JUDGMENT : D. Dash, J. 1. The State of Odisha being aggrieved by the final decree passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Puri in O.S. No. 65 of 1966 had filed appeal i.e. T.A. No. 54 of 1995. The State had also filed twenty (20) more appeals calling in question the decrees passed in twenty (20) separate suits which were disposed of in Lok Adalat in terms of compromise between the parties therein where State of Odisha was not a party and as all those decrees had been given due weight age and recognition in the said final decree passed in O.S. No. 65 of 1966. The appeals were filed in the court of learned District Judge, Puri. All those appeals having been allowed by separate judgments passed on 27.6.2002, twenty one (21) numbers of second appeals have been filed before this Court by the respective respondents as better described in the table provided here in below:- Sl No. In the Court of District Judge (A) In the high Court (B) In the Trial Court (C) 1 T.A. No. 54/95 RSA No.22/02 O.S. N. 65.66 2 T.A. No. 66/95 RSA No.52/02 T.S. No. 242/94 3 T.A. No. 67/95 RSA No. 48/02 T.S. No. 241/94 4 T.A. No. 68/95 RSA No. 56/02 T.S. No. 240/94 5 T.A. No. 69/95 RSA No. 50/02 T.S. No. 239/94 6 T.A. No. 70/95 RSA No. 47/02 T.S. No. 238/94 7 T.A. No. 71/95 RSA No. 53/02 T.S. No. 237/94 8 T.A. No. 72/95 RSA No. 54/02 T.S. No. 236/94 9 T.A. No. 73/95 RSA No. 49/02 T.S. No. 234/94 10 T.A. No. 74/95 RSA No. 57/02 T.S. No. 244/94 11 T.A. No. 75/95 RSA No. 58/02 T.S. No. 245/94 12 T.A. No. 76/95 RSA No. 68/02 T.S. No. 246/94 13 T.A. No. 77/95 RSA No. 69/02 T.S. No. 247/94 14 T.A. No. 78/95 RSA No.61/02 T.S. No. 248/94 15 T.A. No. 79/95 RSA No. 66/02 T.S. No. 249/94 16 T.A. No. 80/95 RSA No. 64/02 T.S. No. 250/94 17 T.A. No. 81/95 RSA No. 62/02 T.S. No. 251/94 18 T.A. No. 82/95 RSA No. 63/02 T.S. No. 252/94 19 T.A. No. 83/95 RSA No. 65/02 T.S. No. 253/94 20 T.A. No. 84/95 RSA No. 60/02 T.S. No. 254/94 21 T.A. No. 85/95 RSA No. 67/02 T.S. No. 254/94 Out of the above appeals, the appeals as indicated in serial Nos. 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 16 and 18 have been dismissed as abated on account of death of respective appellants and for non-substitution of their legal representatives in time by rejecting the highly belated move for said substitution of legal representatives in refusing to setting aside the abatement by condoning the delay by detail order passed on 4.8.2015. Thus now the appeals under above serial Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7 to 13, 17, 19 to 21 remained on board. All these appeals involve common questions although arise out of different suits and yet the ultimate result sought to be achieved is by way of reaping real benefit in getting huge extent of land of 880 acres excluded from the purview of the partition suit i.e. O.S. No. 65 of 1966 in its final decree which has thus been so achieved. Therefore, all the appeals having been heard together, this common judgment is passed which would govern all those. 2. Dinabandhu Puspalak who is appellant No. 7 here as the plaintiff had filed Title Suit No. 65 of 1966 in the court of Subordinate Judge, Puri (as it was then) against other co-sharers of Puspalak family i.e. present appellant Nos. 1 to 6 arraigning them as defendants. The suit was for partition of their joint family property. At that time Chapter-IV of the Odisha Land Reforms Act concerning the fixation of ceiling and vesting as well as disposal of ceiling surplus land had not come into force. In the said suit on 7.4.1967, preliminary decree was passed. The Chapter IV of the OLR Act relating to fixation of ceiling limit as well as vesting of ceiling surplus land and their disposal came into force on 26.9.1970. Sometime in the year 1975, the plaintiff filed a petition for making the preliminary decree final. In that year itself proceeding for declaring ceiling surplus land in respect of the suit land belonging to the Pushpalak family under Section 40(A) of the OLR Act was initiated. That very initiation of the ceiling proceeding was challenged by the members of the Puspalak family by carrying writs to this Court in OJC Nos. 1957-1963 of 1975. Said batch of writs were disposed of with the direction that the ceiling proceeding would not proceed till conclusion of the final decree proceeding. That very initiation of the ceiling proceeding was challenged by the members of the Puspalak family by carrying writs to this Court in OJC Nos. 1957-1963 of 1975. Said batch of writs were disposed of with the direction that the ceiling proceeding would not proceed till conclusion of the final decree proceeding. Thereafter, on 10.4.92, the State of Odisha represented by Collector, Puri filed an application in the said Title Suit No. 65 of 1966 seeking leave to be impleaded as a party. However, the said petition stood rejected by order dated 15.10.92. This Court then by order dated 22.4.94 considering the submission that since the final decree proceeding is under the control of the members of the Pushpalak family and that they have been unnecessarily dragging on the disposal of the said proceeding taking advantage of the order of this Court as above, passed an order that the final decree proceeding of Title Suit No. 65 of 1966 if not completed by 31.7.1994, the ceiling cases would continue for disposal on their own merits. 