against the post on 6.2.1993. When the matter thus stood, there was disturbance in the Governing Body of the college and therefore, respondent No. 2, the Director, Higher Education appointed one K.K. Raymohapatra, the then Principal of S.A. Mahavidyalaya, Balipatna as Special Officer for discharging the day to day affairs of the college vide order dated 25.4.2001. The Special Officer terminated the respondent No. 4 on the charge of negligence in duty vide office order dated 14.5.2002. Thereafter, the appellant was elevated to the 1st post of Lecturer in English after termination of the services of respondent No. 4 by the said Special Officer. The new Governing Body under the Presidentship of Sub-Collector, Puri was constituted vide notification of the Government dated 14.10.2001. Thereafter, the appellant was elevated to the 1st post of Lecturer in English after termination of the services of respondent No. 4 by the said Special Officer. The new Governing Body under the Presidentship of Sub-Collector, Puri was constituted vide notification of the Government dated 14.10.2001. Against the order of termination dated 14.5.2002 respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal before the Director, Higher Education, Odisha. In the said proceeding appellant was not made a party. Without giving opportunity to the said appellant, the Director allowed the appeal preferred by respondent No. 4 and set aside the order of termination vide order dated 21.02.2006 and directed for reinstatement of respondent No. 4 against the post she was holding at the time of termination. Pursuant to such order of the Director, Higher Education, Orissa dated 21.02.2006, respondent No. 4 was reinstated in service on 28.02.2006 and has been discharging her duties against the 1st post of Lecturer in English. Thereafter, respondent No. 4 filed GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 before the learned State Education Tribunal for approval of her appointment against the 1st post of Lecturer in English in which the appellant was not made a party. The learned Tribunal upon hearing the parties allowed the GIA case and directed for approval of her appointment against the 1st post of Lecturer in English and to release GIA by way of Block Grant in respect of the post w.e.f. 01.01.2004. Since the order passed by the learned Tribunal was not implemented, respondent No. 4 filed W.P.(C) No. 17803 of 2009 before this Court. The Division Bench of this Court by order dated 25.11.2009 directed for implementation of the order passed by the learned Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006. Against the said order, the State Government preferred FAO No. 589 of 2010 which was also dismissed by order dated 16.07.2011. After dismissal of FAO No. 589 of 2010, the State Government approved the appointment of respondent No. 4 against the 1st post of Lecturer in English and released Block Grant in her favour w.e.f. 01.02.2009. Thereafter, claiming GIA the appellant filed GIA Case No. 36 of 2010 in which respondent No. 4 has been arrayed as a party. After dismissal of FAO No. 589 of 2010, the State Government approved the appointment of respondent No. 4 against the 1st post of Lecturer in English and released Block Grant in her favour w.e.f. 01.02.2009. Thereafter, claiming GIA the appellant filed GIA Case No. 36 of 2010 in which respondent No. 4 has been arrayed as a party. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Tribunal dismissed the GIA Case holding therein that since respondent No. 4 is senior to the appellant and pursuant to the order passed by the learned Tribunal in the earlier GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 and confirmed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 17803 of 2009 and FAO No. 589 of 2010, the matter has been set at rest and there is no scope for the appellant to claim the benefit any further. Hence, this appeal. 3. Dr. M.R. Panda, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that the very initial appointment of respondent No. 4 having no requisite qualification being bad, any action taken subsequent thereto is also a nullity in the eye of law. More so, it is urged that due to non-impletion of the appellant as a party in the appeal preferred by respondent No. 4 before the Director and subsequent GIA No. 120 of 2006 filed by her, the orders so passed by the Director as well as the learned Tribunal cannot sustain in the eye of law and both the orders should be vitiated. He further submitted that the orders having been obtained by respondent No. 4 by playing fraud on the Court, the same is vitiated and therefore, any consequential action on the basis of the fraud played on the Court cannot sustain in the eye of law. Accordingly, the respondent No. 4 is not entitled to get GIA and this fact has been suppressed before this Court in the writ application and therefore, any benefit accrued to respondent No. 4 by suppressing the material fact and by playing fraud on the Court, is not admissible to her. He further submits that respondent No. 4 had admitted that she was terminated from service and against that order she had preferred an appeal before the Director, who passed order of reinstatement on 21.02.2006. He further submits that respondent No. 4 had admitted that she was terminated from service and against that order she had preferred an appeal before the Director, who passed order of reinstatement on 21.02.2006. Since respondent No. 4 has admitted that the college received GIA w.e.f. 01.01.2004 vide Notification dated 20.04.2004 and the institution being an aided one, the Director Higher Education has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and pass the order of reinstatement. Therefore, the power of adjudication ipso facto would stand transferred by operation of statute to the learned Education Tribunal. Hence, the order of the Director reinstating respondent No. 4 in service is without jurisdiction and void ab-initio and she is not entitled to get other consequential benefits as