JUDGMENT The appellants have preferred this writ appeal challenging the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court dt. 29.05.2012 passed in W.P.No. 38086/2002, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition and quashed the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the L.A. Act, 1894’ for short) mainly on the ground that the scheme which is prerequisite for going ahead with the acquisition of land under Sec. 33(2) of the Karnataka Housing Board Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘KHB Act’ for short) with the provisions of the L.A. Act, 1894, is neither framed nor finalized by the Karnataka Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘Board’ for short); much less it is sanctioned by the State Government before going ahead with the project as required under the provisions of Secs. 20 and 21 of the KHB Act and on various other grounds. 2. The second respondent herein who is the petitioner in the writ petition has filed an application under Section 151 of CPC praying to dismiss the writ appeal, holding it ‘does not survive for consideration’ in view of the scheme being lapsed. 3. In the application, it is contended that the appellants have intended to acquire a total extent of 106 acres of land by virtue of a notification dt. 25.03.91 for public purpose. An extent of 36 acres 19 ½ guntas of land, including 31 guntas of kharab, was denotified by the Government under Sec. 48(1) of the L.A. Act, 1894, in favour of Sri. Dharmasthala Manjunatheswara Educational Society (Ujire) in Dakshina Kannada district, from the acquisition proceedings by notification dt. 14.6.10 as evident from Annexure R.1 to the application. Although the appellants claim to be in possession of 16 acres 23 guntas of land, but the records maintained by them further reveal that, out of 16 acres 23 guntas they are actually in possession of 6 acres 35 guntas, in as much as, the rest of 10 acres is in the occupation of third parties who have already developed the land by constructing buildings. 4. 4. In para 3 of the application, it is contended that in the light of ‘The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013’ (herein after referred to as, the Act, 2013) which has come into force with effect from 01.01.2014, the proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, stood lapsed by friction of law as provided under Sec. 24(2) of the Act, 2013. 5. In para 4 of the application it is contended that possession of the land is not taken and further the Government by considering the application filed by the second respondent for conversion of land from agricultural into nonagricultural purpose, allowed the application and accorded conversion and collected conversion charges as evident from Annexure – R.2 to the application and therefore the acquisition will not survive for consideration. 6. Though second respondent has sought for dismissing of the writ appeal by holding it as `does not survive for consideration’ on various grounds, but Sri. S.M.Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent, while addressing argument on the application, has confined his argument to the effect that the acquisition proceedings initiated by the appellants under the L.A. Act, 1894 does not survive in view of Sec. 24 of the Act, 2013. He submits, though an award has been passed under Sec. 11 of the L.A. Act, 1894, the compensation awarded is neither paid to the second respondent nor deposited before the concerned Court, 5 years prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013. He submits, any interim order, including stay of possession granted for the acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, and time consumed for the said litigation is also liable to be included while reckoning the period of 5 years. With this he prayed for allowing the application and consequently dismissing the writ appeal as the same does not survive for consideration. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following citations : i) AIR 2014 SC 982 – Pune Municipal Corporation and another vs. Alokchand Solanki. ii) AIR 2014 SC 2242 Union of India and others vs. Shivaraj and others. iii) 2014 (6) SCC 586 – Bharat vs. State of Haryana and another. iv) LAWS ILR DH 2014 – Jagjit Singh vs. Union of India. 7. ii) AIR 2014 SC 2242 Union of India and others vs. Shivaraj and others. iii) 2014 (6) SCC 586 – Bharat vs. State of Haryana and another. iv) LAWS ILR DH 2014 – Jagjit Singh vs. Union of India. 7. The application is opposed by the appellants by filing statement of objections inter alia contending that the second respondent has been abusing the process of Courts to prevent lawful acquisition of the lands. In the first instance he had filed W.P.No. 14381/1991 challenging the notification dt. 06-04-89 and 25-03-91 issued under Sec.4(1) and Sec. 6(1) of the L.A. Act, 1894 respectively and it was allowed on 13-07-98. The appellant – Board has challenged the same by preferring W.A.No.1489/1999 and it was allowed by the Division Bench on 04-02-02 and the order passed in the writ petition came to be set aside and even Special Leave Petition filed by the respondent before the Hon’ble Supreme Court also came to be dismissed and thus acquisition of the land by the Board in so far as the second respondent is concerned has reached finality and therefore the present writ petition filed by the second respondent was not maintainable and it ought to have been dismissed. Without considering this aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition solely on the ground that the scheme has not been framed and finalized by the Housing Board. 