3. The matter took a great turn thereafter when respondent Nos. 1 to 20 in the appeals under serial No. 1 of the table as the respective plaintiffs who have also filed separate second appeals before this Court, filed 20 suits claiming acquisition of right of occupancy raiyat by way of adverse possession over different portions of land forming the subject matter of Title Suit No. 65 of 1966 as also the subject matter of the ceiling proceeding. But the State of Odisha was not made a party therein. In those suits in total, the claim of those 20 Nos. of plaintiffs came over the extent of 880 acres of land.-Those suits were disposed of on compromise between the parties thereto. These compromises were effected in the Lok Adalat held on 31.7.94. Being armed with such compromise decrees, then those plaintiffs who are respondent Nos. 1 to 20 in the appeal under serial No. 1 of the table and appellants of the appeals under serial Nos. These compromises were effected in the Lok Adalat held on 31.7.94. Being armed with such compromise decrees, then those plaintiffs who are respondent Nos. 1 to 20 in the appeal under serial No. 1 of the table and appellants of the appeals under serial Nos. 2 to 21 of the table went to file petitions to get them impleaded as parties in the said ceiling proceeding then pending before the Additional Tahsildar, Puri and prayed that said land of 880 acres' over which their right, title and interest has been declared in terms of compromise against the members of the Puspalak family be excluded from the purview of the ceiling proceeding. Then accordingly, the members of Puspalak family filed their revised return excluding those 880 acres of land covered under those 20 compromise decrees. They also applied in the final decree proceeding of O.S. No. 65 of 1966 for allotment of the respective land as decreed in their favour in those suits to them. The trial court thereafter accordingly passed the final decree. The State of Odisha being aggrieved by the said final decree passed in O.S. No. 65 of 1966 filed Title Appeal No. 54 of 1995 as indicated in serial No. 1 of the table provided challenging the same as regards the adjustments made in the said final decree with regard to those lands decreed in favour of respective plaintiffs in those twenty suits i.e. T.S. No. 236 to 255 of 1994 as per the compromise decrees passed in the Lok Adalat. Similarly, the State of Odisha also filed twenty (20) more appeals challenging those compromise decrees passed in those suits in Lok Adalat as find mention under serial Nos. 2 to 21 of the table given in the foregoing para. In the said appeals as the State of Odisha was not a party to the suit and therefore, it prayed for grant of necessary leave to maintain the appeals, condonation of delay and to pursue the same. By order dated 7.4.2000, the learned District Judge granted the leave as prayed for and condoned the delay on that ground. In the said appeals as the State of Odisha was not a party to the suit and therefore, it prayed for grant of necessary leave to maintain the appeals, condonation of delay and to pursue the same. By order dated 7.4.2000, the learned District Judge granted the leave as prayed for and condoned the delay on that ground. These orders were men challenged by filing Civil Revisions before this Court at the instance of plaintiff, Dinabandhu Puspalak as also in other revisions filed by the plaintiffs of those suits decreed in terms of compromise in the Lok Adalat Those Civil Revisions were numbered as 198, 200, 217 and 218 of 2000. This Court by a detail reasoned and well discussed order, upheld the order of the learned District Judge in granting the leave as aforesaid and condoning the delay. Said order of this court was not further challenged by carrying the matter to higher court. Thereafter said main appeal No. 54 of 1995 as well as all other appeals having been allowed by setting aside the final decree passed in O.S. No. 65 of 1966 as also those compromise decrees as passed in those twenty suits, all these above noted appeals have come to be filed. 4. These appeals have been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- "i. Whether a decision rendered in the case without pleadings, without issue and without evidence is sustainable in law and whether such, a judgment can be termed as per incuriam? ii. Whether findings of fraud and collusion can be said to have been substantiated without affording an opportunity to the appellants to controvert it and whether such decision is vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice? iii. Whether the decision based on surmises and conjectures is sustainable in law?" 5. Learned counsel for the appellants of RSA No. 22 of 2002 under serial No. 1 of the table submits that the grant of leave to the appellant in filing the appeal before the learned District Judge is illegal and that appeal is thus not maintainable. iii. Whether the decision based on surmises and conjectures is sustainable in law?" 5. Learned counsel for the appellants of RSA No. 22 of 2002 under serial No. 1 of the table submits that the grant of leave to the appellant in filing the appeal before the learned District Judge is illegal and that appeal is thus not maintainable. He next contends that the State of Odisha having filed the appeal challenging the final decree on the ground of perpetration of fraud by the parties being in collusion with the plaintiffs of other suits filed