JUDGMENT R.S. Chauhan, J. Challenging the judgment dated 10.3.2011 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No.2, Sikar, three appeals have been filed before this court. While Jhabarmal, Mukesh Khud, Hariprasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Kishore Kumar Nehra, Rampal Khinchad, Rajesh Kumar Burdak, Govindram, Bajranglal, Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand have collectively filed D.B. Cr. Appeal No.336/2011, Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand has filed D.B. Cr. Appeal No.337/2011. Meanwhile, aggrieved by the acquittal of Hariprasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Saunthaliya and Nema Mali @ Nemichand for offence u/s.120B IPC, and by total acquittal of Vijaypal @ Birju, Richhpal Singh, Mohd. Amin Pathan, Jai Singh, Manjeet Singh, Daulatram @ Daula Jat, Bhanwar Singh and Roopdan @ Dungardan @ Baji, the State of Rajasthan has filed D.B. Cr. Appeal No.898/2011. Since these three appeals emanate from the same judgment, the appeals are being decided by this common judgment. By the impugned judgment, the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants as under:- i. Accused-appellant, Jhabarmal: U/s.302 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.452 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.148 IPC: Two years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. ii. Accused-appellant, Mukesh Khud: U/s.302 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.452 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.148 IPC: Two years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. iii. Accused-appellant, Hariprasad @ Hari Banuda: U/s.302/120B IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.120B IPC. iv. U/s.148 IPC: Two years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. iii. Accused-appellant, Hariprasad @ Hari Banuda: U/s.302/120B IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.120B IPC. iv. Accused-appellant, Mukesh Sonthaliya: U/s.302/120B IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.120B IPC. v. Accused-appellant, Kishore Kumar Nehra: U/s.302/149 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.452 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.148 IPC. vi. Accused-appellant, Rampal Khinchad: U/s.302/149 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.452/149 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.148 IPC. vii. Accused-appellant, Rajesh Kumar Burdak: U/s.302/149 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.148 IPC. viii. Accused-appellant, Govindram: U/s.302/149 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.452/149 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.148 IPC. ix. U/s.452/149 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.148 IPC. ix. Accused-appellant, Bajranglal: U/s.302/149 IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.452/149 IPC: Three years rigorous imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and directed to further undergo two months rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. U/s.147 IPC: One year simple imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.200/-, and directed to further undergo fifteen days simple imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.148 IPC. x. Accused-appellant, Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand: U/s.302/120B IPC: Life imprisonment, imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and directed to further undergo one month rigorous imprisonment in default thereof. However, acquitted for offence U/s.120B IPC. Moreover, the learned Judge has acquitted the accused-respondents as under:- i. Accused-respondent,Vijaypal @ Birju Jat: For offence U/s. 302/120B, 120B IPC. ii. Accused-respondent, Richhpal Singh: For offence U/s. 302 r.w. 120B, 120B IPC. iii. Accused-respondent, Mohammad Aamin: For offence U/s. 302/120B, 120B IPC. iv. Accused-respondent, Jai Singh: For offence U/s. 302/120B, 120B, 119 IPC. v. Accused-respondent, Manjeet Singh: For offence U/s. 302/120B, 120B, 212 IPC. vi. Accused-respondent, Daulatram @ Daula Jat: For offence U/s. 147, 148, 120B, 302/149, 201 IPC. vii. Accused-respondent, Bhanwar Singh: For offence U/s. 302/120B, 120B, 212 IPC. viii. Accused-respondent, Roopdan @ Dungardan @ Baji: For offence U/s. 212 IPC. The prosecution case commences on 5.4.2006 with Manoj Batad (P.W.16) submitting a written report (Ex. P. 26) before the Police Station Kotwali, Sikar. When translated into English, the written report (Ex. P. 26) reads as under:- Today, at 2:15 PM, the complainant, and Baldev Jat, Bhanwarlal Pilania and Gopal Fogawat, had come to Seven Art Tailor shop owned by Bhagirath Tailor which is situated near the Saini Mandir, Sikar. Gopal Ji had come to pick-up his clothes. Gopal Ji and the complainant went inside the shop, while Baldev Jat and Bhanwarlal Pilania were standing outside the shop. At that moment, two Bolero Jeeps, came in high speed, and stopped outside the shop. Gopal Ji had come to pick-up his clothes. Gopal Ji and the complainant went inside the shop, while Baldev Jat and Bhanwarlal Pilania were standing outside the shop. At that moment, two Bolero Jeeps, came in high speed, and stopped outside the shop. About fourteen to fifteen persons jumped out of these two jeeps; they were Balbir Banuda, Rampal Banuda, Hari Banuda, Govind Banuda, Sanwarmal Khinchad, Parmeshwar Bagadia, Rajesh Burdak, Mukesh Bajia, Mukesh Khud, Jhabarmal Bajia, Mahendra Barala, Bajrang Lal Banuda and Kishore. Out of these persons, Mukesh Bajia, Hari Banuda and Jhabarmal Bajia had pistols with them. Balbir Banuda had a gun, Kishore had a weapon, but I cannot remember of what kind. All these five persons entered the shop uttering curse words for Gopalya and asking as to where he was. At that time, Gopal Ji was inside a cabin (trial room). Kishore opened the door of the cabin, and then all of them started firing indiscriminately at Gopal Ji. Gopal Ji fell on the floor and he was covered, all over, with blood. These persons boarded the jeep, and ran away towards the Shekhpura Mohalla (area). Gopal Ji was rushed to the hospital, where the doctor declared him dead. The jeep numbers were RJ28-UA-0038 and RJ23-C-2825. On the basis of this written report (Ex. P. 26), the police registered a formal FIR (Ex.P.27), namely FIR No.144/06 for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302 read with 120-B IPC, and for offence under Section 3/25, Arms Act. After completing the investigation, the police submitted different charge-sheets against different accused persons, at different times, before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar. The cases were committed to the Session Court, Sikar on different dates. The different cases were transferred to the learned Judge on different dates. However, as all the cases arose out of the same FIR, a single trial was held. By order dated 17.10.2006, the learned Judge framed charges against Mahendra Barala, Jhabarmal and Kishore Kumar Nehra for offences under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 452, 302 and in the alternative, Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Against accused Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Vijaypal @ Birju, Richhpal Singh and Mohammad Amin Pathan, the learned Judge framed charges for offences under Sections 120B, 302 r.w. 120B IPC. Against accused, Jai Singh, he framed charges for offences under Sections 120B, 119 and 302/120B IPC. Against accused Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Vijaypal @ Birju, Richhpal Singh and Mohammad Amin Pathan, the learned Judge framed charges for offences under Sections 120B, 302 r.w. 120B IPC. Against accused, Jai Singh, he framed charges for offences under Sections 120B, 119 and 302/120B IPC. Subsequently, by order dated 22.4.2008, the learned Judge framed charges against accused, Daulat Ram @ Daula for offences under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 302/149 and 201 IPC; against accused, Bhanwar Singh, for offences under Sections 120B, 302/120B and 212 IPC; against accused, Manjeet, for offences under Sections 120B, 302/120B and 212 IPC; against accused, Nemichand, for offences under Sections 120B, 302/120B IPC. Thereafter, by order dated 14.5.2008, the learned Judge framed charges against accused, Govindram, for offences under Sections 147, 148, 120B and 302/149 IPC. By order dated 19.5.2008, the learned Judge framed charges against accused, Roopdan @ Dungardan for offence under Section 212 IPC. By order dated 4.6.2008, he framed charges against accused, Rampal, for offences under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 452, 302 in alternative, 302/149 IPC. By order dated 27.6.2008, he framed charges against accused, Mukesh Khud, for offences under Sections 120B, 147, 148, 452, 302 and 302/149 IPC. By order dated 25.11.2008, he framed charges against accused, Rajesh Kumar, for offences under Sections 147, 148, 120B and 302/149 IPC. Lastly, by order dated 30.3.2008, he framed charges against accused, Bajranglal, for offences under Sections 147, 148, 120B and 302/149 IPC. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined forty-three witnesses, and submitted one hundred and sixty six documents. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The accused claimed themselves to be innocent, and denied the allegations made by the prosecution witnesses. The appellant, Mukesh Sauthalia claimed that on 5.4.2006, the date of the incident, he was at Toll Tax Parvati Bridge situated at Baran. According to him, this Toll Tax is being run by his father, Ghasiram. Therefore, he pleaded an alibi and pleaded innocence. Similarly, the accused Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda also claimed that on 5.4.2006 he was at Toll Tax Parvati Bridge situated at Baran. Meanwhile, the accused Richhpal Singh claims that he was falsely implicated as he had fought election against Gopal’s father. According to him, while he belongs to the Congress Party, Gopal and Gopal’s father belong to the BJP. Similarly, the accused Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda also claimed that on 5.4.2006 he was at Toll Tax Parvati Bridge situated at Baran. Meanwhile, the accused Richhpal Singh claims that he was falsely implicated as he had fought election against Gopal’s father. According to him, while he belongs to the Congress Party, Gopal and Gopal’s father belong to the BJP. He further claimed that due to political reasons, the witnesses have deposed against him. Further, that after assaulting him, the police had compelled him to sign fifteen to twenty blank pieces of paper, and ten to fifteen blank forms. According to him, he is being falsely implicated only because of political rivalry. In defense, the accused submitted a single witness, and submitted twenty-one documents. After completing the trial, the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellants, as aforementioned, and also acquitted a few accused-respondents, as mentioned above. Hence, these appeals filed both by the appellants and by the State of Rajasthan. Since D.B. Criminal Appeal No.336/2011 has been filed by different appellants, namely Jhabarmal, Mukesh Khud, Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Kishore Kumar Nehra, Rampal Khinchad, Rajesh Kumar Burdak, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal, since these appellants have been represented by different counsels, in order to maintain clarity, the judgment shall be divided under the name of different appellants. Since Nemi Chand has filed a separate appeal, his case shall be discussed separately. Lastly, the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan shall be discussed and decided separately. But to begin with, it will be fruitful to deal with the evidence produced by the prosecution and by the defense. Since the prosecution examined a large number of witnesses, it is proposed that we shall deal with only the important witnesses who reveal the crux of the prosecution case. We shall also quote the testimony of the sole defense witness. It is only after going through the prosecution and the defense evidence, that this court proposes to take up the contentions raised by the learned counsel for different appellants. The prosecution has unfolded its story through three eyewitnesses, namely Bhagirath (P.W.2), Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj Kumar (P.W.16). Manoj Kumar is also known as Manoj Batad. Bhagirath (P.W.2), the owner of the tailoring shop, informs the court that “the incident had occurred on 5.4.2006 near about 2:00 PM to 2:15 PM. The prosecution has unfolded its story through three eyewitnesses, namely Bhagirath (P.W.2), Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj Kumar (P.W.16). Manoj Kumar is also known as Manoj Batad. Bhagirath (P.W.2), the owner of the tailoring shop, informs the court that “the incident had occurred on 5.4.2006 near about 2:00 PM to 2:15 PM. When the incident had happened, I was inside the shop. I had gone out to ease myself. Then my client, Gopal, who had left new cloth for stitching new clothes, came for the purpose of giving a trial for his clothes. Manoj was also with him. He (Gopal) had gone into the trial room, and had shown me the trousers he was wearing. He handed over the trouser to me and went inside the trial room for putting on his Pajama. I was measuring his trouser when two boys came in; one of them fired a shot at the light. Due to this, I went out of the shop and went to the shop owned by my elder uncle (Tauji) which has a STD booth. I was frightened. But somebody told me to call up No.100. I called No.100. After that I went to the police chowki situated at the hospital. I went there on a scooter with someone. I went and saw that the shots were fired in my shop. I came back to my shop. There I saw that Gopalji was covered in blood. The police had arrived. The police took him in their vehicle to the hospital. The police had chalked out the site plan in front of me. The witness looked at the site plan and said that this is the site plan of my shop. The site plan is Exhibit-P.3. My signatures are from “A to B”. Immediately the police sealed my shop, and went away. Next day around 3:00 to 4:00 O’clock people had come to prepare the forensic report. They drew certain recovery memos. They took samples of Gopalji’s blood. The recovery memo of the blood is Exhibit-P.4. It contains my signature from “A to B”. The police also collected blood on a white cloth, kept the cloth in an envelope and then kept the envelope in another white cloth. The police also recovered cartridge of bullets. The recovery memo of the cartridge is Exhibit-P.5. It contains my signature from “A to B”. The police also recovered damaged bullets from the wall. The police also collected blood on a white cloth, kept the cloth in an envelope and then kept the envelope in another white cloth. The police also recovered cartridge of bullets. The recovery memo of the cartridge is Exhibit-P.5. It contains my signature from “A to B”. The police also recovered damaged bullets from the wall. The recovery memo of the damaged bullet is Exhibit-P.6. My signatures are from “A to B”. The police took away the trial room from my shop. The recovery memo of the plywood as well as of the trial room is Exhibit-P.7 and contains my signature from “A to B”. The police also recovered a light plate (switch board), the recovery memo of which is Exhibit-P.8 which contains my signature from “A to B”. Note: i. The sealed packets were opened in the court. Eleven bullets were marked as Article-6 which contains the signature of the witness from “A to B”. ii. Another sealed packet was opened in the court. This part contained ten cartridges which are marked as Article-7. Then it was said that eleven cartridges were pulled out from the sealed packet. It contains the signature of this witness from “A to B”. iii. The witness claimed that light plate belongs to his shop. There is a photo of a picture (Kalash). It has two big holes and two small holes which are marked as Article-8. The big hole is made by a bullet. Article-9 is the door of the trial room. It has holes made by the bullets. Articles-10, 11 and 12 are partitions of three sides of the trial room which have bullet marks on them.” In his cross-examination conducted by the learned counsel for the accused, Mahendra Singh Barala, Jhawarmal, Kishore Kumar Nehra, Hari Prasad, Mukesh Sauthalia, Jai Singh, Rampal Kheechad, Mukesh Khud, Daulat Ram @ Daula, Rajesh Kumar Burdak, Govind Ram, and