JUDGMENT : Tashi Rabstan, J. 1. Petitioner through the medium of instant petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir invokes writ jurisdiction of this Court for setting aside/correcting/quashing orders dated 10.07.2015 and 12.10.2015 passed by learned Additional District Judge (Matrimonial Cases), Jammu in case titled as Shivani Rakwal v. Rinkash Singh Rakwal (hereinafter for short as "impugned orders") by virtue of which right of the respondent below, petitioner herein, to lead further evidence, has been closed. Petitioner's case is that he has filed petition under Section 9 of the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Marriage Act. In response thereto, respondent has also filed petition under Sections 13 and 30 of Hindu Marriage Act, which are still pending disposal before the court of learned Additional District Judge (Matrimonial Cases), Jammu, (for brevity "Trial Court") since 2010. It is averred that marriage between petitioner and respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 20.10.2009. 2. Trial Court on 31.03.2015, directed petitioner to bring his witnesses on the next date of hearing. Accordingly, application, containing list of witnesses filed by petitioner on 25.04.2015, was allowed with a direction to petitioner to deposit diet expenses of witnesses. When petitioner approached Nazir of the Court to deposit the diet expenses, he was told to get the same paid to the witnesses in the open Court after recording their statements. The statement of witness, namely Aditya Gupta, was recorded on 05.05.2015 and he was paid the diet expenses in the open Court. Thereafter, an application for extension of time to deposit the diet expenses of rest of the witnesses was filed, which was dismissed on the ground that application under Section 30 of Hindu Marriage Act was pending before the Court since 2010 and the same was fixed for bringing dasti witnesses on 07.07.2015. On 07.07.2015, petitioner was present and craved indulgence of the trial Court to exempt his witness, namely, Kailash Devi on account of her health issue. The said application was allowed and petitioner directed to bring her on 10.07.2015. On the said date (10.07.2015) the witness namely, Kailash Devi was present. However, her statement was deferred due to her ill health. It is stated that on the said date, petitioner was directed to produce all witnesses on next date. When he failed to produce witnesses, he filed another application seeking direction for summoning official witnesses. On the said date (10.07.2015) the witness namely, Kailash Devi was present. However, her statement was deferred due to her ill health. It is stated that on the said date, petitioner was directed to produce all witnesses on next date. When he failed to produce witnesses, he filed another application seeking direction for summoning official witnesses. The petitioner's request has been turned down vide order dated 12.10.2015. It is this order, which is called-in-question in the present petition on the grounds set out in it. 3. Respondent No. 2, who was on Caveat, states that she has filed petition under Section 30 of the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of pendente lite maintenance and for expenses of the proceedings, which is pending since 18.09.2010. The petitioner, according to respondent, on one pretext or other, is protracting the proceedings. It is insisted that proceedings under Section 30 of the Hindu Marriage Act are summary trial proceedings, which are required to be dealt with and concluded within the time specified from the date of its institution. Respondents further avers that Trial Court has afforded adequate opportunities to petitioner to produce evidence, though at the initial stage, the Court directed the petitioner to submit list of his witnesses and deposit their diet expenses, but, the petitioner did not comply the Court order, thereafter many opportunities were afforded to him to produce the witnesses at his own but the petitioner did not comply the direction again despite last and final opportunity and ultimately learned trial Court vide order dated 12.10.2015 closed the rights of petitioner to lead evidence. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. Precisely, the petitioner's case is that impugned order has been passed in not haste, without application of mind and without taking into consideration the grounds taken by the petitioner in the application. It is not in dispute that petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is pending consideration before the Court of learned Additional District Judge (Matrimonial Cases), Jammu. It is not in dispute that petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is pending consideration before the Court of learned Additional District Judge (Matrimonial Cases), Jammu. However, learned counsel contends that the court below has erred in law and also exceeded its jurisdiction while proceeding to decide the application on merits, though the Code of Civil Procedure mandates the Civil Court in case where the witnesses, which are beyond the control of party are to be summoned in order to provide substantial justice to the parties, but the learned trial Court without looking to the facts of the case dismissed the application of the petitioner and has closed the right of leading evidence. It is contended that closing right of petitioner to lead evidence, has occasioned manifest injustice to petitioner for which he invokes supervisory and extra ordinary jurisdiction. 6. Before deciding the controversy raised in present petition, the question that arises for consideration is whether the present petition filed under Section 104 of the Constitution of State of Jammu & Kashmir is maintainable? The answer is negative for the following reasons. 