later claiming to have acquired right title and interest as occupancy raiyat over a large chunk of suit property in order to deprive the State from recovering the ceiling surplus land as duly determined under the law, the lower appellate court has completely erred in law by holding the final decree to be the outcome of collusion and fraud between the plaintiff and those 20 others who had independently filed separate suits claiming acquisition of occupancy raiyati right by adverse possession over portions of land out of the suit land against said plaintiff the suit pending for final decree and members of the Pushpalak family and getting the suit decreed in terms of compromise in the Lok Adalat. It is further submitted that there is no pleading to that effect and no evidence is there on record. It is also stated that the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to meet those allegations of fraud. Thus, according to him, the judgment passed by the lower appellate court being based on conjectures and surmises are unsustainable in the eye of law. He also contends that the lower appellate court has been swayed away by the judgment passed by this Court in Civil Revisions where the question of grant of leave was the subject matter for decision and the discussions and observations made therein being confined for that purpose only at that stage, in appeal against the final decree in order to decide the same on merit, the lower appellate court ought not to have taken those into consideration at all and it ought not to have based its conclusion accepting those very observations. 6. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants of those appeals under serial numbers 2, 5, 7, 8, 10 to 13, 15, 17, 19 to 21 of the table as given above while reiterating the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant of RSA No. 22 of 2002 further submits that the awards having been passed in Lok Adalat in terms of compromise as per Section 21 of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 in the suits filed by those appellants as plaintiffs, No appeal could have been carried at all and as such those appeals are incompetent in the eye of law. Furthermore; he contends that on the face of the provision of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, such appeals at the behest of the State are also not maintainable in challenging the awards of Lok Adalat which could be well said to be decrees on consent. He also contends that such awards of the Lok Adalat for the purpose of execution are deemed decrees as per Section 21(1) of the Legal Services Authority Act but not for the purpose of appeal under the general provision as contained in the Code. In course of submission he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex in case of State of Punjab vs. Jalour Singh: AIR 2008 S.C. 1209 and of this Court in case of Debasis Jena vs. Rajendra Ku. Das: AIR 2008 Orissa 49. Learned Senior counsel on behalf of the State of Odisha submits that here the fraud is quite apparent on the face of the record in showing as to how everything were stage-managed to save the immovable property from the clutches of the Ceiling Law by hatching definite plan in setting up those 20 persons who are appellants in filing suits with stereo type plaint and claim etc. claiming different portions of the suit land measuring huge extent of 880 acres of land and getting those all on a fine morning compromised at the earliest in Lok Adalat. He contends that all those moves are totally collusive to nullify the ceiling proceeding and frustrate the Ceiling Laws to have its play in respect of the land of the Pushpalak family from being vested and made available to the landless and other persons as per said statute. He contends that all those moves are totally collusive to nullify the ceiling proceeding and frustrate the Ceiling Laws to have its play in respect of the land of the Pushpalak family from being vested and made available to the landless and other persons as per said statute. He further submits that the judgment of the lower appellate court is not at all based on conjectures and surmises and the lower appellate court enjoying all the powers as that of the trial court on appreciation of the facts and circumstances which stand admitted has rightly set aside the final decree as passed and also those Lok Adalat awards deemed to be decrees passed in suits filed by the appellants of second appeals under item Nos. 2 to 21. He further contends that the suit lands were the subject matter of the consolidation proceedings and the members of Puspalak family having appeared there and moved for stay of those proceedings till disposal of the second appeals, the prayer was not entertained for which they had moved this Court in OJC Nos. 4269 of 2000 and this Court by order dated 25.9.02 directed expeditious disposal of those consolidation cases. The appellants other than the appellant of this RSA No. 22 of 2002 did not raise their claim in the consolidation forum. He thus submits that thereafter the order being passed on 19.11.2011 that the entire disputed land belongs to the State of Odisha and in pursuance to the same, the possession having been taken over by the State, now nothing remains to be decided in all these appeals. Filing those extract orders of the consolidation cases and the final order dated 19.11.2011, his prayer is to allow the