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2015 DIGILAW 625 (GUJ)

Vijaysingh v. State of Gujarat

2015-06-23

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2015
JUDGMENT Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. Rule was issued in this application on 18.03.2015 and the notice of Rule was waived by learned counsel for the respective respondents. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is being heard and decided finally, at this stage, with the consent of the learned counsel for the respective parties. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code") has been preferred by the applicants for quashing and setting aside the complaint filed against them, being C.R. No. I-203/2010, before Ramol Police Station, Ahmedabad, on 04.08.2010, for offences punishable under Sections 306, 498(A) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, as also the charge-sheet and the criminal case arising out of the said FIR, being Sessions Case No. 344 of 2012, pending in the Court of learned City Civil and Sessions Court, Ahmedabad City. 2. The complainant in the FIR is respondent No. 2, the Police Sub-Inspector of Ramol Police Station, Ahmedabad, who, on receiving a message from the Control Room of the deceased having committed suicide, reached the house of the deceased where he saw her lying dead in her bedroom and recorded the statement of applicant No. 1, the husband of the deceased, and put the machinery into motion. Applicant No. 2 is the mother-in-law of the deceased and applicant No. 3 is the sister-in-law of the deceased. 3. The narration in the FIR is as follows: "Applicant No. 1 married the deceased on 07.05.2009 as per the rituals of his community. Out of such wedlock, they have a daughter, aged six months, named Aashna. Applicant No. 1 and the deceased lived in a joint family with the parents of applicant No. 1. It is alleged that on 03.08.2010, when applicant No. 1 had gone for service, he received a phone call from his mother, applicant No. 2, informing him that his daughter Aashna had been taken to the hospital. When applicant No. 2 returned from the hospital, she found that the deceased had not cooked food, which resulted in a quarrel between her and the deceased. Applicant No. 1 asked applicant No. 2 to hand over the phone to the deceased but the deceased threw the phone on the ground. When applicant No. 2 returned from the hospital, she found that the deceased had not cooked food, which resulted in a quarrel between her and the deceased. Applicant No. 1 asked applicant No. 2 to hand over the phone to the deceased but the deceased threw the phone on the ground. It is further alleged that at about 9:00 p.m., when applicant No. 1 returned home, he inquired from the rest of his family members about the quarrel that had taken place in the afternoon. This resulted in another rift between the family members, followed by a slap given by applicant No. 1 to the deceased, due to agitation. As result, the deceased rushed back to her room. It is alleged that while the other family members were having their dinner, applicant No. 3 (sister of applicant No. 1) had gone to the room of the deceased to give her food and found the room locked from inside. Despite calling out to the deceased, there was no response. Therefore, applicant No. 3 went to a nearby house, from where she saw that the deceased had hung herself from a fan. Immediately thereafter, the door of the room was broken down and the deceased was brought down. In spite of the chest of the deceased being pumped, she did not respond, therefore, an ambulance was called. The deceased was taken to the hospital, where she was declared dead. Under the circumstances, the compliant against the applicants was registered." 4. It is the case of the applicants before this Court that respondent Nos. 3 and 4, who are the father and mother of the deceased, respectively, have resolved the dispute with the applicants, with the intervention of elders of the community and family members and a settlement has been arrived at between the parties. The parents of the deceased, therefore, no longer wish to proceed with the criminal proceedings and have no objection if the FIR and consequential proceedings are quashed. 5. Mr. Pratik B. Barot, learned advocate for the applicants, has submitted that in view of the fact that respondent Nos. The parents of the deceased, therefore, no longer wish to proceed with the criminal proceedings and have no objection if the FIR and consequential proceedings are quashed. 5. Mr. Pratik B. Barot, learned advocate for the applicants, has submitted that in view of the fact that respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the parents of the deceased, who are the main affected parties, no longer wish to proceed further with the criminal proceedings, and as the five years old daughter of the deceased, Aashna, is being brought up by the applicants, the Court may consider the prayers made in the petition to quash and set aside the FIR and the resultant proceedings. 6. In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the applicants has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 582 : AIR 2008 SC 1969 ) and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 838). 7. Learned advocate for the applicants has further submitted that in this case, the first informant is respondent No. 2, who is a Sub-Inspector of Police, serving at the Ramol Police Station. In Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another (2014) 1 SCC 87 : AIR 2014 SC 1198 ), the Supreme Court has made a distinction between the words 'informant' and 'complainant', and has stated that the word used in Section 154(2) of the Code is 'informant' and not 'complainant'. It is further stated that the word 'informant' has a different meaning from the word 'complainant'. The person giving information which leads to lodging of the report under Section 154 of the Code is the informant and the person who files the complaint is the complainant. That, in view of the fact that respondent No. 2 is the informant who has registered the FIR on the basis of the statement of applicant No. 1, this Court may consider dispensing with the consent of respondent No. 2, Police Sub-Inspector, as he is not the affected party but has only set the machinery of law into motion. The affected persons, who are the parents of the deceased, have no objection to the quashing of the proceedings, therefore, the prayers made in the application may be granted. 8. Mr. The affected persons, who are the parents of the deceased, have no objection to the quashing of the proceedings, therefore, the prayers made in the application may be granted. 8. Mr. L.B. Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has objected to the prayers made by the applicants and submits that the law may be permitted to run its own course. He has further submitted that the complaint has been registered on the basis of the information divulged by applicant No. 1 to a Police Officer, therefore, the complaint is not liable to be quashed on the basis of consent between respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and the applicants, on account of a settlement between them. 9. Mr. Sadik A. Ansari, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 3 and 4, has reiterated the stand of the said respondents as stated in the affidavits filed by them, affirmed on 04.03.2015. 10. It is stated in the affidavits filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4, that an amicable settlement has been arrived at between the parties and as the minor daughter of the deceased is being brought up by the applicants, the proceedings may be quashed. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are not desirous of proceeding further with the criminal proceedings any longer. 11. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are present in-person in the Court today and have been identified by their learned advocate. They have reiterated the stand taken in their affidavits. 12. This Court has heard Mr. Pratik B. Barot, learned advocate for the applicants, Mr. L.B. Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Sadik A. Ansari, learned advocate for respondents Nos. 3 and 4, and perused the averments made in the application as well as the contents of the affidavits, affirmed on 04.03.2015, filed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4, which are on the record of the case. 13. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to advert to certain judgments of the Supreme Court wherein exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in respect of quashing of a compliant where a compromise has been arrived at between the parties, has been discussed at length. 14. 13. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to advert to certain judgments of the Supreme Court wherein exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in respect of quashing of a compliant where a compromise has been arrived at between the parties, has been discussed at length. 14. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 2008 SC 1969 ) (supra), the Supreme Court has held that it is advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the courts should ordinarily accept the terms of compromise even in criminal proceedings, since keeping the matter alive, with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution, is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford. The time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are quoted herein-below: "5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has, on 11-1-2004 passed away and the possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out. 6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law." 15. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law." 15. In a more recent judgment in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 838) (supra), the Supreme Court has dealt with the question whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable proceedings, in view of a compromise arrived at between the parties can be exercised and, if so, under what circumstances. It has been held by the Supreme Court that where the offences concerned are purely private offences and do not involve any question of public policy, the power to quash criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise can be exercised. However, where the offences are serious and heinous, such power ought not ordinarily to be used. It has been elaborated by the Supreme Court in the above decision, that offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or like transactions or offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and parties have resolved the dispute, come under the category of offences where the criminal proceedings may be quashed after the parties have amicably resolved and settled the issue. The principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above decision are encapsulated in the following paragraph of the judgment: "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 16. It is true that the FTR has been lodged by a Police Officer, therefore, there cannot be consent on behalf of the Police Officer for quashing the FIR. However, The sequence of events leading to the registration of the FIR may be looked into. Respondent No. 2 was on patrol duty when he received information that the deceased had committed suicide. He, therefore, went to the spot, that is, the house of the applicants, where applicant No. 1, the husband of the deceased, has divulged the information regarding the death of the deceased and the surrounding circumstances. Respondent No. 2 has done his duty by setting the law into motion. No consent is, therefore, called for from him, in order to quash the criminal proceedings. At the best, he can be said to be the 'informant' and not the 'complainant' in view of the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another, ( AIR 2014 SC 1198 ) (supra). The real aggrieved parties would be respondent Nos. 3 and 4, the father and the mother of the deceased, respectively. Had the police not registered the FIR, the persons who would have done so in the natural course, would have been respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The said respondents have no objection if the FIR and the resultant proceedings are quashed. The reason stated by diem in their affidavits is that the matter has been settled between the parties as it would be in the interest of the minor daughter of the deceased who is living with the applicants. 17. In view of the above discussion and the fact that the five-year-old daughter of the deceased is residing with, and is being brought up by, the applicants, it would be in the interest of the minor if there is no acrimony between her grand-parents on the paternal and maternal side. 18. 17. In view of the above discussion and the fact that the five-year-old daughter of the deceased is residing with, and is being brought up by, the applicants, it would be in the interest of the minor if there is no acrimony between her grand-parents on the paternal and maternal side. 18. For the aforestated reasons and taking into consideration the principles of law enunciated in the cases of Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, ( AIR 2008 SC 1969 ) (supra) and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 838) (supra), the following order is passed: "The FIR, being C.R. No. I203/2010, registered with Ramol Police Station, Ahmedabad, on 04.08.2010, for offences punishable under Sections 306, 498(A) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, as also the chargesheet and criminal case arising out of the said FIR, being Sessions Case No. 344 of 2012, pending in the Court of learned City Civil and Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad City, are hereby quashed and set aside." 19. The application is allowed in the above terms. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. Direct Service is permitted.