Bajaranglal, the witness admitted that “the hospital is right in front of his shop; the distance between his shop and the wall of the hospital is about thirty-five to forty feet.” He also admitted that “there are about twenty to thirty shops in his row. Most of the shops were open at that time.” He claims that “fifteen to twenty days prior to the incident, someone had left the clothes on behalf of Gopalji.” He further claimed that ”his statement was recorded by the police on the next day after the incident.” He further admitted that “it is true that Manoj is not my client. He only used to come with Gopalji. It is wrong to say that on the date of the incident, Manoj did not come with Gopalji, or that he did not come with Gopalji on earlier occasion”. He further stated that “when he dialed No.100, he merely informed the police that there has been some shooting in his shop.” He further claimed that when he dialed the No.100, he merely told the police that there were shooting in his shop. When he went to the police chowki, he told the same thing. It is true that when he went to his shop, a crowd had gathered there, but no one went inside the shop. He further admitted that he did not know how many times the police had visited his shop on the day of the incident because “I was not feeling too well as I was afraid”. According to him, immediately after the incident, the police had put a lock on his shop and gone away. He denied the fact that the documents were made and his signatures were taken at the police station. According to him, “they were taken at the shop.” In his further cross-examination by the learned counsel for Richhpal, he admitted that “It is true that I went home, and next day I came in the evening”. Further, Baldev Ram (P.W.9), a friend of Gopal, the deceased, who had accompanied him, has stated in his examination-in-chief that “the incident occurred around 2:00 PM - 2:15 PM on 5.4.2006. We were at the hospital. From the hospital, I, Gopalji, Manoj Batad and Bhanwarlal Pilania came, by jeep, to Seven Art Tailor which is situated under the Saini Temple. I and Bhanwarlal stood outside the shop, and Gopalji and Manoj Batad went inside. Shortly, two Bolero Jeeps came in a high speed from the side of the college. One of the jeeps was silvered colored and has the registration No.RJ28-UA-0038. The other one was black colored, bearing registration No.RJ23-C-2825. I and Bhanwarlal stood outside the shop, and Gopalji and Manoj Batad went inside. Shortly, two Bolero Jeeps came in a high speed from the side of the college. One of the jeeps was silvered colored and has the registration No.RJ28-UA-0038. The other one was black colored, bearing registration No.RJ23-C-2825. About fourteen to fifteen men got down from the jeeps. I know them by their face. They included Balbir Banuda, Mukesh Bajia, Mukesh Khud, Hari Banuda, Jhabarmal Bajia, Kishore Nehra, Mahendra Barala, Bajrang Banuda, Rampal Banuda, Govind Banuda, Rajesh Hurdak, Parmeshwar Bagadia and Sanwarmal Khinchad. These people were armed with weapons. Balbir Banuda had a gun like a carbine, Mukesh Bajia, Hari Banuda and Jhabarmal had pistols, Mukesh Khud had pistol in one hand and a country-made revolver (Deshi Katta) in the other hand. Of these persons, Balbir Banuda, Hari Banuda, Mukesh Bajia, Jhabarmal Bajia, Kishore Nehra, Mukesh Khud and Mahendra Barala were cursing and calling names when they entered the shop. After entering the shop, they started firing indiscriminately. Since we were frightened, we came near the wall of the hospital. There we saw Ameen Pathan, Richhpal Chelasi, Pannal Maneta and Nema Mali all of whom were talking on the phone. I saw them talking on the phone when we came near the hospital wall. I can recognize the accused persons. The witness looked at the accused persons in the court room and said that Balbir Banuda is not present in the court; Mukesh Bajia is not present in the court; Mukesh Khud is also not present in the court; Hari Banuda is also not present in the court. But the witness correctly identified Jhabarmal Bajia, Kishore Nehra, Bajrang Banuda, Rampal Banuda, Rajesh Hurdak, Ameen Pathan, Richhpal Chelasi. He also correctly identified Nema Mali. The witness further claimed that Mahendra Barala, Govind Banuda, Parmeshwar Bagadia, Sanwarmal Khichad, Pannalal Maneta are not present in the court. Note: Mukesh Bajia, Hari Banuda, Mukesh Khurd, have not been produced from the judicial custody. An application for dispensing with the attendance for Govind Banuda has been filed. The accused Mahendra Barala has absconded from J.C. After shooting, these people got into the jeeps and drove away towards Shekhupura Mohallah. We all rushed into the shop. Blood was all over the trial room. Gopalji was lying in a pool of blood. Immediately the police came. An application for dispensing with the attendance for Govind Banuda has been filed. The accused Mahendra Barala has absconded from J.C. After shooting, these people got into the jeeps and drove away towards Shekhupura Mohallah. We all rushed into the shop. Blood was all over the trial room. Gopalji was lying in a pool of blood. Immediately the police came. Police took Gopalji to the hospital where the doctors declared him dead. When the police took Gopalji to the hospital, I and Bhanwarlal were with them. At the asking of the Public Prosecutor, the witness said that Manoj also went with us to the hospital. These persons killed Gopalji because of animosity. Gopal Ji was Chairman of the Jat Mahasabha. He used to oppose the wrong deeds of these persons. By these persons I mean the persons I have named as the accused. These persons used to indulge in sale of liquor and were part of the Bhoomafia (land grabbers). Earlier these persons had assaulted Comrade Sultan and broken his hand and his feet. Gopalji’s name had also come in that case. Comrade also had political animosity with Gopalji. A few people belonging to the gang of Raju Theth had assaulted Vijaypal who was the brother-in-law of Balbir Banuda. Due to this assault, Vijaypal died. Balbir Banuda was of the opinion that Gopalji always speaks in favour of Raju Theth. Therefore, he also had an animosity with Gopalji. In 2006, Sheeshram, who used to work at a distillery owned by Mukesh Baji, too, was assaulted by persons belonging to Raju Theth’s gang. Sheeshram also died. Mukesh Bajia was also of the opinion that Gopal Fogawat speaks in favour of Raju Theth. Therefore, Mukesh Bajia also had an animosity with Gopal Fogawat. In the last Panchayat election, Gopalji’s father had stood for the post of Sarpanch against Richhpal Chelasi. Richhpal Chelasi had lost the election. Therefore, Richhpal Chelasi was also antagonistic to Gopal Fogawat. Biju Sarpanch, who was friend of Mukesh Bajia, also had an animosity with Gopal Fogawat. I do not know the names of the two drivers who drove the jeeps. But I can recognize them by face. The witness touched two persons amongst the accused. These persons revealed their names as Vijay Pal and Daulat Ram. According to this witness, while Daulat Ram drove the silver colored Bolero, Vijay Pal drove the black colored Bolero. I do not know the names of the two drivers who drove the jeeps. But I can recognize them by face. The witness touched two persons amongst the accused. These persons revealed their names as Vijay Pal and Daulat Ram. According to this witness, while Daulat Ram drove the silver colored Bolero, Vijay Pal drove the black colored Bolero. The police had drawn up the Panchayatnama. Panchayatnama is Exhibit-P.1. It contains my signatures from “C to D”. At the time of drawing of Panchayatnama, the police had shown us Gopal’s body. There was a gunshot injury in the fingers of the right hand and the skin was burnt; slightly below the wrist of the right hand, there was gunshot injury and the skin was burnt; below the left ear, there was a gunshot injury and the skin was burnt; there was a wound on the right ear. When we five were asked about the cause of death, we said that the person had died due to the gunshot injuries. After this the post-mortem was done. In the evening we took the body to the Jat Boarding. Next day, the cremation was performed. Twice my statements were recorded. The first statement was recorded on 7.4.2006, and the second statement was recorded on 25.5.2006.” In his cross-examination by the learned counsel for for accused, Mahendra Singh Barala, Jhabarmal, Kishore Kumar Nehra, Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthaliam, Jai Singh, Rampal Khindhad, Mukesh Khud, Daulat Ram @ Daula, Rajesh Kumar Burdak, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal, this witness claimed that “Gopal Fogawat was the District Chairman of the Jat Mahasabha. He was a social worker. That is the reason why we knew him. I live in Sikar. I was in Sikar on 5.4.2006. I had gone to meet Gopal Fogawat on that day. I had gone to the hospital to meet him. I met him in the hospital. In my statement recorded on 7.4.2006 (Ex.D.4) I had told the police that I had gone to the hospital to meet him. Even in my statement recorded on 25.5.2006 (Ex.D.5) I told the police the same fact. Why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibits-D. 4 and D5, I cannot say. In Exhibits-D. 4 and D. 5, I had told the police that from the hospital, Gopalji, Manoj and I had come to Seven Art Tailor by Jeep. Even in my statement recorded on 25.5.2006 (Ex.D.5) I told the police the same fact. Why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibits-D. 4 and D5, I cannot say. In Exhibits-D. 4 and D. 5, I had told the police that from the hospital, Gopalji, Manoj and I had come to Seven Art Tailor by Jeep. Why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibit-D4 and D5, I cannot say. At least I had told this fact. I know Manoj since the days of our studies in college. Manoj was not studying with me, but was my senior. Once or twice I had met Bhanwarlal with Gopalji. Therefore, I know him. This was not the first time that I had gone to Seven Art Tailor shop. I had gone there once or twice with Gopalji. On the date of the incident Gopalji had gone to Seven Art Tailor for getting his clothes stitched. The clothes were new one which he had gone to pick them up. The jeep in which we had gone to the shop bears the registration No.RJ21-C-6984. We had parked the jeep near the hospital wall. Just five to seven minutes after Gopalji had entered the shop, the jeeps had come. These jeeps did not come the moment he had entered the shop. For five to seven minutes we kept on standing outside the shop. It is wrong to say that immediately after seeing the jeeps coming, we had gone near the hospital wall. In fact, when the jeeps had stopped, fourteen to fifteen persons got down, and they started shooting. At that time, we were frightened. The accused persons must have shot inside the shop for about one and a half minutes. They must have taken three to four minutes to get down, fire the shots and again to come back to the jeep. The hospital was not more than thirty to forty feet away from the shop. But was thirty to thirty five feet away. Both the jeeps were parked outside the shop one after the other. In my statement (Ex.D.4) I had told the police that the registration number of the silver colored jeep was RJ28-UA-0038, and the registration number of the black colored jeep was RJ23-C-2825. Why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibit-D. 4, I cannot tell the reason. Both the jeeps were parked outside the shop one after the other. In my statement (Ex.D.4) I had told the police that the registration number of the silver colored jeep was RJ28-UA-0038, and the registration number of the black colored jeep was RJ23-C-2825. Why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibit-D. 4, I cannot tell the reason. I did not tell the police that I knew the jeep driver, but I told the police that I can recognize them. It is wrong to say that today and on previous occasions when I had come to the court, the accused persons were shown to me, and I was told to identify these persons as the jeep driver before the court. In my police statement (Ex.D.5), I told the police that I do not know the Jeep driver, but I can only recognize them. Because all the accused persons got down from the jeep one after the other, I cannot say which accused person got down from which jeep. In my police statement Ex.D.5 portion marked as “A to B”, “from one Bolero Mukesh Khud ..... disembarked carrying weapons” I have heard, but I did not tell this to the police. The portion marked as “C to D”, “about seven to eight people …… Kishore Nehra got down from the other Jeep.” This I did not tell the police. In my police statements (Ex.D.4 and Ex.D.5) I did not tell them that everyone was armed with weapons. What I said in the court that everyone was not armed with weapons is correct. Of those who had gotten off, some had arms but others did not. When I said that everyone had arms it is incorrect. Only few were armed with weapons. In my police statement (Ex.D.4), I had told the police that Balbir had a carbine like gun, but why this fact has not mentioned in Exhibit-D.4, I cannot tell the court. In my police statement (Ex.D.5), I had told the police that Balbir had a gun, why this fact is not mentioned in Exhbiit-D5, I cannot say. In my police statement (Ex.D.4), I had told the police that Mukesh Khud had a pistol in one hand and a country-made pistol (Deshi Katta) in the other hand. But why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibit-D.4, I cannot tell. In my police statement (Ex.D.4), I had told the police that Mukesh Khud had a pistol in one hand and a country-made pistol (Deshi Katta) in the other hand. But why this fact has not been recorded in Exhibit-D.4, I cannot tell. In Exhibit-D.5, I had informed the police that Hari Banuda, Mukesh Bajia, Jhabarmal Bajia, and Kishore Nehra were armed with weapon. I do not remember whether I had told this to the police in Exhibit-D.5, or not. I have studied up to B.A. Having read Exhibit-D.5, it is not written that Hari Banuda, Mukesh Bajia, Jhabarmal Bajia and Kishore Nehra were armed with pistols. I had not told this fact when my police statement (Ex.D.5) was recorded as this fact I had already told them in my earlier statement. It is wrong to say that I had told the police that I will not tell you those facts which I had already told you on 7.4.2006. Whatever the police had asked in my second statement I told them about it. It is true that police did not ask me while recording Exhbiit-D.5 about the persons who had entered into the shop, as I had already told them about this fact in my previous statement. I did not tell them in Exhibit-D.5 that Balbir Banuda, Mukesh Khud, Hari Banuda, Mukesh Bajia, Jhabarmal Bajia, Kishore Nehra, Mahendra Barala had entered the shop cursing loudly and had indiscriminately fired, as this fact I had already told the police in my first statement. While recording my statement (Ex.D.5), the police did not ask me as to who had entered the shop cursing loudly, and who had shot indiscriminately. The part marked as “E to F” in Exhibit-D.5, I did not tell the police this part. In Exhibit-D.5, I had told the police that two persons were armed with firearms. I have not been trained in firearms. When the accused persons entered the shop, we did not follow them inside the shop as we were scared. Due to fear, we could not even shout because we were frightened. I did not say anything to the shopkeepers around the area. In my police statement (Ex.D.4), I had told the police that I had seen Nema Mali, Ameen Pathan, Richhpal Chelasi, Pannalal Maneta talking on the phone. Whey this fact is not recorded in Exhibit-D.4, I cannot say. Due to fear, we could not even shout because we were frightened. I did not say anything to the shopkeepers around the area. In my police statement (Ex.D.4), I had told the police that I had seen Nema Mali, Ameen Pathan, Richhpal Chelasi, Pannalal Maneta talking on the phone. Whey this fact is not recorded in Exhibit-D.4, I cannot say. In Exhibit-D.5, I had told the police about Richhpal Chelasi. In part marked as “E to F” in Exhibit D.5 why the name of Richhpal Chelasi has not been mentioned, I cannot say. In Exhibit-D.5, I told the police that Govind Banuda, the accused, had gotten down from the Jeep, why this fact is not mentioned in Exhibit-D.5, I cannot say. After the accused persons had left the shop, I went inside the shop. The police arrived eight to ten minutes after the incident. During these ten minutes, before the police came, I went to Gopalji and