Judgment 1. By the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged order dated 05.05.2015 at Annexure 'C' passed by the respondent No. 2 the Returning Officer whereby the nomination papers of the petitioners to contest election as members of the Gram Panchayat came to be rejected. The petitioners have also prayed for direction to allow them to contest election of the Gram Panchayat which was scheduled on 17.05.2015. 2. It appears that since rival candidates raised objections against the nomination of the petitioners that the petitioners did not have Toilets and the certificate given by the Talati of the village was false, the Returning Officer got the physical verification made at the residential places of the petitioners through the Taluka Development Officer. After the site inspection when it was reported that the petitioners have Toilets but with incomplete closet (cesspool) commonly known as Khalkuwa, the Returning Officer refused to accept the nomination of the petitioners. 3. Learned Advocate Mr. M.A. Kharadi for the petitioners submitted that as per Section 30 (kk) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993("the Act") a person is not qualified to be member of Panchayat if he is not having Toilet at his place of residence, however, as per the report of Taluka Development Officer, the petitioners were found to have Toilets but the cesspool attach to Toilets were stated to be incomplete in the report and only on this count, the nomination papers of the petitioners were rejected. Mr. Kharadi submitted that once the petitioners were found to have Toilets attached with their residential premises, the petitioners could be said to have satisfied the requirement to have facility of water closet or privy accommodation at their places of ordinary residence, therefore, the Returning Officer was not justified in rejecting the nominations of the petitioners. Mr. Kharadi submitted that the Returning Officer has otherwise also acted in gross violation of Rule 15 of the Gujarat Panchayat Elections Rules, 1994 ("the Rules"), in the matter of holding scrutiny of the nomination papers of the petitioners. Mr. Kharadi submitted that as per sub-Rule (5) of Rule 15, the Returning Officer was required to hold and complete the scrutiny of the nomination papers on the appointed date which was 04.05.2015 without any adjournment to the proceedings of the scrutiny of the nomination papers. Mr. Kharadi submitted that as per sub-Rule (5) of Rule 15, the Returning Officer was required to hold and complete the scrutiny of the nomination papers on the appointed date which was 04.05.2015 without any adjournment to the proceedings of the scrutiny of the nomination papers. However, the Returning Officer completed such scrutiny on the next day, i.e. on 05.05.2015, which was in gross violation of mandatory requirement of sub-Rule (5) of Rule 15. Mr. Kharadi submitted that the Returning Officer has also violated the rule as regards declaration of the result of the election inasmuch as the results were declared on the last date of withdrawal of the nomination on 05.05.2015 instead of declaring on the next date of withdrawal of the nomination papers. Mr. Kharadi submitted that in fact, on 08.05.2015, this Court granted interim protection against declaration of the result, however, by manipulating the documents result was stated to be declared on 05.05.2015 to show that there is no breach of interim order. Therefore, this Court may take serious view of the matter and set aside the result of the election and direct to hold fresh election. 4. Learned Advocate Ms. Roopal R. Patel appearing for the respondent No.1 submitted that the Returning Officer has not committed any illegality in rejecting the nominations of the petitioners as the Returning Officer found that the petitioners did not satisfy legal requirement to have facility of water closet or privy accommodation at the place of their residential premises on the basis of the summary inquiry made by him. Ms. Patel submitted that the Returning Officer is not stopped from holding summary inquiry during scrutiny of the nomination papers, when summary inquiry is held, it may not be possible for the Returning Officer to complete the scrutiny of the nomination papers on the same day. Ms. Patel submitted that the Returning Officer on holding summary inquiry found that the petitioners did not comply with the requirement of water closet and therefore he committed no illegality in rejecting the nomination papers of the petitioners. 5. Learned GP Ms. Ms. Patel submitted that the Returning Officer on holding summary inquiry found that the petitioners did not comply with the requirement of water closet and therefore he committed no illegality in rejecting the nomination papers of the petitioners. 5. Learned GP Ms. Shah appearing for the respondent No.2 submitted that requirement to have facility of water closet or privy accommodation at the place of ordinary residence of aspiring candidate for the office of member of Panchayat is with the good purpose and simple construction of Toilet without fully operational by such candidate is not enough so as to qualify to be a member of the Panchayat. Ms. Shah submitted that under the rules, the Returning Officer was entitled to hold summary inquiry once there was objection raised against the petitioners that the petitioners were not having the facility of water closet or privy accommodation. Ms. Shah submitted that the Returning Officer also committed no error in completing the scrutiny of the nomination papers on the next date and in passing the impugned order rejecting the nominations of the petitioners. Ms. Shah submitted that the facility of water closet or privy accommodation at the place of ordinary residence of the petitioners should be in operation and then only it could be said that such candidate has got facility of water closet or privy accommodation, otherwise, the very purpose or object to insert the clause by amendment in the Panchayat Act to make it compulsory to have facility of water closet or privy accommodation to qualify to be a member of Panchayat will stand frustrated. Ms. Shah submitted that the results were declared of uncontested candidates as there was no interim order on the date of declaration of the results and therefore, there is no violation of the interim order passed by this Court. 6. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties, it appears that against the nomination of the petitioners, since the objection was raised that the certificates given by the Talati for Toilets were in respect of the other places and not of the places of residences of the petitioners, the Returning Officer decided to hold summary inquiry to find out through site inspection as to whether the petitioners have water closets (Toilets) at the places of their ordinary residences. It appears from the documents produced with reply-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents that after site inspection, report was prepared by Taluka Development Officer stating that though there are Toilets at the places of residence of petitioners but the closet (cesspool) in which discharges/filths are pushed or carried off by water are incomplete. 7. Based on the above said report, the Returning Officer has not accepted the nominations of the petitioners. Mr. Kharadi however, submitted that as per the report only cesspools were found incomplete, but the Toilets were found fully constructed and cesspools which remain attached with the Toilets since found in open condition were stated to be incomplete. Therefore, it could not be said that the petitioners did not comply with the requirement to have facility of water closet or privy accommodation at their places of residence. 8. Section 30 of the Act prohibits a person to be member of the Panchayat or continue as such who is disqualified on the various counts as provided therein. By inserting Clause (kk) in Section 30 by Gujarat Act No. 23 of 2014, it is provided that if a person has no facility of water closet or privy accommodation at the place of his ordinary residence, he shall not be qualified to be member of the Panchayat or continue as such. Such amendment by insertion of Clause(kk) in Section 30 to provide for disqualification of a person to be member or to continue as such is with good purpose for betterment of the public health. Such good purpose or the object behind the amending Act could be achieved only by fully working and operational Toilet. If the same is given restricted meaning that to qualify to be a member of Panchayat it is enough to have only a construction of Toilet though unusable or not possible to be operated in absence of facility of cesspool in the village where there is no facility of gutter or drainage, the amended provision to disqualify the person who have no water closet or privy accommodation at his ordinary place of residence would be rendered nugatory and otiose. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Kharadi that since the Toilets were found constructed with incomplete cesspools (closets) attached to the Toilets will not disqualify a person to be a member of the Panchayat. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Kharadi that since the Toilets were found constructed with incomplete cesspools (closets) attached to the Toilets will not disqualify a person to be a member of the Panchayat. It is known fact that closed cesspool properly connected to Toilet for flushing discharges and filths is must in the village where there is no gutter facility to drain filths or dirty water. A Cesspool popularly known as 'Khalkuwa' in the villages is a deep pit which is dug under earth and used in a closed condition and unless it is complete in all respects, the Toilet is not capable to be used and therefore in the eye of law having only Toilet with incomplete cesspool is no facility of water closet or privy accommodation at the place of residence of a person to qualify to be a member of the Panchayat. In fact, the legislature, having seen the importance of having water closet or privy accommodation for every premises in village, has fastened duty by Section 107 of the Act on Taluka Development Officer to ensure availability of water closet at all premises in village. The meaning of 'water closet' is given in explanation to Section 107, which reads as under:- "107. Explanation For the purposes of this section "water closet" means a closet used as a privy in which discharge are pushed in or carried off by water, and includes an aqua privy, gas plant, latrine attached with gas plant, a closet of type known as P.R.A.I. (Planning Research Action Institute) type, septic tank type, band flush type, before hole type, clap trap type or any other type which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify. It appears that the purpose to make water closet or privy accommodation compulsory for a person to qualify to be a member is to make the people at the village level alert and aware about the importance of sanitation facility for public health. 9. It appears that the purpose to make water closet or privy accommodation compulsory for a person to qualify to be a member is to make the people at the village level alert and aware about the importance of sanitation facility for public health. 