has been granted by the Director. This fact has been suppressed before the learned Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 and before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 17803 of 2009. He further submitted that since the termination of respondent No. 4 has been given effect to by the Governing Body by following the principles of natural justice and the same having not been challenged before the appropriate forum, the order passed by the Governing Body remains unaltered. But the respondent No. 4 misled this Court in OJC No. 3798 of 2001 and the order itself does not whisper about the words of "setting aside the order of termination". A proceeding was initiated against respondent No. 4 for having remained absent from duty unauthorizedly from 06.04.1998 following the procedure prescribed and she was charge sheeted and was called upon to put in his written statement and on receipt of the written statement of defence, the enquiry officer was appointed who dealt with the entire case and after the charges stood proved against respondent No. 4 she was terminated from service by Resolution dated 29.07.2001. Against the said order of termination dated 29.07.2001, respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal on 07.07.2005, i.e., after lapse of four years before the Director Higher Education. By that time, the Director had no jurisdiction to entertain such appeal since the College in question had been declared as aided one. Against the said order of termination dated 29.07.2001, respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal on 07.07.2005, i.e., after lapse of four years before the Director Higher Education. By that time, the Director had no jurisdiction to entertain such appeal since the College in question had been declared as aided one. But while disposing of O.J.C No. 3798 of 2001, this Court directed the Director to take a decision and the Director has taken a decision on 26.12.2001 and therefore, neither this Court nor the Director has stated anything about the disciplinary proceeding initiated against respondent No. 4, which has been approved by the Governing Body vide Resolution dated 29.07.2001. After the College was declared as an aided one, the Director Higher Education had become functus officio and as such, any order passed by him cannot sustain in the eye of law. More so, in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 the respondent No. 4 has approached the learned Education Tribunal with unclean hands and suppressed the materials facts and intentionally has not made the Principal-cum-Secretary or the Sub-Collector, who became the President of the Governing body as a party after the college was notified as aided one w.e.f. 01.01.2004. But she made Mr. Baidhar Mallick as a party only to conceal, suppress and mislead the facts before the learned Tribunal. After termination of respondent No. 4, the appellant was elevated to the 1st post of Lecturer in English on 14.10.2001, therefore, it was within the knowledge of respondent No. 4 that he is a necessary party to the proceeding and that ultimately the appellant would be affected in the event any order is passed by the learned Tribunal. Even then deliberately he has not been made a party to the proceeding. More so, by the time respondent No. 4 was appointed, she had no requisite qualification. Therefore, the very appointment of respondent No. 4 against the 1st post of Lecturer in English having no requisite qualification was absolutely illegal. To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon the judgments in Kulwant Singh and others v. Dayaram and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 177 ; Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 ; State of Orissa & Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty, JT 2011 (2) SC 164; Meghmala & Ors. To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon the judgments in Kulwant Singh and others v. Dayaram and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 177 ; Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi, (2012) 4 SCC 307 ; State of Orissa & Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty, JT 2011 (2) SC 164; Meghmala & Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors., 2010 (II) OLR SC 778; Smt. Rama Panigrahi v. State of Orissa & others, 2003 (I) OLR 438 ; and in Balraj Teneja & Anr. v. Sunil Madan and Anr., J.T. 1999 (6) SC 473. 4. Mr. K.K. Swain, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, per contra, stated that the order passed by the learned State Education Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 is wholly and fully justified. He further stated that the appellant has not challenged the judgment and order passed by the learned State Education Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 and the order of the Director dated 21.02.2006 and the consequential approval order dated 13.01.2011 approving the appointment of respondent No. 4 against the 1st of post Lecturer in English as well as the consequential release of GIA in her favour in the present appeal. He further submitted that the learned Tribunal has rightly passed the impugned order in Annexure-5. It is further urged that the order passed by the learned Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 has reached its finality after dismissal of FAO No. 589 of 2010 read with order dated 25.11.2009 passed in W.P.(C) No. 17803 of 2009 wherein this Court directed for implementation of the judgment and order of the learned Tribunal passed in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006. Therefore, the contention raised by the appellant that the order passed by the learned Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 and the order of the Director dated 21.06.2006 are nullity and can be ignored, is not legally correct. To substantiate his contention he has relied upon the judgment in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. V. