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2015 DIGILAW 605 (BOM)

Acharya Mahant Salkar Baba v. Dattatraya

2015-02-27

A.S.CHANDURKAR

body2015
Oral Judgment: 1. These appeals filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) lay challenge to the judgment passed by the first appellate Court dated 27-8-2012 in Regular Civil Appeal No.17/1998 whereby said appeal has been dismissed and the decree passed by the trial Court in Special Civil Suit No.57/1980 on 10.12.1997 has been confirmed. 2. Facts: The dispute between the parties is with regard to recompilation and editing of literature in relation to “Mahanubhav Panth”. The work of editing “Lila Charitra” was assigned to Dr. V. B. Kolte (original defendant No.3). The said work of recompilation was released on 22-11-1978. The plaintiffs who are followers of “Mahanubhav Panth” noticed various glaring omissions, wrong statements, misleading references to the great Saints of said Panth. According to the plaintiffs, the founder of Mahanubhav sect was Shri Chakradhar Swami. The life of Shri Chakradhar Swami was compiled and written by Shri Mahim Bhat in 1196. However, subsequently, said manuscript was lost in the invasion by alien rulers. According to the plaintiffs, devotees of Mahanubhav sect had compiled and written various books on the life of Shri Chakradhar Swami. Accordingly, the great epic “Lila Charitra” came to be written. 3. The plaintiffs, therefore, in representative capacity approached the Civil Court for a decree of mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to take note of various glaring omissions, wrong statements, misleading references and injurious submissions that were contained in the edition of “Lila Chatritra” that was compiled by defendant No.3. The plaintiffs also sought prohibitory injunction to prevent the defendants from further publishing and circulating said work of defendant No.3. Damages for sum of Rs.25,000/- were also claimed from the defendants. Aforesaid suit came to be filed on 17-10-1980. 4. The defendant Nos.1 & 2 filed their written statement at Exhibit-33. According to said defendants, on 17-1-1974, the Akhil Bhartiya Mahanubhav Parishad had passed a resolution that defendant No.2 Board should edit and publish a volume dealing with the life of Shri Chakradhar Swami and/or Mahanubhav literature. Accordingly, on 4-3-1974, the defendant No.2 – Board accepted the request as made. This work of preparing aforesaid volume was entrusted to the defendant No.3 who was a learned person and an authority on Mahanubhav philosophy and literature. Thereafter, the defendant No.3 undertook aforesaid work and started compilation of said literature. Accordingly, on 4-3-1974, the defendant No.2 – Board accepted the request as made. This work of preparing aforesaid volume was entrusted to the defendant No.3 who was a learned person and an authority on Mahanubhav philosophy and literature. Thereafter, the defendant No.3 undertook aforesaid work and started compilation of said literature. In the meanwhile, in November 1977, the defendant No.2 – Board received a legal notice from Nagdeo Ashram authorities in relation to certain omissions/mistakes in the work of defendant No.3. After considering the same, the work of defendant No.3 came to be published in the year 1980. About three thousand copies of the first edition were printed and sold out within one year. The said defendants, therefore, denied the claim as made in the suit and stated that there was no intention whatsoever of hurting any religious feelings. 5. The defendant No.3 filed his written statement vide Exhibit-38. According to him, he had visited various Ashrams and Maths in Ridhapur, Aurangabad, Samvatsar, Bhusawal, Hyderabad etc. and after securing various manuscripts of different versions of the “Lila Charitra”, the work of compilation had been completed. According to the defendant No.3 he had consulted various Mahants and had deliberations with them. He further stated that he held Shri Chakradhar Swami in high esteem and denied that there were any wrong or misstatements made in the book. It was stated that nothing defamatory was mentioned in the book. It was stated that the plaintiffs had no right to file aforesaid suit so as to stifle publication of various portions of the book. The constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression was also referred to. 6. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs amended the plaint and averred that the defendant Nos.1 & 2 on being convinced about the omissions, wrong statements and misleading references had stayed the publication of the third edition of “Lila Charitra” on 6-8-1992. It was also pleaded that two editions of the said book that were already published and circulated were required to be recalled. 7. After the issues came to be framed, the plaintiffs examined three witnesses. PW-1 was Govindraj Guru Daryapurkarbaba vide Exhibit-444. He claims to have deep knowledge of Mahanubhav sect. PW-2 was one Dinkar Borkute vide Exhibit-461 who was the General Secretary of Mahanubhav Mandal, Nagpur. 7. After the issues came to be framed, the plaintiffs examined three witnesses. PW-1 was Govindraj Guru Daryapurkarbaba vide Exhibit-444. He claims to have deep knowledge of Mahanubhav sect. PW-2 was one Dinkar Borkute vide Exhibit-461 who was the General Secretary of Mahanubhav Mandal, Nagpur. Thereafter PW-3 Vasudeo Muni vide Exhibit-469 was examined to highlight various omissions/mistakes in the work of defendant No.3. The defendant Nos.1 & 2 did not examine any witness. The defendant No.3 Dr. Vishnu Kolte examined himself vide Exhibit-492 and also examined one Chandrakant Nimbhorkar – Exhibit-496 who was the publisher of weekly Vishwa Mandal. 8. The trial Court thereafter on due consideration of the evidence on record held that the plaintiffs had proved that there were glaring omissions, wrong statements and misleading references in the work compiled by the defendant No.3. It further held that certain portions of the work of the defendant No.3 had hurt the feelings and sentiments of followers of Mahanubhav sect. The trial Court, therefore, by its judgment dated 10-12-1997 decreed the suit. It granted permanent injunction against the defendants from publishing, printing and circulating “Lila Charitra” in any form with objectionable contents. The defendant Nos.1 & 2 were directed to recall all the books already circulated and were also directed to stop further circulation of said books. The plaintiffs were held entitled to damages of Rs.25,000/- from the defendant No.3. 9. The defendant No.3 filed Regular Civil Appeal No.17/1998 challenging aforesaid decree. Aforesaid appeal came to be partly allowed on 16-2-1999 and a direction was issued to rectify various mistakes in said works. The aforesaid judgment of the first appellate Court was challenged in three second appeals before this Court. One appeal was filed by the legal heirs of defendant No.3, other two appeals came to be filed by members of Mahanubhav sect. By common judgment dated 22nd and 23rd July 2008, the second appeals came to be partly allowed and the judgment passed by the first appellate Court came to be set aside. The matter was remanded to the first appellate Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with law. The plaintiffs being aggrieved by aforesaid judgment approached the Supreme Court of India. By order dated 27-1-2012, the Supreme Court of India declined to interfere with the remand of the matter and instead directed expeditious consideration of the appeal by the first appellate Court. 10. The plaintiffs being aggrieved by aforesaid judgment approached the Supreme Court of India. By order dated 27-1-2012, the Supreme Court of India declined to interfere with the remand of the matter and instead directed expeditious consideration of the appeal by the first appellate Court. 