petition under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code giving rise to Misc. Case No. 678 of 2015 and accept those documents as additional evidence. This move is seriously objected to the learned counsels for the appellants in writing as also in course of submission on the ground that such prayer should have been made before hearing of these appeals and not after commencement of the hearing. Moreover, the objection is also on the ground that the prayer having been advanced at a highly belated stage that too without any sort of plausible explanation, the same is not to be entertained. Moreover, the objection is also on the ground that the prayer having been advanced at a highly belated stage that too without any sort of plausible explanation, the same is not to be entertained. It is lastly submitted that said documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence do not have any such bearing on the substantial questions of law framed for being answered in this appeal. It is next stated that the ingredients for favourably considering such prayer for adduction of additional evidence in this appeal are not at all fulfilled. The State being well aware of the litigation having fled the petition at such highly belated stage and that too without any explanation, the same according to him is thus liable to be dismissed. 7. At the outset taking up the matter of adduction of additional evidence as prayed for by the State, it is seen that such documents which are now sought to be admitted as additional evidence are mostly of the year 2011. The explanation given is that of delay in the official process in compiling the papers for which those could not be produced earlier on account of official congestion. Thus it is said to be neither willful nor deliberate. The State as the appellant had carried the appeals in the lower appellate court way back in the year 1995 and has been contesting these appeals since the year 2002. The litigation concerns with huge extent of landed property. It is said that the properties were also the subject matter of the consolidation proceeding. But the fact remains that those proceedings from which the documents are now forthcoming as it appears have been culminated way back in the year 2011. So now to say that in the official process, the delay took place as those papers could not be compiled and those could not be produced earlier is per se not acceptable for holding that the respondent in spite of exercise of due diligence could not produce the document earlier. Moreover, in view of the substantial questions of law which have been framed in this appeal, although these orders have been passed during pendency of the present appeals but then those are not shown to be having any such important bearing for answering the questions so as to enable this Court to pronounce judgment. Moreover, in view of the substantial questions of law which have been framed in this appeal, although these orders have been passed during pendency of the present appeals but then those are not shown to be having any such important bearing for answering the questions so as to enable this Court to pronounce judgment. Moreover, on the contentious issues involved, those do not go to throw any light for rendering just and proper answer. Therefore, the prayer stands accordingly rejected and resultantly, the Misc. Case No. 678 of 2015 stands dismissed. 8. On the rival submission of the learned counsel for the parties touching the merit of the case and with reference to the substantial questions of law as framed, it is felt apposite to first of all answer as to whether at this stage the appellants can question the grant of leave to the State to file the appeal i.e. Title Appeal No. 54 of 1995 under serial No. 1 of the table as also the appeals under serial Nos. 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, to 13, 15, 17 and 19 to 21 of the table as given above challenging the final decree passed in O.S. No. 65 of 1966 and those awards passed in Lok Adalat in the suits filed by the other appellants that goes to the root of the matter and an answer to it in favour of the appellants would decide the fate of this appeal in favour of the appellants as also the unsustainability of the lower appellate court's judgment in all those appeals. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that this order of grant of leave as passed by the learned District Judge was challenged in Civil Revisions before this Court wherein the said orders of grant of leave as passed by the learned District Judge has been given the seal of approval by this Court and upheld. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that this order of grant of leave as passed by the learned District Judge was challenged in Civil Revisions before this Court wherein the said orders of grant of leave as passed by the learned District Judge has been given the seal of approval by this Court and upheld. For the purpose of challenge, reliance is heavily placed on the provision of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:- "Other orders.