N. Chaudhury, J. -- This First appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 3, Kamrup at Guwahati in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993, thereby dismissing the suit of the plaintiff Smt. Prem Sarin. 2. Prior to institution of the aforesaid suit in question, the defendant of the present suit had instituted Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 in the Court of learned Civil judge at Kamrup for specific performance of contract of an agreement to get lease of the present suit property. In that suit the defendant of the present suit was the plaintiff and the plaintiff of the present suit was the defendant No.1. The plaintiff of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 pleaded that the defendant No.1 of that suit had taken loan of Rs. 5,00,000/- from it and executed an agreement in the month of February 1986 containing a number of clauses. It is stipulated therein that the loan was required for the purpose of construction of the second floor of the building and that the said construction would be completed within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of payment of the first installment and thereafter, the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 would be given the same on lease for 5 (five) years at a rental of Rs. 2.50 per sq. ft. Pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 granted loan of Rs.5,00,000/- to the defendant No. 1 to construct the second floor and on turn the property was mortgaged with the plaintiff. But even after construction of the second floor the same was not let out to the plaintiff for which they had to hire a different house at a rental of Rs.3.30 per square feet from December 1987. Thus, the plaintiff was making payment in excess and so notice was issued to the defendant No.1 through advocate demanding Rs. 6,42,319.12. As the notice did not yield any result, Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 was filed by National Insurance Company Limited praying for a decree of specific performance to the effect that the defendant No.1 of that suit would lease its second floor to the plaintiff Insurance Company as per the terms of the aforesaid agreement and hand over possession thereof. 3. 3. While the said suit was in progress, the defendant No. 1 of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 filed the present suit, namely, Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 stating that pursuant to the loan agreement referred to in the previous suit, the second floor construction was over in the year 1986 itself and thereupon, before October 1986, the husband of the plaintiff Prem Sarin informed Regional Manager of the defendant of the present suit about completion of the work and thereupon, the Regional Manager accompanied by one D. Sengupta visited the suit premises on 04.10.1986. They were satisfied about the completion of the building and floor area was roughly measured to be 6144 sq. ft. excluding the staircase and the landing. Thereupon, on 21.10.1986 the plaintiff Prem Sarin informed Regional Manager of the defendant Insurance Company that since the house was completed, the last installment of the loan should be released. In the meantime last installment was also released and as a stopgape arrangement the plaintiff permitted the defendant Insurance Company to occupy about 3000 sq. ft. in the ground floor of the same building till the possession of the second floor was given. Accordingly, the defendant fixed a signboard in the second floor and allegedly locked the door of the second floor upon taking possession thereon from the plaintiff but no formal agreement of lease was executed. Under such circumstances, a draft agreement was handed over to the defendant by the plaintiff on 16.12.1986 and obtained receipt, but even thereafter apart from holding 2/3 sittings nothing happened substantially and the defendant neither executed a lease agreement nor did they make payment of the rent to the plaintiff. Under such circumstances, suit was filed praying for recovery of Khass possession of the second floor of the building by evicting the defendant and also for realization of arrear rent to the tune of Rs.2,46,525/-. In the plaint of this subsequent suit, the plaintiff herself made mention about the pendency of the previous suit i.e. Title Suit No.36 of 1989 in the same court and substantially between the set of parties with regard to the same suit premises. 4. In the plaint of this subsequent suit, the plaintiff herself made mention about the pendency of the previous suit i.e. Title Suit No.36 of 1989 in the same court and substantially between the set of parties with regard to the same suit premises. 4. Upon service of notice in the subsequent suit the defendant herein appeared and submitted written statement denying the case of the plaintiff and stating that there is no subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and no tenancy was created in respect of the second floor premises. Possession of the same was never delivered to the defendant and so there was no question of decree of eviction or arrear rent on account of tenancy. In Paragraph-5 of this written statement, the defendant reiterated the statement made in plaint of Title Suit No.36 of 1989 and prayed that the suit is liable to be dismissed on compensatory and exemplary cost. According to the defendant, as per admission of the plaintiff in the written statement of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989, the suit premises were still under possession of the plaintiff and so there cannot be any question of decreeing suit for eviction of the defendant from the second floor and there would be no question of payment for arrear rent. In Paragraph-23 of the written statement, the sole defendant furnished its own facts and it appears that the statement made in this paragraph are same as that of the plaint in Title Suit No. 36 of 1989. Be that as it may, upon considering all the rival contentions of the parties, the learned trial court which was also in seisin with the trial of the Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 framed as many as 6 issues and the same are quoted below: “(1) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in law as well as in facts? (3) Whether the plaintiff has handed over the possession of the second floor to the defendant and whether there is created a relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant and the plaintiff? (4) Whether the defendant put lock on the door of the second floor and taken over possession of the floor? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? (4) Whether the defendant put lock on the door of the second floor and taken over possession of the floor? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as prayed for? (6) To what any other relief/reliefs are entitled to the plaintiff?” 5. Although an application was filed by the defendant of Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 for stay of proceedings under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the present plaintiff objected to it and ultimately the learned trial court took both the suites on same date for trial, however, separately. The plaintiff examined her husband Bidya Sagar Sarin as sole witness in the present case. His examination-in-chief in the form of affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil procedure and it contained the identical facts as mentioned in the plaint of Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 as well as written statement in Title Suit No. 36 of 1989. The witness adduced as many as 9 documents to prove the case of the plaintiff. The basic thrust of the witness was that after completion of the construction at the second floor, the Regional Manager of the defendant Insurance Company was offered to take possession and accordingly, he took over possession of the same and kept under his possession by putting a lock in the door. He also fixed a signboard at the second floor in the name of the defendant company. In course of cross-examination, he stated that they have objection in regard to the terms and conditions mentioned in Exhibit-1 agreement. He also admitted that the power of attorney on the basis of which he deposed on behalf of the plaintiff was executed on 20.08.2002 and that there was no power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in his favour. He, however, claimed that while doing negotiation with the defendant company he had another power of attorney, the copy of which was not produced by him to the Court and thus, he denied that prior to 20.08.2002 he did not have any authority to sign in the paper of the suit on behalf of the plaintiff. He maintained his stand even at the time of cross-examination that on 04.10.1986 he verbally informed the Regional Manager of the defendant Insurance Company about the completion of the building. No other person was present at that time. He maintained his stand even at the time of cross-examination that on 04.10.1986 he verbally informed the Regional Manager of the defendant Insurance Company about the completion of the building. No other person was present at that time. Even when Regional Manager entered the ground floor he had given verbal intimation and there was none present at that time. He adhered to the averment made in the plaint that on 16.12.1986 draft agreement was handed over to the defendant wherein date of commencement of the tenancy was kept blank and the date of expiry of tenancy was also kept blank. In that agreement the space for monthly rent was kept blank and it did not contain any signature of either of the parties. He admitted in course of cross examination that at the time of handing over the possession tenancy had not commenced and that is why there is no date of commencement in it. He deposed on the adjourned date of cross-examination that the plaintiff became entitled to rent with effect from the date of handing over the copy of agreement to the defendant and so the same should be date of commencement of the tenancy. He denied in reply to a suggestion that prior to handing over of Exhibit-7 agreement, defendant did not have possession of the suit premises. He also stated that Exhibit-7 did not contain any recital as to handing over or taking over of possession. He could not say on which date defendant company had fixed the sign board at the second floor but it could not be in the year 1985. Later on he said it could be in the year 1985 also. According to him construction was completed in the month of June or July of 1986. He further stated that in Paragraph -7 of his written objection against injunction petition arising out of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 that the Insurance Company had taken over the possession of the premises in the year 1986 and subsequently, the agreement was cancelled in March, 1988 and so plaintiff of that suit had no right to claim possession of the second floor of the building. 6. The defendant examined one Newton Gogoi as sole witness. His examination-in-chief appears to be a replica of the written statement in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993. 6. The defendant examined one Newton Gogoi as sole witness. His examination-in-chief appears to be a replica of the written statement in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993. The defendant as examined D.W.2 one Amiyo Bhagawati who was looking after accounts department of the company in the year 1985-1986 to prove the averment in regard to loan advanced to the plaintiff. 7. It is to be noted that evidence in Title suit No. 36 of 1989 and evidence in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 proceeded separately but on same dates and ultimately both the suits were heard on the same date and the learned court thereafter passed two different judgments in both the suits on 31.08.2006. While Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 was dismissed by the impugned judgment, Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 preferred by the defendant of Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 was decreed for delivering of possession of the second floor and execution of the lease deed as per agreement. However, as required under Order XX Rule 12 A of the Code of Civil Procedure no time period was mentioned in the judgment and decree for performance of the contract in question. It appears there is no appeal against the decree passed in Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 passed on 31.08.2006. However, the decree of dismissal passed in Title Suit No.268 of 1993 on the same date has been brought under challenge by the present appeal. The sole point for consideration before this Court, therefore, would be as follows: Whether in view of finality of judgment passed on 31.08.2006 in Title Suit No.36 of 1989 between the same parties with respect to the same suit premises and substantially for same cause would be fatal for Title Suit No.268 of 1993, whereby the suit of the plaintiff in Title Suit No.268 of 1993 has been dismissed? 8. I have heard Mr. P.K. Kalita, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.S. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. B.J. Mukherjee for the respondent. 9. Mr. P.K. Kalita, learned counsel for the appellant has furnished a certified copy of the judgment dated 31.08.2006 passed in Title Suit no. 268 of 1989 to the Court and has placed the same in course of his argument. I have perused the judgment passed in both the suites along with records of Title Suit No. 268 of 1993. 10. Mr. P.K. Kalita, learned counsel for the appellant has furnished a certified copy of the judgment dated 31.08.2006 passed in Title Suit no. 268 of 1989 to the Court and has placed the same in course of his argument. I have perused the judgment passed in both the suites along with records of Title Suit No. 268 of 1993. 10. From perusal of the aforesaid facts it is clear that the dispute between the parties is in regard to second floor of RCC construction in holding No. 105A over a plot of land measuring 3 Kathas covered under Dag No. 561 to 565 of K.P. Patta No. 285 of village Japorigog Mouza- Beltola in the District of Kamrup. The admitted fact is that plaintiff is the owner of the plot of land and she prayed for loan from defendant company for construction of a second floor on the aforesaid land and the defendant paid loan of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the plaintiff inter alia on the condition that after completion of the second floor the same would be let out to the defendant at a rental of Rs. 2.50 per sq. ft. and out of this tenancy Rs. 15,000 will be adjusted by the defendant towards liquidation of loan. It was also agreed between the parties that in case the tenancy is terminated for any reason other than default by the defendant in that event loan would be liquidated by the plaintiff. Upto this, there is no dispute between the parties but the pleadings of both the sides have diverged from the next point. According to the plaintiff construction of the second floor was completed in the year 1986 itself and prior to October of the same year, the Regional Manager of the defendant company was intimated about the completion of the construction. Thereafter, the Regional Manager along with one D. Sengupta visited suit premises and was satisfied about its construction. He took over the possession of the suit premises and put a lock at the door thereon apart from placing a sign board. Thereafter, the Regional Manager along with one D. Sengupta visited suit premises and was satisfied about its construction. He took over the possession of the suit premises and put a lock at the door thereon apart from placing a sign board. The defendant did not admit this part of averment made in the plaint and claimed that the plaintiff sought to avoid the liability of the agreement (Exhibit-1) and did not hand over the possession of the suit premises to the defendant for which the defendant was compelled to institute Title Suit No. 36 of 1989, 4 years before institution of the suit by the present plaintiff. In that suit the Insurance Company had taken specific stand that it the plaintiff did not hand over possession of the second floor of the building for which the Insurance Company had to hire a different premises on a higher rent. The Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 was, therefore, filed on compelling circumstances to get the possession of the suit premises upon execution of lease by the plaintiff of Title Suit No. 268 of 1993. In the former suit the defendant 1 therein who is none other than the plaintiff in the present suit had taken the same stand as has been mentioned in the present suit. The learned Court allowed the parties to adduce their respective evidence in both the suits separately. Upon such evidence being led Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 was decreed on 31.08.2006 holding that possession of the second floor of the building was never handed over to the defendant Insurance Company by the plaintiff and that the Insurance Company was entitled to a decree of specific performance for getting lease of the said floor and delivery of possession thereof. The parties in both the suites substantially are same. Subject matter of both the suits is the same and pleadings of the parties were also identical in both the suits. The finding of fact in Title Suit No. 36 of 1989, therefore, is bound to affect the decision of the present appeal. Since the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2006 has not been appealed against by Smt. Prem Sherin, the defendant No.1 who is the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993, the findings of that suit have attained finality. The finding of fact in Title Suit No. 36 of 1989, therefore, is bound to affect the decision of the present appeal. Since the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2006 has not been appealed against by Smt. Prem Sherin, the defendant No.1 who is the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993, the findings of that suit have attained finality. This means that the finding regarding non delivery of possession of the suit premises to the defendant insurance company and non execution of deed of lease with respect to the second floor of the building have become a closed chapter. If these two findings on facts are found to have attain finality, in that event the pleading in Title Suit No.268 of 1993 stands automatically repudiated. This is because as disclosed in judgment in Title Suit No.36 of 1989, the facts stated in the written statement of Title Suit no. 36 of 1989 are same as that of the plaint in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993. However, the same learned court has rejected to accept all the contentions raised in the written statement of Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 and these findings have attained finality. Thus, preferring an appeal against the same findings in Title Suit No. 268 of 1993 would not be permissible. This is because in case the findings of facts in Title Suit no. 268 of 1993 are revisited on appeal, the same would amount to unsettling the settled fact finally held by the learned trial court in Title Suit No. 36 of 1989 against which no appeal was preferred by the present appellant. This means that findings of fact in Title suit No. 36 of 1989 in judgment passed on 31.08.2006 have become fatal for the present appeal. The sole point for determination in the present appeal, therefore, has to be decided in affirmative and against the appellant. Accordingly, appeal stands dismissed. Send down the lower court records immediately after framing of decree only. 11. No order as to costs.