9. In respect of such requirement of law to qualify to be a member of the Panchayat, if the objection is raised by the rival candidates at the time of scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer was required to decide such objection to find out whether a person filing nomination is qualified to be a member of the Panchayat and if he thinks that for such purpose a summary inquiry is required, he may hold such summary inquiry and then take decision on the objection raised against the nomination of any candidate. Rule 15 of Gujarat Panchayats Elections Rules, 1994("the Rules) reads as under: "15. Scrutiny of nomination papers One of the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination under clause (b) of sub rule (2) of rule 9, the candidates, their election agents one proposer, of each candidate and one other person duly authorised in writing by each candidate, but no other person, may stand at such time and place as the returning officer may appoint and the returning officer may appoint and the returning officer shall give them all reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers of all candidate which have been delivered other than those which have been rejected by the returning officer under the proviso to sub rule (2) of under sub rule (6) of rule 12. (2) The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion after such summary inquiry if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination paper on any of the following grounds, namely. (2) The returning officer shall then examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or on his own motion after such summary inquiry if any, as he thinks necessary, reject any nomination paper on any of the following grounds, namely. (a) on the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations the candidate is either not qualified or disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under the Act or any other law for the time being in force: or (b) that the prosper is disqualified from subscribing a nomination paper; or (c) that there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of rules 12 or 13; or (d) that the candidate or the prosper or any seconder is not identical with the person whose electoral number is given in the nomination paper as number of such candidate or prosper or a seconder, as the case may be; or] (e) that the signature of the candidate or any proposer [or any seconder] on the nomination paper is not genuine or has been obtained by fraud. (3) Nothing contained in clause (b), (c) or (d) of sub-rule (2) shall be deemed to authorise the rejection of the nomination of any candidate on the ground of any irregularity in respect of a nomination paper, if the candidate has been duly nominated by means of another nomination paper in respect of which no irregularity has been committed. (4) The returning officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any technical defect which is not a substantial character. 10. Rule 15 is almost pari materia to Section 36 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Sub Rule (5) of Rule 15 though provides for holding the scrutiny of nominations on the appointed date and not allowing any adjournment of the proceedings, however, such would not prohibit taking of time by the Returning Officer to decide the objection after holding summary inquiry. If during scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer decides to hold summary inquiry, it may not be possible for him to conclude such summary inquiry on the appointed date for scrutiny of nomination papers. If during scrutiny of the nomination papers, the Returning Officer decides to hold summary inquiry, it may not be possible for him to conclude such summary inquiry on the appointed date for scrutiny of nomination papers. Therefore, the contention that the Returning Officer was required to finalize the scrutiny of the nomination papers on the appointed day and taking decision on the objections raised against the petitioners on the next day would vitiate the impugned decision cannot be accepted as accepting such contention would frustrate and make the provisions permitting the Returning Officer to hold summary inquiry to decide on the objections raised against the nominations of other candidates redundant. It may be that the Returning Officer may not act like a Court if highly disputed question is posed for his decision. However, if he finds that by holding summary inquiry, he can decide the objection raised, he can certainly exercise his power and take decision on the objections as a quasi judicial authority. Mr. Kharadi however, submitted that there was no communication requiring report to be prepared by Taluka Development Officer and the report of incomplete cesspool was prepared just to deprive the petitioners to contest the election and the petitioners were not given opportunity to rebut the contents of the report. However such contention cannot be considered at this stage as, it would amount to entering into the arena of disputed questions of facts. Suffice it to say that the petitioners were very much aware about the nature of the objection raised against their nominations. Therefore, the opportunity of rebuttal to the petitioners would have required the Returning Officer to decide the disputed facts on report like a Civil Court which appears to be not the intention of the legislature when providing for holding summary inquiry by the Returning Officer on the objections raised against the nomination of any candidate. During the summary inquiry based on any material either produced before him or collected by him through other agency, if the Returning Officer finds that the objection has substance, he may in such summary inquiry either reject the nomination or accept the nomination of the candidate against whom the objection is raised. During the summary inquiry based on any material either produced before him or collected by him through other agency, if the Returning Officer finds that the objection has substance, he may in such summary inquiry either reject the nomination or accept the nomination of the candidate against whom the objection is raised. The order of the Returning Officer on the nomination papers of the candidates is in exercise of power under Rule 15 and cannot estop the candidate from calling in question the decision of the Returning Officer by election petition. In the election petition, it is always open to the petitioner to prove the contrary to the decision taken by the Returning Officer by leading evidence before the concerned Court. 