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal thereafter, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness." It's no doubt correct to say that the scope of a revision application is narrower than the scope of an appeal. However, when the revisional jurisdiction of the superior court is invoked, it is so done as the superior court is in a position to interfere with the said order for the purpose of rectifying the error committed by the court below. Section 115 of the Code no doubt circumscribes the limitation of that revisional jurisdiction but still the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the statute. Basically and fundamentally, it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. If the order of grant of leave would not have been challenged before this Court, certainly as provided in Section 105 of the Code, its correctness and sustainability would have remained open to be examined further. Basically and fundamentally, it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. If the order of grant of leave would not have been challenged before this Court, certainly as provided in Section 105 of the Code, its correctness and sustainability would have remained open to be examined further. But since a remedy has been availed of and the order on that score has become final, their correctness or sustainability is no more open to challenge in the present appeal by banking upon the provision of Section 105 of the Code which in fact is not engrafted in the Code being intended to be taken aid of in the present eventuality. Thus the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant on this score fails. 9. Now let me proceed to address the question of maintainability of the appeals filed by the State challenging the final decree as also those awards passed in Lok Adalat in the suits filed by said appellants. The final decree has been challenged basically in view of the exclusion of the land which are the subject matter of those 20 suits wherein the title of those respective plaintiff have been declared. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that those decrees having been passed in Lok Adalat in terms of compromise between the parties, and accordingly those having been duly given respect to and weightage in the final decree proceeding, those are no more available to be challenged by resorting to provision of Section 96 of the Code and said provision has no applicability to challenge Lok Adalat awards. It is further submitted that since those decrees have been passed in terms of compromise, the provision of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure as also the provision under Section 21(2) of the Legal Services Authority Act stand as bar. It is further submitted that since those decrees have been passed in terms of compromise, the provision of Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure as also the provision under Section 21(2) of the Legal Services Authority Act stand as bar. The above submission is countered by contending that since the State was not a party in those suits where the parties being hand in gloves have got the suits disposed of in terms of compromise in the Lok Adalat and accordingly have obtained the awards, the State being the person seriously and highly affected by those awards which are deemed to be decrees under Section 21(1) of the Legal Services Authority Act, said person, here the State whose right has been affected thereby and who has not been deliberately not made party and had it been the party there would not have been a compromise as it has been so recorded, the appeals are very much maintainable under the provision of Section 96 of the Code and in that event Section 21(2) of the Legal Services Authority Act do not and cannot stand as legal bar. It is contended that said Lok Adalat awards are nullity and as such void. 10. By virtue of Section 21(1) of the Legal Services Authority Act, all awards of the Lok Adalat are deemed to be decrees of a civil court or as the case may be, an order of any other court and where compromise and settlement has been arrived at by a Lok Adalat, in a case referred to it under Sub-Section-1 of Section 20 of the Act, the Court fees paid in such cases shall be refunded in the manner as provided under the court fees Act. As per Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act such awards passed in Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. As per Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act such awards passed in Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. No doubt this sub-section-2 of Section 21 of the Act prohibits the appeal against the award of the Lok Adalat but when as per said provision it is said to be binding on all the parties to the dispute, the bar against entertainment of an appeal as indicated therein certainly stand for all the parties and that cannot apply to a non-party who has been definitely affected thereby or claims to have been materially affected in so far as his right is concerned. This in my considered view comes out as the correct interpretation on a harmonious reading of the said provision and me other correct interpretation also emerges that the award referred to therein so as to be no more open to challenge, it must be an award passed by the authority in accordance with law. The intention of legislature in prohibiting the appeal against the Lok Adalat is no doubt to give finality to the award in order to see that further unnecessary litigations are avoided. But its again between the parties in terse. So, when the award is not binding upon a nonparty, it cannot be said to have reached its finality in so far as the non-party