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 1140 , wherein the Apex Court has held that a void order is also required to be challenged in appropriate Court of law. To substantiate his contention he has relied upon the judgment in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. V. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 1140 , wherein the Apex Court has held that a void order is also required to be challenged in appropriate Court of law. So far as jurisdiction of the Director is concerned, he has relied upon the judgment in Arjun Charan Jena v. Director, Secondary Education, Orissa, 66(1988) CLT 293 which has been confirmed by the Full Bench of this Court in Nityananda Lenka v. State of Orissa and Ors., 2011 (I) OLR 524 and has also relied upon the judgment in State of Uttaranchal & Anr. V. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & Ors., 2014 (I) SLJ 33. 5. On the basis of the facts pleaded above, the following questions emerge for consideration. "(i) Whether the order passed by the Director Higher Education dated 21.02.2006 and the order dated 05.12.2008 passed by the learned State Education Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 without impleading the appellant as a party can sustain in the eye of law? (ii) If the orders have been passed by the authority on the basis of the fraud played on Court by respondent No. 4, whether the same are vitiated and void ab-initio or not? (iii) If the initial appointment of respondent No. 4 has been made without having requisite qualification, whether such appointment can sustain in the eye of law or not? (iv) To what relief the appellant is entitled to?" 6. The admitted fact is that Indira Gandhi (Junior) Mahavidyalaya, Nimapara with +2 wing was established in the year 1989. Though on completion of five years of its establishment as on 01.06.1994, the institution ought to have been brought within the fold of grant-in-aid, but effectively the same has been brought into the grant-in-aid fold w.e.f. 01.01.2004 as per the GIA Order-2004 instead of GIA Order-1994. One Choudhury Ramakanta Das was initially appointed as 1st of post Lecturer in English in 1989 and he continued up to 15.12.1992. Respondent No. 4 having secured 39% of marks in her Post Graduation was appointed against the 2nd post of Lecturer in English on 25.11.1991. By the time she was appointed she had no requisite qualification to be appointed as a Lecturer in English. Respondent No. 4 having secured 39% of marks in her Post Graduation was appointed against the 2nd post of Lecturer in English on 25.11.1991. By the time she was appointed she had no requisite qualification to be appointed as a Lecturer in English. Choudhury Ramakanta Das, the holder of the 1st of post Lecturer in English submitted his resignation on 15.12.1992 and consequentially, respondent No. 4 was elevated to the 1st of post Lecturer in English. The appellant was appointed as Lecturer in English on 06.03.1993. But due to the negligence in duty following a disciplinary proceeding, respondent No. 4 was dismissed from service on 29.07.2001. Therefore, the appellant was elevated to the 1st of post Lecturer in English vide Resolution No. 5 dated 14.10.2001. By the time respondent No. 4 was terminated from service the college was not an aided one. Therefore, the respondent No. 4 preferred appeal before the Director Higher Education. When the matter was pending before the Director, the College came within the GIA fold w.e.f. 20.02.2004 giving effect from 01.01.2004. This Court in OJC No. 3798 of 2001 vide order dated 09.07.2001 directed the Director to pass an order in consonance with law in respect of smooth management of the College. On receipt of the same the director appointed the Special Officer as per Sub-section (6) of Section-7 of the Orissa Education Act on 25.04.2001. The Special Officer served notice on Respondent No. 4 on 19.05.2001 and in spite of such notice, since respondent No. 4 did not respond, following a disciplinary proceeding, she has been terminated from service, against which she preferred an appeal. This Court vide order dated 15.10.2001 in OJC No. 11169 of 2001 extended the continuance of Special Officer and even though the respondent No. 4 was terminated from service on 29.07.2001, she preferred an appeal before the Director on 07.07.2005 challenging such order of termination, after a long lapse of four years and by the time she filed the appeal, the Director has no jurisdiction to entertain the same and more so, the respondent No. 4 has not impleaded the present appellant as a party in the said appeal. Consequently, the Director passed the order declaring the order of termination of respondent No. 4 as illegal and directing her for reinstatement of service vide order dated 21.06.2006. Consequently, the Director passed the order declaring the order of termination of respondent No. 4 as illegal and directing her for reinstatement of service vide order dated 21.06.2006. Therefore, the order so passed by the Director is without jurisdiction, as by the time he passed the order, the College became an aided one and no appeal lay to him. Any such order passed by him cannot sustain in the eye of law. More so, the order has been passed without impleading the present appellant as party to the said proceeding. Therefore, any order passed by the Director is a nullity in the eye of law. 7. Mr. K.K. Swain, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 strenuously urged that once the Director has passed the order of reinstatement, the same should be given effect to and the order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction as action has been taken by the Governing Body when the institution was an aided one. Relying on the judgment in Arjun Charan Jena (supra), he submitted that the termination having been made during the unaided period, the Director had got jurisdiction to consider the appeal preferred by respondent No. 4 even if the college came within the fold of GIA when respondent No. 4 preferred the appeal. The admitted fact is that the respondent No. 4 was