10. Before the first appellate Court, various applications under provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 and 8A read with Rule 10 of the Code had been moved. Reference is being made to such of those applications that were considered and granted by the first appellate Court. By application at Exhibit-9, 12 applicants had sought permission to be joined as appellants in the said appeal. They sought permission to address the Court on questions of law. By order dated 14-1-1998, the first appellate Court granted said application and directed issuance of public notice under provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code. The original defendant No.3 – Dr. V. B. Kolte expired during pendency of the appeal on 8-4-1998. His legal heirs moved application vide Exhibit-47 for being joined as appellants in their capacity as legal representatives and on 1-1-1999, said application came to be allowed. The Akhil Bhartiya Mahanubhav Parishad and another initially moved application vide Exhibit-74 for permission to join as appellants in the appeal on the basis of a will executed by the original defendant No.3 in their favour. The trial Court on 10-8-2012 rejected said application on the ground that the original will had not been brought before the Court nor were its contents proved. Thereafter, the Akhil Bhartiya Mahanubhav Sahitya Yuva Manch Ridhapur moved application vide Exhibit-94 for permission to participate in the proceedings. Said application was allowed on 31-7-2012 and the applicants were permitted to address the Court on questions of law. The Maharashtra Nava Nirman Sena also moved application vide Exhibit-97 under provisions of Order 1 Rule 8A for permission to argue on law points and said application came to be allowed on 21-4-2012. Another application under provisions of Order 1 Rule 8A of the Code was moved by Shri Banwarilal Purohit and Shri Baban Huskule vide Exhibit-111 and the same came to be allowed on 21-4-2012. It is in this background that the appeal was heard by the first appellate Court. 11. Accordingly, the first appellate Court considered the Regular Civil Appeal No.17/1998 on merits and by judgment dated 27-8-2012 dismissed the appeal. It is in this background that the appeal was heard by the first appellate Court. 11. Accordingly, the first appellate Court considered the Regular Civil Appeal No.17/1998 on merits and by judgment dated 27-8-2012 dismissed the appeal. The decreetal amount of damages that was granted by the trial Court was directed to be credited to the State Government as a separate entity with a direction to utilize the same for the benefits of Mahanubhav Panth. 12. It is in this background that these four appeals have been filed before this Court challenging aforesaid judgment of the first appellate Court. Second Appeal No.86/2013 has been filed by four appellants who were so joined as appellants before the first appellate Court. Second Appeal No.10/2013 has been filed by the legal representatives of defendant No.3. Second Appeal No.85/2013 has been filed by five appellants who are followers of Mahanubhav sect. Similarly, Second Appeal St. No.18883 of 2012 has been filed by Akhil Bhartiya Mahanubhav Parishad along with Civil Application No.187/2013 seeking leave to file second appeal. 13. Civil application No.187 of 2013 has been filed by Akhil Bhartiya Mahahubhav Parishad and another praying that they be granted leave to file appeal for challenging judgment dated 27-8-2012. It is stated that before the first appellate Court they had moved an application vide Exhibit-74 for being joined as appellants in said appeal. In said application, reference was made to resolution dated 28-8-2008 that was passed by applicant No.1 for taking steps to file appropriate proceedings. The original defendant No.3 had executed a will and had authorized the applicants to take part in all proceedings in the Court. Said application was considered at the stage of hearing of the appeal. The first appellate Court rejected said application on 10-8-2012 as the original will was not brought before the Court and, therefore, the applicants could not enter the shoes of the defendant No.3 to contest the proceedings on his behalf. In the civil application, it is stated that said Exhibit-74 had been wrongly rejected and the legal heirs of defendant No.3 had no objection whatsoever to their joinder. The application was opposed by the contesting respondents. On behalf of respondent Nos.19 & 20 reliance was placed on the judgment in Vidyadhar Jagannath Kakde and another vs. Amolkchand Daulatram Gandhi and others, 1995(1) Mh.L.J. 356 . The application was opposed by the contesting respondents. On behalf of respondent Nos.19 & 20 reliance was placed on the judgment in Vidyadhar Jagannath Kakde and another vs. Amolkchand Daulatram Gandhi and others, 1995(1) Mh.L.J. 356 . It is to be noted that the application moved by present applicants was not accepted by the first appellate Court. As observed by this Court in Vidyadhar Kakde (supra) if the parties on record sufficiently represent the cause sought to be espoused by the applicants then there is no point in adding present applicants in the array of parties. As the cause sought to be espoused by present applicants is being taken care of in a proper manner by the appellants, there is no reason to take any different view from that taken by the first appellate Court while rejecting the application below Exhibit-74. Hence, for these reasons I do not find it desirable to grant any leave to the present applicants to file appeal against judgment dated 27-8-2012. Hence, Civil Application No.187 of 2013 for grant of leave stands rejected. Second Appeal Nos.86/2013, 10/2013 and 85/2013 are admitted. 14. The following substantial questions of law have been formulated as per order dated 13-12-2013 for consideration in these appeals: (1) Whether jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in view of the powers conferred upon the State Government under Section 95 of the Cr. P. C. and the reliefs claimed in the suit as filed in the present matter? (2) Whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to go into historical facts, scrutinize them and decide upon their correctness or otherwise? (3) Whether the injunction granted by the Courts below amounts to curtailment of freedom of expression of the author of the book and book’s readers? 15. Substantial Question of Law No.1: This substantial question pertains to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and whether the same was barred in view of powers conferred upon the State Government under Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Shri R. L. Khapre, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants urged that jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in view of the provisions of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code which granted powers to the State Government to forfeit any publication which contained any matter that was punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code. Shri R. L. Khapre, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants urged that jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in view of the provisions of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code which granted powers to the State Government to forfeit any publication which contained any matter that was punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code. Reliance was placed on the judgment of learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sarvadeshik Press and Ors. Vs. Usman Ghani and Ors., 2008 (154) DLT 628 wherein it was held that in view of provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for banning/issuing an injunction on the publication of a book on the ground that its publication was likely to disturb public tranquility and peace order. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in Sadhu Sri Vaishnavar Nambi Srinivasa Iyengar vs. K.K.V. Annan Srinivasachariar and others, AIR 1990 Madras 375 wherein it was held that as a civil right was not sought to be agitated, the suit was barred under Section 9 of the Code. The learned Counsel also relied upon decision in Koil Pillai v. Territorial Commandor Territorial Head Quarters, Salvation Army and other, AIR 1994 Madras 27 to urge that performance of mere rituals did not amount to exercising a civil right. The learned Counsel then relied upon judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Riyazuddin Ahmed S/o Mohammad Sayeed & others vs. Tayyab Razak Chimthanwala, 2002 (4) Bom. C. R. 781 wherein it was held that in absence of any right of civil nature being involved, suit was not tenable. The learned Counsel then relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer alias Sr. Vanamamalai Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer alias Emberumanar Jeer and others, AIR 1961 SC 1720 wherein the principles of law pertaining to maintainability of a suit in the Civil Court in respect of honours in temples had been laid down. Similarly, by relying upon Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan and others v. Moran Mar Marthoma and another, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2001, it was submitted that the view regarding jurisdiction of the civil court was a minority view of only one learned Judge. Similarly, by relying