tried to look after him. But I did not touch him, nor did I try to find out whether he is dead or alive. I did not try to put him in a vehicle or take him to the hospital. Then the witness said that the police had already come. Neither I, nor Bhanwarlal said anything to the police about the incident when the police reached at the scene of the crime. Even when the Panchnama (inquest report) was made, even then I did not tell the police about the incident. Even after the post-mortem, I did not tell the police about the incident because by that time, the relatives of Gopalji had reached the hospital, and I was busy in looking after them. It had taken about three to four and a half hours for the police to bring the body to the hospital, to draw up the inquest report, and for the post-mortem to be done. I do not remember during this period, whether the police was there or not. As I was too busy taking care of the family members of Gopalji. It is wrong to say that Gopalji was cremated on the very same day when he died. Instead, his cremation took place on the next day. On the next day, around 10:00 to 11:00 AM, his cortege was taken out, and his cremation was done around 3:00 to 4:00 PM. It is wrong to say that Gopalji was cremated on the very same day when he died. Instead, his cremation took place on the next day. On the next day, around 10:00 to 11:00 AM, his cortege was taken out, and his cremation was done around 3:00 to 4:00 PM. It is true that my first statement was recorded on the 7th. Gopalji had suffered a bullet injury on the right hand between his fingers and his skin was burned; he had also suffered bullet injury below the wrist of the left hand, and the skin was burned; below his left ear, he had suffered gunshot injury, and the skin was burned; near the right ear, there was a large injury. All these facts I had told to the police when my statement was recorded as Exhibits-D. 4 and D.5. But why these facts are mentioned in Exhibits-D.4 and D.5, I do not know. It is wrong to say that I had told the police that Gopalji had suffered a firearm injury on his head. Instead, I told them that he had suffered a bullet injury below his ear. The part marked as “G to H” in Exhibit-D.5 where it says that Gopalji had been hit on the head with a firearm injury, I did not tell this to the police. Similarly, the part marked as “A to B” in Exhibit-D.4 stating that Gopalji had suffered a bullet injury on the head, I did not tell this to the police. Those accused persons whom I have identified in the court, I already knew them from before. In my police statement, Exhibit-D.4 and D.5, I had told the police that I know these accused from before. But why this fact has not been mentioned in Exhibit-D.4 and D.5, I cannot say. I am neither friendly with these persons, nor inimical to them; I have neither worked with them, nor have relationship with them. I was not involved in any test identification parade before a Magistrate. After the incident, the police did not show me any of these accused persons. It is wrong to say that the police had shown these accused persons to me many a times at the police station and that they had provided me with their photographs. I was not involved in any test identification parade before a Magistrate. After the incident, the police did not show me any of these accused persons. It is wrong to say that the police had shown these accused persons to me many a times at the police station and that they had provided me with their photographs. It is wrong to say that my testimony has not been recorded for the last six months, despite the service of summons, as I was unable to recognize these accused persons. It is equally wrong to say that these accused persons have been shown outside the court and inside the court and for this reason, I have been able to identify them today.” This witness was again confronted with his police statement (Ex.D.5) with regard to motive for the alleged offence committed by the appellants. Although he claimed that he had told the police the motive behind the alleged crime, but he could not say why these facts were not recorded in Exhibit-D.5. Most importantly, he has clearly stated that “it is incorrect to say that on the day of the occurrence, at that time, Hari Banuda, and Mukesh Bajia were not present”. He further claimed that “It is incorrect to say that these two persons were at Baran”. In his cross-examination by the counsel for Richhpal, he admits that in his police statement (Ex.D.5) the fact that Amin Pathan, Richhpal Chelasi, Pannalal Maneta and Nema Mali were talking on the phone, this fact has not been recorded. Why this fact has not been recorded he cannot say. Similarly, he admits that the name of Richhpal Chelasi is not written in Exhibit-D.5. He also admits that Richhpal was not subjected to test identification by him, or by Manoj Batad, or by Bhanwarlal. He further admits that “It is true that I did not meet the police prior to 7.4.2006 as I did not have the time and I was not feeling well”. He further admits that even at the time of drafting of the inquest report, he did not give anything in writing to the police. He denied the suggestion that Richhpal Chelasi’s name has been told by him as he is the friend of Gopal and his family members. Lastly, he admits that he was aware of the rivalry between the gang belonging to Mukesh Sauthalia and Raju Theth. He denied the suggestion that Richhpal Chelasi’s name has been told by him as he is the friend of Gopal and his family members. Lastly, he admits that he was aware of the rivalry between the gang belonging to Mukesh Sauthalia and Raju Theth. He was not personally aware of this rivalry, but came to know through the newspaper. Most important eyewitness is the complainant himself, namely Manoj Kumar @ Manoj Batad (P. W. 16). In his examination-in-chief he has reiterated what he has said in the FIR. He claimed that he knows the accused appellants by face. He had identified them correctly in the court. He had even named those who were absent in the court. A note was placed by the court that those persons who were named but were absent were either absent due to the fact that they were absconding, or their personal attendance had been dispensed with for the day. He has described the incident in detail. He has claimed that he was told the registration number of both the jeeps by Baldev. Lastly, he claimed, in his examination-in-chief, that there was an animosity between the appellants and Gopalji as Gopalji was the District Chairman of the Jat Mahasabha. In his cross-examination by the counsel for the accused, Mahendra Singh Barala, Jhabarmal, Kishore Kumar Nehra, Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthaliam, Jai Singh, Rampal Khindhad, Mukesh Khud, Daulat Ram @ Daula, Rajesh Kumar Burdak, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal, he claims that he had gone to meet Gopal Fogawat at the hospital as he was working in S.K. Hospital at Sikar. He further admitted that he could not escape from the shop as he did not have sufficient opportunity to do so. He further claimed that he could not escape as the accused persons had started shooting the moment they entered the shop. According to him, the moment he tried to get up from his seat, Mukesh Bajia shot at him. He barely escaped the shot. Therefore, frightened he stood in the corner. He further states that only one shot was fired at him and rest of the shots were fired at the trial room. He further admitted that because he was scared, he sat glued to the corner and could not escape from the shop. He barely escaped the shot. Therefore, frightened he stood in the corner. He further states that only one shot was fired at him and rest of the shots were fired at the trial room. He further admitted that because he was scared, he sat glued to the corner and could not escape from the shop. He does admit that after the assailants had left the shop he neither checked Gopalji’s pulse, nor offered him any water and that he did not do much to look after him, because he was in a hurry to rush him to the hospital. But before he could take Gopalji to the hospital, the police had already arrived. He further claimed that he had asked Bhagirath to help him in lifting Gopalji. When he thought that both of them could not lift Gopalji, he asked others for help. Since he and Bhagirath could not lift Gopalji, they did not carry him to the hospital. He further claimed that firing went on for one and a half minutes. Therefore, he cannot tell as to how many bullets were fired. According to him, the moment the police came in, he placed Gopalji in their vehicle and rushed him to the hospital. At that time he did not tell anything to the police. He further claimed that when Kailash Ji told him to write a report to the police, he did not write it. But he went to a computer shop, got it drafted, and gave it to the police. He had gone to a shop near the LIC office. He further claimed that the body was returned to Gopalji’s relatives at 6:00 PM. They had taken the body to the Jat Boarding. He stayed with the body till the next morning till 10:00 AM. A Big crowed had accompanied the cortege of the body to Gopalji’s village. The cremation was done around 4:00 PM. At night, he stayed with Gopalji’s family members at his village. Next day, he came back to Sikar. He was told that police had come to his house, and that they had called him. He further claimed that Bhanwarlal Pilania and Baldev Jat also stayed with him at Gopalji’s village at night. The cremation was done around 4:00 PM. At night, he stayed with Gopalji’s family members at his village. Next day, he came back to Sikar. He was told that police had come to his house, and that they had called him. He further claimed that Bhanwarlal Pilania and Baldev Jat also stayed with him at Gopalji’s village at night. According to him, “it is correct that he was involved in a few criminal cases some of them are still pending against him.” He further admitted that his statements were recorded twice by the police: once on 7.4.2006 and second time on 22.5.2006. He claimed that he had given the written report in cursory manner, but he had given all the details in his statement recorded by the police on 7.4.2006. He further claimed that because the police needed certain clarifications from him, the police recorded his supplementary statement on 22.5.2006. He claimed that both Mukesh Bajia and Hari Banuda were present at the spot. But why this fact has not been mentioned in his supplementary statement (Ex.D.12), he cannot tell the reason. He also claims that some of the details that he had mentioned regarding who was the person driving the Jeep, regarding the fact that Mukesh Khud was carrying both pistol and a country-made pistol, that Mukesh Khud also entered the shop, but why these facts have not been mentioned in the written report (Ex.P.26) he cannot say. He further claimed that he told the police that Mukesh Bajia had shot at him. But the shot had hit the wall behind him. He had told this fact to the police in Exhibit-D.12, but why this fact has not been mentioned, he cannot say. He claimed that he was feeling quite well when his first statement was recorded on 7.4.2005 (Ex.D.11). He further claimed that from the day of occurrence till the next day at 10:00 AM, he did not contact the police as he was busy looking after the dead body, and looking after Gopalji’s relatives. He further admitted that although he was mentally stable after the incident, but he was frightened. He further claimed that instead of trying to get pen and paper for writing the report, he went to a shop to get it typed. He claimed that he knew the owner of the Seven Art Tailor’s shop because he had gotten his clothes stitched there. He further claimed that instead of trying to get pen and paper for writing the report, he went to a shop to get it typed. He claimed that he knew the owner of the Seven Art Tailor’s shop because he had gotten his clothes stitched there. He further claimed that Gopalji was shot from a distance of one foot. He further admitted that he did not have animosity with them all the persons named by him in the written report. According to him, the test identification parade was not held as he already knew these persons. He denied the suggestion that Hariram Banuda and Mukesh Sauthalia @ Mukesh Bajia were in Bara from 26.3.2006 to 6.4.2006. According to him, they were present at the scene of the crime. He denied the fact that on 5.4.2006, around 4.30 PM, Mukesh Sauthalia and Hariram Banuda were arrested at Baran. For, according to him, both of them were present at the scene of crime. He denied the fact that he did not report the case immediately because he was not present at the spot. He also denied the fact that on 6.4.2006 when the police drew up the site plan, he was not associated with the site plan as he had no knowledge about the incident. When he is confronted with the omissions made by him in his first police statement (Ex.D.11), his supplementary police statement (Ex.D.12) with regard to the details regarding the weapons carried by the appellant, he claims that he had informed the police the details. But why these details have not been recorded in his police statement (Ex.D.12), he cannot say. He further admits that he did not check Gopalji’s pulse after the incident, but saw him lying in a pool of blood from about one and half feet away. He claims that he did not go near him as it was essential to save him. He further clarified that since he had stayed back after the cremation in Gopalji’s village, he could not give any statement to the police till the 7th. He further claimed that in his first police statement, he had named Pannalal Maneta, Nema Mali, Ameen Pathan and Richhpal Chelasi, but why these names have not been mentioned in Ex.D.11, he cannot say. Dr. Mohd. Farooq (P.W.21) was a member of the Medical Board which carried out the autopsy of Gopal Fogawat. He further claimed that in his first police statement, he had named Pannalal Maneta, Nema Mali, Ameen Pathan and Richhpal Chelasi, but why these names have not been mentioned in Ex.D.11, he cannot say. Dr. Mohd. Farooq (P.W.21) was a member of the Medical Board which carried out the autopsy of Gopal Fogawat. He has proven the Post-Mortem report (Ex.P.60). According to him the Medical Board had noticed the following injuries on Gopal Fogawat:- 1. At left side temporo mandible joint, there is a round tid hole 2 inch x 1/2 inch with inverted margin on probing with …. embedded in radius of mandible, take out fragment of bone present in adjacent tissue (the wound caused by entry of firearm weapon). 2. On front of right ear trigs on maxillary regions, zigzag laceration about 4 x 3 x 4 cm with blackening of tissue averted margins, massive bleeding present due to laceration on right side carotid artery and juggler way. 3. One abrasion with burning 1½ x ½ cm placed oblique on lateral aspect on left forearm. 