8. In para 4 of the objection, it is contended that interim order granted by the learned Single Judge on 05-07-91 in W.P.No.14381/91 as not to dispossess the second respondent from the possession of the lands acquired was in force till 04-02-02, the date on which the Division Bench allowed W.A.No.1489/1999 filed by the appellants and set aside the order passed in the writ petition and has upheld the acquisition proceedings. After disposal of W.A.No.1489/1999 the award proceedings were continued by issuing notices as required under Secs. 9 and 10 of the L.A. Act, 1894, and award was passed on 18-08-02 and approved by the Commissioner and it was within the time prescribed under law after excluding the stay period and by virtue of which acquisition was revived. 9. In para 5 of the objections it is contended that the award notice dt. 22.08.02 was received by the wife of the second respondent on 18-09-02. 9. In para 5 of the objections it is contended that the award notice dt. 22.08.02 was received by the wife of the second respondent on 18-09-02. Immediately the second respondent preferred W.P.No.38086/2002 once again challenging the notification issued under Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A. Act and on 31-10-2002 the learned Single Judge granted an interim order of stay of dispossession and it was continued during the pendency of the writ petition. It is contended that, even though an award was passed within the time, the possession of the land could not be taken in view of continuation of interim order obtained by the second respondent. 10. In para 6 of the objection it is contended that the contention of the second respondent that by virtue of Sec. 24(2) of the Act, 2013, acquisition in question stood lapsed is misconceived and untenable. It is contended that before coming into force of the Act, 2013, the State had completed the acquisition proceedings in all respects and when possession was about to be taken after service of award notice, the second respondent had filed writ petition and obtained an interim order against dispossession and it was in force till the disposal of the writ petition and consequently appellants could not have taken possession of the land. Therefore the provisions of Sec. 24(2) of Act 2013 have no application to the case. With the above grounds the appellants have prayed for rejection of the application. 11. Sri. Basavaraj V. Sabarad, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants – Board by reiterating the contentions raised in the objection prays for rejection of the application filed by the second respondent. In support of his submission, he mainly relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Poona Municipal Corporation. 12. After hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perusing the application filed by the second respondent and objections filed by the appellants to the said application, the point that arises for our consideration is : `Whether the acquisition proceedings initiated by the appellants under Secs.4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A. Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed by friction of law in view of Sec. 24(2) of the Act, 2013 and the writ appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed as it does not survive for consideration ? What order ?’ 13. What order ?’ 13. In order to answer the above question, it is necessary to state a few admitted facts as under : The second appellant had issued the notification dt. 06-04-89 under Sec. 4(1) gazetted on 18-01-90 and the final declaration dated 25.3.1991 under Sec. 6(1) which was gazetted on 11-04-91 of the L.A. Act, 1894, at the instance of the first appellant for acquiring 2 acres 26 guntas of land in Sy.No.8/2 and 26 guntas of land in Sy.No. 8/7 both situated at Allalasandra village, Yelhanka Hobli, Bangalore north taluk, belonging to the second respondent. The second respondent had preferred W.P.No. 14381/1991 challenging both the notifications and obtained an interim order of stay of dispossession on 05-07-91. The writ petition was allowed on 13-7-98 and acquisition proceedings were quashed. The interim order granted on 05-07-91 was in force till the disposal of the writ petition. The appellants had preferred W.A.No.1489/1999 challenging the order passed in the writ petition and it was allowed on 04-02-2002 and the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.14381/91 was set aside and even the SLP filed by the second respondent before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the order passed in the writ appeal also came to be dismissed. Thereafter, the second appellant had issued notices under Secs. 9 and 10 of the L.A.Act and passed the award on 18-08-02. The award notice dt. 22-08-02 was served on the wife of the second respondent on 18-09-02. Immediately, the second respondent has preferred the present writ petition once again challenging the acquisition proceedings initiated under Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A. Act, 1894, on the ground that there was no prior sanction of the scheme. An interim order of stay of dispossession was granted on 31.10.2002 and ultimately the writ petition came to be allowed on 29.05.2012 quashing the acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground that there was no prior sanction of the scheme by the Government. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge, appellants have preferred the above appeal. 14. Sri. An interim order of stay of dispossession was granted on 31.10.2002 and ultimately the writ petition came to be allowed on 29.05.2012 quashing the acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground that there was no prior sanction of the scheme by the Government. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge, appellants have preferred the above appeal. 