upon Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan and others v. Moran Mar Marthoma and another, AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2001, it was submitted that the view regarding jurisdiction of the civil court was a minority view of only one learned Judge. Reference was also made to judgment of the Madras High Court in Vathiar Venkatachariar vs P. Ponappa Ayyenger and others, 45 Indian Cases 959. Shri S. V. Sirpurkar the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in Second Appeal No.10 of 2013 who are the legal representatives of defendant No.3 submitted that criminal prosecution that was launched against the defendant No.3 had been set aside by the High Court in Criminal Application Nos.629/1986, 631/1986 and 636/1986 on 21-11-1987. He submitted that aforesaid three complaint cases alleging offence to have been committed by defendant No.3 under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code had been filed in which the learned Magistrate had issued process. The defendant No.3 had approached this Court seeking quashing of said proceedings and this Court had set aside the order issuing process. Hence, according to the learned Counsel, there was no cause of action for filing the suit. It was also submitted that grant of any injunction would be violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution as defendant No.3 had only deciphered old existing material and had reproduced the same in Marathi. 16. On the other hand, Shri M. G. Bhangde, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon Ashok Ghosh Vs. Urmi A Goswami, ILR (2005) I Delhi 34, wherein it was held that a civil suit was not barred under Section 9 of the Code merely on the ground that there was no enactment of any statute under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Relying upon decision in Taj Mohammnad and others vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Nagpur, 1981 Mh.L.J., 453, it was urged that merely because remedy under criminal law was provided, jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be held to be barred. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Baragur Ramchandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases 11. Reliance was also placed in Most. Rev. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Baragur Ramchandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2007) 5 Supreme Court Cases 11. Reliance was also placed in Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan and others vs. Moran Mar Marthoma and another 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286 to urge that suit of a civil nature could not be held to be barred and enforcement of fundamental rights could also be agitated before the Civil Court. By relying upon judgment of the Division Bench in W. W. Joshi and others v. State of Bombay and others, AIR 1959 Bombay 363, it was submitted that any unauthorized or illegal act infringing a legal right of another amounted to “actionable wrong” and remedy in that regard was available. Reference was also made to the decision of Supreme Court in Union of India vs. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1 to urge that right to approach the Court was a fundamental right and the same could not be abridged. It was then submitted that civil law relating to defamation was still uncodified in India and hence, remedy under civil law was available. It was then submitted that judgment rendered in criminal proceedings would not be relevant in view of provisions of Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act. By referring to the provision of Section 2(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1963) which defines the expression “obligation”, it was submitted that under Section 38(1) of the Act of 1963, a perpetual injunction could be granted to prevent breach of an obligation. In view of provisions of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, a fundamental right was granted to the plaintiffs and if any derogatory statements were made, the same would amount to breach of Articles 25 & 26. Similarly, there would be breach of obligation entitling the plaintiffs to an order of perpetual injunction. Reference was also made to provisions of Section 39 of the Act of 1963 wherein injunction can be granted to prevent breach of an obligation. It was, therefore, submitted that the suit as filed was legally tenable and it could not be said that provisions of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Reference was also made to provisions of Section 39 of the Act of 1963 wherein injunction can be granted to prevent breach of an obligation. It was, therefore, submitted that the suit as filed was legally tenable and it could not be said that provisions of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Reference was also made to the commentary on the Constitution of India by Dr. Durga Das Basu in the context of provisions of Article 19(1)(a) thereof to point out that criminal law relating to defamation was contained in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code while civil law relating to defamation was still uncodified. Without prejudice to aforesaid, it was also submitted that remedy under Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not exclusive in nature and the civil court also had jurisdiction to consider the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that the judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants were clearly distinguishable and ratio laid down therein would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 17. On behalf of the respondent Nos.15 to 17, Shri P. S. Sadavarte, learned Counsel appearing for them supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that the respondent Nos.15 & 16 had been permitted by the first appellate Court to make submissions on points of law by virtue of order passed below Exhibit-111. Similarly, the respondent No.17 had also been permitted by the first appellate Court to address on questions of law. He submitted that the second appeals did not give rise to any substantial questions of law. He submitted that the second appeals did not give rise to any substantial questions of law to warrant interference under Section 100 of the Code. He further submitted that reappreciation of evidence was not permissible nor was it possible to interfere in second appeals merely because another view of the matter was possible. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court as under: [1] 2008(1) Mh.L.J. 389 Boodireddy Chandraiah and others vs. Arigela Laxmi and another. [2] (2002)6 SCC 375 , Ram Khilona and others vs. Sardar and others. [3] AIR 2007 Patna 21, Sarifa Devi & Ors. v. Anna Khatoon & Ors. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court as under: [1] 2008(1) Mh.L.J. 389 Boodireddy Chandraiah and others vs. Arigela Laxmi and another. [2] (2002)6 SCC 375 , Ram Khilona and others vs. Sardar and others. [3] AIR 2007 Patna 21, Sarifa Devi & Ors. v. Anna Khatoon & Ors. [4] (2008) 4 SCC 75 , Bant Singh and another vs. Niranjan Singh and another. [5] 2007 (1) Mh.L.J. 541 , Shankar Shridharrao Deshmukh vs. Vyankatesh Shankarrao Deshmukh and others. [6] 2007(4) Mh.L.J. 256 , Faruka Begum w/o Samdali Khan vs. Dnyaneshwar and others. [7] (2002) 1 SCC 134 , Veerayeeammal vs. Seeniammal. [8] (2004) 5 SCC 762 , Thiagarajan and others vs. Sri Venugopalswamy and others. [9] (2008) 8 SCC 258 , Nune Prasad and others vs. Nune Ramakrishna. He then submitted that on account of death of the original defendant No.3, the cause of action for prosecuting the second appeal by his legal representatives was not permissible as the cause of action for defamation did not survive after death of original defendant No.3. In this regard, he relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1986 SC 411 , Melepurath Sankunni Exhuthassan vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair and AIR 1970 AP 178 , In re P. Ramalakshmamma. He then submitted that the interveners before the first appellate Court had no right to file second appeal and there was a distinction between the right to file a suit and the right to file an appeal. This distinction was relevant when the appeal was preferred by a person who was not a party to the suit in the trial Court. He relied upon the decision in AIR 1984 Gujarat 18, Champak Vashram vs. Dharamsi Pola and Rajkot and others in that regard. He then submitted that the legal representatives of the original defendant No.3 were bound by the pleadings of defendant No.3 before the trial Court. They stood in the shoes of said defendant No.3 after his death and it was not permissible for them to take any new or different stand from the one taken by the defendant No.3. Reference in this regard was made to the decision in 1999 (2) CLJ 822, Gajraj vs. Sudha and others. He also referred to judgment of the Division Bench in 2010 (1) ALL MR 74, Umar Abid Khan and ors. Reference in this regard was made to the decision in 1999 (2) CLJ 822, Gajraj vs. Sudha and others. He also referred to judgment of the Division Bench in 2010 (1) ALL MR 74, Umar Abid Khan and ors. vs. Vincy Gonsalves alias Vincent Gonsalves & Ors., to indicate the scope of libel and actionable wrong. He, therefore, submitted that in view of aforesaid there was no merit whatsoever in the appeals and there was no reason to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate Court. 