JUDGMENT B.P. RAY, J. - The unsuccessful plaintiff, as appellant, has preferred this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree rendered on 12.5.1988 and 18.2.1988 respectively in T.S. No.53 of 1982 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur whereby his suit for specific performance of contract has been dismissed on contest. 2.Be it mentioned here that the original appellant-plaintiff, Nathmal Sharma since dead during pendency of this appeal, his legal representatives have been impleaded as appellant nos. 1(a) to 1(c). Similarly the legal representatives of the original respondent no. 1 have been impleaded as respondent nos. 1(a) to 1 (d). Likewise on the death of proforma respondent no.2, his legal representatives have been arrayed as respondent nos. 2(a) to 2(c). 3.The subject-matter in respect of which the suit was filed relates to lands covered under H.S. Plot No. 1197 measuring an area Ac. 0.02 decimals of Khunti No. 33 of Jharsuguda Town located in Ward No. 8 Holding No. 465 whereon suit house belonging to original respondent no. 1 was in existence. In a nutshell, the case of original appellant (herein after referred to as “plaintiff”), as record reveals, was that he was a tenant under the original respondent no. 1 (herein after referred to as “ defendant no.1) in respect of the suit house on the basis of payment of rent of Rs. 100/- per month till the year 1974. It is further alleged that the defendant no.1, due to his pressing legal necessities, proposed to sell the suit house in favour of the plaintiff with a consideration of Rs.30,000/- and entered into an agreement of sale on 13.6.1974 in favour of the plaintiff receiving earnest amount of Rs. 14,800/- with a stipulation to execute regular sale deed in his favour on receipt of balance consideration of Rs. 15,200/-. The said deed of agreement of sale (Ext. 7) was duly executed and possession of the suit house was delivered in favour of the plaintiff. It is pleaded that on 15.4.1975, the defendant no. 1 on receiving the balance consideration of Rs. 15,200/- executed a money receipt (Ext. 6) acknowledging such receipt of consideration amount. Ext. 6 alleged to have been duly scribed on the instruction of defendant no. 1 in presence of the witnesses and understanding contents thereof, the same was duly executed by defendant no. 1. 1 on receiving the balance consideration of Rs. 15,200/- executed a money receipt (Ext. 6) acknowledging such receipt of consideration amount. Ext. 6 alleged to have been duly scribed on the instruction of defendant no. 1 in presence of the witnesses and understanding contents thereof, the same was duly executed by defendant no. 1. It is alleged that as the plaintiff, who was carrying joint business with his brother (proforma defendant no.2), intended to purchase the suit house in his favour and in favour of his brother in equal half, the defendant no. 1 allegedly purchased two separate sets of stamp papers, vide Exts. 4 & 5 with a view to execute two registered sale deeds; one in the name of the plaintiff and the other in the name of proforma defendant no.2. Consequent upon delivery of possession pursuant to such agreement of sale, the plaintiff converted the suit house into a lodge for accommodation of his business and betel shop in front portion thereof spending huge expenditure around Rs. 30,000/-. The defendant no. 1 allegedly handed over stamp papers, vide Exts. 4 & 5 to one Kalilash Chandra Agarawalla, Advocate at Jharsuguda with an instruction to scribe two different sale deeds in respect of suit house, i.e., one in favour of the plaintiff and another in favour of proforma defendant no.2 placing two sets of trace maps specifying portion of lands proposed to be transferred. Ext. 4 & 5 were prepared with the instruction of defendant no. 1 with a view to present before the Sub-Registrar, Jharsuguda for registration. It is alleged that the defendant no. 1 abruptly left the place for his village with a plea that he will execute the sale deeds on the next day, i.e., 16.1.1979. The defendant no.1 went on deferring the execution of sale deed on some pretext and others and ultimately, filed House Rent Control Case No. 2/1979 before the Court of S.D.J.M. Jharsuguda against the plaintiff on frivolous grounds with a view to evict him from the suit house alleging that the plaintiff has defaulted in payment of house rent. The said case was ended with dismissal and the appeal bearing No. H.R.C. Appeal 14/1981 preferred threfrom also suffered from dismissal. The said case was ended with dismissal and the appeal bearing No. H.R.C. Appeal 14/1981 preferred threfrom also suffered from dismissal. The plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the agreement of sale fulfilled his part of his contract making final and full payment of sale consideration in respect of the suit house but the defendant no. 1 failed to perform his part of contract which he ought to have performed, therefore, the inaction of defendant no. 1 in performing his part of contract leads to filing of suit for specific performance of contract. 