JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Mr. Maulik Shelat, learned advocate waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondent No.1. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is not necessary to issue notice to the respondent No.2. 2. By this application under rule 1 of Order XLVII read with sections 114 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), the applicants-original claimants viz. the respondents No.1.1 and 1.2 in First Appeal No.3289 of 2013 seek review of the judgment and order dated 8.5.2014 passed by this court in First Appeal No.3289 of 2013. 3. In paragraph 24 of the judgment and order dated 8.5.2014 which is subject matter of review, this court had issued the following directions: “..... Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached as a part of the security. If necessity arises, the executing court shall take assistance of the Regional Transport Office concerned. The executing court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the insured, owner of the vehicle shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default, it shall be open to the executing court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured.” 4. The applicants herein are aggrieved by the directions issued by this court to the extent the court has directed that, before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. 5. Mr. M.T.M. Hakim, learned advocate with Mr. Hemal Shah, learned advocate for the applicants invited the attention of the court to the judgment and order dated 8.5.2014 to point out that this court has held that the case would fall within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). M.T.M. Hakim, learned advocate with Mr. Hemal Shah, learned advocate for the applicants invited the attention of the court to the judgment and order dated 8.5.2014 to point out that this court has held that the case would fall within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). It was pointed out that this court has thereafter, while issuing the above referred directions, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan, 2004 ACJ 721. Referring to the said decision, it was pointed out that the same was rendered in a case where the passenger travelling in a goods vehicle sustained injury when the vehicle met with an accident. It was submitted that, therefore, the above referred decision had been rendered in a case where the Supreme Court had exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and that it was, in those circumstances, that the court had with a view to protect the interest of the insurance company, issued the above referred directions. It was submitted that in a case where sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act is attracted, the statute does provides for the insurance company to make payment and thereafter, recover it from the insured. Therefore, to the extent the court had issued directions while placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan (supra), the same is a mistake apparent on the face of the record, inasmuch as, the court has failed to notice that such directions had been issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and not in a case which fell within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act. It was submitted that such stringent conditions, as imposed by this court in the operative part of the judgment, are not warranted in a case which falls under sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 149 of the Act as the same would defeat the very purpose of the provisions. It was submitted that such stringent conditions, as imposed by this court in the operative part of the judgment, are not warranted in a case which falls under sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 149 of the Act as the same would defeat the very purpose of the provisions. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh and others, AIR 2004 SC 1531 , to point out that the said decision had been rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court and it has been held that the provisions contained in sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and subsection (5) of section 149 of the Act which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims. It was submitted that, therefore, it is the interest of the victims which has to be looked into and that if the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan (supra) are to be issued in cases which fall under sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 149 of the Act, the same would delay the recovery of the amount by the claimants and deprive the claimants from getting the compensation. Therefore, the procedure as provided in the statute, is required to be followed and that, therefore, the above referred directions issued by this court being a mistake apparent on the face of the record, the matter requires consideration and such directions are required to be deleted. 5.1 Mr. Hakim further submitted that the directions as applicable in case of a gratuitous passenger should not be made applicable in case of statutory defence and that the directions issued are contrary to the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh (supra). 5.1 Mr. Hakim further submitted that the directions as applicable in case of a gratuitous passenger should not be made applicable in case of statutory defence and that the directions issued are contrary to the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh (supra). It was, accordingly, urged that the matter may be reconsidered and directions may be issued in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh (supra) and statutory provisions. 