Order M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. 1. This petition is filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'C.P.C.') seeking permission to amend the plaint to incorporate certain reliefs i.e. recovery of possession of schedule property i.e. plot No. 126 in R.S. No. 3672B, Bhavanipuram, Vijayawada, alleging that the petitioners filed suit O.S. No. 52 of 2010 on the file of the Court of XII Additional District Judge, Vijayawada (for short, 'the trial Court'), for declaration of title and for consequential injunction against the 1st respondent who set up title over the property by way of private sale. The 2nd respondent society sold schedule property to late Panduranga Rao, who is husband of the 1" petitioner and father of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, under registered sale deed dated 29-02-1996. The property in an extent of Ac. 14.12 cents at Bhavanipuram, Vijayawada, was acquired by Government exclusively for the purpose of providing house sites to the 2nd respondent personnel under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act of 1894' brevity) in the year 1985. Vijayawada Urban Development Authority (for, short, VUDA') approved layout and the same was divided into 215 plots. The 2nd respondent society allotted the plots to its members. During the allotment, late Panduranga Rao was allotted schedule property in the year 1996 through executing (sic) registered sale deed in his favour. In fact, the allotment was done in the year 1982 itself but execution of registered sale deed was postponed due to challenge of land acquisition before this Court which finally ended in dismissal. The 1st respondent, though not a member of the 2nd respondent society, challenged the very acquisition of land on one hand and she is trying to encroach the plot of her choice on the other. Schedule property within the boundaries mentioned in Ex. A1 is exclusive property of the petitioners and they are in possession of the property. The 1st respondent filed suit for bare injunction against the petitioners and other individuals without seeking declaratory relief and the suit was decreed but the boundaries mentioned in injunction suit filed by the 1st respondent and the boundaries of schedule property were totally different. The 1st respondent was never in possession of schedule property initially but, encroaching into schedule property during pendency of the suit, continuing in possession of the same till today. The 1st respondent was never in possession of schedule property initially but, encroaching into schedule property during pendency of the suit, continuing in possession of the same till today. The petitioners further contended that the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that L.P. No. 4 of 1995 was not filed and number of plots consisting in L.P. No. 4 of 1995 were not disclosed. The trial Court dismissed the suit concluding that mere producing sale deed and marking the same as Ex. A1 are not sufficient since the petitioners are out of possession. The specific allegation made in the affidavit as to how the 1st respondent came into possession is that the petitioners were, originally, in possession of schedule property, which is vacant land, but, during pendency of the suit i.e. on 05-02-2011, the 1st respondent encroached into schedule property. Therefore, the petitioners claimed recovery of possession and permit them to amend the plaint. The 1st respondent filed counter denying material allegations of the affidavit filed along with the petition while contending that she is the absolute owner of the property described in the schedule ever since her purchase from 30-01-1982 vide document No. 660 of 1982 of Sub-Registrar, Vijayawada. The 1st respondent has been paying property tax to authorities concerned. While the matter stood thus, when members of the 2nd respondent society tried to interfere with schedule property, the 1st respondent filed O.S. No. 171 of 1996 on the file of the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, for grant of permanent injunction against the society, its members, agents, servants and associates from ever interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of schedule property and the same was decreed ex parte on 30-07-1998. The 2nd respondent did not choose to take steps in the suit for permanent injunction though the suit was decreed in favour of the 1st respondent believing that she is the absolute owner and in possession of the property. The 2nd respondent did not choose to take steps in the suit for permanent injunction though the suit was decreed in favour of the 1st respondent believing that she is the absolute owner and in possession of the property. The petitioners filed suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction but, when the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the petitioners were not in possession of the property, now came up with the present petition to convert the suit for declaration of title and for consequential permanent injunction into suit for recovery of possession which cannot be permitted after commencement of trial; in view of Central Act of 22 of 2002 i.e. amendment to C.P.C., the petitioners are not entitled to claim the relief and prayed for dismissal of the petition. 2. During the course of argument, Sri S. Sreeramachandra Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioners, drawn attention of this Court to the order in E.P. No. 16 of 2011 in O.S. No. 1994 of 2007 on the file of the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, whereunder execution petition filed by the 1st respondent was dismissed on the ground that the property on ground was not tallying with the present schedule property; on the strength of the same, it is contended that the property purchased by the 1st respondent is different and distinct from the property covered by the suit and, therefore, she is not entitled to claim any right. Learned counsel also contended that proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. introduced by Act 22 of 2002 did not create any interdict totally disabling parties to amend pleadings unless extraordinary circumstances are shown and, in support of his contentions, placed reliance on Delhi Development Authority v. S.S. Aggarwal and others, 2011 (6) SCJ 496 : AIR 2011 SC 3265 , Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, 2008 (6) SCJ 440 : AIR 2008 SC 2234 : 2009 (3) ALT 21.1 (DN SC); Rameshkumar Agarwal v. Rajmala Exports Private Limited and others, 2012 (4) ALT 1 (SC) : 2012 (4) SCJ 724 : AIR 2012 SC 1887 ; Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others v. K.K. Modi and others, 2006 (3) ALT 50 (SC) : 2006 (3) SCJ 268 : (2006) 4 SCC 385 , A. Krishna Rao v. A. Narahari Rao and others, 2015 (1) ALT 113 : 2014 (6) ALD 258 , and Bairam Susheela v. Pendota Rama Rajaiah 2004 (5) ALT 233 : 2004 (4) ALD 700 . 3. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that, in view of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. amendment cannot be allowed; unless the petitioners proved extraordinary circumstances, which disabled them to seek amendment of plaint during pendency of the suit, the petition cannot be allowed; mostly relied on proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. which was brought on statute by Act 22 of 2002 and also placed reliance on Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and others, 2009 (8) SCJ 401 : (2009) 10 SCC 84 : 2010 (6) ALT 19.4 (DN SC), Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by LRs., (1989) 4 SCC 732 ; Jagajeevan Panigrahi and others v. Gelala Somayya, 1998 (3) ALT 49 : 1998 (3) ALD 280 ; and Ran Singh v. Mukhtiara Singh, AIR 1953 PEPSU 105. 4. In view of rival contentions, perusing material available on record, the sole point that arises for consideration is thus: "Whether the petitioners were prevented by sufficient cause, which is beyond their control, to take steps to amend the plaint during pendency of the suit before commencement of trial, if so, will the petitioners be permitted to amend the plaint claiming recovery of possession of schedule property?" 5. In Re. In Re. Point: The consistent case of the petitioners from the beginning is that (the petitioners) (sic.) late Panduranga Rao, husband of the 1" petitioner and father of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, was allotted schedule property by the 2nd respondent society and executed Ex. A1 registered sale deed. Since then, the said Panduranga Rao was in possession of the property during his lifetime. Later, the petitioners, being legal-heirs, succeeded the property and in possession and enjoyment of the same but, due to threats and setting up of claim by the 1st respondent, the petitioners filed O.S. No. 52 of 2010 before the trial Court for declaration of title and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the respondents herein. The 1st respondent, contesting the suit, filed written statement contending that she purchased the property under registered sale deed in the year 1982 and, ever since, she has been in possession and enjoyment of the property. The trial Court, believing the contention of the 1st respondent that she has been in possession and enjoyment of the property, dismissed the suit basing on the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ('the Act of 1963' for brevity). The petitioners, challenging the said findings, preferred this appeal and the present petition is filed raising a specific contention that, during pendency of the suit, the 1st respondent encroached into schedule property on 05-02-2011 and, therefore, the reason for dismissal of the suit is only due to highhanded act, of trespassing into the property during pendency of the suit. The petitioners explained the reason for failure to take steps during pendency of the suit on the ground that schedule property is totally different from schedule in O.S. No. 1994 of 2007 filed by the 1st respondent and even in E.P. No. 16 of 2011 in O.S. No. 1994 of 2007. 6. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent mostly relied on proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. which disables the petitioners to claim relief in the present petition more particularly to amend the pleadings. 6. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent mostly relied on proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. which disables the petitioners to claim relief in the present petition more particularly to amend the pleadings. According to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. However, the principles to allow amendment petitions under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. are well settled; they are that the amendment shall not alter the basic structure or nature of the claim and that the amendment shall not take away the valuable right that accrued to the respondent or such amendment will not take away the unequivocal admissions made in the pleadings. However, by amendment to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. an interdict is created to allow such amendments that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. In view of the proviso, it is for the petitioners to satisfy the Court that they exercised due diligence but could not take steps to raise such plea before commencement of trial in the suit before the trial Court. Allowing amendments prior to commencement of trial is a matter of routine. The petitioners, who seek permission to amend the plaint after commencement of trial, have to establish that, despite due diligence, they could not raise such plea. In the present case, the reason assigned by the petitioners is that the boundaries of schedule property are totally different from the schedule of property in O.S. No. 1994 of 2007 but, during pendency of the suit, the 1st respondent suddenly encroached into schedule property and set up claim over it though the property purchased by her in the year 1982 before acquisition of land is distinct from schedule property. Therefore, the petitioners could not take steps before commencement of trial. 7. Therefore, the petitioners could not take steps before commencement of trial. 