terminated from service on 29.07.2001 when the college was an unaided one and as such at the relevant point of time the Director might have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, but knowing fully well that the Director had got the jurisdiction, the respondent No. 4 did not prefer any appeal during the unaided period and admittedly, respondent No. 4 preferred appeal on 07.07.2005 when the college had already come within the fold of GIA, pursuant to notification dated 20.04.2004 giving effect from 01.01.2004 by which time the Director had lost its jurisdiction to entertain any appeal preferred by any person. Therefore, the reliance placed on Arjun Charan Jena (supra) has no application to the present facts and circumstances of the case and the same is distinguishable. Even when the appeal was preferred, respondent No. 4 was fully aware of the fact that the appellant has been elevated to the 1st of post Lecturer in English and knowing fully well he was not impleaded as a party in the said appeal. Even when the appeal was preferred, respondent No. 4 was fully aware of the fact that the appellant has been elevated to the 1st of post Lecturer in English and knowing fully well he was not impleaded as a party in the said appeal. In course of hearing when a query was made by this Court to Mr. K.K. Swain, learned counsel for respondent No. 4, that if the college has become an aided one, how respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal before the Director without impleading the appellant as party to the proceeding itself. No satisfactory answer was offered from the side of respondent No. 4. This clearly indicates that the respondent No. 4 has played fraud on the Court itself and consequentially she has detained the order of reinstatement passed by the Director on 21.02.2006 when the Director had no jurisdiction to pass such order. 8. Respondent No. 4 has also preferred GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 before the learned Education Tribunal without impleading the appellant as a party. Therefore, a right which has been accrued in favour of the appellant being the holder of 1st of post Lecturer in English by way of elevation after termination of respondent No. 4 from service, the order so passed by the learned Tribunal is not binding on the appellant himself as he is not a party to the proceeding. Without complying with the principles of natural justice, the learned Tribunal has passed the order in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 allowing the application of respondent No. 4 granting the benefits as against the 1st of post Lecturer in English. That itself jeopardize the claim of the appellant and as such, the order so passed by the learned Tribunal without impleading the appellant to the present proceeding cannot sustain in the eye of law. 9. In Kanwar Singh Saini (supra) the apex Court in paragraph-22 has held as follows:- "22. There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes order/decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the proceedings including in appeal or execution. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Acquiescence of a party equally should not be permitted to defeat the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute." 10. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court mentioned above, if the order has been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice, it goes to the root of the cause and such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings including in appeal or execution. Therefore, the finding of the Court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction and as such, if the Court passes an order/decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it amounts to a nullity. In that view of the matter, since the order has been passed by the Director reinstating respondent No. 4 in service and consequential benefit has been granted by the learned State Education Tribunal by releasing GIA in her favour in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006 without impleading the appellant as a party, the same is without jurisdiction and as such, is a nullity in the eye of law and more so, if at a belated stage the appellant assails the same, it cannot be said that the appellant cannot raise the question at this point of time. 11. In Kulwant Singh (supra), the apex Court in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 has held as follows: "45. At this stage, we shall notice certain authorities which have been commended to us for adjudging the effect of such non-impleadment. In Khetrabasi Biswal case, 2004 (1) SCC 317 Orissa Public Service Commission had issued an advertisement inviting applications in the prescribed form for twenty-five posts of temporary Munsif (Emergency Recruitment) in Class II of the Orissa Judicial Service. The appellants and the respondents had applied before the Commission. A written examination was held by the Commission, a list of successful candidates was prepared and selectees were later on interviewed by the Commission and in the said proceeding a sitting Judge of the High Court acted as an expert. Thereafter the select list was prepared on the basis of merit which contained 39 names. A written examination was held by the Commission, a list of successful candidates was prepared and selectees were later on interviewed by the Commission and in the said proceeding a sitting Judge of the High Court acted as an expert. Thereafter the select list was prepared on the basis of merit which contained 39 names. The names of the appellants before this Court found place therein. The said list was sent to the State Government for approval. The State Government on receiving the said list, prepared another list in which the name of the appellant was found placed therein but the names of Bijaya Kumar Patra and Govinda Chandra Parida and others were omitted. Number of writ petitions were filed before the High Court purporting to interpret the service rules prepared the list of candidates who should have been selected. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the directions issued by the High Court offers of appointment were issued by the State Government in terms of the list prepared by the High Court. The appellants who had come to this Court were not parties to the writ petitions. The High Court, while preparing its own list did not think it fit to issue notices to other candidates like the appellants before this Court who had suffered prejudice by reason of the directions issued by the High Court. While dealing with the justifiability of the same this Court held that they were necessary parties and, in that context, expressed thus: (Khetrabasi Biswal case, SCC p. 319, para 6) "6. The procedural law as well as the substantive law both mandates that in the absence of a necessary party, the order passed is a nullity and does not have a binding effect." 46. In Shiv Kumar Tiwari, (2001) 10 SCC 11 a suit was filed without making the affected person a party. Dealing with the said facet this Court opined that such a judgment could not be pressed into service to the detriment of the rights of a party as he was not a party and any judgment/decree/order of courts or any other authority binds only the parties to it or their privies when it concerns the rights of parties and such proceedings purport to adjudicate also the rights of the contesting parties by means of an adversarial process. The Court, while rejecting the plea that the affected party could have filed an appeal by obtaining special leave of the court, held that though it would have been open for such party to file an appeal with the leave of the court, there is no duty or obligation cast on it so to do on pain of distress when in law he could also legitimately ignore the said judgment as it is a judgment of no value. 47. In Kailash Chand Mahajan case 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351 the Court ruled that if a decision is rendered which affects a party, it would amount to clear violation of the principles of natural justice and an order passed in violation of the salutary provision of natural justice would be a nullity." 12. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court if the decision has been taken which affects a party, it would amount to clear violation of the principles of natural justice and the order passed in violation of salutary provision of natural justice would be a nullity. 13. In Meghmala (supra), the apex Court in paragraph-33 held as follows: "33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (Vide Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 ; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 ; State of Andhra Pradesh v. T. Suryachandra Rao, AIR 2005 SC 3110 ; K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 481; and Regional Manager, Central Bank of India V. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 170 )" 14. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the apex Court an act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. 15. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the apex Court an act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. 15. On the factual discussions made above, there is no semblance of doubt that respondent No. 4 has played fraud on court in obtaining the order from the Director, who has no jurisdiction and the consequential order passed by the learned State Education Tribunal without impleading the affected party, namely the appellant, is in gross violation of principles of natural justice and therefore, is a nullity in the eye of law. 16. In Mamata Mohanty and another (supra), relied on by learned counsel for the appellant, the apex Court held that the persons having no requisite qualification cannot and should not be appointed by the authority. In any case, in view of the subsequent upgradation of educational qualification, the respondent No. 4 being eligible to be considered for appointment, this Court is not delving into that question to answer in the present context. 17. Much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 on Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia (supra) where the apex Court has held that void order is required to be challenged in the appropriate Court of law. In the present case, the appellant has also preferred W.P.(C) No. 23435 of 2010 challenging the order of Director by which reinstatement order has been passed in favour of the respondent No. 4 which is pending for adjudication. 18. In Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (supra) it is held that no relief can be granted to a person who has approached the Court at a belated stage. But this view cannot hold good if the order has been obtained by playing fraud on Court and more so, by suppression of fact, and apart from that due to non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, without impleading the party in the proceeding itself, the order being void ab initio, it is a nullity in the eye of law. In such case the ratio decided in Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (supra) cannot apply in the eye of law. 19. In such case the ratio decided in Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (supra) cannot apply in the eye of law. 19. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the considered view that the learned State Education Tribunal has committed gross error apparent on the face of record in disentitling the appellant from receiving the benefits as due and admissible in accordance with law in relying upon the order of the very same Tribunal in GIA Case No. 120 of 2006. Accordingly the impugned order being a nullity and void ab initio, cannot sustain in the eye of law and is hereby quashed. The respondent No. 2 is directed to extend the benefit admissible to the appellant against 1st of post Lecturer in English in accordance with GIA principle within a period of three months from the date of communication of this judgment. 20. Appeal is allowed. No costs.