is concerned so as to bind him and even deny him the right of appeal. When a necessary party to the suit is omitted from being made party and the award has been passed affecting his right, said the award cannot certainly be held to be final and binding on him. More particularly in view of the fact that had he been a party the compromise either would not have materialised at all or would not have been so effected without his consent. So in this case it has to be said that the necessity of the consent of the non-party has been suppressed being not brought to the notice of the authority and had that been so brought to the notice, the awards would never have resulted at all. In that event, the bar to appeal cannot come to operate so far as that non-party is concerned. In that event, the bar to appeal cannot come to operate so far as that non-party is concerned. Then also the award being void ab initio so far as the non-party is concerned as the parties to the suit had not got the very power to enter into the compromise affecting the right of the non-party the compromise can be said to have been entered into by playing fraud and in such circumstances that award could be said to be nonest so far as the non-party is concerned whose right has been affected. Thus where the compromise has been entered into in the Lok Adalat is void ab-initio or nullity or nonest in that circumstance the non-party cannot be said to be remediless in any way. Therefore an appeal as one of the mode of challenge could be maintainable under Section 96 of the Code and the similar bar contained in Order 23 Rule 1-A(ii) of the Code would also not come into play. When Section 96(3) of the Code bars an appeal against the decree passed in terms of compromise between the parties, it implies that such decree are very much binding on the party unless set aside by the procedure prescribed or available to the parties. One such remedy available was by way of filing appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(m) of the Code. If the order recording the compromise gets set aside in that appeal, there remains no necessity or occasion to file an appeal against the decree. Similarly a suit is used to be filed for setting aside a decree on the ground that the decree is based an invalid and illegal compromise not binding on a person who was not a party. But after amendment which has been introduced by Amending Act of 1976 neither an appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing suit is available in cases covered under Rule-3(A) of Order 23 of the Code. As such a right has been given under Rule 1(A)(ii) of Order 43 to a party who challenges the recording of the compromise to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree only on the ground that it should not have been recorded. This is not available to a non-party. As such a right has been given under Rule 1(A)(ii) of Order 43 to a party who challenges the recording of the compromise to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree only on the ground that it should not have been recorded. This is not available to a non-party. So, section 96(3) of the Code shall not be a bar to such an appeal because of its applicability to a case where the factum of compromise or agreement by the parties is not in dispute. The cases in hand stand in a different and much higher pedestal that here the State is not a party to the suit and its challenge to those awards is on the ground that those have been made to pass or obtained by collusion between the parties in order to defraud the State-by not purposely making it a party to the suit knowing fully well that the right of the State would get affected seriously and that those awards which are deemed decrees would be projected as weapons to defeat and frustrate the statutory proceeding highly detrimental to the interest of the State. It has also been said to have been obtained by playing fraud and thus not a settlement in the eye of law. In other wards such awards can well be termed as to have been so obtained by fraud upon the statutory provisions engrafted in Chapter IV of the Odisha Land Reforms Act and the proceeding under that statute. It has been held in case of State of Punjab vs. Jalour Singh (supra) that if a party wants to challenge such award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agreed to the order or approach the High Court for disposal of the appeal on merits, if he does not agree, the same is not an award of the Lok Adalat and in that event it has been held that the High Court ought to have heard and disposed of the appeal on merit. However, the instant case is not like that. However, the instant case is not like that. In the said case, it was a challenge by the party himself whereas here it's by a non-party. In that case the Hon'ble Apex Court did not find it to be an award at all in terms of the provision of Section 21 of the Legal Services Act since there was no agreement between the parties even and it was a decision left open to be agreed or disagreed running against the objective and spirit of the concept of Lok Adalat awards. In case of Debasis Jena (supra), it was a case where the persons challenging were very much parties to the suit in which compromise was so recorded in Court and where the decree was drawn up in Lok Adalat. These decision's are well distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand and thus I find those are of no support in any way for a decision in these appeals. 