4.Defendant no.1 entering appearance before the Court below appears to have filed written statement containing, inter alia, that the suit is not maintainable as the plaintiff defaulted in performing his part of contract within the period stipulated to be performed, the suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties and the name is barred by limitation. However, defendant no. 1 admitted with regard to agreement of sale entered into between the parties on 13.06.1974 with an allegation that the plaintiff misrepresenting him managed to get an agreement of sale executed in the garb of an agreement for deferring payment of pending rent amount. It is further pleaded that there was no agreement of sale in respect of the suit house and there was no delivery of possession. Defendant no. 1 never received any earnest amount and Ext. 7 was drafted on the instruction of plaintiff. No document, i.e., money receipt (Ext.6) ever executed by defendant no. 1 receiving consideration of Rs. 15,200/- on 15.4.1975. Execution of Ext. 6 is specifically denied. With the above assertions of facts, defendant no. 1 has prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5.Learned lower Court appears to have formulated as many as six issues arising out of disputed facts emerged from pleading of the parties and the issues so settled are re-produced below for proper appreciation and adjudication of the appeal at hand. ISSUES I) Whether the agreement dated 13.06.1974 was for sale of the suit house in favour of both plaintiff and defendant no.2 or plaintiff alone. II) Whether the receipt dated 1.4.1975 is a genuine or fabricated document. III) Whether the plaintiff has performed his part of the contract. IV) Is the suit barred by limitation ? V) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties? VI) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to. II) Whether the receipt dated 1.4.1975 is a genuine or fabricated document. III) Whether the plaintiff has performed his part of the contract. IV) Is the suit barred by limitation ? V) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties? VI) To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled to. 6.Admittedly, the plaintiff was a tenant under defendant no. 1 prior to the alleged agreement of sale, which fact is also supported by evidence. It appears that defendant no. 1 at para-2 of the written statement admitted to have executed the agreement of sale dated 13.6.1974 in respect of the suit premises. Such fact is also admitted by defendant no. 1 in the House Rent Control Proceeding as Ext. 17. Ext. 7 herein was marked as an Exhibit on admission of defendant no. 1 in such proceeding. Likewise, defendant no. 1 admitted to have executed Ext. 7, at para-3 of his evidence. The execution of Ext. 7 appears to have been proved through the evidence of attesting witness, P.W.6, vis-à-vis evidence of plaintiff (P.W.7). On a glance to Ext. 7 it is seen that the same has been executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of plaintiff on 13.6.1974 receiving consideration amount of Rs. 14,800/- with a stipulation to execute a sale deed within two years receiving the balance consideration of Rs. 15,200/-. Thus, the above evidence on record having its cumulative effect to lead a reasonable conclusion that in fact, defendant no. 1 entered into an agreement of sale in respect of the suit house and premises under Ext. 7 receiving earnest amount of Rs. 14,800/- intending to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in a future deed on receipt of balance consideration amount. 7.Now, pivotal question falls for consideration if the learned lower Court is justified in disbelieving Ext. 6 as not a genuine and authentic document and consequently holding that the suit of the plaintiff is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. It appears that learned lower Court, while answering issue no. 2, disbelieved Ext. 6 assigning logic that Ext. 7.Now, pivotal question falls for consideration if the learned lower Court is justified in disbelieving Ext. 6 as not a genuine and authentic document and consequently holding that the suit of the plaintiff is hopelessly barred by law of limitation. It appears that learned lower Court, while answering issue no. 2, disbelieved Ext. 6 assigning logic that Ext. 6 is type-written document on an unusual size of demipaper, which is neither a foolscap paper nor a half size of the foolscap paper, the date 15.5.1975 has been tampered with and over-written as15.4.1975, the scribe has given endorsement in handwriting but not by typing that he read over and explained the contents, the same does not disclose the term and condition of agreement for sale rather the same appears to be a simple money receipt, the evidence of the plaintiff runs counter to the contents of Ext. 6 as he stated that he has not paid Rs. 15,200/- to defendant no. 1 on the date of execution of a receipt (Ext. 6) but earlier to it and destroyed the receipt at the time of its execution inasmuch as such evidence also does not find any corroboration from other witnesses. 8.Learned counsel for the appellant launches scathing attack to the finding of the learned lower Court with regard to Ext. 6 submitting that the learned lower Court has discarded Ext. 6 on flimsy ground illegally with extraneous consideration, such findings are not only against the weight of material on record but also contrary to sound principle of law. It is also submitted that had the learned lower Court been taken into account Ext. 6, there would not have been any finding that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation as there was nothing on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract when final consideration for sale was already paid and on such count, the limitation will run for filing of the suit from the date of refusal of defendant no. 1 to execute registered sale deed and not from the date of expiry of stipulated two years of the agreement. 9.In respect to above submissions, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that at no count does the findings of the learned lower Court suffer from any infirmity either factually or legally and therefore, no interference is called for. 1 to execute registered sale deed and not from the date of expiry of stipulated two years of the agreement. 