6. Vehemently opposing the application, Mr. Maulik Shelat, learned advocate for the respondent insurance company submitted that there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. It was submitted that during the course of arguments, the matter was discussed and argued and the court had accepted the arguments canvassed by the insurance company. It was submitted that merely because another view is possible, is no reason for review of the order. Under the circumstances, there is no scope for review of the judgment and order passed by this court and that the remedy lies elsewhere. Reference was made to the contents of paragraph 16 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Kusum Rai and others, AIR 2006 SC 3440, wherein the vehicle involved was a commercial vehicle. The Supreme Court held that the driver of the said vehicle was required to hold a proper licence. The driver of the vehicle was a holder of licence to drive the light motor vehicle and he did not possess any licence to drive a commercial vehicle. Therefore, there was a breach of condition of contract of insurance. It was submitted that despite fact that the said case was one under sub-section (4) of section 149, the court in paragraph 16 of the decision, has observed that the victim was aged only 12 years. The claimants are from a poor background. They must have suffered great mental agony. Therefore, the court was of the opinion that it may not be appropriate to push them into another round of litigation particularly when it may be difficult for them to secure the presence of the owner of the vehicle. The claimants are from a poor background. They must have suffered great mental agony. Therefore, the court was of the opinion that it may not be appropriate to push them into another round of litigation particularly when it may be difficult for them to secure the presence of the owner of the vehicle. It was pointed out that the court in paragraph 18 of the judgment has held that the appellant was not liable to pay the claimed amount as the driver was not possessing a valid licence. The court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, directed the appellant to recover the amount from the owner in the same manner as was directed in Nanjappan (supra). It was submitted that, therefore, in a case which fell under sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act, the Supreme Court had issued directions that the appellant insurance company may recover the amount from the owner in the same manner as was directed in Nanjappan (supra). It was submitted that, therefore, this court did not commit any error while issuing such directions in the facts of the present case. It was submitted that the insurance company has taken steps to execute the order for seizing the vehicle and the Tribunal has issued directions to the Regional Transport Office. That once the vehicle is sold, the claimants would get the amount. It was submitted that this factor was not argued at the relevant time when the appeal was heard and that the applicants having missed the opportunity they cannot re-agitate such issue to open the stage of final hearing. It was submitted that the scope of the review application is limited and that, on facts, no case has been made out for exercise of review jurisdiction and that the application being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed. 6.1 Mr. Shelat also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 wherein the court has held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. The court summarised the principles for review jurisdiction as under:- “Summary of the Principles: “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1 When the review will be maintainable-:- (I) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520 : ( AIR 1954 SC 526 ), to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and Ors., JT 2013 (8) SC 275 : (2013 AIR SCW 2905). 20.2 When the review will not be maintainable:- (I) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 6.2 Mr. Shelat submitted that keeping the above principles in mind, no case has been made out for interference while exercising review jurisdiction. Reliance was also placed upon an unreported decision dated 26th August, 2014 of this court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Bhikhabhai Jeshabhai and another rendered in First Appeal No.476 of 2005 wherein the question before the court was as to whether the Insurance Company was liable to pay the amount on behalf of the owner-cum-driver for breach of conditions of the Insurance inasmuch as the licence of the driver had expired and he had not cared to renew the same. The court after holding that the insurance company was not liable to satisfy the award followed the principles laid down in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanjappan (supra) and directed that before release of the amount, the insured, the owner of the vehicle, shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. It was submitted that thus this court in a case falling within the ambit of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 149 of the Act had issued such directions and hence, the directions issued by this court being in consonance with the directions issued by the coordinate bench and the Supreme Court in the above decisions, there is no warrant for exercise of powers of review. 7. As noted hereinabove, the review application is limited to the directions issued by the court to the effect that, before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. 7. As noted hereinabove, the review application is limited to the directions issued by the court to the effect that, before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. As is borne out from the contents of paragraphs 23 and 24 of the judgment, the above referred directions have been issued by this court in the light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan (supra). A perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan, (supra) reveals that the said case was one where the passenger was travelling in a goods vehicle and had sustained injury when the vehicle met with an accident. Clearly, therefore, the said case related to a gratuitous passenger and was not one which fell within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act. Therefore, the direction to the insurance company to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and to recover it from the insured was issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and not under sub-sections (4) or (5) of section 149 of the Act. In the present case, as rightly pointed by the learned counsel for the applicants, this court has clearly held that this is a case which falls within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act. 8. At this juncture, reference may be made to the provisions of sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 149 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act provides that any sum paid by insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which has been covered by the policy by virtue only of that sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. Sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act provides that any sum paid by insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which has been covered by the policy by virtue only of that sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. Sub-section (5) of section 149 of the Act provides that if the amount which an insurer becomes liable under that section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of that section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. Thus, both sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 149 of the Act take care of the interest of the insurer to the extent that it would be entitled to recover the amount in excess of its liability from the other person towards whose liability it had paid the excess amount. The provision does not extend such protection to the effect that the insurer shall not be liable to pay till such amount which the other person is liable to pay is secured by attachment of the offending vehicle. As noted hereinabove, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan, (supra) was rendered in a case where the passenger was travelling in a goods vehicle. Therefore, though not specifically stated therein, the order directing the insurer to pay the amount and recover the same from the owner of the offending vehicle appears to have been passed in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the subsequent direction to the effect that before release of the amount to the insured, the owner of the vehicle shall be required to be issued notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants has been given in the context of an order passed in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution where there was no statutory liability cast upon the insurer to pay such amount. Whereas in case where the insurer is liable to pay and recover under the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 149 of the Act, there is a statutory liability cast upon the insurer which has to be discharged in terms of the said provisions. The said provision does not require the owner to furnish security prior to release of the amount. Putting a condition of furnishing security prior to release of the amount would, therefore, amount to reading into the statute, something beyond the intention of the legislature. The statute gives protection to the insurer to the extent indicated therein and such protection cannot be extended further by reading into the statute something that is not provided therein and putting a condition therein of taking security prior to releasing the amount. The proviso to sub-section (4) of section 149 of the Act, provides that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of the sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. Sub-section (5) of section 149 of the Act provides that if the amount the insurer becomes liable under that section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of that section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. From the plain words of the statute, it is manifest that the sum which has been paid by the insurer towards the liability of the other person can be recovered by him. Thus, the payment precedes recovery from the other person, and such payment is not subject to any condition of obtaining security. The above relevant fact had not been noticed by this court at the time of issuing the directions contained in paragraph 24 of the judgment and order dated 8.5.2014 passed in First Appeal No.3289 of 2013. Evidently, therefore, there is an error apparent on record, as the directions have been issued without noticing the distinction between the facts in the present case and the facts in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan, (supra). Evidently, therefore, there is an error apparent on record, as the directions have been issued without noticing the distinction between the facts in the present case and the facts in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Nanjappan, (supra). The error committed by the court is an error of inadvertence which in the opinion of this court would fall within the meaning of the expression “any other sufficient reason” as contemplated in rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224 , has held that an error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. Such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In the opinion of this court, the error pointed out by the applicants is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision and, therefore, warrants exercise of powers of this court under its review jurisdiction. 10. In Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741 , the Supreme Court held thus:- “89. Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit." 11. Thus, the words “sufficient reason” in rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of law by a court. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit." 11. Thus, the words “sufficient reason” in rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of law by a court. As discussed hereinabove, the directions contained in the operative part of the above order for furnishing security prior to releasing the amount deposited by the insurer have been issued on a misconception of fact warranting exercise of review jurisdiction. 12. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (supra), it has been held that review of the earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. From the facts and reasons stated hereinabove, a material error is manifest on the face of the order, which results into miscarriage of justice inasmuch as by imposing a condition requiring the owner of the offending vehicle to furnish security prior to releasing the amount in favour of the claimants, the claimants would be deprived of getting compensation expeditiously which is the intent of the legislature behind enacting sub-section (4) and (5) of section 149 of the Act. Therefore, necessary circumstances for exercise of review jurisdiction are clearly made out. 13. In the light of the above discussion, the application succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The following directions issued in paragraph 24 of the judgment and order dated 8.5.2014 passed in First Appeal No.3289 of 2013, “... Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. ...” shall stand substituted by the following: “The amount so deposited shall forthwith be released in favour of the claimants after due verification. For the purpose of facilitating recovery of the amount, the owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security of the entire amount which the insurer has paid to the claimants.” Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.