7. Petitioner has not questioned the competence-jurisdiction of the Trial Court. Petitioner has also not averred in the petition that Trial Court or appellate Court has passed the order without or in excess of jurisdiction. 8. The maintainability of the petition is put under cloud by its very own averments on the ground that Civil Procedure Code has undergone a sea change with the incorporation of Amending Act of 2009. The amendment has restricted the powers of the Revisional Court. Virtually, petition on hand is in the nature of revision petition and if such a practice is adopted and allowed that will render the aim and object of the amendment infructuous and meaningless. The fact of this Court having vast powers under Articles 226 and 227 is undisputed, but care has to be taken when the same is warranted to be exercised, because the powers under such Articles has to be utilized very cautiously, carefully, sparingly and in rarest of the rare cases. 9. The fact of this Court having vast powers under Articles 226 and 227 is undisputed, but care has to be taken when the same is warranted to be exercised, because the powers under such Articles has to be utilized very cautiously, carefully, sparingly and in rarest of the rare cases. 9. The Apex Court in case titled Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported as 2010 AIR SCW 6387 has observed that there is tendency in High Courts to entertain petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against the orders against which revision is barred in terms of amended Act of CPC. It is apt to reproduce paragraph Nos. 80, 81 and 82 of the judgment supra herein:- "80. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 81. As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. 82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." 10. 82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." 10. The Apex Court in a case titled Kokkanda B. Poondacha & others v. K.D. Ganapathi & another reported as 2011 AIR SCW 1737, held that invoking of writ or supervisory jurisdiction against interlocutory orders is permissible only when any subordinate Court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and not otherwise. 11. This Court also in case titled Abdul Rehman Dar and others v. Showkat Ali Bhat and others reported in 2011 (4) JKJ 334 [HC] and in case titled Kuldip Singh and others v. Krishna Devi and others passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in LPAOW No. 30/2013, dated 16.04.2013, while following the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, has laid down the same principle that if a party which loses the case before the trial Court or before the appellate Court is allowed to file writ petition and thereafter if such writ petition is entertained without any check and balance that will amount to beating litigation and in breach of the purpose, aim and object of the legislation, which was made basis for amendment of the CPC. 12. In Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has surveyed judicial pronouncements as to the nature of the power of superintendence and control conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution (Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir). Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has started with the constitutional Bench's judgment of the Court in Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath, AIR 1954 SC 215 , where the Court, while relying upon a Special Bench judgment delivered by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airway Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , had held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. 193 , had held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. Hon'ble Supreme Court has also referred to another constitution Bench judgment in State of Gujarat v. Vakhat Singh Ji Vajesingh Ji Vaggekam, AIR 1968 SC 1481 , in which the Court has opined that the supervisory power under Art. 227 is meant to keep the subordinate Tribunal within the limits of their authority and to ensure that they obey law. 13. Before proceeding further to determine the controversy raised in this petition, it would be appropriate to refer the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India for exercise of jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, which is in pari materia to Section 227 of the Constitution of India. 14. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others Hon'ble Supreme Court, after discussing ambit of powers vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, laid down following propositions:- "(1) Amendment by Act No. 46 of 1999 with effect from 01.07.2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e., when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e., which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others, 2015 AIR SW 1849, has taken a different view from one that was taken in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others concerning jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the judicial order of Civil Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the question referred to in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), held that judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is distinct from the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The contrary view taken in Surya Dev's case has, thus, been overruled. The contrary view taken in Surya Dev's case has, thus, been overruled. However, the position qua jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, elaborately dealt with in Surya Dev Rai's case, has not been changed. 