9.In respect to above submissions, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that at no count does the findings of the learned lower Court suffer from any infirmity either factually or legally and therefore, no interference is called for. It is also submitted that the learned lower Court considering pros and cons of the evidence in its proper perspective rightly concluded that Ext. 6 is not a genuine document and since the suit is not filed within three years from expiry of the stipulated period contained in Ext. 7, the suit is barred by limitation. 10.Having regard to the contentions and counter contentions advanced on behalf of the parties and bestowing anxious consideration, I succinctly scrutinize the respective case of the parties, evidence adduced on their behalf with reference to the facts in issue, therefrom, it is ascertained that defendant no. 1 has seriously disputed the receipt of balance consideration amount executing Ext. 6 with an acknowledgment of receipt of payment. To substantiate the fact of payment of balance consideration within two years of the time fixed in Ext. 7, the scribe of Ext. 6 and one of its attesting witnesses have been examined as P.Ws. 4 & 5 respectivey. Be it noted that, one of the terms contained in Ext. 7 that defendant no. 1 was to execute one regular sale deed in favour of plaintiff within two years on receipt of final consideration amount. Ext. 7 admittedly executed on 13.6.1974. Acknowledgment of receipt of balance consideration, vide Ext. 6, alleged to have been executed on 15.4.1975. Law does not prescribe any mode or manner of acknowledgment of receipt of consideration, it may be either oral or written. There is no requirement of law that such acknowledgment of consideration, if reduced into writing, must be upon non-judicial stamp papers. It entirely depends upon the wish of the parties. If parties so desire, they may go for reflecting the acknowledgment of receipt of the consideration on non-judicial stamp papers. However, the parties must affix revenue stamp in case of payment of Rs. 500/- and more. Here in this case, it appears that the defendant no. 1 has received the balance consideration amount signing over four nos. of revenue stamps. The execution Ext. However, the parties must affix revenue stamp in case of payment of Rs. 500/- and more. Here in this case, it appears that the defendant no. 1 has received the balance consideration amount signing over four nos. of revenue stamps. The execution Ext. 6 is to be established in terms of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act or otherwise in terms of other provisions thereof. The contents of Ext. 6 need not be proved adducing evidence being prohibited by Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act except the exceptional circumstances of case in terms of Section 92 of the said Act made out by the parties in pleading and evidence. In the instant case, defendant no.1 appears to have taken the stand that there was no due execution and passing of final consideration amount under Ext. 6 so as to bring the case within the proviso I of Section 92 of the said Act. In such background and circumstances of the case, burden of proof and shifting of onus have an important role to play so far the proof of respective case of the parties. Once the plaintiff successfully established due execution of Ext. 6, the contents thereof shall be read in evidence. Thereafter, the defendant no. 1 is to establish placing rebuttal evidence that there was no execution and passing of consideration. 11.It appears that the learned lower Court while analyzing the evidence of scribe and attesting witness of Ext. 6 with reference to issue no. 2 has neither disbelieved their evidence nor entertained any doubt as to their credibility. In such backdrop, it is also seen that the learned lower Court at para-7 of the impugned judgment has made a mention that the hand-writing expert has also given his opinion that the disputed signature appeared in Ext. 6 is similar in all respect with that of other signature of defendant no. 1. On a conjoint reading of evidence of P.Ws. 4 & 5, it is found that they have given the vivid description of the manner and circumstances in which defendant no. 1 ;executed Ext. 6 understanding the contents and purport thereof. Nothing is elicited to disbelieve their version with regard to execution of Ext. 6. The evidence of P.W. 5 is quite consistent with regard to the stand of the plaintiff that some days prior to execution of Ext. 6 the defendant no. 1 ;executed Ext. 6 understanding the contents and purport thereof. Nothing is elicited to disbelieve their version with regard to execution of Ext. 6. The evidence of P.W. 5 is quite consistent with regard to the stand of the plaintiff that some days prior to execution of Ext. 6 the defendant no. 1 had received the balance consideration of sale and in token of such receipt, the executed Ext. 6 some days later. Ext. 6 does not reveal that the same has been executed by defendant no. 1 receiving the consideration on the same day. Rather the contents thereof recites that receiving total sum of Rs. 30,000/- from the plaintiff towards sale in respect of the suit land, defendant no. 1 undertakes to execute the sale deed and get it registered on demand of the plaintiff and the term of the agreement dated 13.6.1974 will thereby fulfill. The learned lower Court misreading the contents of Ext. 6 wrongly observed that Ext. 6 is simply in the form of a money receipt without disclosing the terms and conditions of agreement for sale. Learned lower Court should not have entertained any doubt with regard to execution of Ext. 6, as it is