JUDGMENT U. C. Dhyani, J. (Oral) 1. Since the factual matrix of the abovenoted writ petitions and law governing the field is the same, therefore, all aforementioned writ petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment for the sake of convenience and brevity. Writ Petition No.3090 of 2015 (M/S) shall be the leading case. 2. Present writ petition Nos.3090/2015, 3091/2015 & 3093/2015 have been filed by the petitioners against the judgment and order dated 03.12.2015 passed by the 1st Addl. District Judge, Dehradun in Misc. Case No.912 of 2015, 913 of 2015 and 910 of 2015 respectively. 3. An ex-parte judgment and decree was passed against the petitioners by learned 1st Additional Civil Judge (S.D.) / Judge Small Causes Court, Dehradun on 05.11.2014. Aggrieved against the same, an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. was filed by the judgment debtors / petitioners on 21.11.2014, which was dismissed on 03.10.2015. Feeling aggrieved against this order, the petitioners filed revision before the District Judge, Dehradun, which is pending adjudication before the said court. During the pendency of the said revision, the petitioners filed a regular civil revision (SCC Revision) alongwith application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act against the ex-parte decree on 16.11.2015 with a delay of 376 days. The revisional court, vide order dated 03.12.2015, did not condone the delay and observed that the revision is not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the same. Hence, the present writ petitions. 4. So far as the maintainability of the revision is concerned, it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhanu Kumar Jain vs. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787 that after dismissal of application under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C., the appeal against the ex-parte decree is maintainable, but the converse is not true. So, it is held that the revision against such an order is maintainable. 5. Learned court below also held that there was no sufficient ground to condone the delay in filing the revision and hence dismissed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act citing various reasons. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew attention of this Court towards various decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shyamal Kanti Danda vs. Chunilal Choudhary, (1984) 4 SCC 345 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & another vs. Mst. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew attention of this Court towards various decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shyamal Kanti Danda vs. Chunilal Choudhary, (1984) 4 SCC 345 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & another vs. Mst. Katiji & others, 1987 AIR 1353 (SC), Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & others vs. Gobardhan Sao & others, 2002 AIR 1201 (SC) and J. Kumaradasan Nair & another vs. IRIC Sohan & others, (2009) 12 SCC 175 to argue that learned court below ought to have condoned the delay and ought to have heard the revision on merits. 7. It is the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners are not entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew attention of this Court towards the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ketan V. Parekh vs. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement & another, (2011) 15 SCC 30 and Zafar Khan & another vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. & others, (1985) AIR 39 (SC). He also relied upon a Full Bench decision of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Raziuddin Mohd. Siddiqui & another vs. Zaihab Khatoon & another, (2004) 6 ALD 564 and on a decision of Hon’ble Chattisgarh High Court in Vinod Kumar Thawani & another vs. Shankar Lal Agrawal & others passed in S.A. No.213 of 2007 on 26.11.2007. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zafar Khan’s case (supra) has observed as follows: “10. …………………….. Sec.14(1)of the Limitation Act reads as under: “14(1): In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain it.” 11. In order to attract the application of Sec. 14(1), the parties seeking its benefit must satisfy the court that: (1) that the party as the plaintiff was prosecuting another civil proceeding with due; diligence; (ii) that the earlier proceeding and the later proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and (iii) the former proceeding was being prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. It may be assumed that the earlier proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil procedure was a civil proceeding for the purpose of Sec. 14. It may as well be assumed in favour of the appellants that they were prosecuting the same with due diligence and in good faith, as they relentlessly carried the proceeding upto the High Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. The first of the aforementioned three cumulative conditions can be said to have been satisfied.” 9. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that firstly, the petitioners did not comply with the provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and, thereafter, they have nowhere pleaded in their application for condonation of delay that they are entitled to get the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the grounds pleaded by the petitioners in their application dated 16.11.2015 relate to Section 14 of the Limitation Act and not in respect of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It will be worthwhile to reproduce para 19 of the affidavit accompanying the SCC revision filed by the petitioners hereinbelow: “19. That apart from the same restoration application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was also filed within limitation on 21.11.2014 but the same was rejected on technical ground for want of compliance of Section 17 of Provincial Small Cause Court Act. Undisputedly, defendant came forward to assail the decree dated 05.11.2014 on 21.11.2014 by filing restoration application but with effect from 21.11.2014 i.e. from the date of filing restoration defendant was bonafidely prosecuting the proceeding of restoration which was not maintainable without compliance of Section 17 of Provincial Small Cause Court Act, as such period from 21.11.2014 till filing the present revision deserves to be excluded under Section 14 of Limitation Act while computing the limitation of present revision.” 10. It is the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the exclusion of time in pursuing a wrong remedy so as to attract Section 14 of the Limitation Act has been pleaded by the petitioners, to which learned counsel for the petitioners drew attention of this Court towards para 22 of the affidavit which speaks as under: “22. That as such under the circumstances it would be expedient in the interest of justice that delay in filing the present revision be condoned, failing which defendant shall suffer irreparable loss.” 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in J. Kumaradasan Nair’s case (supra) held : “12. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether only because a mistake has been committed by or on behalf of the appellants in approaching the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances, the same would mean that the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which is otherwise available, should not be taken into consideration at all. The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. The provisions contained in Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act are meant for grant of relief where a person has committed some mistake. The provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act alike should, thus, be applied in a broad-based manner. When Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se is not applicable, the same would not mean that the principles akin thereto would not be applied. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the same would be applicable to a case of this nature.” 14. It is also now a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. Wile exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficient provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. Wile exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. The court will not apply the beneficient provisions like Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act in a pedantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a case, in our opinion, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provision has been mentioned. In a case of this nature, Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se may not be applicable, but, as indicated hereinbefore, the principles thereof would be applicable for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 thereof. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents while relying upon para 31 of Ketan Parekh’s case (supra) contended that the petitioners having pleaded the grounds of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, no benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be given to them. For the sake of convenience, para 14 of Ketan Parekh’s case (surpa) reads as under: “22. A careful reading of the above reproduced averments shows that there was not even a whisper in the applications filed by the appellants that they had been prosecuting remedy before a wrong forum, i.e. the Delhi High Court with due diligence and in good faith. Not only this, the prayer made in the applications was for condonation of 1056 days’ delay and not for exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting the writ petitions before the Delhi High Court. This shows that the appellants were seeking to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which, as mentioned above, cannot be pressed into service in view of the language of Section 35 of the Act and interpretation of similar provisions by this Court.” 13. Even if be conceded for the sake of argument that the petitioners are not entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the fact remains that they are entitled to get benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which though not happily worded in the application of the petitioners as per respondents’ counsel, but, nevertheless, contents-wise, it is an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act also. 14. 14. In a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balwant Singh (dead) vs. Jagdish Singh and others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 , the following was observed : “…………….However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. …………………” 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court in G. Ramagowda vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897 and Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1869 SC 575 has observed that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 (10) JT 179 that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. 16. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. Whether explanation furnished would constitute ‘sufficient cause’ or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. However, courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed, a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed, a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merits. The courts should strike balance between the resultant effect of the order it was going to pass upon the parties either way. 17. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the aforesaid decisions, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned orders cannot sustain in the eye of law. The impugned orders are, accordingly, set aside on payment of costs of Rs.5000/- each (in all Rs.15,000/-) to opposite parties. 18. The writ petitions are allowed on payment of costs as above, which shall be paid by the petitioners to the respondents within two weeks from the date of receiving a certified copy of this order. It is directed that the court below shall make every endeavour to decide the revision at the earliest, but not later than three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. It is further directed that during the pendency of the revisions, the decree shall be kept in abeyance.