Md. Ismail Basha alias Ekbal Basha v. Union of India
2015-07-23
ARINDAM SINHA
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The matter has been heard at length. In order dated 15th July, 2015 a point of challenge raised by the petitioner giving rise to the question regarding what was the law in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of India in Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas & Ors., reported in AIR 1994 SC 2179 , as subsequently interpreted by a Division Bench of the said Court in the case of Kesar Devi (Smt) v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2003) Supreme Court Cases 427, ( AIR 2003 SC 4195 , 2003 Cri LJ 3750) was recorded as is reproduced below : 'The petitioner has challenged the order dated 7th December, 2009 made by the Appellate Tribunal for forfeited property constituted under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 whereby the order of forfeiture of the petitioners properties made by the competent Authority was upheld. The petitioners only ground of challenge is that on the materials on record the Tribunal had not found it to be established that the properties ordered to be forfeited were the properties held by the petitioner on behalf of the detenu as his associate. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied on a decision in the case of Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2179 , in particular paragraph 43 thereof to submit that the said Court had interpreted the said Act, inter alia, as follows : '… .The idea is not to forfeit the independent properties of such relatives or associates which they may have acquired illegally but only to reach the properties of the convict/detenu or properties traceable to him, wherever they are, ignoring all the transactions with respect to those properties.' 2. Mr. Saraf, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the revenue has relied on a later judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kesar Devi (Smt) v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2003) 7 SCC 427 , ( AIR 2003 SC 4195 , 2003 Cri LJ 3750) in particular to paragraphs 11 to 13 therein.
Mr. Saraf, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the revenue has relied on a later judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kesar Devi (Smt) v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2003) 7 SCC 427 , ( AIR 2003 SC 4195 , 2003 Cri LJ 3750) in particular to paragraphs 11 to 13 therein. In those paragraphs the Supreme Court had considered the judgment in Amratlal Prajivandas ( AIR 1994 SC 2179 ) (supra) and held as follows: 'We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that under the scheme of the Act, there is no requirement on the part of the competent authority to mention or establish any nexus or link between the money of the convict or detenu and the property sought to be forfeited. In fact, if such a condition is imposed, the very purpose of enacting SAFEMA would be frustrated, as in many cases it would be almost impossible to show that the property was purchased or acquired from the money provided by the convict or detenu.' This matter is adjourned to be listed on next Wednesday i.e. 22nd July, 2015 for the petitioner to make submission regarding the law applicable to the challenge made in the writ petition.' 3. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted with reference to the decision in Kesar Devi ( AIR 2003 SC 4195 , 2003 Cri LJ 3750) (supra) that the facts in that case were that the competent Authority had made orders on the findings that though ostensible owner of the properties was Smt. Kesar Devi but the real owner was her husband Jagannath Sharma, the detenu. On the facts the Supreme Court in that judgment had held as follows : '12. … … … In those cases where the relationship is a very remote one, the competent authority may have to indicate some link or nexus while recording reasons for belief that the property is an illegally acquired property. But cases where relationship is close and direct like spouse, son or daughter or parents stand on an altogether different footing. Here no link or nexus has to be indicated in the reasons for belief between the convict or detenu and the property, as such an inference can easily be drawn.' 4.
But cases where relationship is close and direct like spouse, son or daughter or parents stand on an altogether different footing. Here no link or nexus has to be indicated in the reasons for belief between the convict or detenu and the property, as such an inference can easily be drawn.' 4. He submitted the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in interpreting the earlier judgment of that Court delivered by a larger Bench, had interpreted the law declared to be that where the relationship is a very remote one, the competent Authority may have to indicate some link or nexus, not having to so indicate where the relationship was close. In that judgment, he submitted, there being this interpretation of requirement of indication of some link or nexus and the omission therein to mention about the cases of associates where there was no relationship whatsoever, could not amount to a straight-jacket formula of law interpreted to be that there is no requirement on the part of the competent Authority to mention or establish any nexus or link between the money of the convict or detenu and the property sought to be forfeited, for application as such in the facts and circumstances of the case being considered. Moreso because in that judgment itself another judgment delivered by a Bench of three Judges of the said Court in the case of Fatima Mohd. Amin v. Union of India, reported in (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 436 had been referred and distinguished on facts. Relying on Fatima Mohd. (supra) Mr. Chakraborty submitted the said Court upon relying on and quoting extensively from Amratlal Prajivandas ( AIR 1994 SC 2179 ) (supra) had held as follows: '7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the reasons recorded by the competent authority along with the show-cause notice. We do not find any averments to the effect that the property acquired by the appellant is a benami property of her son or the same was illegally acquired from her son. 8. The contents of the said notices, even if taken at their face value do not disclose any reason warranting action against the appellant. No allegations whatsoever has been made to this effect that there exists any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired money of the detenus. 9.