drafted in a plain paper affixing four revenue stamps and on the ground that consideration amount was paid earlier to its execution. When execution of Ext. 6 is duly proved by cogent and unimpeachable evidence inasmuch as payment of full consideration pursuant to Ext. 7 is acknowledged by defendant no. 1 executing Ext. 6, the learned lower Court is not justified in knocking down Ext. 6 in flimsy ground. Therefore, the irresistible conclusion would be that the plaintiff has performed his part of contract within the period of two years stipulated in Ext. 7 in making payment of final and full consideration of sale of the suit land and the plaintiff had nothing to be further performed. On the other hand, nothing is established by defendant no. 1 to take contrary view. In other words, the defendant no. 1 failed to substantiate the stand that there was no due execution of Ext. 6 and no passing of balance consideration amount. Rather the evidence on record is quite consistent that the defendant no. 1 had received the balance consideration amount. Rather the evidence on record is quite consistent that the defendant no. In other words, the defendant no. 1 failed to substantiate the stand that there was no due execution of Ext. 6 and no passing of balance consideration amount. Rather the evidence on record is quite consistent that the defendant no. 1 had received the balance consideration amount. Rather the evidence on record is quite consistent that the defendant no. 1 had received the balance consideration amount from the plaintiff and acknowledged such receipt of consideration amount executing Ext. 6. 12.The learned lower Court appears to have disbelieved the stand of the plaintiff that the defendant no. 1 purchasing stamp papers handed over the scribes to execute two separate sale deeds in favour of the plaintiff and proforma defendant no.2 respectively in respect of the suit land and due to the ill-advise and influence of others, defendant no. 1 ultimately abstained from executing sale deeds, assigning reasoning that the stamp papers, vide Exts. 4 & 5 do not bear the signature of defendant no. 1 showing the fact of his purchase of stamp papers. Such circumstances simplicitor is not sufficient to discard the plaintiff’s case when the evidence of the scribe, to whom defendant no. 1 supplied stamp papers for execution of sale deeds, is not demolished in any manner inasmuch as non-bearing of signature of defendant no. 1 on such stamp papers can be considered to be natural, when defendant No. 1 at the last moment avoiding execution of sale deeds left the place after completion of preparation of sale deeds by the scribe. 13.It is well proved that the defendant entering into a contract for sale under Ext. 7 received the consideration amount agreed between the parties as evident from Ext. 6 and other discussed evidence highlighted above, pursuant to such agreement, defendant no. 1 having delivered possession indicating the same in Ext. 7 remained the plaintiff in possession over the suit premises. There is no dispute that the plaintiff was in possession over the suit premises as a tenant prior to agreement for sale, it has been specifically mentioned by the defendant no. 1 that “ADYA DINA DAKHAL MADAI DELU” (Today gave possession). This definitely reflects the intention of the parties to the agreement as regards the nature of further possession by the plaintiff after the agreement for sale. 1 that “ADYA DINA DAKHAL MADAI DELU” (Today gave possession). This definitely reflects the intention of the parties to the agreement as regards the nature of further possession by the plaintiff after the agreement for sale. Thus, the position becomes clear that the prior possession of the plaintiff as a tenant was given a completely go-bye and it having been so deposed by the plaintiff (P.W.7), the same has not been shaken. So the nature of possession of the suit premises by the plaintiff did not remain as that of a tenant when no further evidence remains on record to negate the same that the parties ever continued with such earlier relationship either by tendering rent or otherwise. So the plaintiff falls within the purview of the expression “being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract” as contained in Section 53 A of the T.P. Act. Above being the conclusion, now it is further seen that the evidence is consistent that the plaintiff in possession of the suit premises as above has made substantial improvement by erecting constructions within the knowledge of the defendant. In such scenario, provision of Section 53(A) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 comes into play. The said provision recognizes the right of a transferee although does not create title of transferee in the property in question. So far as the transferee is concerned, the Section confers a right on him to the extent it imposes a bar on the transferor in protecting his possession against any challenge to it by the skillful transferor contrary to the terms of the contract. It would be profitable to take reference of a decision in Dharmaji vrs. Jagannath Sarkar vrs. Jadhav reported in AIR 1994 Bombay 254, wherein it has been held as follows:- “…… Under the provision of Section 53(A), the transferee is entitled to resist any attempt on the part of the transferor to disturb transferee’s lawful possession under the contact of sale and his position either as a plaintiff or as a defendant should make no difference. Jadhav reported in AIR 1994 Bombay 254, wherein it has been held as follows:- “…… Under the provision of Section 53(A), the transferee is entitled to resist any attempt on the part of the transferor to disturb transferee’s lawful possession