11. In the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. The State of Punjab reported in AIR 1956 S.C. 153 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held and observed in paragraph No.7 as under: "7. We have now to decide whether in view of the principles above stated and the functions and powers entrusted to the returning officer under the Act he is a court. The statutory provision bearing on this matter is S. 36.Under S. 36 (2), the returning officer has to examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be made thereto. This power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in exercising this power, he is authorised to come to a decision "after such summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary". That means that the parties have no right to insist on producing evidence which they may desire to adduce in support of their case. There is no machinery provided for summoning of witnesses, or of compelling production of documents in an enquiry under S. 36. The returning officer is entitled to act 'suo motu' in the matter. When one compares this procedure with that prescribed for trial of election petitions by the Election Tribunal under Ss. 90 and 92 of the Act, the difference between the two becomes marked. While the proceedings before the Election tribunal approximate in all essential matters to proceedings in civil courts, the proceedings under S. 36 present a different picture. There is no 'lis', in which persons with opposing claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner, but an enquiry such as is usually conducted by an 'adhoc' tribunal entrusted with a quasi-judicial power. There is no 'lis', in which persons with opposing claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner, but an enquiry such as is usually conducted by an 'adhoc' tribunal entrusted with a quasi-judicial power. In other words, the function of the returning officer acting under S. 36 is judicially in character, but he is not to act judicial in discharging it. We are of opinion that the returning officer deciding on the validity of a nomination paper is not a Court for the purpose of S. 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the result is that even as regards the charge under S. 193, the order of the Magistrate was not appealable, as the offence as the offence was not committed in or in relation to any proceeding in a Court." 12. In the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit reported in 1988 (Supp) SCC 604, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held and observed in paragraph No. 10 as under:- "10. Dr. Chitale learned counsel for the appellant urged that on the admitted facts and circumstances the Returning Officer could not be held to have acted improperly in rejecting the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi. He urged that since at the time of the scrutiny neither of the two candidates nor their proposer nor anybody else appeared before the returning officer, or placed any material before him showing that either of the two candidates was qualified to contest the election having attained the age of more than 25 years, the returning officer had no option but to rely on the entries contained in the electoral roll and therefore the rejection of the nomination papers of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi could not be said to be improper. Learned counsel further urged that if the returning officer did not act improperly in rejecting the nomination paper of the aforesaid candidates, appellant's election could not be set aside on the basis of fresh or additional material placed before the High Court. Section 36 provides that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination, the candidate his election agent, proposer or any other person duly authorised in writing by the candidate may attend the proceedings at the time and place fixed for scrutiny. Section 36 provides that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nomination, the candidate his election agent, proposer or any other person duly authorised in writing by the candidate may attend the proceedings at the time and place fixed for scrutiny. The returning officer is required to give them all reasonable facility for examining the nomination paper of all the candidates. Section 36(2) required the returning officer to examine the nomination papers and to decide all objections which may be made to any nomination. He may, either on such objection or on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he may think necessary, reject any nomination on any of the grounds specified under clauses (a)(b) and (c). Clause (d) empowers the returning officer to reject nomination paper of a candidate if on the date fixed for the scrutiny of the nomination the candidate is not qualified or is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under any of the provisions of Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191 of the Constitution. Article 173 lays down constitutional qualification for being a Member of the State Legislature, according to which a person is not qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislature of a State unless he is not less than 25 years of age. During the scrutiny the Returning Officer is under a statutory duty to satisfy himself that