7. Whereas, learned counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that, by the date of alleged encroachment i.e. on 05-02-2011, the trial was not commenced and nothing prevented the petitioners to take steps to amend the plaint. 8. Undoubtedly, schedule property is vacant site and proof of effective possession is difficult for anybody. In any view of the matter, the petitioners are entitled to claim relief in the present petition if the petitioners are able to show exercise of due diligence. In Rameshkumar Agarwal v. Rajmala Exports Private Limited and others (3rd supra), the Apex Court, relying on Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and others (7th supra) to decide the scope of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C., held in para Nos. 10 and 11 as follows: "On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide', (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are illustrative and not exhaustive. It is clear that while deciding the application for amendment ordinarily the Court must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide and dishonest amendments. The purpose and object of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. Amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances, but the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hyper-technical approach. The purpose and object of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. Amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances, but the Courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hyper-technical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly, in cases where the other side can be compensated with costs. Normally, amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigations." The Apex Court further held that amendment application (to) (sic) be filed immediately after filing suit i.e. before commencement of trial. If the petitioners are able to prove or explain as to how they failed to take steps before the trial Court (sic commenced) despite exercising due diligence, the Court can allow such amendment. The factum of exercising due diligence depends upon circumstances. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others v. K.K. Modi and others (4th supra), wherein the Apex Court held that "The object of Order 6 Rule 17 is that the Courts should try the merits of the case that come before them and should, consequently, allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. The rule of amendment is essentially a rule of justice, equity and good conscience and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interest of doing full and complete justice to the parties before the Court. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleadings of a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide. The amendment to pleading should be liberally allowed since procedural obstacles ought not to impede the dispensation of justice. The Court should also take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten the litigation, to preserve and safeguard the rights of both parties and to subserve the ends of justice." It is further held that "While considering whether an application for amendment should or should not be allowed, the Court should not go into the correctness or falsity of the case in the amendment. Likewise, it should not record a finding on the merits of the amendment and the merits of the amendment sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be adjudged at the stage of allowing the prayer for amendment." 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance on Delhi Development Authority v. S.S. Aggarwal and others (1st supra) and Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand (2nd supra). In both these judgments, the Supreme Court, while discussing about applicability of proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. held that suits filed prior to amendment are not governed by the proviso. Therefore, these two judgments are not necessary for deciding the present dispute for the reason that the suit was filed subsequent to Act 22 of 2002. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners further placed reliance on Bairam Susheela v. Pendota Rama Rajaiah (6th supra), wherein it was held that "Mere grant of permission to amend the pleadings does not confer or take away the rights of the parties. On the basis of the amendment, necessary issues have to be framed after giving an opportunity to the other party and evidence has to be adduced on the issues so framed, if necessary. It shall always be open to the parties to raise such pleas as are open to them touching on the relief introduced through amendment." In the facts of the above judgment, the suit was filed for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, which was dismissed, and filed petition under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. to introduce relief of recovery of possession on the ground that the respondent pleaded that the petitioner was dispossessed from the property. The facts of the above decision are identical to the present facts of the case but the principle laid down in the above judgment did not deal with proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. since the suit relates to the period prior to amendment of Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. In A. Krishna Rao v. A. Narahari Rao and others (5th supra), this Court, while dealing with an application under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. held that "Rejection of petition under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. on the ground that proposed amendment is inconsistent with original plea and petitioner cannot be permitted to raise such inconsistent plea is not justified. Amendment of pleading cannot be rejected even if proposed amendment has effect of raising conflict in plea. It is for the plaintiff to justify his pleadings and prove the same with reference to evidence. Since the procedure being handmaid of justice, a party cannot be deprived of his right to raise pleadings by way of amendment unless proposed amendment results in failure of justice." 