14. Sri. S.M. Chandrashekar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent contends, since award under Sec. 11 of the L.A. Act has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013, physical possession of the land has not been taken or compensation has not been paid, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act shall be deemed to have lapsed by friction of Sec. 24(2) of the Act, 2013. 15. The principal contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that, in view of dismissal of Special Leave Petition of the second respondent by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the acquisition of the land of the second respondent has reached finality and therefore it cannot be held as lapsed under the Act, 2013. Secondly he contends, in view of filing of writ petition by the second respondent challenging the acquisition proceedings and obtaining an interim order, there is delay in passing the award and the Board could not take possession of the land from the second respondent and therefore acquisition proceedings cannot be held as lapsed under the Act, 2013. Thirdly he contends, though Sec. 114 of the Act, 2013 repeals the L.A. Act, 1894, but by virtue of sub-Sec. (2) of the said Sec. 114, proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, are not lapsed and therefore prays for rejection of the application filed by the second respondent. 16. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties and to answer the questions raised for consideration, it is necessary to extract the very provisions of Sec. 24 of the Act, 2013 which reads as under : “24. 16. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties and to answer the questions raised for consideration, it is necessary to extract the very provisions of Sec. 24 of the Act, 2013 which reads as under : “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.I of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: (a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) Where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act”. 17. By reading of Sec. 24 (1) and (2) of the Act, 2013, it is clear that both the provisions begin with non-abstante clause and they have got overriding effect over all other provisions of the said Act. 18. As per sub-Sec.(1) of Sec. 24 of the Act 2013, the land acquisition process initiated under Act No.1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. 19. 18. As per sub-Sec.(1) of Sec. 24 of the Act 2013, the land acquisition process initiated under Act No.1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. 19. Clause (a) of sub-Sec.(1) of Sec. 24 deals with a situation where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the L.A.Act, 1894, but no award under Sec. 11 of the said LA Act has been made, then in such cases all provisions of the Act, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. 20. Clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 24 deals with a situation where acquisition proceedings were initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894 and an award under Sec. 11 of the said Act has also been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act No.1 of 1894, as if the said Act has not been repealed. 21. Sec.24(1)(b) has got an exception and that exception is dealt under sub-Sec.(2) of Sec.24 and it deals with a situation where acquisition proceedings were initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894 and an award has also been made under Sec. 11 of the said Act but even after lapse of five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013, if the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation awarded has not been paid, in such cases, the proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed and it is open to the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, to initiate acquisition proceedings of such land afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 2013. 22. This sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 24 has got further exception that even though acquisition proceedings were initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894 and award has also been made under Sec. 11 of the said Act, if compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then all, beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Sec.4 of the Act (1) of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 2013. 23. In the instant case, admittedly the acquisition proceedings were initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894 and an award has also been made under Sec. 11 of the said Act. 23. In the instant case, admittedly the acquisition proceedings were initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894 and an award has also been made under Sec. 11 of the said Act. Therefore, the question would be whether the compensation awarded under Sec. 11 of the Act, 1894, has been paid to the second respondent or physical possession of the land has been taken by the Government five years prior to commencement of the Act, 2013. 24. It is admitted case of the appellants that they have not deposited the compensation amount awarded under Sec. 11 of the Act, 1894, either before the concerned Court, or into the account of the beneficiary i.e. the second respondent, muchless, as contemplated under Sec. 31 of the L.A. Act, 1894, and the possession of the land has not been taken by them from the second respondent for whatsoever reason. Therefore, the next question would be, whether the interim order granted by this Court in W.P.No.14381/91 filed by the second respondent challenging the acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, which order was in force till the disposal of the writ petition on 13-07-98 could be considered as an excuse for nonpayment of award amount to the second respondent or for not taking possession of the land from the second respondent and whether the period from the date on which the interim order of stay was granted in W.P.No.14381/91 till 04-02-02, the date on which writ appeal 1489/1999 came to be allowed and order passed in the writ petition was set aside, by holding acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, as valid has to be excluded in reckoning the period of five years or more, as contemplated under Sec. 24(2) of the Act, 2013. 