18. As this substantial question is related to the bar of jurisdiction of the civil court in view of the provisions of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it would be relevant to refer to aforesaid provisions. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as under: 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. – The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” Explanation [I]. – A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation II. – For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place. 19. Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under: “95. Power to declare certain publications forfeited and to issue search-warrants for the same. 19. Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under: “95. Power to declare certain publications forfeited and to issue search-warrants for the same. (1) Where – (a) any newspaper, or book, or (b) any document, wherever printed, appears to the State Government to contain any matter the publication of which is punishable under Section 124-A or section 153-A or section 153-B or section 292 or section 293 or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the State Government may, by notification, stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the newspaper containing such matter, and every copy of such book or other document to be forfeited to Government, and thereupon any police officer may seize the same wherever found in India and any Magistrate may by warrant authorise any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any copy of such issue or any such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be. (2) In this section and in Section 96,- (a) “newspaper” and “book” have the same meaning as in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (25 of 1867); (b) “document” includes any painting, drawing or photograph, or other visible representation. (3) No order passed or action taken under this section shall be called in question in any Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Section 96.” Thus, under Section 9 of the Code, the civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In the present case, the suit being not one in which right to property or to an office is contested, Explanation-I and Explanation-II to Section 9 of the Code would not be attracted. The question, therefore, is with regard to bar of jurisdiction in view of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 20. In Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan (supra), the maintainability of a civil suit in the context of provisions of Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 was considered. It was held that jurisdiction to try a suit would be available in every case where the dispute has the characteristic of affecting one's right which are not only civil but of civil nature. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan (supra), the maintainability of a civil suit in the context of provisions of Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991 was considered. It was held that jurisdiction to try a suit would be available in every case where the dispute has the characteristic of affecting one's right which are not only civil but of civil nature. It was further observed that Article 25 of the Constitution of India guaranteed a fundamental right to every citizen of his conscience, faith and belief irrespective of caste, creed and sex. Infringement of the same was enforceable in a court of law and such Court would be none else except the civil court. In para 89 of said decision, it has been observed thus: 89. The conclusions thus reached are: (a) The civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suits for violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India and suits. (b) The expression ‘civil nature’ used in Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is wider than even civil proceedings, and thus extends to such religious matters which have civil consequence. (c) Section 9 is very wide. In absence of any ecclesiastical courts any religious dispute is cognizable, except in very rare cases where the declaration sought may be what constitutes religious rite. 21. In Ashok Ghosh (supra), the issue that arose before the Delhi High Court was as regards maintainability of a defamation suit in absence of any statute permitting filing of such suit in the context of Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution of India. It was urged that unless any law was enacted permitting filing of suit on the ground of defamation, such suit was barred under Article 19(1)(a). It was held that the plea that the suit was barred as Parliament has not enacted any law permitting filing of suit for defamation was not acceptable. In Taj Mohammad (supra), the Agricultural Produce Market Committee had filed various suits seeking to restrain the defendants from working as commission agents within the market area and also for restraining the defendants from recovering excess commission. A plea was raised that as provisions of Section 46 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 provided for imposition of penalty, filing of civil suit was barred. A plea was raised that as provisions of Section 46 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 provided for imposition of penalty, filing of civil suit was barred. It was held by the Division Bench that merely because there existed a penal provision rendering certain acts punishable under the criminal law, the same would not necessarily imply negation of a civil liability. It was held that the plaintiff could seek enforcement of provisions of said Act and to prevent breach of its civil right. It was held that the civil court had necessary jurisdiction. 22. In 1998 Cr. L.J. 3639, Baragur Ramchandrappa and others vs. State of Karnataka and others the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court had dismissed a petition which had been filed under Section 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code for setting aside a notification issued by the State Government for forfeiting copies of a novel under Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In Baragur Ramchandra Appa (supra), while considering the challenge to aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code when read together were clearly preventive in nature and designed to pre-empt any disturbance to public order. It was further held that Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. After examining the matter on merits, the order of forfeiture was upheld. 23. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), it has been held that if an employee intends to enforce his constitutional rights or a right under a statutory regulation, the civil court will have the necessary jurisdiction to try such suit. In W.W.Joshi (supra), the Division Bench considered meaning of the term “actionable wrong” and held that any illegal or unauthorized act infringing a legal right of another affords him a ground for action in law. In M. V. Elizabeth and others (supra), it was observed that where statute was silent and judicial intervention was required, Courts would strive to redress grievances according to principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 24. In an effort to urge that jurisdiction of the civil court was barred and remedy under Section 95 of the civil court was Criminal Procedure Code ought to have been availed, the learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon Sadhu Sri (supra). 