8. The contents of the said notices, even if taken at their face value do not disclose any reason warranting action against the appellant. No allegations whatsoever has been made to this effect that there exists any link or nexus between the property sought to be forfeited and the illegally acquired money of the detenus. 9. As the condition precedent for initiation of the proceedings under SAFEMA did not exist, the impugned orders of forfeiture cannot be sustained. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserve to be allowed. The order under challenge is set aside.' 5. Mr. Saraf in reply relied on the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal-III v. Oberoi Hotels (P) Ltd., reported in 2011(4) CHN (Cal) 552, (2011 Tax LR 568 (Cal)) in which a Division Bench of this Court had held as follows: '12. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that if there are conflict of opinions between the two Benches of the Supreme Court on a question of law, the one declared by the larger Bench would prevail over the one pronounced by the other Bench. But if a Bench consisting of a smaller number of Judges interprets a decision of a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in a different way which may be apparently opposed to the one taken by the larger Bench, a subsequent co-ordinate Bench of the Supreme Court may refuse to follow the interpretation of the latter one on the ground that it proposed to follow the earlier view expressed by a larger Bench. But if the subsequent decision of the smaller Bench explaining the larger Bench is placed before a High Court, the latter is bound to follow the subsequent one by the smaller one which interprets the decisions of the larger Bench because that is the interpretation of the larger Bench by a Bench of Supreme Court and the High Court cannot make a different interpretation than the one made by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court which is binding upon it. The position, however, would be different if the subsequent smaller Bench of the Supreme Court in ignorance of the earlier larger Bench takes a contrary view from the one taken by the earlier larger Bench.
The position, however, would be different if the subsequent smaller Bench of the Supreme Court in ignorance of the earlier larger Bench takes a contrary view from the one taken by the earlier larger Bench. In that situation, the High Court is entitled to reject the view of the latter smaller Bench of the Supreme Court as per incuriam.' 13. In the case before us, the subsequent decision of a Smaller Bench in the case of Ajadi Bacho Andolon (supra), has taken note of the earlier decision in the case of McDowell & Company Ltd. (supra), and has interpreted the same and thus, it is not a case of passing decision in ignorance of a binding decision. Therefore, in this case, the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be said to be wrong and is consistent with the one taken in the case of Ajadi Bacho Andolon (supra).' 6. On perusal of the judgments cited, it is seen in Amratlal Prajivandas ( AIR 1994 SC 2179 ) (supra) the judgment was delivered by a nine Judge Bench, Fatima Mohd. Amin (supra) delivered by a three Judge Bench and Kesar Devi ( AIR 2003 SC 4195 : 2003 Cri LJ 3750) (supra) delivered by a two Judge Bench, all of the Supreme Court. It is found that the said Court in Kesar Devi (supra) had interpreted the law declared in Amratlal Prajivandas (supra) as reproduced above. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court while delivering that interpretation, took note of the judgment in Fatima Mohd. Amin (supra) delivered by a larger Bench of the said Court. This Court finds in Fatima Mohd. Amin (supra) there does not appear to be any exercise made in interpreting the law declared in Amratlal Prajivandas (supra). Since the interpretation was made subsequently by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the manner reproduced above, this Court is bound by such interpretation in following Oberoi Hotels P (Ltd.) (2011 Tax LR 568 (Cal)) (supra) and therefore cannot interfere with the order upholding the order of forfeiture made by the competent Authority on the ground that no link or nexus was found to have been established to show that the properties sought to be forfeited were the properties of the detenu, held by the associate, the petitioner. The short point of challenge of the petitioner thus cannot be upheld.
The short point of challenge of the petitioner thus cannot be upheld. The writ petition therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. 7. After the order was made Mr. Chakraborty submitted that he had further points of challenge regarding the impugned order being perverse on the ground that the petitioner is not the associate. Such argument made at belated stage after the order has been dictated pursuant to point of challenge raised as recorded in earlier order dated 15th July, 2015, cannot be considered. 8. Stay of operation of the order has been prayed for. The prayer is considered and rejected. Petition dismissed.