25. The interpretation regarding reckoning of five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013, and limitations relating to the period spent during litigation, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Shiv Raj and others reported in AIR 2014 SC 2242 and connected cases, wherein it has held as under : “19. In order to clarify the statutory provisions of the Act, 2013 with respect to such lapsing, the Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development, Delhi Division, came up With a circular dated 14.03.2014 wherein on the basis of the legal opinion of the Solicitor General of India, it has been clarified as under: “3. Interpretation of five years period: “With regard to this issue viz., interpretation of five years period two situations have been envisaged in cases where the acquisition has been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 viz., (1) parties whose lands have been acquired have refused to accept the compensation and (2) parties whose lands have been acquired having just parted with physical possession of the land. However, in both the above situations, as on 1.1.2014, the period of 5 years would not have ended and in such cases, the advisory seeks to clarify that the new law shall apply only if the situation of pendency continues unchanged for a period that equals to or exceeds five years. In my view, it should be further clarified that in none of the cases the period of five years would have elapsed pursuant to an award made under Section 11 from the date of commencement of the Act and that the benefit of Section 24(2) will be available to those cases which are pending and where during pendency, the situation has remained unchanged the physical possession not being handed over or compensation not having been accepted and the period equals to or exceeds five years. 4. Limitation: As regards this item relating to the period spent during litigation would also be accounted for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has to be counted or not, it should be clarified that it will apply only to cases where awards were passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 5 years or more prior to 1.1.2014 as specified in Section 24(2) of the Act, to avoid any ambiguity. Since this legislation has been passed with the objective of benefiting the landlosers, this interpretation is consistent with that objective and also added as a matter of abundant caution that the period spent in litigation challenging an award cannot be excluded for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has elapsed or not. Since this legislation has been passed with the objective of benefiting the landlosers, this interpretation is consistent with that objective and also added as a matter of abundant caution that the period spent in litigation challenging an award cannot be excluded for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has elapsed or not. If the possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid due to the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings, the pendente lite period will be included to determine the five year period and including such period if the award was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, then the said acquisition proceedings will be deemed to have elapsed and fresh proceedings, if so desired, will have to be initiated in accordance with the new Act.” The objects and reasons of the Act, 2013 and particularly clause 18 thereof fortify the view taken by this Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove. Clause 18 thereof reads as under: “The benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where award has not been made or possession of land has not been taken.” 26. This issue has been further elaborated by the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Kishan & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. wherein it has held as under : “4. Limitation : As regards this item relating to the period spent during litigation would also be accounted for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has to be counted or not, it should be clarified that it will apply only to cases where awards were passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition act, 1894, 5 years or more prior to 1.1.2014 as specified in Section 24(2) of the Act, to avoid any ambiguity. “Since this legislation has been passed with the objective of benefiting the landlosers, this interpretation is consistent with that objective and also added as a matter of abundant caution that the period spent in litigation challenging an award cannot be excluded for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has elapsed or not. “Since this legislation has been passed with the objective of benefiting the landlosers, this interpretation is consistent with that objective and also added as a matter of abundant caution that the period spent in litigation challenging an award cannot be excluded for the purpose of determining whether the period of five years has elapsed or not. If the possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid due to the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings, the pendente lite period will be included to determine the five year period and including such period if the award was made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, then the said acquisition proceedings will be deemed to have elapsed and fresh proceedings, if so desired, will have to be initiated in accordance with the new Act.” The Objects and Reasons of the 2013 Act and particularly Clause 18 thereof fortify the view taken by this Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove. Clause 18 thereof reads as under: “18. The benefits under the new law would be available in all the cases of land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where award has not been made or possession of land has not been taken.” 