4. Laceration and bone exposed with burning and blackening on proximal phalanges of dorsal of right middle finger. Note: Before conducting post-mortem, X-ray of dead body (skull and right middle finger) taken in our presence. Opinion: All the injuries are ante-mortem in nature. Cause of death is hemorrhagic shock due to massive laceration of right side neck vessels which is sufficient to cause death. All these injuries were caused by firearm. Time since death: within six hours. On the other hand, in order to establish the plea of alibi, the defense examined Pratap Rao as D.W.1. In his examination-in-chief he claimed that “on 5.4.2006 he was posted as ASI at Police Station Baran. On 5.4.2006 around 3:50 PM information was received that a fight has broken out between the workers of the Toll Tax at Baran and drivers of some vehicles.” He had written the said information in the Roznamcha (Ex.D.18) which is the certified copy of the Roznamcha. “On this information, I, the Head Constable, Ibrahim, Constable, Ram Prasad, and the driver, Arif, went in a government vehicle to the Toll Tax situated at Parvat Bridge, Baran. There we discovered Mukesh and Hari Prasad were drunk and were stopping the vehicles and were creating nuisance. “On this information, I, the Head Constable, Ibrahim, Constable, Ram Prasad, and the driver, Arif, went in a government vehicle to the Toll Tax situated at Parvat Bridge, Baran. There we discovered Mukesh and Hari Prasad were drunk and were stopping the vehicles and were creating nuisance. They were threatening the vehicle drivers that if anybody will pass the Toll Tax, they will kill them. Therefore, I arrested them under Section 151 Cr.P.C. A certified copy of the arrest memo of Mukesh is Exhibit-D.19. It contains my signature from “A to B” and the signature of Mukesh at “C to D”. The arrest memo of Hari Prasad is Exhibit-D.20. It contains my signature at place marked as “A to B” and signature of Hari Prasad at “C to D”. I brought them to the hospital and had them examined for the level of liquor presented in their body. Exhibit-D.20 is the certified copy. Upon returning to the police station, I recorded my return in the Roznamcha. The certified copy of the Roznamcha is Exhbiit-D.21. On 6.4.2006, I submitted a complaint against Hari Prasad and Mukesh, which is in my handwriting and is Exhibit-D.17. It contains the signature of the SHO at three places marked as “A to B”. Since I am working under the SHO, I recognize his signature. The certified copy of the complaint is Exhibit-D.17.” In his cross-examination, he claims that “Bhagwan Singh, ASI, from the Police Station Kotwali, Sikar had come to him. But what investigation he carried out, I do not know. Bhagwan Singh, ASI, did not tell me that the person whom I had arrested as Hari Banuda and Mukesh Sauthalia, were in fact, Motil Lal S/o. Sanwal Ram, aged 26 years, by caste Jat, r/o. Purana Bas, P.S. Neem Ka Thana, District Sikar, and Rajesh Kumar S/o. Jagnaram, by caste Balai, aged 23 years, r/o. Laspur, P.S. Khetri, District Jhunjhunu who were employees on the Theka whom I had arrested. I have no information that Bhagwan Singh, ASI, had submitted any application before the Tehsildar, Baran, on 22.5.2006. I do not know that on the basis of the said application, the Tehsildar had sent a notice to Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia and Shankarlal S/o. Dungaram for summoning them. I have no information that Bhagwan Singh, ASI, had submitted any application before the Tehsildar, Baran, on 22.5.2006. I do not know that on the basis of the said application, the Tehsildar had sent a notice to Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia and Shankarlal S/o. Dungaram for summoning them. I did not arrest Hari Prasad S/o. Gangaram, then the witness said, but I had arrested Hari Prasad S/o. Ramu Ram.” He further admitted in his cross-examination that “at the time of arresting Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia, he did not ask for any identification document.” He denied the suggestion that it is wrong to say that on 5.4.2006 he did not arrest Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia and instead, he had arrested Motilal S/o. Sanwal Ram and Rajesh Kumar S/o. Jagnaram. . In order to counter the plea of alibi, the prosecution has examined Bhagwan Singh (P.W.38). In his examination-in-chief he states that on 11.4.2006 he had left for Chhabda where a Bolero Jeep bearing registration No.RJ28-UA-0038 was seized by the Police Station, Chhabda. Since the said Bolero Jeep was said to be involved in the present case, he had gone to the Police Station Chhabda in order to seize the said Bolero. There he learnt that the father of Mukesh Sauthalia is running a Toll Booth near Sabalpur. Therefore, in order to locate the accused Mukesh, he went to the Toll Booth. At the Toll Booth, one Mukesh Meena told them that on the 5th, two persons by the names of Moti and Rajesh Kumar, were arrested by the Police Station, Baran. Therefore, he went to the police station Baran in order to examine the record. At the Police Station, Baran, he discovered that Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Banuda were arrested on 5.4.2006 under Section 151 Cr.P.C. and they have been released on bonds. According to this witness, he was informed by Mukesh Meena that in fact, Motilal and Rajesh Kumar were locked up as Mukesh and Hari. He, therefore, relayed this information to the C.O. Sahab. He further claimed that the security bonds were given by Shankar Lal R/o. Srimadhopur who works at the Toll Booth. Subsequently in his investigation, he discovered that Shankarlal was not a resident of Srimadhopur, but was a worker at the Toll Booth at Sabalpur. He, therefore, relayed this information to the C.O. Sahab. He further claimed that the security bonds were given by Shankar Lal R/o. Srimadhopur who works at the Toll Booth. Subsequently in his investigation, he discovered that Shankarlal was not a resident of Srimadhopur, but was a worker at the Toll Booth at Sabalpur. In his cross-examination he admitted that from the Police Station Baran he had learnt that Hari Banuda and Mukesh Sauthalia were arrested. He sought the record of the said arrest. He recovered the Roznamcha Aam, the complaint submitted by the police, the bail bonds and a copy of the order of the SDM Sahab. The copies that he had received were not attested by the Tehsildar. This completes the testimonies of the important witnesses of the prosecution and the defense. Mukesh Sauthalia @ Mukesh Bajia and Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda. According to the prosecution, the two important accused persons in the array of accused are Mukesh Sauthalia @ Mukesh Bajia and Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda. While Mr. Vivek Bajwa represents the appellant Mukesh Sauthalia, Mr. Suresh Sahni represents Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda. Mr. Suresh Sahni has also appeared for three other appellants, namely Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal. But to begin with, we shall record the contentions raised by Mr. Bajwa and Mr. Sahni for Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad respectively. The contentions raised by Mr. Sahni qua Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal shall be dealt with at appropriate place in the judgment. Mr. Bajwa and Mr. Sahni have vociferously raised the following arguments before this court: firstly, although the case is claimed to be based on direct evidence, but even the direct evidence is not sufficient to prove the prosecution case beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to give teeth to the prosecution case, the investigating agency has planted Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj Kumar (P.W.16) as eyewitnesses. However, the only natural witness and therefore, the only reliable witness is Bhagirath (P.W.2), the owner of the tailoring shop where allegedly Gopal Fogawat was killed. Secondly, Bhagirath (P.W.2) knocks the bottom out of the prosecution case. For, according to him, only two persons had entered his shop, one of whom had fired at a light. However, the only natural witness and therefore, the only reliable witness is Bhagirath (P.W.2), the owner of the tailoring shop where allegedly Gopal Fogawat was killed. Secondly, Bhagirath (P.W.2) knocks the bottom out of the prosecution case. For, according to him, only two persons had entered his shop, one of whom had fired at a light. Although Bhagirath claims that he had immediately left the shop as he was too frightened, but he does not claim that two jeeps had come with high speed, and had been parked in front of his shop; he does not claim that fourteen to fifteen persons had jumped out of the jeep and had aggressively entered his shop; he does not claim that five to seven persons were carrying firearms. Therefore, he does not support the case of the prosecution on material points. Thirdly, although Bhagirath (P. W. 2) claims that two persons, unknown to him, entered the shop, but the investigating agency did not hold any identification parade in order to discover the identity of these two culprits. Moreover, even in the court Bhagirath (P. W. 2) does not identify any of the accused persons as the two persons who had entered his shop. Fourthly, according to the report of the Forensic Science Experts (Ex.D.16), the bullets recovered from the scene of the crime belonged to three different kinds of firearm. Therefore, the recovery corroborates the testimony of Bhagirath (P. W. 2) that only two persons had entered the shop. Fifthly, there is a clear-cut contradiction between the testimony of Bhagirath (P. W. 2) and the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16). Sixthly, there are glaring contradictions between the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16). Therefore, their deposition cannot be relied upon to convict the accused. Seventhly, Manoj Kumar (P. W. 16) is a planted witness. This is obvious from the fact that he keeps on changing his stand between the stand taken by him in the FIR, the stand revealed by him in his two statements recorded by the police (Ex.D.11 and D.12), and the position taken by him before the court. Further, although he claims that he was a close friend of Gopal Fogawat, yet in his cross-examination he readily admits that after Gopal Fogawat was shot, he neither went to check him up, nor took any step to rush him to the hospital. Further, although he claims that he was a close friend of Gopal Fogawat, yet in his cross-examination he readily admits that after Gopal Fogawat was shot, he neither went to check him up, nor took any step to rush him to the hospital. Such a contemporaneous conduct clearly proves that he was not present at the scene of the crime. Furthermore, despite the fact that this witness is the complainant, and had submitted the written report (Ex.P.26) in a written form to the police, yet his statement was not recorded by the police till 7.4.2006, i.e. after lapse of two days. The prosecution has not offered any explanation for the delay. Hence, this witness kept mum over the entire incident for two days. Lastly, despite the fact this witness claims that he was available to the police in the hospital, but he has neither identified the dead body, nor signed the inquest report (Ex.P.1). Hence, it is highly doubtful that this witness was present at the scene of the crime. Eighthly, Manoj (P.W.16) has adopted a shifting stand with regard to the presence of Mukesh Sauthalia @ Mukesh Bajia and Hari Banuda. For, he has not named either of them in his police supplementary police statement (Ex.D.12) given by him under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Yet both in the FIR and in his court statement he claims that they were very much present at the place of the occurrence. Hence, he is an unreliable witness. Ninthly, even Baldev (P.W. 9) is a concocted witness. Although this witness claims that he was standing outside the shop, but he raised no hue and cry when his own friend, Gopal Fogawat, was allegedly killed. Instead, he claims to have run away from the place. Further, even after the alleged incident he came into the shop, like Manoj (P.W.16) he did not make any effort for rushing Gopal Fogawat to the hospital. Both these witnesses have claimed that they came from the hospital with Gopal Fogawat in a jeep that the jeep was readily available as it was parked near the hospital, but both these witnesses kept on waiting for the police to come and take Gopal to the hospital. Moreover, like Manoj (P.W.16), the statement of this witness too was recorded two days later. For two days, this witness kept a studied silence about the entire incident. Moreover, like Manoj (P.W.16), the statement of this witness too was recorded two days later. For two days, this witness kept a studied silence about the entire incident. According to him, he was with the police at the hospital throughout the proceedings in the hospital, yet he did not reveal anything about the incident to the police. Therefore, his presence at the scene of the crime is highly uncertain. Tenthly, all the three witnesses, Bhagirath (P.W.2), Baldev (P.W.9), Manoj (P.W.16) clearly admit that the tailor shop was located in a busy bazaar, but even then the prosecution has not examined any independent witnesses. Instead, it has examined two witnesses, Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) who are close friends of the deceased Gopal Fogawat. Thus, only interested witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. Eleventh, the prosecution has not examined Bhanwarlal who was allegedly present with Baldev outside the shop. Twelfth, both Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) claim that Manoj Sauthalia and Hari Prasad were present at the scene of the crime. However, according to Pratap Rao (D.W.1) and according to Bhagwan Singh (P.W.38) and according to Dr. Devendra Sharma (P.W.40), the investigating officer, on the fateful day, i.e. on 5.4.2006, both the accused persons, Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia, were arrested under Section 151 Cr.P.C. at Baran. Therefore, considering the fact that Baran is about 500 kms. away from Sikar, it was absolutely impossible for them to be present at the scene of the crime on 5.4.2006. This proves the fact that Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) are both planted witnesses. Thirteenth, the testimonies of both these eyewitnesses are not even supported by the medical evidence. For, both these witnesses claim that seven person carrying firearm had indiscriminately shot at Gopal Fogawat. But according to the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P.60), Gopal Fogawat had suffered only four injuries by firearms. Therefore, the medical evidence strengthens the testimony of Bhagirath (P. W. 2) that only two persons had entered his shop. Fourteenth, in order to introduce the element of conspiracy, the prosecution had introduced Ramchandra Sharma (P.W.10). However, even Ramchandra Sharma is a concocted witness. For, his statement was not recorded by the police till more than two months. Therefore, his silence over the fact that he had heard the accused persons conspire for getting rid of Gopal proves the fact that he is a fake witness. However, even Ramchandra Sharma is a concocted witness. For, his statement was not recorded by the police till more than two months. Therefore, his silence over the fact that he had heard the accused persons conspire for getting rid of Gopal proves the fact that he is a fake witness. Moreover, in his testimony he had claimed that he had heard the conversation amongst the appellants on 23.3.1996 which is well over ten years prior to the date of occurrence. Therefore, his entire testimony loses its significance. But the learned Judge has relied upon testimony of this witness in order to convict the appellants for offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC. Fifteenth, but for the evidence of Bhagirath (PW.2), Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16), there is no corroborative piece of evidence to connect the appellants to the alleged crime. For, the investigating agency has failed to recover any weapon used for the commission of the crime. Moreover, since the firearm weapons have not been recovered, the mere recovery of the bullets does not buttress the case of the prosecution. For, there is no ballistic report to show that the recovered bullets were, indeed, fired from the firearms alleged to be carried by the appellants. Sixteenth, both Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) have admitted in their cross-examination that they are persons of criminal background. Therefore, they are clearly unreliable witnesses. Seventeen, the prosecution has withheld material witnesses, such as Bhanwarlal who was allegedly with Baldev at the tailor’s shop. According to the site plan, three persons were working at the upper story of the tailor’s shop, namely Bharat, Sushil and Subhash. None of these witnesses have been produced. Moreover, according to Bhagwan Singh (P.W.38), he was informed by one Mukesh Meena that in fact, Moti and Rajesh Kumar were arrested by Pratap Rao (D.W.1) as Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Banuda. Yet the prosecution has not produced Mukesh Meena. Therefore, an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution for withholding material witnesses from the court. Lastly, the prosecution has failed to prove the motive behind such a dastardly crime. On the other hand, Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, and Mr. Rajesh Goswami, for the complainant, have raised the following submissions before this court: firstly, through cogent and convincing evidence, the prosecution has proven its case beyond a shadow of doubt. Lastly, the prosecution has failed to prove the motive behind such a dastardly crime. On the other hand, Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, and Mr. Rajesh Goswami, for the complainant, have raised the following submissions before this court: firstly, through cogent and convincing evidence, the prosecution has proven