under the contact of sale and his position either as a plaintiff or as a defendant should make no difference. Contrary interpretation viz., the transferee can use the shield only as a defendant and not as a plaintiff would defeat the very spirit of Section 53(A) of Transfer of Property Act, for it will be possible for an overpowering transferor to forcibly dispossesses the transferee even against the covenants in the contact and compel him to go to the Court as a plaintiff.” Therefore, the plaintiff being in possession of the suit premises pursuant to the contract of sale in part performance of the same having made substantial improvement in furtherance of the contract and when it has been found that he has performed and was ready to perform his part of the contract all through, he has the right to restrain and resist his lawful possession of the suit premises in the event of any attempt on the part of the transferor to disturb the same. 14.Even the plaintiff has satisfied all the requirements of sale, i.e. passing of consideration, delivery of possession of immovable property in his favour, the question next arises, if the plaintiff is entitled to enforce the contract for sale against the defendant. It is already observed that the plaintiff showing his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract paid the final consideration amount to the defendant within the stipulated period and further he arranged stamp papers, get two sale deeds prepared and called upon the defendant no. 1 to execute the sale deed but it is for the inaction of the defendant no. 1, ;the plaintiff deprived to get the sale deed executed in his favour. Enforcement of the contract depends upon limitation, if any, prescribed by law. On a reference to Articles 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is seen that period of three years has been prescribed for bringing suit to enforce the specific performance of contract from the date of accrual of cause of action. The fact remains that the suit has been brought by the plaintiff in the year 1982. On a reference to Articles 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is seen that period of three years has been prescribed for bringing suit to enforce the specific performance of contract from the date of accrual of cause of action. The fact remains that the suit has been brought by the plaintiff in the year 1982. The seminal question to be determined as to whether the period of limitation begins to run from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. It is already held that the plaintiff performing his part of contract within the time stipulated advanced the balance consideration to the defendant and the defendant has already received such balance consideration. So there is no question of running of limitation from the date fixed for performance. The learned lower Court erroneously held that the limitation shall run on expiry of two years from the date of agreement for sale. In such backdrop, it is to be seen when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused by the defendant so as to compute the period of limitation. It is the stand of the plaintiff that the defendant avoiding to execute the draft sale deed vide Exts. 4 & 5 left the place with some pretext and others. So such circumstances of refusal of the defendant to execute sale deed were within the knowledge of plaintiff. Therefore, it can be said that the plaintiff had acknowledged or noticed refusal of performance of contract at the instances of the defendant to execute sale deed on 15.1.1979. It appears that the date of purchase of stamp paper mentioned in Exts. 4 & 5 is 21.6.1978 and the date of execution is mentioned as 15.1.1979. It cannot be said that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed on 21.6.1978, i.e., the date of purchase of stamp paper, therefore, the date of execution of sale deed as mentioned in the sale deed, i.e., 15.1.1979 can be reasonably taken as the date of refusal of sale deed which the plaintiff had noticed. It appears from the L.C.R. that the suit was presented on 20.7.1982. The suit should have been brought by the plaintiff within three years from 15.1.21979. It appears from the L.C.R. that the suit was presented on 20.7.1982. The suit should have been brought by the plaintiff within three years from 15.1.21979. Since the suit is not filed within January, 1982, it is barred by limitation, as it was filed six months after expiry of three years from the date of notice of plaintiff with regard to refusal of defendant no. 1 to execute sale deed. Thus, the finding of the learned lower Court that the suit is barred by limitation, is thus not liable to be interfered with. 15.In view of the finding as above, the appellants are not entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract in the present suit as prayed for. However, as the appellants are in possession of the suit property since 13.6.1974 pursuant to the contract for sale in part performance of the same having been found that he had performed and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract all through, it obviously means that the possession of the appellants cannot be disturbed except by due process of law and in case the respondents file suit for possession and/or ejectment of the appellants, it would be open to the appellants to so plead in defence for protection of their possession. Needless to mention at this stage, the appellants shall also be at liberty to plead the finding on the issue as recorded in paragraph-13 of the judgment operates as res judicata. 16.Subject to the above clarification, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to cost. Appeal dismissed.