27. In the instant case, the issue whether the period from 05-07-91, the date on which an interim order was granted in writ petition No. 14381/1991 staying the acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, till 04-02-2002 the date on which the writ appeal No.1489/1999 filed by the appellants was allowed and order passed in the writ petition was set aside, upholding the acquisition proceedings as valid is to be excluded or not in reckoning the period of five years or more, as contemplated under Sec. 24(2) of the Act does not arise for the reason that even after allowing writ appeal on 04-02-2002, award itself has not been passed till 31-01-2008 for more than a period of 5 years and further admittedly the award amount has not been paid to the second respondent and possession of the land has not been taken by the appellants from the second respondent five years prior to the commencement of the Act, 2013. In any event, the acquisition proceedings initiated under Act 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in view of Sec. 24 of the Act, 2013. 28. In any event, the acquisition proceedings initiated under Act 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in view of Sec. 24 of the Act, 2013. 28. There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the Board that although Sec.114(1) repeals the L.A.Act, 1894, but, proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act, 1894, are saved by virtue of subsection (2) of the said Sec.114, wherein it is said that `save as otherwise’ provided in this Act, the repeal under subsection (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals. This issue had also come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki reported in AIR 2014 SC 982 wherein it was held as under: “21. The argument on behalf of the Corporation that the subject land acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under the 1894 Act and that they are not affected at al in view of Section 114(2) of the 2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected. Section 114(1) of the 2013 Act repeals 1894 Act. Subsection (2) of Section 114, however, makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the 2013 Act. Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid. The legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there is no merit in the contention of the Corporation.” 29. The legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there is no merit in the contention of the Corporation.” 29. It was finally contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that by virtue of dismissal of SLP of the second respondent by the Hon’ble Apex Court thereby confirming the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, whereby the Division Bench has allowed the writ appeal filed by the Board and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and upheld the acquisition proceedings the matter reached finality, therefore, the present writ petition being a second round of litigation is not maintainable. The said contention is liable to be rejected as devoid of merit for more than one reason. Firstly, this ground was not urged by the Board before the learned Single Judge and the learned Judge had no occasion to consider this issue and therefore it cannot be raised in the appeal which is an intra Court proceedings for the first time. Secondly, in the first round of writ petition, acquisition proceedings initiated by the board and the Government were challenged solely on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner had no authority to issue notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, whereas, in the second round of litigation the acquisition proceedings initiated by the Board and the Government under Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A. Act, 1894, were challenged on the ground that the scheme has not been formulated which is prerequisite for going ahead with the acquisition of land under Section 33(2) of the KHB Act. 30. For the reasons stated above, without going into the merits of the case, I.A.I/14 filed by the second respondent has to be allowed, holding acquisition proceedings initiated by the appellants and the State Government under Secs. 4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A.Act, 1894, for acquiring the land belonging to the second respondent, shall be deemed to have lapsed by friction of Sec.24(2) of the Act, 2013 and the writ appeal filed by the appellant – Board does not survive for consideration and it is liable to be dismissed. 4(1) and 6(1) of the L.A.Act, 1894, for acquiring the land belonging to the second respondent, shall be deemed to have lapsed by friction of Sec.24(2) of the Act, 2013 and the writ appeal filed by the appellant – Board does not survive for consideration and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I.A.No.1/2014 filed by the second respondent under Sec. 151 of CPC is allowed and writ appeal is dismissed holding that it does not survive for consideration.