its case beyond a shadow of doubt. Neither Baldev (P.W.9), nor Manoj Kumar (P.W.16) is concocted witnesses. For, according to Bhagirath (P.W.2), Manoj Kumar had come with Gopal Fogawat to his shop. Since the defense claims that Bhagirath (P. W. 2) is the most reliable witness, then even this statement of Bhagirath that “Manoj had come with Gopal has to be accepted.” Therefore, Manoj Kumar’s presence, at the place of occurrence, is spelt out. Secondly, Bhagirath (P.W.2) being the owner of the shop is certainly a natural and reliable witness. But he does not disprove the case of the prosecution. He merely introduces the story of the prosecution as he describes the very initial events of the fateful day. Therefore, merely because he claims that two persons, carrying firearms, had entered his shop, it does not mean that others carrying the firearm weapons did not enter his shop. But as Bhagirath was scared out of his wits, he escaped from the shop and ran away to a shop belonging to his elder uncle (Tauji) which was a STD booth. It is he who called the police, but his testimony on the whole does not weaken the prosecution case. In fact, it lends credence to the prosecution case. Thirdly, there was no need for the prosecution to subject any of the accused appellants to a test identification parade as the appellants were known to the witnesses, namely Baldev (P.W.9), Ramchandra (P.W.10) and Manoj (P.W.16). Moreover, these witnesses have identified the appellants in the courtroom. For those appellants who were absent on the particular day when the testimonies were recorded, a note was placed by the learned trial Judge clearly stating that these persons are absent from the court. Fourthly, there are no glaring contradictions between the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16). In fact, they corroborate and supplement each other on material facts. Fifthly, like Bhagirath (P.W.2), Manoj (P.W.16) is also a natural and reliable witness. For, immediately after the incident, he had tried his level best to rush the injured Gopal to the hospital. Fourthly, there are no glaring contradictions between the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16). In fact, they corroborate and supplement each other on material facts. Fifthly, like Bhagirath (P.W.2), Manoj (P.W.16) is also a natural and reliable witness. For, immediately after the incident, he had tried his level best to rush the injured Gopal to the hospital. But before he could take any concrete steps, the police had already arrived. Further, he had immediately submitted the written report (Ex. P. 26) to the police at the hospital. In the written report (Ex. P. 26), he had clearly mentioned the names of all the appellants as the assailants. Even in his testimony, he had mentioned their names and had assigned overt acts to them. In his testimony, he had also explained the delay in recording of his statement by the police till 7.4.2006. Furthermore, his testimony is corroborated both by the site plan (Ex.P.3) and by the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.P.60). His testimony is further corroborated by the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and of Dr. Devendra Sharma (P.W.40), and by the medical evidence. Therefore, he is a trustworthy and reliable witness. Sixthly, the testimony of Manoj Kumar is corroborated by various pieces of evidence including the site plan (Ex. P.3). According to Manoj Kumar (P. W. 16), Mukesh Bajia had fired at him, but had missed the shot. The bullet had pierced the wooden partition. The police had recovered the wooden partition and according to the site plan, a bullet mark was discovered precisely as described by Manoj. Seventhly, similarly Baldev (P.W.9) is a natural and reliable witness. For, in his testimony he describes the reason as to why he was with Gopal Fogawat on the fateful day; he describes the incident in detail; he is honest enough to admit that he got scared and ran away to save himself. He has signed the Panchayatnama (Ex. P.1); he has given reasons as to why his statement was recorded by the police on 7.4.2006; his testimony is corroborated by Manoj (P. W. 16). Eighthly, the prosecution is not required to examine all the witness. For, it is not the number of witnesses, but the quality of witnesses which determine the outcome of the prosecution case. Therefore, if the prosecution has not chosen to examine Bhanwarlal, who was with Baldev and the deceased, it is not fatal to the prosecution. Eighthly, the prosecution is not required to examine all the witness. For, it is not the number of witnesses, but the quality of witnesses which determine the outcome of the prosecution case. Therefore, if the prosecution has not chosen to examine Bhanwarlal, who was with Baldev and the deceased, it is not fatal to the prosecution. Ninthly, both Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia have pleaded alibi in order to save their skin. However, they have miserably failed to establish their plea of alibi. In fact, the documents produced by the defense, namely the arrest memo of Mukesh (Ex.D.19), arrest memo of Hari Prasad (Ex.D.20), the bail bonds of Mukesh (Ex.D.14) and the bail bonds of Hari Prasad (Ex.D.13) shatter their plea of alibi. For, the signature of these two appellants given in the arrest memos do not match with their signatures in other documents, such as the vakalatnamas submitted by them both before the trial court and before this court. Therefore, the signatures on the various documents being different could not have been made by the same person. Thus, their arrest memos (Ex. D. 19 and Ex. D. 20) do not contain their signatures. Hence, they were not arrested at Baran on 5-4-2006, as claimed by them. Moreover, while the prosecution had produced evidence to show that the mobiles recovered from these two appellants, the location of these mobiles was at Baran on 5.4.2006. But both these appellants have denied the fact that they are owners of these mobile numbers. Since according to both these appellants, the mobile phones do not belong to them, therefore, the recovery of these mobiles does not buttress their plea that they were present at Baran on the fateful day. Therefore, both Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) are justified in claiming that Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad were, indeed, present at the scene of the crime on 5.4.2006. Tenthly, the medical evidence does not belie the case of the prosecution. Even if Gopal Fogawat had suffered four firearm injuries, the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) is not diluted. For, a large number of holes on the walls of the trial room, as indicated in the site plan, and the large number of bullets discovered at the scene of the crime, clearly prove that the assailants were not sharp shooters, but missed their mark. For, a large number of holes on the walls of the trial room, as indicated in the site plan, and the large number of bullets discovered at the scene of the crime, clearly prove that the assailants were not sharp shooters, but missed their mark. Even Mukesh Sauthalia who had fired a shot at Manoj had missed his mark. Therefore, the medical evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution. Eleventh, Ramchandra (P.W.10) is not a concocted witness, but a reliable one. For, Dr. Devendra Sharma (P.W.40), the I.O., has clearly explained the delay in recording the statement of Ramchandra (P.W.10). Although Ramchandra has claimed in his testimony that he had seen the appellants conspiring against Gopal on 23.3.1996, but he had also claimed that it was on the day when Sheeshram was cremated on the same day. Sheeshram was cremated on 23.3.2006. Therefore, the date given in his testimony is but a typographical mistake. Hence, through the testimony of Ramchandra (P.W.10), the prosecution has clearly established the element of conspiracy. Therefore, the learned Judge was justified in convicting the appellants for offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC. Twelfth, in a case of direct evidence, the lack of motive is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Therefore, even if the prosecution could not prove the motive, it cannot be read adversely against it. Moreover, the prosecution has stated the motive for getting rid of Gopal Fogawat by the appellants. Hence, the element of motive is clearly established. Thirteenth, in a case of direct evidence, the non-recovery of weapons of crime does not dilute the case of the prosecution. Fourteenth, merely because Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) happened to be involved in few criminal cases, it would not cast a doubt on the veracity of the testimony. It would merely put the court on guard. However, as their testimony is corroborated by other evidence, their testimony is a reliable one. Fifteenth, neither of these two witnesses, Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) have shifted their stand. Wherever there are discrepancies in the police statement of Baldev, he has given reasons for the said discrepancy. Even if there are minor contradictions between the testimony of Baldev and Manoj, such minor contradiction only led credence to the truthfulness of the testimonies and do not dilute their deposition. Lastly, the prosecution has not withheld the material witnesses. Wherever there are discrepancies in the police statement of Baldev, he has given reasons for the said discrepancy. Even if there are minor contradictions between the testimony of Baldev and Manoj, such minor contradiction only led credence to the truthfulness of the testimonies and do not dilute their deposition. Lastly, the prosecution has not withheld the material witnesses. It has produced sufficient number of witnesses to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not the quantity of the witnesses, but the quality of witnesses which is the deciding factor in appreciation of evidence. Therefore, even if the prosecution has not produced Bhanwarlal, or Mukesh Meena, or Bharat, Sushil and Subhash, even then their absence would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and considered the record. Being the owner of the tailoring shop, Seven Art Tailor Shop, where the crime was allegedly committed, Bhagirath (P. W. 2) is, of course, a natural witness in the case. But his testimony merely introduces the prosecution story to us. Since he himself admits that he had immediately left the shop when two persons had entered the shot and had fired a shot, obviously, he has not witnessed the entire incident. Thus, to expect him to narrate the entire incident is to be unrealistic. He has narrated the story as far as he was familiar with it. He tells the court that he was too nervous to do anything till someone told him to dial the number 100 and seek the help of the police. He called the police and the police arrived subsequently. Thus, he tells the court as to how the police arrived at the scene of the crime. Having narrated the story up to this point, his role is over. Even if he doesn’t reveal about the arrival of the two jeeps, the entry of armed men into his shop, one cannot ignore the fact that different persons have different reactions to a traumatic experience. According to this witness he himself was frightened out of his wits. To expect him to remember each and every detail may be asking a bit too much. People, at times, do tend to block certain details of a traumatic experience. According to this witness he himself was frightened out of his wits. To expect him to remember each and every detail may be asking a bit too much. People, at times, do tend to block certain details of a traumatic experience. Therefore, his testimony does not dilute the evidential value of the testimonies of Manoj (P. W. 16) and Baldev (P. W. 9). Moreover, Bhagirath (P. W. 2), a trustworthy witness, does categorically state that Manoj (P. W. 16) had come with Gopal Fogawat to his shop. He also claims that even on earlier occasions, Manoj had come with Gopalji to the shop. Even Baldev (P. W. 9) also states that Manoj, Bhawarlal, Gopal and he had gone to the tailoring shop. He further claims that while he stood outside the shop with Bhawarlal, Manoj had gone inside the shop with Gopalji. Thus, both the witnesses, Bhagirath (P. W. 2) and Baldev (P. W. 9) unequivocally state that Manoj (P. W. 16) had gone inside the shop with Gopal. Therefore, Manoj’s presence at the time of the incident cannot be doubted. In fact, it is stamped. Hence, Manoj (P. W. 16) is not a concocted witness. Manoj (P. W. 16), being the complainant, narrates the entire story in graphic detail. The incident is said to have taken place around 2:15 PM, he hands the written report (Ex. P. 26) to the police at 3:30 PM. Thus, immediately after the incident, he submits a typed report to the police. In the written report (Ex. P. 26) he names all the accused persons. Thus, the possibility of over-implicating innocent persons is clearly ruled out. In the written report (Ex. P. 26) he claims that five persons had carried firearm weapons and had shot Gopal. He repeats the same fact in his first police statement (Ex. D. 11) recorded on 7-4-06. He does not mention all the five names as shooting at Gopal in his supplementary police statement (Ex. D. 12). When this particular contradiction was pointed out, he claimed that he had told the names to the police while his supplementary statement (Ex. D. 12) was recorded. His supplementary statement (Ex. D. 12) does reveal that he had claimed that “Balbir Banuda and Mukesh Khud and two to three other persons entered the shop”. Since he had already named the assailants in his initial police statement (Ex. D. 12) was recorded. His supplementary statement (Ex. D. 12) does reveal that he had claimed that “Balbir Banuda and Mukesh Khud and two to three other persons entered the shop”. Since he had already named the assailants in his initial police statement (Ex. D. 11), he is not expected to repeat the same statement ad infinitum. His mentioning of “two to three other persons” clearly reveals that he is talking about five persons who had entered the shop and fired at the trial room. Even in his testimony he assigns firearm weapons to only five persons, namely Mukesh Bajiya, Jhawar Bajiya, Hari Banuda, as having pistols; Balbir as having a carbine gun, and Mukesh Khud having a pistol in one hand and a country made pistol (Katta) in the other hand. Although he names others as having entered the shop and as cursing and shouting, but the firing is confined to only these five persons. Hence, he has narrated a consistent story. Therefore, the learned counsels for the appellants are not justified in claiming that Manoj (P. W. 16) shifts his stand. Even Manoj’s conduct after the shootout is not unusual. For, he clearly states that he tried to get up during the shootout, but Mukesh Sauthalia shot at him. Therefore, he stood glued to the corner. Immediately, after the incident, he went out of the shop and shouted for help. He was in a great hurry to carry the injured Gopal to the hospital which was close by. He even asked Bhagirath to help him lift the body, but Gopal was too heavy to be lifted just by two of them. But before he could lift the body, the police arrived. Even in the hospital, he went immediately to get the written report typed from a shop. He handed over the typed report (Ex. P. 26) to the police. He explains the reason why he could not narrate the incident to the police at the hospital. For, he was too busy looking after Gopal’s family members who had rushed to the hospital. It is for this reason that he neither identified the body, nor signed the inquest report. He accompanied the body from the hospital to the Jat Board. He stayed the night with the body and Gopal’s family members. For, he was too busy looking after Gopal’s family members who had rushed to the hospital. It is for this reason that he neither identified the body, nor signed the inquest report. He accompanied the body from the hospital to the Jat Board. He stayed the night with the body and Gopal’s family members. Next day, he accompanied the body to Gopal’s village, attended the funeral in the evening, and came back to Sikar on 7-4-2006. As soon as he was told by his family members that the police had come to his house to record his statement, he went to the police station for getting his statement recorded. His first statement (Ex. D. 11) was recorded on 7-4-06. In his testimony, he talks about his fears and about his being upset. Thus, his conduct from the very