12. In view of the principles laid down in the above judgments, the Courts have to allow amendments if petitions under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. are filed before commencement of trial. If petitions are filed after commencement of trial, the petitioners have to show that amendment could not be made in spite of exercise of due diligence. Here, the petitioners explained the reason for their failure to amend the plaint, more particularly based on boundaries of schedule property and boundaries of property purchased by the 1st respondent and dismissal of E.P. No. 16 of 2011 in O.S. No. 1994 of 2007, contending that schedule property is vacant site and effective possession cannot be proved but the trial Court, disbelieving their contention, held that the petitioners failed to prove their possession as on the date of filing suit and dismissed the suit for declaration and consequential permanent injunction. Therefore, the present amendment necessitates to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to shorten the litigation. 13. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent mostly based his argument on proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. and drawn attention of this Court to Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons and others (7th supra), wherein the Apex Court laid down certain tests which are extracted above. In para No. 61 of the same judgment, it was held that "The Courts have consistently laid down that for unnecessary delay and inconvenience, the opposite party must be compensated with costs. The imposition of costs is an important judicial exercise particularly when the Courts deal with the cases of amendment. The costs cannot and should not be imposed arbitrarily." Even according to the principles laid down in the above judgment, if amendment is necessary for deciding real controversy, Court may allow such amendment, if the proposed amendment shortens the litigation and avoids multiplicity of proceedings, but on payment of costs. 14. The costs cannot and should not be imposed arbitrarily." Even according to the principles laid down in the above judgment, if amendment is necessary for deciding real controversy, Court may allow such amendment, if the proposed amendment shortens the litigation and avoids multiplicity of proceedings, but on payment of costs. 14. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent further drawn attention of this Court to Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by L.Rs. (8th supra), wherein the Apex Court held that "When a new ground is taken in re-joinder, an issue was framed by trial Court to the knowledge of opposite party but no objection was raised at that time by the opposite party. In such case, amendment cannot be allowed at appellate stage." 15. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent also placed reliance on Jagajeevan Panigrahi and others v. Gelala Somayya (9th supra), wherein this Court held that "The petitioners cannot seek amendment at a belated state (sic. stage) setting up a claim for possession of suit property for the institution of a fresh suit would be barred by limitation. The amendment cannot be allowed, as it seriously prejudices the respondent and the valuable right accrued to the respondent during the pendency of the suit to raise the plea of adverse possession would be defeated." 16. No doubt the proposed amendment may change nature of the suit to some extent. However, the intention of the legislature in permitting amendments is to shorten the litigation and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. If such conversion is not permitted, certainly the parties have to again approach Court by filing suit for recovery of possession and it will be delayed for another decade or so. If that principle is applied, it is difficult for any party to amend their pleadings. 17. If such conversion is not permitted, certainly the parties have to again approach Court by filing suit for recovery of possession and it will be delayed for another decade or so. If that principle is applied, it is difficult for any party to amend their pleadings. 17. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that amendment can be allowed to clarify position put forward in the plaint or rectification of any formal defect therein but not to convert suit for declaration into recovery of possession and placed reliance on Ran Singh v. Mukhtiara Singh (10th supra), wherein it was held that "Where an amendment does not amount to a mere clarification of the position put forward in the plaint or rectification of any formal defect therein, but, if allowed, would result in plaintiffs going back upon his own admissions and disproving facts which he himself asserted in the plaint and got a decision against him; such amendment would necessarily change the nature of the suit and cannot be allowed at the stage of appeal." 18. In the present case, the case of the plaintiff is based on title and claimed declaration of title but relief of recovery of possession is purely consequential to the primary relief of declaration. While deciding petitions filed under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C., Courts have to keep in mind the object of the legislature in permitting parties to amend their pleadings. The main object is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and shorten the litigation without driving parties to further litigation. 19. Taking into consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case; to avoid multiplicity of proceedings without driving the petitioners to file fresh suit for recovery of possession and to shorten the litigation, I find that it is a fit case to permit the petitioners to amend the pleadings on payment of costs of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) to the 1st respondent. Accordingly, the point is answered. In the result, the petition is allowed on payment of costs of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) to the 1st respondent within ten (10) days from today. In the event of failure to pay costs, the petition shall stand dismissed automatically.