24. In an effort to urge that jurisdiction of the civil court was barred and remedy under Section 95 of the civil court was Criminal Procedure Code ought to have been availed, the learned Counsel for the appellants has relied upon Sadhu Sri (supra). Therein, suit had been filed for establishing a hereditary right of the plaintiff’s family of appointing persons for reciting Divya Prabandhan in the temple at Srirangam. In that context, while considering objection regarding jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit, it was held that the plaintiff had not sought to establish his right to any office in the temple and to honours and privileges attached to said office as remuneration or perquisites. In absence of any legal obligation to the discharge of duties non performance of which can result in penalty, it was held that the suit was not maintainable. In Koil Pillai (supra), a suit for declaration that the plaintiff had right to worship in accordance with particular practices and rituals had been filed. It was held that the ritual claimed by the plaintiff was neither incidental to a question of civil right nor did it relate to a religious office to which obligations or emoluments were attached. It was, therefore, held that the suit seeking right in respect of conducting a ritual was not tenable. 25. In Riyazuddin Ahmad (supra), a suit for perpetual injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from publically and socially claiming that they were Muslims came to be dismissed as not being maintainable. Learned Single Judge held that the nature of injunction that was sought was directly in conflict with the freedom enjoyed by the defendants under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. Since the plaintiffs had not claimed any right of a civil nature that was existing and was being infringed, it was held that the suit itself was not tenable. In Sri Sinha (supra), it was held that a suit simplicitor for declaration of religious honours would not lie in the civil court. Similarly, in Vathiar Venkatachariar (supra) the dispute was with regard to a certain order of precedence of receiving Teertham and Prasadam. 26. In Sri Sinha (supra), it was held that a suit simplicitor for declaration of religious honours would not lie in the civil court. Similarly, in Vathiar Venkatachariar (supra) the dispute was with regard to a certain order of precedence of receiving Teertham and Prasadam. 26. In Usman Gani (supra), the question that arose for consideration before the Delhi High Court was whether the civil court could entertain a suit for issuing an injunction on the publication of a book on the ground that its publication was likely to disturb public tranquility and public order fell for consideration. It was held that when no civil right or monetary loss or any function of the plaintiff connected with his civil right had been affected, the suit was not tenable in the civil court. It proceeded to hold that in view of specific provisions under Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purposes of forfeiture of such publication, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 27. The submission made on behalf of the legal representatives of original defendant No.3 that on account of quashing of criminal proceedings, there was no cause of action to file the suit cannot be accepted. The complainant in said case is not any of the plaintiffs who have filed the present proceedings. The plaintiffs were within their legal right while seeking the relief of declaration and permanent injunction in the present proceedings. There was sufficient cause of action to seek said reliefs along with the relief for damages. Hence, quashing of criminal proceedings cannot be a ground for holding absence of cause of action for the present suit. 28. The Supreme Court in Most REV PMA (supra) has held that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit where there was violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India. Religious matters having civil consequences were included in the expression “civil nature” as used in Section 9 of the Code. Though it is true that aforesaid view has been expressed only by R. M. Sahai, J, the other two learned Judges have specifically observed in para 156 that it was not necessary to go into the question of maintainability of the suit in question under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though it is true that aforesaid view has been expressed only by R. M. Sahai, J, the other two learned Judges have specifically observed in para 156 that it was not necessary to go into the question of maintainability of the suit in question under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, therefore, clear that in absence of any different majority view on said question, the view expressed by R. M. Sahai, J regarding maintainability of the civil suit in the matter of violation of fundamental rights cannot be said to be a minority view. Hence, the view as expressed in para 89 of said decision reproduced earlier is required to be followed. 29. From the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned Counsel, the following general principles emerged: (a) The civil court would have necessary jurisdiction to try a suit for enforcement of his constitutional rights. It cannot be said that a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India is incapable of enforcement as there is no court which can take cognizance of it. (b) The civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits for violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The expression ‘civil nature’ used in Section 9 of the Code extends to religious matters which have civil consequences. (c) Provisions of Section 95 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code are preventive in nature and are designed to pre-empt any disturbance to public order. (d) Merely because there exists a penal provision rendering certain acts punishable under the criminal law, the same would not necessarily imply negation of a civil liability. (e) In the absence of any civil right being breached, a civil suit would not be tenable. Similarly, suit simpliciter for declaration of religious honours would not be tenable in the civil court. 30. In this backdrop, if the case in hand is examined, it is clear from the averments as made in the plaint that according to the plaintiffs, there being glaring omissions, wrong statements and misleading references in the work of compiling and editing “Lila Charitra” by the defendant No.3, the feelings of the plaintiffs who were the followers of Mahanubhav sect had been hurt. The suit as filed was in representative capacity praying for taking notice of said glaring omissions and wrong statements with further relief of perpetual injunction from further publication and sale of said work of defendant No.3. In view of the fact that there is no bar under Section 9 of the Code expressly or impliedly barring filing of such suit seeking protection of civil rights of the plaintiffs, it cannot be held that the suit as filed was not maintainable. Moreover, the provisions of Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are preventive in nature and deal with forfeiture of such material that is likely to disturb public order. The relief as sought with regard to taking notice of various glaring omissions and wrong statements as sought to be pointed out by the plaintiffs in representative capacity from the work done by defendant No.3 cannot be obtained under Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Similarly, no perpetual injunction can be granted under Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code from future publication and sale of the works in question. In the context of the reliefs as sought by the plaintiffs in the civil suit, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred in view of provisions of Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 31. The decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sarvadeshik Press (supra), though supports the case as urged by the appellants, it is to be noted that it is observed that the suit involved rights of religious nature under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. It, however, does not take into account the law in that regard laid down by the Supreme Court in Most. Rev. P.M.A. (supra). By observing that banning publication of certain works involves constitutional issues which cannot be entertained by the civil courts, the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) that the civil court has necessary jurisdiction to try a suit seeking enforcement of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights has also been ignored. In view of aforesaid, it is not possible to agree with aforesaid view as taken by the Delhi High Court in Sarvadeshik Press (supra). Hence, substantial question of law No.1 is answered in the negative. In view of aforesaid, it is not possible to agree with aforesaid view as taken by the Delhi High Court in Sarvadeshik Press (supra). Hence, substantial question of law No.1 is answered in the negative. The jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit was not barred in view of powers conferred upon the State Government under Section 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 32. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO.2: This substantial question of law is being considered in the context of the facts of the present case on the basis of material that has been placed on record. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the work of editing was done by defendant No.3 with reference to various existing material. The sources from which said material was collected and compiled were historical in nature. There was no challenge on the part of the plaintiffs to the various basic sources from which all the material was collected. It was further submitted that the entire context from which said work of editing was done was required to be considered and if in that backdrop the work of defendant No.3 was examined then it was clear that no case was made out as sought to be urged by the plaintiffs. There was no actionable wrong demonstrated by the plaintiffs. It was also submitted that the first appellate Court wrongly drew inference that the microfilms of the script were not produced before the trial Court. He submitted that as there was no challenge to various sources of information, it was not necessary to bring on record microfilms of the script. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of the Special Bench of this Court in M/s Varsha Publication Pvt. Ltd., and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others 1983 Cr.L.J. 1446 to urge that that any historical discussion could not be construed by any man of ordinary prudence as a ground that would promote disharmony. The learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memoial Trust Vs. Govt. State of Maharashtra and others 1983 Cr.L.J. 1446 to urge that that any historical discussion could not be construed by any man of ordinary prudence as a ground that would promote disharmony. The learned Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memoial Trust Vs. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi 2001 Cr.L.J. 3689 to urge that for the purposes of provisions of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, the words used should be such that any reasonable man would find the same to be provocative and maliciously and deliberately intended to outrage the feeling of any class of citizens. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs on the other hand submitted that the defendant No.3 in his deposition had admitted various mistakes committed in the work of editing. If it was demonstrated that what existed in the basic source was not properly compiled and edited by defendant No.3, that by itself was sufficient to justify the stand of the plaintiffs. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the first appellate Court rightly considered the evidence on record while holding that the mistakes as committed were in the nature of glaring omissions and misstatements. 33. The observations of the Special Bench in M/s Varsha Publication Pvt. Ltd. (supra) are in proceedings under Section 96 of the Cr.P.C challenging a notification issued under Section 95 of the Cr.P.C. dealing the publication in question to be forfeited as it contained matters punishable under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code. It was observed that historical events cannot be looked as a secret on the plea that if the history is made known, there is likelihood of someone else being hurt. In Trustees of Safdar Hashmi (supra) also, notification issued under Section 95, Cr.P.C. was under challenge. It was held that it was not shown that the ingredients of Sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code existed to justify issuance of said notification. In the present case, the plaintiffs are seeking relief on the basis of glaring omissions and misstatements in the work of defendant No.3. Hence, aforesaid decisions cannot apply in the present facts. 34. In the present case, the plaintiffs are seeking relief on the basis of glaring omissions and misstatements in the work of defendant No.3. Hence, aforesaid decisions cannot apply in the present facts. 34. As regards the finding recorded by the first appellate court regarding 18 mistakes found in the work of defendant No.3, it is to be noted that there is a detailed and elaborate discussion in that regard in paragraphs 54 to 84 of its judgment. After considering various different sources of information placed on record as well as the historical background thereof, the first appellate court concurred with the findings of the trial court while upholding the finding regarding said mistakes. Though the learned counsel for the appellants took the Court through various exhibited documents/books/literature and strenuously urged that the conclusion arrived at in that regard by both the courts was incorrect, said effort cannot succeed. Firstly, the finding recorded by both the Courts cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence whatsoever. The various admissions given by defendant No.3 in his deposition and the subsequent amendments made in the later editions of said work cannot be ignored. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal (supra), in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code, it is not open for the High Court to disturb a finding arrived at concurrently and substitute it with its own findings. As held in Boodireddy (supra), if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, there is no scope to interfere in second appeal. Even assuming that if the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants were to be upheld, at the highest it would merely be another possible view of the matter. But that is not the scope of Section 100 of the Code. Hence, in the facts of the present case, both the Courts have properly examined the historical facts and after scrutinizing them have arrived at the finding that there were glaring omissions and wrong statements in the work of defendant No.3 entitling the plaintiffs for grant of relief of declaration and perpetual injunction. Substantial question of law No.2 stands answered accordingly. 35. Substantial question of law No.2 stands answered accordingly. 35. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW NO.3: This substantial question requires examination of the nature of injunction granted by the trial Court as maintained by the first appellate Court and whether the same amounts to curtailment of freedom of expression of the author and readers of the book. However, before doing so, it is necessary to refer to certain facts that have bearing on the consideration of the substantial question of law. The suit in question came to be filed on 17-10-1980. During pendency of the suit on 6-8-1992, the State Government stayed the publication of the third edition of the book “Lilacharitra” vide Exhibit-463. This order dated 6-8-1992 came to be challenged in Writ Petition No.3208/1994 before the Aurangabad Bench of this Court. The suit was thereafter decreed on 10-12-1997. On 24-6-1998, the State Government – respondent No.18 recalled all copies of the book “Lilacharitra” from various libraries. Thereafter on 3-8-1998, aforesaid Writ Petition No.3208/1994 came to be decided observing that the petitioner therein could make a representation to the State Government to allow publication of the third edition of the book ‘Lilacharitra” by omitting objectionable portions in respect of which the Civil Court had granted injunction. Thereafter on 23-9-1998, the State Government which was original defendant No.1 in the trial Court took a decision not to challenge the decree as passed in Special Civil Suit No.57/1980. Hence, decree passed by the trial Court became final against original defendant Nos.1 & 2. 