beginning was normal and natural. Much has been made about the delay in recording the statement of Manoj (P. W. 16) and Baldev (P. W. 9). Baldev’s presence at the scene of the crime cannot be doubted. His testimony has been corroborated by Manoj (P. W. 16). He had accompanied the injured Gopal to the hospital. He has signed the inquest report (Ex. P.1). He too has explained the delay in recording of his police statement (Ex. D. 4). According to him, the police was too busy drawing up the necessary documents, in getting the postmortem done, in returning the dead body to the relatives of the deceased. Like Manoj, he too had accompanied the dead body to the Jat Board. He too had stayed the night with the body; he too had gone to Gopal’s village for the funeral. Thus, his statement was also recorded on the 7th. Hence, there is cogent reason for the delay in his recording of his statement under Section 161 Cr. P. C. According to Baldev (P.W. 9) and Manoj (P. W. 16), Gopal Fogawat was a Jat leader of the locality. Since he was the District Chairman of the Jat Mahasabha, since he was a social worker, he was well known in the community and the society at large in Sikar. Sikar happens to be in the heart of area called Shekhawati, in Rajasthan--an area dominated by the Jat community. Since he was the District Chairman of the Jat Mahasabha, since he was a social worker, he was well known in the community and the society at large in Sikar. Sikar happens to be in the heart of area called Shekhawati, in Rajasthan--an area dominated by the Jat community. According to Rajendra Kumar Tyagi (P.W. 35) due to the sudden and violent death of Gopal Fogawat, the police was busy with the law and order problem, both in the day time as well as in the night. On 5-4-2006, the body was carried from the hospital to the Jat Board, a public place. It was placed there for public viewing. On 6-4-2006, a large crowd had carried the dead body to Gopal’s village. He was cremated around 4:00 PM in his village. Thus, the police did not have sufficient time to record the police statement of these two witnesses till 7-4-2006. Delay in recording the statement of a witness under Section 161 Cr. P. C. would be fatal to the prosecution only when there is a possibility of over-implication of accused persons. However, in the present case as all the accused were named immediately after the incident, such a possibility is ruled out. Moreover, as both Baldev (P. W. 9) and Manoj (P. W. 16) have explained the reason for the delay, the delay as such would not be fatal to the prosecution case. Further, their testimony is buttressed by the testimony of Rajendra Kumar Tyagi (P. W. 35). Hence, the delay in recording the police statement of Baldev (P.W. 9) and of Manoj (P. W. 16) is certainly not fatal to the prosecution case. Such a delay does not cast any shadow of doubt over the prosecution case. In the case of Bunty vs State of M. P. [(2004) SCC (Cri) 294, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined as under: Unless the investigating officer is categorically asked as to why there was delay in examination of the witnesses, the defence cannot gain any advantage therefrom. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that if there is any delay in examination of a particular witness, the prosecution version becomes suspect. It would depend upon several factors. If the explanation offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason to interfere with the conclusion. It would depend upon several factors. If the explanation offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason to interfere with the conclusion. As discussed above, not only Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) but also Rajendra Kumar Tyagi (P.W.35) and Dr. Devendra Sharma (P.W.40), the I.O., have given plausible explanation for the delay. Therefore, the delay in recording police statement of Baldev (P. W. 2) and Manoj (P. W. 16) does not dilute the case of the prosecution. Both Baldev (P. W. 9) and Manoj (P. W. 16) have been lambasted as according to both of them Manoj Sauthalia and Hari Prasad were present at the place of occurrence. But according to these two appellants they were arrested by the police on 5-4-2006 at Baran. Thus, they pleaded an alibi. In order to substantiate their plea they examined Pratap Rao (D.W.1). The learned counsel for these two appellants also pointed out that according to the prosecution, the mobile phones owned by Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia, their locations were also discovered to be at Baran. Moreover, both according to Bhagwan Singh (P. W. 38) and Dr. Devendra Sharma (P. W. 40), the police was convinced that on the day of the incident, these two appellants were at Baran and not at Sikar. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that both the accused appellants were charged for offences under Section 302 read with Section 120 B IPC, but not for offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Hence, both the witnesses are unreliable. At the first blush this argument appears to be very strong. For even the investigation officer, Dr. Devendra Sharma (P. W. 40) has admitted that the police was convinced that these two accused persons were at Baran on the fateful day. But the analysis of the evidence available on the record proves otherwise. Firstly, the prosecution has argued that the mobile phones which were recovered and whose location is said to be at Baran belonged to these two accused appellants. But both the accused appellants have claimed in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that these mobiles sets do not belong to them. Once their ownership and possession is denied by these two appellants, their location in Baran, even if proven, does not buttress the plea of alibi. But both the accused appellants have claimed in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that these mobiles sets do not belong to them. Once their ownership and possession is denied by these two appellants, their location in Baran, even if proven, does not buttress the plea of alibi. Secondly, the defense has relied upon the testimony of Pratap Rao (D. W. 1), upon the Arrest Memo of Mukesh Sauthalia (Ex. D. 19) and the Arrest Memo of Hari Prasad (Ex. D. 20) in order to prove the alibi of being at Baran on the day of the occurrence. However, the prosecution has challenged the veracity of the signatures of Mukesh Sauthalia on Ex. D. 19 and of Hari Prasad on Ex. D. 20. According to the prosecution, these signatures do not tally with the known and accepted signatures of these two appellants on other documents, namely the vakalatnamas submitted by them. Thus, the prosecution has argued that since the signatures on the arrest memos (Ex. D. 19 and 20) are fake, therefore, it clearly proves that Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad were enither arrested, nor present in Baran on the fateful day. Instead as claimed by Baldev (P. W. 9) and by Manoj (P. W. 16), these two accused persons were present at the scene of the crime. Since the plea of alibi was taken by these two appellants, the burden of proving the said plea was entirely upon them. To test the veracity of this plea, one of the best ways is to compare the signature of Mukesh Sauthalia in the arrest memo dated 5.4.2006 and to compare his signature both in the Vakalatnama submitted before the trial court as well as before this court. After all, Mukesh Sauthalia’s signatures on his Vakalatnamas are admitted to be his. If, indeed, he was arrested at Baran on 5.4.2006, then his signature in the arrest memo (Ex.D.19) should naturally tally with his signatures on the Vakalatnamas. Similarly, the signature of Hari Prasad in his arrest memo (Ex.D.20) should be compared with his admitted signatures on Vakalatnamas submitted both before the trial court and before this court. Needless to say, such a comparison can be made by a court under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. A bare perusal of Mukesh’s signature in Exhibit-D.19 clearly reveals that the signature is written in Hindi language. Needless to say, such a comparison can be made by a court under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. A bare perusal of Mukesh’s signature in Exhibit-D.19 clearly reveals that the signature is written in Hindi language. It is in large font and the accent q which is connected with the letter e goes completely around the letter e and forms the standing vertical line of the letter d . The right part of the letter d forms two loops and runs into the letter ‘k . Mukesh had submitted two Vakalatnamas, one in favour of Purshottam Sharma, Advocate, and another in favour of Mr. Vivek Raj Bajwa, Advocate. The comparison of his signatures in both these Vakalatnamas clearly shows that they are quite different. For, although the accent q does go around the letter e , but the right part of the letter d does not even have a single loop while its connects to the letter ‘k . Therefore, the arrest memo (Ex.D.19) does not seem to contain the signature of Mukesh Sauthalia. Similarly, in the arrest memo of Hari Prasad (Ex.D.20), the entire name ‘Hari Prasad’ has been written in Hindi in a large font. Whereas in the Vakalatnamas submitted by him before the learned trial court dated 28.6.2006 and 7.9.2006, he has signed his name merely as ‘Hari’ that too in a small font. Thus, the signatures of the Vakalatnamas, which are his admitted signatures, do not match with his signature in the arrest memo (Ex.D.20). Interestingly, in the Vakalatnama submitted by Hari Prasad before this court on 28.11.2011, he has signed his name as Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda. Even the handwriting contained in this Vakalatnama does not tally with the handwriting contained in the arrest memo (Ex.D.20). Thus, it can be safely concluded that neither of the two arrest memos (Ex.D.19 and Ex.D.20) contain the genuine signatures of Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad respectively. Therefore, there is no evidence to prove the fact that on 5.4.2006, these two appellants were present in Baran. Of course, Pratap Rao (D.W.1) does claim that he had arrested both these appellants at Baran on 5.4.2006. However, as he is the person who had arrested them obviously, he could not have admitted that he intentionally, or otherwise made a mistake. To do so would be to expose himself to departmental action. Of course, Pratap Rao (D.W.1) does claim that he had arrested both these appellants at Baran on 5.4.2006. However, as he is the person who had arrested them obviously, he could not have admitted that he intentionally, or otherwise made a mistake. To do so would be to expose himself to departmental action. Naturally his survival instinct would prevent him from publically admitting his mistake that, too, in a judicial proceeding. But interestingly, he does admit in his cross-examination that while arresting Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad, he did not ask them for any identification document in order to ensure their identity. Therefore, Pratap Rao (D.W.1) is merely saving his skin from any adverse action that can be taken against him. Therefore, considering the fact that the signatures of Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad do not exist on the arrest memos (Ex.D.19 and D.20) respectively, considering that their identity is not established before the arresting authority, Pratap Rao (D.W.1), the plea of alibi has not been established cogently and convincingly. The learned counsels for the appellants have also argued that there is a contradiction between the ocular evidence and the medical evidence. According to Manoj (P.W.16), the accused persons, who were armed with firearm weapons, had indiscriminately shot at Gopal. However, Gopal has suffered only four firearm injuries on his body. But even this argument is unworthy of acceptance. For, a perusal of the site plan clearly shows that the three walls, and the door of the trial room, were riddled with holes made by firearm weapons. In fact, subsequently, the police had recovered eleven bullets from the scene of the crime. According to Manoj (PW.16) even when Mukesh Sauthalia took an aim at him, he missed his mark. Thus, obviously despite the fact that the accused persons were armed with firearms, they are not sharp shooters. Hence, despite the indiscriminate shooting, only few bullets had hit the mark. The learned counsels have also argued that according to the report of scene of crime (Ex.D.16), the bullets belong to only three firearms. Whereas Manoj had claimed that five persons were armed with firearm weapons. Since according to both Manoj (P.W.16) and Baldev (P.W.9) the entire shooting had lasted only for two minutes, is a grave possibility that not all the accused persons carrying the firearms had used the weapons, but only few of them had used the weapons. Whereas Manoj had claimed that five persons were armed with firearm weapons. Since according to both Manoj (P.W.16) and Baldev (P.W.9) the entire shooting had lasted only for two minutes, is a grave possibility that not all the accused persons carrying the firearms had used the weapons, but only few of them had used the weapons. But, nonetheless, the bullets had found their mark and had achieved the common object of killing Gopal Fogawat. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the ocular testimony of Manoj and the medical testimony of Dr. Mohd. Farooq (P.W.21). Besides questioning the veracity of the testimonies of Manoj and Baldev, the defense has also challenged the testimony of Ramchandra Sharma (P.W.10). According to Ramchandra Sharma (P.W.10), on 23.3.1996 he had seen Mukesh Sauthalia, Mukesh Khud, Mahendra Barala, Rajendra Burdak, Hari Banuda, Nemi Chand Mali and about ten to fifteen persons get out from two or three different Bolero jeeps and to go into the shop owned by Mukesh Sauthalia. He further claims that on that day, Sheesh Ram, a person belonging to the group of Hari Banuda, was killed. Then he overheard Hari Banuda telling the gathering that persons belonging to a gang of Raju Theth have killed two of their men and that Gopal Fogawat is advocating for Raju Theth. Therefore, it is imperative that to get rid of Gopal Fogawat. According to this witness, Mukesh Sauthalia said that an attack on Sheesh Ram is an attack on him. Therefore, he was asking the people around him to help him get rid of Gopa Fogawat. The learned counsels for the appellants have argued that the date given by Ramchandra Sharma (P.W.10) is 23rd March, 1996, i.e. ten years prior to the alleged incident in the present case. Therefore, the conspiracy could not have been hatched ten years prior to the death of Gopal Fogawat. But even this argument is baseless. For, according to Baldev Ram (P.W.9), Sheesh Ram was killed in 2006. Therefore, the date given as 1996 is a typographical mistake; it refers to the year 2006. Hence, the said date is very close to the date of the incident. i.e. 5.4.2006. The learned counsels have also challenged the veracity of Ramchandra’s testimony ostensibly on the ground that his police statement was recorded after two months of the alleged incident. However, even this argument is unworthy of acceptance. For, Dr. Hence, the said date is very close to the date of the incident. i.e. 5.4.2006. The learned counsels have also challenged the veracity of Ramchandra’s testimony ostensibly on the ground that his police statement was recorded after two months of the alleged incident. However, even this argument is unworthy of acceptance. For, Dr. Devendra Sharma (P.W.40), the I.O., has clearly explained in the court that while interrogating Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Banuda, they had informed him that on 23rd they had held a meeting wherein they planned the murder. Taking his cue from the statement made by the accused during their interrogation, he carried out further investigation in the area where Mukesh Sauthalia had his office. He discovered a hardware shop opposite to Mukesh Sauthalia’s office. When he inquired from the owner, Ramchandra Sharma, Ramchandra Sharma told him few facts relating to the present case. Therefore, he recorded the statement of Ramchandra Sharma under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Thus, there is a plausible explanation for the delay in recording of the statement of Ramchandra Sharma (P.W.10). Most importantly, there is no reason for this witness to falsely implicate the accused persons. As according to him, there is no animosity