16. Judicial pronouncements as to the object and scope of power of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution (Section 104 of the State Constitution) would leave little scope to interfere with the orders of the subordinate courts as a matter of routine. This power cannot be taken as right of another Appeal to the aggrieved party. Nor this power can be invoked to point out an error of law or fact in the Order or judgment/decision of Subordinate Court as has been sought by the petitioner in this case. This power cannot be used to make out that the decision of the Subordinate Court could have been or must have been other than what it is. 17. High Courts in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution should interfere with the Trial Court orders only to keep Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority' and to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction vested in them and not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from the above, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the Orders of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 18. In view of the settled legal position, it is abundantly clear that the powers of this Court under Article 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir are extra ordinary power of superintendence and are, therefore, required to be exercised in the rarest of rare cases. 19. Viewed from the settled position of law, the aforesaid case does not fall in any of the aforesaid parameters laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court and as such, does not call for any interference. It is reiterated that the powers vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J & K is not a substitute for the revisional powers vested in the Civil Court under Section 115 of CPC. It is reiterated that the powers vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J & K is not a substitute for the revisional powers vested in the Civil Court under Section 115 of CPC. Once the revision petition against the order passed by the Civil Court is barred, this Court would be loath to exercise jurisdiction under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir unless it is demonstrated that the order impugned is perverse and has occasioned serious miscarriage of justice. 20. As noted above, learned Trial Court was correct to hold that petitioner had all opportunities to lead additional evidence, but he had chosen not to do so. The petitioner, as rightly pointed out by Trial Court, cannot be allowed to choose time of his own by filing applications after applications and unnecessarily protract the proceedings to his advantage and to the detriment of respondent. Any interference by this Court, at this stage, would only delay the trial, which has already been protracted inordinately. In this regard, it would be appropriate to reproduce paragraph No. 12 of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in M/s. Bagai Construction Tr. Prop. v. Gupta Building Material Store on 22.02.2013 as under:- "12. After change of various provisions by way of amendment in the CPC, it is desirable that the recording of evidence should be continuous and followed by arguments and decision thereon within a reasonable time. This Court has repeatedly held that courts should constantly endeavour to follow such a time schedule. If the same is not followed, the purpose of amending several provisions in the Code would get defeated. In fact, applications for adjournments, reopening and recalling are interim measures, could be as far as possible avoided and only in compelling and acceptable reasons, those applications are to be considered. We are satisfied that the plaintiff has filed those two applications before the trial Court in order to overcome the lacunae in the plaint, pleadings and evidence. It is not the case of the plaintiff that it was not given adequate opportunity. In fact, the materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the applications after more than sufficient opportunity had been granted to it to prove its case. During the entire trial, those documents have remained in exclusive possession of the plaintiff, still plaintiff has not placed those bills on record. In fact, the materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the applications after more than sufficient opportunity had been granted to it to prove its case. During the entire trial, those documents have remained in exclusive possession of the plaintiff, still plaintiff has not placed those bills on record. It further shows that final arguments were heard on number of times and judgment was reserved and only thereafter, in order to improve its case, the plaintiff came forward with such an application to avoid the final judgment against it. Such course is not permissible even with the aid of Section 151 CPC". 21. It is not the case of the petitioner that Trial Court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; therefore, the writ petition cannot stand the test laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments reproduced hereinbefore. Even otherwise, the order passed by the Matrimonial Court does not warrant interference by exercise of extra ordinary or supervisory jurisdiction of the Court, for, neither the decision making process of the Matrimonial Court suffers from any bias nor does the order cause any miscarriage of justice or otherwise suffers from any error of law. 22. For all what has been discussed above, it is abundantly clearly that there has been a deliberate effort on part of petitioner to unnecessarily protract the proceedings before the Trial Court. The order impugned was passed by the trial Court to check this also. That being the position, impugned order passed by the learned trial Court calls no interference. 23. For all what has been said herein above, this petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed along with connected MP(s), if any. However, keeping in view the nature of controversy involved in the petition raising matrimonial disputes involving two young lives, I deem it proper to direct the learned trial Court to proceed in the matter expeditiously and conclude the proceedings within a reasonable dispatch. Heard the Caveator. Caveat discharged.