the candidate who, may have filed nomination paper possesses the necessary constitutional qualification for contesting the election. In the instant case none of the two candidates appeared nor anybody on their behalf appeared or placed any material before the returning officer to show that the candidates were not less than 25 years of age on the date of scrutiny 111984. No doubt in the nomination papers both the candidates had made a declaration that they were not less than 25 years of age but entries pertaining to them in the electoral roll clearly indicated that they were less than 25 years of age. The returning officer placing reliance on the entries contained in the public document i.e. the electoral roll, rejected the nomination paper of the two candidates on the ground that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi were not qualified to contest the election. The returning officer placing reliance on the entries contained in the public document i.e. the electoral roll, rejected the nomination paper of the two candidates on the ground that Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi were not qualified to contest the election. In the absence of any material before the returning officer, the returning officer was not wrong in taking the entries in the electoral roll into consideration and acting on them. But his decision is not final. In an election petition it is open to an election petitioner to place cogent evidence before the High Court to show that the candidate whose nomination paper was rejected had in fact attained the age of 25 years on the relevant date. It is open to the High Court to take a final decision in the matter notwithstanding the order of the returning officer rejecting the nomination paper. If on the basis of the material placed before the High Court it is proved that the candidate whose nomination paper had been rejected was qualified to contest the election it is open to the High Court to set aside the election. Enquiry during scrutiny is summary in nature as there is no scope for any elaborate enquiry at that stage. Therefore it is open to a party to place fresh or additional material before the High Court to show that the Returning Officer's order rejecting the nomination paper was improper. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings in an election petition are not in the nature of appeal against the order of the returning officer. It is an original proceeding. In the instant case it was open to the respondent election petitioner to place material before the High Court to show that the two candidates were qualified and their nomination paper was improperly rejected." 13. In the case of Shaligram Shrivastava Vs. Naresh Singh Patel reported in (2003) 2 SCC 176 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held and observed in paragraph 14 as under:- "14. For the purpose of scrutiny further information is necessary. The scrutiny may call for even suo motu inquiry by the Returning Officer though summary in nature. In the case of Shaligram Shrivastava Vs. Naresh Singh Patel reported in (2003) 2 SCC 176 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held and observed in paragraph 14 as under:- "14. For the purpose of scrutiny further information is necessary. The scrutiny may call for even suo motu inquiry by the Returning Officer though summary in nature. It is one of the statutory duties of the Returning Officer to scrutinize the nomination paper in the light of Section 8 of the Act and he is statutorily authorised to hold a summary inquiry about the qualification and disqualification of a candidate (See Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit). Such a power which vests in the Returning Officer is not dependent upon any instructions issued by the Election Commission, therefore, it is not necessary to enter into the controversy which is sought to be raised as to whether the instructions issued by the Election Commission are in exercise of its power under Article 324 or not. The Returning Officer is supposed to have the necessary information at the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper and for that purpose he can very well require a candidate to furnish information relevant for the purpose of Section 8 of the Act before or on the date of scrutiny. At best it can be said that the Election Commission by its letter dated 28.8.1997 had brought to the notice of the Returning Officers certain decisions of different High Courts in regard to disqualification under Section 8 of the Act. It was further desired that such a scrutiny be made by the Returning Officers looking to the menace of criminalisation of the politics. Barring the fact that the instructions apprised the Returning Officers of the position under law in the light of the judgments of the High Courts, nothing else was provided thereunder which was already not within the power of the Returning Officer under the statutory provisions rather it was a part of their duty to scrutinize the nomination papers in the light of Section 8 of the Act which implies that he is authorised to seek necessary information for the purpose. It can be suo motu as well." 14. In the case of Uttamrao Shivdas Jankar Vs. Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh Mohite Patil reported in (2009) 13 SCC 131 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held and observed in paragraph Nos. It can be suo motu as well." 14. In the case of Uttamrao Shivdas Jankar Vs. Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh Mohite Patil reported in (2009) 13 SCC 131 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held and observed in paragraph Nos. 31, 32, 35, 42 and 45 as under:- "31. Section 100 of the Act provides for the grounds for declaring election to be void inter alia in a case where a nomination has been improperly rejected. Improper rejection of a nomination, on a plain reading of the aforementioned provision, in our opinion, would not mean that for the said purpose an election petitioner can only show an error in the decision making process by a Returning Officer but also the correctness of the said decision. 32. Indisputably, there exists a distinction between a decision making process adopted by a statutory authority and the merit of the decision. Whereas in the former, the court would apply the standard of judicial review, in the latter, it may enter into the merit of the matter. Even in applying the standard of judicial review, we are of the opinion that the scope thereof having been expanded in recent times, viz., other than, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality and (iii) procedural impropriety, an error of fact touching the merit of the decision vis-a-vis the decision making process would also come within the purview of the power of judicial review. 35. The Returning Officer is a statutory authority. While exercising his power under Section 36 of the Act, he exercises a quasi-judicial power. For the said purpose, the statute mandates him to take a decision. A duty of substantial significance is cast on him. As in the present case, by his order the fulcrum of the democratic process, viz., election can be set at naught. Improper rejection of nomination paper, in the instant case, may lead a party not to enter into the fray of elections. 42. Before the returning officer, two sets of signatures were available. He could not have, on his own showing, arrived at any conclusion on that basis, particularly when prima facie he did not find the signatures of the concerned proposers to be discrepant on the basis of the naked eye comparison of their admitted signatures and the ones appearing in the registers of the Municipal Council. He could not have, on his own showing, arrived at any conclusion on that basis, particularly when prima facie he did not find the signatures of the concerned proposers to be discrepant on the basis of the naked eye comparison of their admitted signatures and the ones appearing in the registers of the Municipal Council. While, as indicated hereinbefore, he proceeded on the basis that the said proposers were appearing before him and filed their affidavits, indisputably affidavits had not only been filed by five others including the appellant but also by the brother of the proposer No. 8. The evidence before the returning officer, therefore, was by way of affidavits affirmed by the parties. 45. We must, however, notice another aspect of the matter: A quasi-judicial authority while deciding an issue of fact may not insist upon a conclusive proof. While doing so, he has to form a prima facie view. Indisputably, however, in terms of subsection (5) of Section 36 in Handbook for Returning Officers, if any objection is raised then while holding the summary inquiry in the matter of taking a decision on the objection as to whether the same is valid or not, he is not only required to record his brief decision for the same but further in case of doubt the benefit must go to the candidate and the nomination paper should be held to be valid although his view may be prima facie a plausible view or otherwise bona fide." 15. In the case on hand, the Returning Officer has considered the material in the form of the report submitted by the Taluka Development Officer and has found that on account of incomplete closet as per the report, the nominations of the petitioners could not be accepted. Such order of the Returning Officer since was made in exercise of the powers available to him under Rule 15 of the Rules, it cannot be said that the Returning Officer has committed any illegality in making the impugned decision of rejecting the nominations of the petitioners. 16. Mr. Kharadi however submitted that there was also violation of mandatory provision of Rule 15 inasmuch as the election declared on 5th May, 2015 was invalid declaration as the same was the last date for withdrawal of the nominations. 16. Mr. Kharadi however submitted that there was also violation of mandatory provision of Rule 15 inasmuch as the election declared on 5th May, 2015 was invalid declaration as the same was the last date for withdrawal of the nominations. It is required to note that when the Returning Officer found that the petitioners did not qualify to contest the election, their nominations were rejected. The remaining candidates since were required to be declared elected uncontested, declaration of the result on 5th May, 2015 could not be a ground to say that the decision taken by the Returning Officer of the rejecting the nomination of the petitioners would vitiate the result of election. If any irregularity is committed in the matter of declaration of result of the election, the same could be urged by election petition where the competent authority may decide on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties. 17. The Court does not find any error in the view taken by the Returning Officer as the cesspool is the main source to drain into it the discharges and filths to make the Toilet workable and with incomplete cesspool, no person can say that he is having facility of water closet or privy accommodation at the place of his ordinary residence and such person therefore could not be said to be qualified to be a member of the Panchayat. Whether the report of Taluka Development Officer was incorrect or got up could be examined by competent Court in the election petition. It is always open to the petitioners to challenge the decision of the Returning Officer and the election by election petition. 18. For the reasons stated above, this petition is rejected. Interim Relief stands vacated.