or an axe for him to grind against the accused persons. Hence, he is a reliable witness as far as the element of conspiracy is concerned. The learned counsels have also questioned the characters of Baldev (P.W.9), Ramchandra (P.W.10) and Manoj (P.W.16), for all three of them have admitted that they themselves are involved in criminal cases. Therefore, they are unreliable witnesses. Merely because a witness may be involved in criminal activity, it would not ipso facto make him an unreliable witness. Knowing the alleged criminal activity of the witness, the court is merely put on guard and seeks corroboration of his testimony. But, as discussed above, the testimonies of Baldev (P.W.9) and of Manoj (P.W.16) are fully corroborated by the site plan and by the medical testimony. Therefore, notwithstanding their criminal background, they are reliable witnesses. The defense has also stressed on the fact that despite a thorough investigation, the police could not recover a single weapon used in the alleged crime. However, the said contention is acceptable. For, it is indeed trite to state that in case of direct evidence where the witnesses are trustworthy and credible, the non-recovery of the weapons does not dilute the case of the prosecution. However, the said contention is acceptable. For, it is indeed trite to state that in case of direct evidence where the witnesses are trustworthy and credible, the non-recovery of the weapons does not dilute the case of the prosecution. In the case of State of Punjab v. Hakam Singh [ (2005) 7 SCC 408 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the case where different assailants had used different types of fire arms. Although the firearms could not be recovered, but still the testimony of the eye-witnesses were relied upon in order convict the accused. Lastly, the defense has contended that the investigating agency did not hold any identification parade. Therefore, the identification by the witnesses in the court is insignificant. Even this contention is without any merit. For, both Baldev (P. W. 9) and Manoj (P. W. 16) have clearly stated in their testimonies, quoted above, that they have known the accused persons prior to the incident. Once the witnesses are familiar with the accused persons, there is no need for the investigating agency to hold a test identification parade. Moreover, both these witnesses have not only identified the accused persons who were present in the court on the day when their testimony was recorded, but had even specified those accused persons who were absent in the court on that particular day. This clearly proves that they were familiar with the accused. Hence, the non-holding of the test identification parade would not dilute the case of the prosecution. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the prosecution has proven its case beyond a shadow of doubt against Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad. Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram, and Bajrang Lal Mr. Sahni has further represented Rampal Khinchad, appellant No.6, Govind Ram, appellant No.8, and Bajrang Lal, appellant No.9, before this court. In order to assail the prosecution evidence, he has again reiterated his argument that Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) are unreliable witnesses. Secondly, since no overt act has been assigned either to Rampal Khinchad, or to Govind Ram, or to Bajrang Lal, they cannot be convicted for offence under Section 149 IPC. Hence, the learned Judge has erred in convicting Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram, and Bajrang Lal for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. Secondly, since no overt act has been assigned either to Rampal Khinchad, or to Govind Ram, or to Bajrang Lal, they cannot be convicted for offence under Section 149 IPC. Hence, the learned Judge has erred in convicting Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram, and Bajrang Lal for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor has pleaded that for the purpose of Section 149 IPC, mere presence in an unlawful assembly is sufficient for making the accused vicariously liable for the criminal act. Since both Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) have testified about the presence of Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram, and Bajrang Lal, along with Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia, and along with other assailants; they were part of the unlawful assembly whose common object was to kill Gopal Fogawat. Hence, the learned Judge was certainly justified in convicting these three accused-appellants for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. Section 149 IPC has essentially two ingredients viz. i) offence committed by any member of an unlawful assembly consisting five or more members and ii) such offence must be committed in prosecution of the common object (under Section 141 IPC) of the assembly or members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. For "common object", it is not necessary that there should be a prior concert in the sense of a meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly, the common object may form on spur of the moment; it is enough if it is adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them. In order that the case may fall under the first part the offence committed must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused were members. [Ref. to: Bhanwar Singh & Ors. v. State of M.P., (2008) 16 SCC 657]. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under second part of Section 149 IPC if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. The expression 'know' does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. The expression 'know' does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. For instance, it is a matter of common knowledge that if a body of persons go armed to take forcible possession of the land, it would be right to say that someone is likely to be killed and all the members of the unlawful assembly must be aware of that likelihood and would be guilty under the second part of Section 149 IPC. There may be cases which would come within the second part, but not within the first. The distinction between the two parts of Section 149 IPC cannot be ignored or obliterated. [Ref. to: Mizaji & Anr. vs. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 572 ; and Gangadhar Behera & Ors. vs. State of Orissa, AIR 2002 SC 3633 ]. However, once it is established that the unlawful assembly had common object, it is not necessary that all persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed some overt act. For the purpose of incurring the vicarious liability under the provision, the liability of other members of the unlawful assembly for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence, rests upon the fact whether the other members knew before hand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. [Ref to: Daya Kishan vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 5 SCC 81 ; Sikandar Singh vs. State of Bihar (2010) 7 SCC 477 , and Debashis Daw v. State of W.B., (2010) 9 SCC 111 ]. In the case of Sumer vs. State of U.P. [ (2005) 7 SCC 220 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that Section 149 IPC provides that any offence committed by any member of unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of the assailants or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed the prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of committing that object, is a member of that assembly, is guilty of that offence. Thus, the question of attributing any role to a particular accused was wholly inconsequential. Thus, the question of attributing any role to a particular accused was wholly inconsequential. In the present case, both Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) have stated in their testimonies, reproduced above, that Rampal Khinchad, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal had come with the other accused persons who were armed with firearm weapons, they stood outside the shop, and left with the other accused who had committed the actual murder. Thus, their presence as a member of the unlawful assembly is clearly proven. Since they shared the common object of killing Gopal Fogawat, they had rightly been convicted for offence under Section 302/149 IPC by the learned Judge. Jhabarmal, Mukesh Khud, Kishore Nehra and Rajesh Kumar Burdak Mr. Biri Singh Sinsinwar, the learned Senior Counsel, is representing Jhabarmal, Mukesh Khud, Kishore Kumar Nehra and Rajesh Kumar Burdak. As far as Jhabarmal is concerned, Mr. Biri Singh has echoed the arguments which were taken by Mr. Sahni and Mr. Bajwa vis-à-vis Hari Prasad and Mukesh Sauthalia. Therefore, these arguments need not be repeated again. Suffice it to say that since this court has found Baldev (P.W.2) and Manoj (P.W.16) to be reliable witnesses, since both these witnesses have unambiguously testified about the presence of Jhabarmal, that too armed with a pistol, the case against Jhabarmal is well proven by the prosecution. Hence, the learned Judge was justified in convicting Jhabarmal for offence under Section 302 IPC and for other offences mentioned above. As far as the case of Rajesh Burdak, appellant No.7, is concerned, Mr. Biri Singh has contended that no overt act has been assigned to him. Therefore, he could not be convicted for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. However, as stated above, the case of Rajesh Burdak is not different from the case of Rampal, Govind Ram and Bajrang Lal. Therefore, like them, Rajesh Burdak was legally convicted for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. As far as Kishore Kumar Nehra is concerned, the learned counsel has vehemently contended that the only role assigned to Kishore by Manoj (P.W.16) is that he had opened the door of the trial room. However, as the door of the trial room is also studded with bullet marks, apparently the door was never opened. In the alternative, even if the door was opened by Kishore Nehra, he has not shot at the deceased. However, as the door of the trial room is also studded with bullet marks, apparently the door was never opened. In the alternative, even if the door was opened by Kishore Nehra, he has not shot at the deceased. Therefore, he could not have been convicted for offence under Section 302/149 IPC. The contentions raised by the learned counsel are clearly untenable. For, merely because the door shows bullet marks does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the door was never opened. According to Manoj (P. W. 16), Kishore Nehra had opened the door; he had facilitated the killing of Gopal Fogawat. Since Kishore was also carrying a weapon in his hand, since he came with Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Jhabarmal and Balbir Banuda, and equally left with them, obviously he shared the common object of the unlawful assembly. Thus, he has been correctly convicted for offence under Section 302/149, 452 and 147 IPC. As far as Mukesh Khud is concerned, the learned counsel has pleaded that he was not named in the written report (Ex.P.26) by Manoj. In fact, his name was introduced much later in his supplementary statement (Ex.D.12) recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. However, even this contention raised by the learned counsel is unacceptable. For, it is a settled principle of law that a FIR is not meant to be encyclopedic in scope. Moreover, Manoj in his first statement (Ex.D.11) and Baldev in his first statement (Ex.D.4) had clearly taken the name of Mukesh Khud. As mentioned above, both these statements were recorded on 7.4.2006. Since the delay in recording of these statements has already been explained by both these witnesses, the possibility of over-implicating Mukesh Khud does not exist. Moreover, these witnesses have no animus against this person. Therefore, the learned Judge was certainly justified in convicting Mukesh Khud for offences under Sections 147, 148, 452 and 302 IPC. Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Appeal No.337/2011 Mr. Anoop Dhand, the learned counsel for Nema Mali, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, Manoj (P.W.16) does not name Nema Mali as being present at the time of commission of the crime in his written report (Ex.P.26). Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand vs. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Criminal Appeal No.337/2011 Mr. Anoop Dhand, the learned counsel for Nema Mali, has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, Manoj (P.W.16) does not name Nema Mali as being present at the time of commission of the crime in his written report (Ex.P.26). Secondly, neither Baldev (P.W.9), nor Manoj (P.W.16) has mentioned his name in their statements given to the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Thus, obviously, Nema Mali was not present when the alleged crime was committed. Thirdly, the learned Judge has merely relied upon the testimony of Ram Chandra (P.W.10). But Ram Chandra is an unreliable witness. For, Ram Chandra has given the date as 23.3.1996 for over-hearing the conversation amongst the accused persons while conspiring to cause the death of Gopal Fogawat. Therefore, he refers to an incident which is ten years prior to the actual commission of the crime. Fourthly, Ram Chandra (P. W. 10) even after hearing the cooking up of the conspiracy neither informs the police, nor informs Raju Theth, nor informs Gopal Fogawat that there is a conspiracy to kill him. According to Section 39 Cr.P.C., every person aware of the commission of or the intention of other person to commit any offence under the Indian Penal Code is required to inform the police. Yet Ram Chandra (P. W. 10) does not follow mandate of Section 39 of Cr.P.C. Fifthly, Ram Chandra (P. W. 10) does not identify Nema Mali either in his test identification parade, or in the court. Therefore, the learned Judge was not justified in convicting Nema Mali for offence under Section 302/120 B IPC. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor, has frankly conceded, and in the opinion of this court rightly so, that Baldev and Manoj do not speak about the presence of Nema Mali at the scene of the crime. However, the learned Public Prosecutor has contended that for convicting a person for offence under Section 120B IPC read with another offence, it is not necessary that the accused must be physically be present at the scene of the crime. Therefore, even if Nama Mali was not present at the place of the incident, it would not absolve him of his criminal liability under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC. Lastly, Ram Chandra (P.W.10) is a reliable witness. Therefore, even if Nama Mali was not present at the place of the incident, it would not absolve him of his criminal liability under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC. Lastly, Ram Chandra (P.W.10) is a reliable witness. For, he has no animosity for falsely implicating Nema Mali in the present case. Further, according to him, Nema Mali was present when Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Banuda were conspiring to get rid of Gopal Fogawat. During the course of his testimony, Ram Chandra had clearly stated that Nema Mali is not present in the court. A note was also placed by the court verifying the fact that due to an application submitted by Nema Mali for dispensing with his personal appearance before the trial court, the trial court has dispensed with his personal attendance for the day. Hence, this witness has identified Nema Mali by pointing out his absence in the court. Therefore, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment qua Nema Mali. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and examined the record. Merely because a witness is supposed to follow the law, but fails to do so, his testimony cannot be ousted only on this ground. At best, the court is put on alert and has to critically analyze his testimony. Thus, merely because Ram Chandra is expected to follow the mandate of Section 39 Cr. P. C., of informing the police about hatching of a conspiracy, merely because he failed to do so, merely on this ground, his testimony cannot be over-looked. As discussed above, Ram Chandra (P.W.10) has mentioned the date of 20.3.1996 in his examination-in-chief. However, the learned Judge is justified in concluding that the year 1996 is a typographical mistake. Firstly, Ram Chandra claims that he is working in finances. On the date his deposition was recorded, he was thirty years old. If the year 1996 were true, then he would be seventeen years old. Obviously, he could not be doing a business of finances at the young age of seventeen. Moreover, according to Exhbiit-P.89, it is claimed that Sheesh Ram was assaulted on 20.3.2006 due to which he expired. According to Ram Chandra (P.W.10), the meeting organized by Mukesh Sauthalia was organized after Sheesh Ram expired. Obviously, he could not be doing a business of finances at the young age of seventeen. Moreover, according to Exhbiit-P.89, it is claimed that Sheesh Ram was assaulted on 20.3.2006 due to which he expired. According to Ram Chandra (P.W.10), the meeting organized by Mukesh Sauthalia was organized after Sheesh Ram expired. Thus, obviously, the year 1996 is a typographical mistake and has to be read as the year 2006 as the meeting is said to have been organized immediately after the death of Sheesh Ram. Ram Chandra (P.W.10) also states that he had seen Nema Mali at the meeting with Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad and with other accused persons. Thus, Nema Mali was a member of the conspiracy. This witness also claims that he has known Nema Mali and other persons as they used to come to the same tea-stall which was used by this witness. Therefore, prior to the occurrence, he had known Nema Mali. When this witness was asked to identify Nema Mali in the court amongst the accused available in the court, he categorical stated that “Nema Mali is not present in the court today.” According to the note placed by the Presiding Officer, Nema Mali’s presence for the day was dispensed with as an application had been moved on his behalf for dispensing with his presence for the day. Thus, Ram Chandra (P. W. 10) had clearly identified Nema Mali. In the case of State of Himachal Prades vs. Krishan Lal Pradhan [ (1987) 2 SCC 17 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court had opined that “the offence of criminal conspiracy consists of a meeting of mind of two or more persons for agreeing to do or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means, and performance of an act in terms thereof. In pursuant of the criminal conspiracy the conspirator commits several offences, then all of them will be liable for the offences even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of the offences” (Emphasis added). Therefore, even if Nema Mali was not present in the tailoring shop belonging to Bhagirath (P.W.2) at the time when Gopal Fogawat was killed, but his mere presence at the meeting organized by Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad on 23.3.2006 is sufficient for convicting Nema Mali for offence under Section 302 read with 120B IPC. Therefore, even if Nema Mali was not present in the tailoring shop belonging to Bhagirath (P.W.2) at the time when Gopal Fogawat was killed, but his mere presence at the meeting organized by Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Prasad on 23.3.2006 is sufficient for convicting Nema Mali for offence under Section 302 read with 120B IPC. State of Rajasthan vs. Hariprasad @ Hari Banuda & Ors. (D.B. Criminal Appeal No.898/2011) The State of Rajasthan has filed the present appeal against eleven accused-respondents, namely Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand, Vijaypal @ Birju Jat, Richhpal Singh, Mohd. Amin, Jai Singh, Manjeet Singh, Daulat Ram, Bhanwar Singh and Roopdan. Against the first three accused-appellants, mentioned above, the State of Rajasthan is aggrieved by the fact that by the impugned judgment, they have been acquitted for offence under Section 120B IPC, although Hari Banuda and Mukesh Sauthalia and Nema Mali have been convicted for offence under Section 302 read with 120B IPC. Mr. Aladeen Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, has contended that Section 120B IPC being a substantive offence, even if these three accused persons have been convicted for offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B IPC still they should have been convicted for offence under Section 120B IPC. As far as the other accused respondents are concerned, the learned Public Prosecutor has contended that the learned Judge has not assigned any cogent reasons for acquitting them of their respective charges. Therefore, qua these accused persons, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and they deserve to be convicted for their respective charges. However, on the other hand, Mr. Ajay Gupta, the learned counsel for Bhanwar Singh, respondent No.10, has contended that in fact, the learned Judge has given cogent and convincing reasons for acquitting the accused respondents. Moreover, according to the learned counsel, the presumption of innocence gathers strength once the accused is acquitted by the learned trial court. Therefore, in interfering with a judgment of acquittal, the scope for interference by the appellate court is extremely limited. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Sudershan Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2014 (14) SCALE 276]. Secondly, the learned Public Prosecutor is not justified in contending that the learned Judge has not assigned any reasons for acquitting the accused persons. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied on the case of Sudershan Kumar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [2014 (14) SCALE 276]. Secondly, the learned Public Prosecutor is not justified in contending that the learned Judge has not assigned any reasons for acquitting the accused persons. In fact, the learned judge has justified his decision by giving cogent reasons. Since we have maintained the conviction of the appellants, Hari Prasad @ Hari Banuda, Mukesh Sauthalia, Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand, Vijaypal @ Birju Jat, Richhpal Singh, Mohd. Amin, Jai Singh, Manjeet Singh, Daulat Ram, Bhanwar Singh and Roopdan, under Section 302 read with 120B IPC, we need not entertain the argument raised by the learned Public Prosecutor for the State that the appellant should also be substantively convicted for offence under Section 120B IPC as the same remains only an academic one. As far as Richhpal Singh is concerned, the allegations against him were that according to Pawan Kumar (P.W.18), he had seen Richhpal standing in front of his shop and then he had seen him follow the deceased. Moreover, it was claimed that he has had conversation with Hari Banuda and Mukesh Sauthalia on their mobile numbers. Secondly, he was relaying certain information to Hari Banuda and to Mukesh Sauthalia over the mobile phones owned by them. However, the learned Judge has noticed the fact that merely because Richhpal happened to be standing in front of Pawan Kumar’s shop and merely because he had followed the deceased, it could be a real coincidence. Such a coincidence does not unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused in a conspiracy. Moreover, since both, Mukesh Sauthalia and Hari Banuda, have denied the fact that the mobiles belong to them, therefore, the evidence that Richhpal was speaking to them over mobile phone looses all its significance. Most importantly, the learned Judge has noticed the fact that Richhpal Singh was not named in the written report (Ex.P.26). Therefore, the learned Judge has given weighty reasons for acquitting Richhpal Singh. As far as Mohd. Ameen Pathan is concerned, the learned Judge has noticed the fact that his name has not been mentioned in the written report (Ex.P.26). Moreover, his name was neither mentioned in the first statement (Ex.D.4) of Baldev (P.W.9), nor in the first statement (Ex.D.11) of Manoj (P.W.16). As far as Mohd. Ameen Pathan is concerned, the learned Judge has noticed the fact that his name has not been mentioned in the written report (Ex.P.26). Moreover, his name was neither mentioned in the first statement (Ex.D.4) of Baldev (P.W.9), nor in the first statement (Ex.D.11) of Manoj (P.W.16). Therefore, the subsequent involvement of his name by these two witnesses creates a doubt that it could be a case of over-implication. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that Mohd. Ameen had any conversation, or was part of conspiracy with Hari Prasad or Mukesh Khud for even Ram Chandra (P.W.10) does not mention his presence at the meeting organized by Hari Prasad. Therefore, Mohd. Ameen cannot be roped in with the aid of Section 120B IPC for offence under Section 302 IPC. Hence, again the learned Judge has given well thought out reasoned for his decision qua Mohd. Ameen. As far as Vijaypal @ Birju is concerned, the learned Judge has noticed the fact that neither in the written report (Ex.P.26), nor in the first statement (Ex.D.4) of Baldev (P.W.9), nor in the first statement (Ex.D.11) of Manoj has Vijaypal @ Birju been named. Even in his supplementary statement (Ex.D.5), Baldev does not mention Vijaypal’s name. For the first time, Manoj in his supplementary statement (Ex.D.12) mentions Vijapal’s name. Even in the deposition neither Baldev (P.W.9), nor Manoj (P.W.16) mentioned Vijaypal. Moreover, even the testimony of Sanjay (P.W.4) does not lead to the inference that the Bolero jeep belonging to Vijaypal was used in the commission of the crime as both the number plates have never been recovered by the police. Thus, the learned Judge is certainly justified in granting the benefit of doubt to Vijaypal @ Birju. Similarly, for Daulat Ram, his name is neither mentioned in the written report (Ex.P.26), nor in the first statement (Ex.D.4) of Baldev, nor in the first statement (Ex.D.11) of Manoj. For the first time Manoj (P.W.16) mentions his name in his testimony before the court. Therefore, it would be unsafe to convict Daulat Ram merely on the fact that Manoj (P.W.16) has mentioned him in his court testimony. For the first time Manoj (P.W.16) mentions his name in his testimony before the court. Therefore, it would be unsafe to convict Daulat Ram merely on the fact that Manoj (P.W.16) has mentioned him in his court testimony. Further, since Ram Chandra (P.W.10) did not know Daulat Ram from before and since no test identification parade was conducted and merely because Ram Chandra had identified him for the first time in the court, the identification in the court is too fragile an evidence for convicting Daulat Ram. Thus, the learned Judge was certainly justified in acquitting him. As far as Bhanwar Singh is concerned, the prosecution has claimed that on an information given by Bhanwar Singh (Ex.P.129), a Scorpio vehicle was recovered by Exhibit-P.85. It was claimed by the prosecution that the said Scorpio vehicle was used by the accused persons for fleeing from the law. However, the said information (Ex.P.129) was not drawn up before two independent witnesses. Moreover, there is no evidence to establish the fact that the Scorpio was actually used by the accused persons for fleeing from the law. The only other piece of evidence used by the prosecution against Bhanwar Singh is that in the statement (Ex.P.121) given by Daulat Ram under Section 27 of the Evidence Act he had stated that “he along with Balbir Banuda, Mukesh Khud had gone to the house of Bhanwar Singh and left the Bolero which was used for commission of the crime and had also left the firearm weapons at his house.” However, since the said statement was given under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and since no recovery was made on the basis of this statement, the said statement cannot be read against Bhanwar Singh. Moreover, since the said statement has been given by a co-accused, it cannot be used against Bhanwar Singh Therefore, the learned Judge was certainly justified in acquitting Bhanwar Singh form the charges leveled against him. The only evidence that the prosecution had sought to produce against Roopdan was the fact that he has given shelter to the accused persons after commission of the crime. However, the prosecution could not bring any such evidence to buttress its plea against Roopdan. A bare perusal of the record also reveals that there is no cogent evidence produced against Roopdan for proving the allegation against him. However, the prosecution could not bring any such evidence to buttress its plea against Roopdan. A bare perusal of the record also reveals that there is no cogent evidence produced against Roopdan for proving the allegation against him. Thus, the learned Judge was justified in acquitting Roopdan for offence under Section 212 IPC. As far as Manjeet Singh is concerned, he has neither been named in the written report (Ex.P.26), nor Baldev (P.W.9) and Manoj (P.W.16) claim that he was present at the time the crime was committed. But for the arrest memo (Ex.P.68) of Manjeet, no other evidence has been produced against him. In fact, no mobile set, or sim has been recovered from him in order to make out a case that he was involved in the criminal conspiracy for committing the murder of Gopal Fogawat. Hence, again the learned Judge has given convincing reasons for acquitting Manjeet Singh of the charges framed against him. Lastly, as far as Jai Singh is concerned, the learned Judge has noticed the fact that the mobile set recovered from Jai Singh does not prove the fact that he was in communication with Hari Banuda, or with Mukesh Sauthalia. Moreover, the mobile set which was allegedly recovered at the instance of Hari Banuda has not been proven to belong to Jai Singh. Furthermore, the SIM recovered at the instance of Jai Singh has not been proven to belong to Mukesh Sauthalia. Therefore, there is no linking evidence to connect Jai Singh to either of these two accused persons. Hence, the learned Judge was certainly justified in acquitting Jai Singh of offence under Section 302, 120B, 119 IPC. It is true that the appellate court does have the power to reassess the entire evidence even while dealing with a judgment of acquittal. But it is equally a settled principle of law that an appellate court will not interfere with a judgment of acquittal where the view taken by the learned trial court is a plausible one. Even if there are two views of the evidence produced and one of them has been adopted by the learned trial court, the appellate court will not interfere even in such a situation. In the case of Sudershan Kumar (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 29. Even if there are two views of the evidence produced and one of them has been adopted by the learned trial court, the appellate court will not interfere even in such a situation. In the case of Sudershan Kumar (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 29. It has been stated and restated that a cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced by an order of the acquittal. The appellate court, in such a case, would interfere only for very substantial and compelling reason. There is plethora of case laws on this proposition and we need not burden this judgment by referring to those decisions. Our purpose would be served by referring to one reasoned pronouncement entitled Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401 is the judgment where most of the earlier decisions laying down the aforesaid principle are referred to. In para 39, propositions laid down in an earlier case are taken note of as under: "39. In Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court held: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 30. Thereafter, in para 41, the Court curled out five principles and we would like to reproduce the said para hereunder: “41. The following principles emerge from the cases above: 1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court. 3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. 5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached-one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High Courts/ appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused." Since the learned Judge has given weighty, cogent and convincing reasons for acquitting the accused respondents, this court does not find any reason for interfering with the impugned judgment. Thus, there is no merit in the appeal filed by the State. The same is, hereby, dismissed. Thus, there is no merit in the appeal filed by the State. The same is, hereby, dismissed. As far as the appeal filed by Jhabarmal and Others, D.B. Criminal Appeal No.336/2011, and the criminal appeal filed by Nema Mali @ Nemi Chand, namely D.B. Criminal Appeal No.337/2011, are concerned, this court does not find any merit in these two appeals. Therefore, they too are dismissed.