11. Adverting to the merit of appeals, when we come to the facts of the cases in hand, it is seen that the challenge is in essence to the final decree on the ground of exclusion of land as per the awards passed in twenty (20) suits in the Lok Adalat where only the members of Puspalak family and those respective plaintiffs were the parties. The claim in all those suits are based on adverse possession and in total the suit land of those twenty (20) suits comes to an extent of 880 Acres. Thus the appeals are at the instance of the State later for setting aside the said final decree in which those awards which were obtained by fraud and also void and nullities have been given respect to by way of exclusion of said chunk of land from the purview of the final decree passed in the suit and thereby all have become successful in defrauding the State which had long prior to that initiated the ceiling proceeding for declaring the ceiling surplus land of the Pushpalak family for vesting with the State and for being made available to be settled on persons as eligible under the provisions of OLR Act. Thus fraud practised in obtaining the awards in Lok Adalat being in collusion and with the full knowledge of the pendency of the ceiling proceeding and without making the State a party is the attack. 12. In case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and others; AIR 1994 SC 853 , it has been held:- "Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree - by the first court or by the highest court - has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. The Court went on to observe that the High Court in that case was totally in error when it stated that there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to the Court with a true case and prove it by true evidence. Their Lordships stated:- "The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation." In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court have further held that "A litigant who approaches the Court is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as the Opposite Party." In the said case it was also clearly stated that the courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties & one who comes to the court must come with the clean hands. A person whose-case is based on false hood has no right to approach the Court. A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If a vital document is withheld in order to gain advantage on the other side he would be guilty of playing fraud on court as well as on the opposition party. 13. In Smt. Shrist Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers: AIR 1992 SC 1555 , it has been opined that fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal: AIR 2002 SC 33 , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education & others: (2003) 8 SC 311 and Ram Chandra Singh V. Savitri Devi & others: (2003) 8 SCC 319 . In State to State of Andhra Pradesh & another V.T. Suryachandra Rao: AIR 2005 SC 3110 after referring to the earlier decision the court observed as follows: "In Lazaurs Estate Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702 Lord Denning observed at pages 712 & 713, No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything. In the same judgment Lord Parker L.J. observed that fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity. Yet in another decision Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala & another, AIR 2006 SC 3028 , it his been held that court will allow itself to be used as art instrument of fraud and no court, by way of rule of evidence and procedure, can allow its eyes to be closed to the fact it is being used as an instrument of fraud. The basic principle is that a party who secures the judgment by taking recourse to fraud should not be enabled to enjoy the fruits thereof. In case of Ramjas Foundation and another Vs. The basic principle is that a party who secures the judgment by taking recourse to fraud should not be enabled to enjoy the fruits thereof. In case of Ramjas Foundation and another Vs. Union of India and others, reported in 113 (2012) CLT 632 relying on a catena of decisions it has been held as follows: "The principle that a person does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Article 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in other courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case." 14. According to Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 14th Edn. Vol. 1, Para-263:- "Fraud indeed, in the sense of a Court of Equity, properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another." In Lakshmi Charan Saha vs. Nur Ali, ILR (1911) 38 Calcutta 15 CWN 1010 it was held that: "The jurisdiction of the Court in trying a suit [questioning the earlier decision as being vitiated by fraud.], was not limited to an investigation merely as to whether the plaintiff was prevented from placing his case properly at the prior trial by the fraud of the defendant. The Court could and mustrip up the whole matter for determining whether there had been fraud in the procurement of the decree." In Manindra Nath Mittra vs. Hari Mondal, (1919) 24 CWN 133: AIR 1920 Calcutta 126 the Court explained the elements to be proved before a plea of a prior decision being vitiated by fraud could be upheld. The