36. The defendant No.3 had been examined in the trial Court vide Exhibit-492. In his deposition he admitted certain mistakes committed in the first edition of his work “Lilacharitra”. Out of 18 mistakes that were stated to have been committed in the said works, the mistakes at Sr. Nos.1, 7 to 11 and 14 to 17 were admitted by the defendant No.3. Said finding has been recorded by the first appellate Court in para 72 of its judgment. On perusal of the entire deposition of defendant No.3, it is clear that said finding recorded by the first appellate Court is on the basis of the deposition of defendant No.3 and the same cannot be faulted. The mistakes at Sr. Nos.2, 4 to 6, 12, 13 & 18 have not been admitted to have been committed by the defendant No.3. The mistakes at Sr. Nos.2, 4 to 6, 12, 13 & 18 have not been admitted to have been committed by the defendant No.3. Hence, in respect of the mistakes that have been admitted by the defendant No.3 in his deposition, the injunction granted by the trial Court in that regard cannot be said to be unjustified or contrary to the record. The first appellate Court while considering the mistakes at Sr. Nos.2, 4 to 6, 12, 13 & 18 has assigned various reasons for coming to the conclusion that the mistakes in that regard had been duly proved and the decree passed by the trial Court on that basis could not be faulted. 37. According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, the grant of injunction by the trial Court as maintained by the first appellate Court amounted to curtailment of freedom of expression of the author of the book and the book’s readers. It was submitted that the plaintiffs were not prevented from giving their own clarification and that existence of criticism was permissible and the same should not be prevented. It was urged that such injunction amounted to violating provisions of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The public had a right to read the works of the defendant No.3 who had done work of editing on the basis of literary material that was already in existence. It was further submitted that the work done by the defendant No.3 was of editing existing material and it was related to freedom of expression of the author. The foot notes gave the sources from which the material was collected and edited. Reliance was placed on the decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Ushaben Navinchandra Trivedi and another Vs. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir and others AIR 1978 Gujarat 13. It was submitted that after considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sinha Ramluja (supra) the Court held that merely because religious sentiments of the plaintiffs were shocked, the same did not give them any cause of action. As regards the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Most REV PMA (supra), it was submitted that the same was a minority view of only one learned Judge. It was, therefore, submitted that the injunction as granted was not sustainable. 38. As regards the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Most REV PMA (supra), it was submitted that the same was a minority view of only one learned Judge. It was, therefore, submitted that the injunction as granted was not sustainable. 38. Countering said submissions, it was urged on behalf of the respondents that the injunction as granted did not amount to curtailing the freedom of expression either of the author of the book or its readers. It was submitted that Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India did not give a free hand to publish defamatory matter and in that regard, reliance was placed on the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hari Shankar Vs. Kailash Narayan and others AIR 1982 Madhya Pradesh 47. It was further submitted that Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India guaranteed the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice in propagation of religion and if any derogatory statements were made, the same would amount to breach of obligation giving a right to the aggrieved persons to seek relief. Reference in that regard was made to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Baragur Ramchandra Appa (supra) which view was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court. Similarly, the reliance was placed on the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Aman Preet Singh and others Vs. Govt. of India and others AIR 1996 Punjab and Haryana 284. As regards the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Ushaben Trivedi (supra), it was submitted that the same was contrary to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Most REV PMA (supra). It was further submitted that in aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court though the view as relied upon by the respondents was expressed by one learned Judge, the other two learned Judges of the Supreme Court did not express any view whatsoever on the question regarding tenability of the civil suit vis a vis breach of fundamental rights. It was therefore submitted that the view as expressed by R. M. Sahai, J could be relied. It was also submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Sinha Ramanuja (supra) was in relation to religious rites and ceremonies and hence, ratio of said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case. It was therefore submitted that the view as expressed by R. M. Sahai, J could be relied. It was also submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Sinha Ramanuja (supra) was in relation to religious rites and ceremonies and hence, ratio of said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case. It is to be noted that as held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Harishankar (supra), Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India does not give a free hand to publish any defamatory material under the guise of freedom of expression. Similarly, as observed in Aman Preet Singh (supra), freedom of speech and expression implies reasonable restriction and the same has to be exercised up to the extent and limit till it does not infringe the right or faith of others. The observations aforesaid squarely apply to the facts of the present case. The reasons for relying upon the view of R. M. Sahai J in Most Rev PMA are already stated in para 28 hereinabove. If it is found that the work of the defendant No.3 results in infringing the faith and belief of the plaintiffs resulting in violation of provisions of Article 25 of the Constitution of India, then it cannot be said that by grant of such injunction, the freedom of expression of the author of the book and book’s readers has been curtailed. It is to be noted that the injunction relates not to the entire work of the defendant No.3, but only in respect of objectionable contents of the same. Hence, by restraining the defendant No.3 from not publishing the glaring omissions, mistakes and wrong statements in the book, it cannot be said that such injunction curtails the freedom of expression as alleged. It cannot be said that grant of injunction violated provisions of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution as urged by legal representatives of defendant No.3. As noted above, under guise of freedom of expression, the faith and belief of the plaintiffs with regard to Mahanubhav Panth could not be infringed. 39. Reference was made by the learned Counsel for the appellants to various provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 (for short the Act of 1957). It was submitted that in terms of provisions of Section 17 to 19 of the Act of 1957, the defendant No.3 had a copyright in respect of aforesaid works. 39. Reference was made by the learned Counsel for the appellants to various provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 (for short the Act of 1957). It was submitted that in terms of provisions of Section 17 to 19 of the Act of 1957, the defendant No.3 had a copyright in respect of aforesaid works. Reference was also made to the provisions of Section 57 of the Act of 1957 in that regard. It was submitted that in terms of Section 22 of the Act of 1957, the term of the copyright subsisted for 60 years after the death of author. The learned Counsel in that regard relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Academy of General Education, Manipal Vs. B. Malini Mallya AIR 2009 SC 1982 . The learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand referred to the provisions of Section 2(k) of the Act of 1957 which define “Government work”. Reference was also made to provisions of Section 17(d) which relate to the ownership of copyright in respect of government work. It was submitted that as the owner, publisher and printer of said works was the State Government, the copyright in that regard vested with the State Government. It was submitted that the first appellate Court had recorded a specific finding in para 110 of its judgment that the copyright of said work vested in the State Government and the same could not be claimed by the appellants on behalf of the original defendant No.3. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.15 to 17 submitted that the defendant No.3 was only the editor of aforesaid works and was not its author. Hence, no copyright vested with the defendant No.3. In this regard, he referred to decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 2002 SC 2989 K. M. Mathew vs. K. A. Abraham and others in the context of the expression “Editor” as defined under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. 40. The provisions of the Act of 1957 indicate that “government work” as defined by Section 2(k) means work which is made or published by or under the direction or control of the Government or any department of the Government. 40. The provisions of the Act of 1957 indicate that “government work” as defined by Section 2(k) means work which is made or published by or under the direction or control of the Government or any department of the Government. Section 17(d) of the Act of 1957 indicates that in case of government work, the Government shall in absence of any agreement to the contrary be the first owner of the copyright therein. In the present case, there is no agreement to the contrary with the defendant No.3. On the contrary, in response to the averments made in para 3 of the plaint, the defendant No.3 has admitted that the defendant Nos.1 & 2 were the publishers of said book. It is, therefore, clear from aforesaid provisions that the defendant Nos.1 & 2 were the first owners of copyright of aforesaid government work especially when the work of editing was undertaken under the directions of said defendants and was thereafter published by the defendant Nos.1 & 2. Hence, the finding as recorded by the first appellate Court that the copyright of aforesaid government works was with the State Government is in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1957 and said finding cannot be faulted. Reliance as placed on behalf of the appellants on the decision of the Supreme Court in Academy of General Education (supra) is misplaced as said decision considers the question of copyright in respect of a dramatic work. It is to be noted that in the present case, the work of editing done by the defendant No.3 was not of any “dramatic work” as defined by Section 2(h) of the Act of 1957. Similarly, provisions of Section 52 of the Act of 1957 that were considered in aforesaid decision are not attracted in the facts of the present case. The provisions of Section 22 of the Act of 1957 also cannot come to the aid of the appellants in support of their submissions regarding rights of the defendant No.3. 41. It is to be noted that the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos.1,2,4 and 5 – original plaintiffs also relied upon provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short the Act of 1963) to substantiate his submission regarding tenability of the civil suit. 41. It is to be noted that the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos.1,2,4 and 5 – original plaintiffs also relied upon provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short the Act of 1963) to substantiate his submission regarding tenability of the civil suit. It was submitted that provisions of Section 38 of the Act of 1963 gave right to a plaintiff to seek perpetual injunction to prevent breach of an obligation existing in his favour. Similarly, there was a right to enjoy property under Section 38(3) and a perpetual injunction could be granted in that regard. Reference was also made to the provisions of Section 39 of the Act of 1963. It was submitted that under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1963, “obligation” included every duty enforceable by law. It was, therefore, submitted that the plaintiffs were justified in seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants in the present case. In reply, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that no such injunction could be granted as urged and that no fetters could be put as to what an author should or should not write. Reliance in that regard was placed on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Khushwant Singh and another vs. Maneka Gandhi AIR 2002 Delhi 58. Similarly, it was submitted that no restrictions could be placed by granting injunction in view of decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and others AIR 1995 SC 1236 . 42. The provisions of Section 2 (a) read with Sections 38 & 39 of the Act of 1963 indicate that a perpetual injunction can be granted to prevent breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiffs. The obligation includes every duty enforceable by law. Similarly, in case of invasion of the plaintiff’s right to enjoyment of property, a perpetual injunction could be granted. Similarly, for preventing the breach of an obligation, mandatory injunction can also be granted. In the present case, according to the plaintiffs, by the glaring omissions and misstatements in the work of editing done by the defendant No.3, the plaintiffs right under Article 25 of the Constitution of India were violated. The plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to seek the relief of perpetual injunction to prevent future breach. In the present case, according to the plaintiffs, by the glaring omissions and misstatements in the work of editing done by the defendant No.3, the plaintiffs right under Article 25 of the Constitution of India were violated. The plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to seek the relief of perpetual injunction to prevent future breach. The aforesaid provisions, therefore, justify the invocation of civil remedy by the plaintiffs by filing the present suit. The decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Khushwant Singh (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants pertain to adjudication of an interim application seeking to restrain the defendants from publishing, circulating or selling an autobiography. In said case, the High Court did not examine the statements attributed to the defendant therein on the touch stone of defamation inasmuch as the matter was at an interlocutory stage. These observations find place in para 60 of the said judgment and it was observed that the interim order as granted by the trial Judge was a prepublication injunction. It was further observed that the remedy of damages was also available. In that context, it was observed that no fetters could be put on the author as to what he should or should not write. In that background, it was held that the injunction as granted by the trial Judge could not be sustained and hence, the same was vacated. In the present case, it has been found that various mistakes have been committed by the defendant No.3 in the work of editing. Various mistakes have been admitted to have been committed by the defendant No.3 himself. It is also to be noted that glaring omissions and misstatements are sought to be prevented/restrained on account of violation of provisions of Article 25 of the Constitution of India. In view of these distinguishing features, ratio of the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (supra) also cannot be relied on. 43. In view of these distinguishing features, ratio of the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (supra) also cannot be relied on. 43. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the injunction as granted by the trial Court against the misstatements and glaring omissions in the works of the defendant No.3 cannot amount to curtailment of freedom of expression of the author of the book and the book’s readers. Accordingly, substantial question of law No.3 stands answered in the negative. 44. Before parting, it must be observed that all the learned counsel for the parties ably put forth their respective submissions and relied upon a number of precedents to buttress the same. Considering the fact that there were almost 498 Exhibits in the record of the trial court and about 134 Exhibits in the record of the first appellate court coupled with the fact that the judgment of the first appellate court runs into 220 pages, their combined effort and assistance is appreciable and hence same has been referred to. It may also be stated that reference has been made to those decisions having bearing on the substantial questions of law as formulated. 45. In view of the answers given to the substantial questions of law as formulated, no interference is called for in the second appeals. The judgment dated 27-8-2012 passed by the first appellate Court stands confirmed. Accordingly, Second Appeal Nos.86/2013, 10/2013 and 85/2013 are dismissed with no order as to costs.