Court said:- "With respect to the question as to what constitutes fraud for which a decree can be set aside, two propositions appear to be well established. The Court said:- "With respect to the question as to what constitutes fraud for which a decree can be set aside, two propositions appear to be well established. The first is that although it is not permitted to show that the Court (in the former suit) was mistaken, it may be shown that it was misled, in other words, where the Court has been intentionally misled by the fraud of a party and a fraud has been committed upon the Court with the intention to procure its judgment, it will vitiate its judgment. The second is that a decree cannot be set aside merely on the ground that it has been produced by perjured evidence." The position was reiterated by the same High Court in Esmile Uddin Biswas Vs. Shajoran Nessa Bewa, 132 IC 897 : AIR 1931 Calcutta 649 (2). It was held that:- "It must be shown that the fraud was practised in relation to the proceedings in Court and the decree must be shown to have been procured by practising fraud of some sort, upon the Court." In Nemchand Tantia Vs. Kishinchan Chellaram (India) Ltd. (1959) 63 CWN 740 : AIR 1959 Calcutta 776 it was field that:- "A decree can be reopened by a new action when the Court passing it had been misled by fraud, but it cannot be reopened when the Court is simply mistaken; when the decree was passed by relying on perjured evidence, it cannot be said that the Court was misled." 15. In the light of aforesaid, lets now further examine the case from another angle. In view of the pendency of the ceiling proceeding to the full knowledge of the defendants of those suits placed in Lok Adalat where awards in terms of compromise were passed, they were fighting tooth and nail to save maximum acreage of land from out of the purview of the said proceeding from being vested to the State and when in that situation the compromise has been entered into with 3rd parties who were till then not in the arena of litigation and that too they came to file the suits with stereo type pleadings just by changing the subject matter when rest everything remain the same and by the day by which this Court had directed the final decree proceeding to end or the ceiling proceeding to continue, those twenty suits have been compromised. Perpetration of fraud upon the Court as well as the State having been greatly caused thereby is as clear as noonday. The defendants in those suits have suppressed all those material facts about prior long drawn litigations in different forums and have gone to accept the claim of those persons highly detrimental to their interest which is highly shocking and running against common sense. This clearly reveals underhand deals and hidden agenda that they used the legal forum and abused the legal process. It is also a case of fraud on the statute as the whole things have been sought to have been managed by members of Puspalak family and those twenty plaintiff-appellants being in collusion to frustrate the ceiling proceeding. Thus those void awards passed in twenty suits which are nullities having been given effect to with their full weightage in the final decree, the said final decree as passed cannot stand in the eye of law. The court just cannot act as a mute spectator and go on to observe with silence that the stream of justice is polluted by resorting to suppression of vital facts. No sooner did those suits are compromised, the parties are running to the court in seisin of final decree proceeding as well as to the authority deciding the ceiling proceeding for doing the needful to get those lands excluded. There even the members of Pushpalak family are filing revised return. This shows clearly the collusion and knowledge of all about prior proceedings or else that those plaintiffs of twenty suits to be actually dummy. Those awards passed in Lok Adalat as stated above are all nonest in the eye of law. Those being pressed into service in the final decree proceeding, when the move has become successful as the fraud perpetrated has achieved its goal, the State being the sufferer and person greatly affected by said final decree being not in a position to proceed with the statutory proceeding under a special statute as per law, so as to achieve its objective, has all the right of appeal resorting to the provisions of Section 96 of the Code and in such situation the legal bar under Section 96(3) of the Code or under Section 21(2) of the Legal Services Authority Act are not attracted so as to come to the aid of perpetrators of fraud. The fraud being crystal clear as viewed from the materials on record and on their face value, the question of pleading in detail in compliance to the provision of Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code in the appeal does not arise and thus the question of depriving the appellants of the opportunity to meet those in the facts and circumstances pales into insignificance as even those accepted facts clearly expose the perpetration of fraud of colossal magnitude. 16. The above discussions and reasons accordingly provide the answers to the substantial questions of law as framed and in the upshot of the same, this Court thus finds that all these appeals are liable to be dismissed. Resultantly, all the appeals stand dismissed and in the facts and circumstances with cost throughout.