Research › Search › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 63 (KAR)

Adishakti Mahapeetha, A Religious, Educational and Charitable Trust v. Vidwan Sri Krishnanand Bharati Swami

2015-01-09

A.S.BOPANNA

body2015
Order A.S. Bopanna, J. 1. The petitioner is before this Court assailing the order dated 4-8-2012 passed in M.A. No. 7 of 2012 and in that light is seeking confirmation of the order dated 16-4-2012 passed on I.A. No. 10 in O.S. No. 132 of 2007. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 132 of 2007. In the said suit, an order of status quo had been granted at the first instance. The plaintiff alleges that despite the grant of an order of status quo in his favour, the defendant in a high handed manner had dispossessed the plaintiff. 2. In that view, I.A. No. 10 was filed in the suit under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking the relief of ad interim mandatory injunction against the defendant to handover the possession of the property. The defendant had filed I.A. No. 13 under Order 39, Rules 3 and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking that the ex parte order of status quo which had been granted on 18-6-2002 be vacated. Both the applications were considered together and disposed of by the order dated 16-4-2012. The Trial Court did not find any reason to vacate the ad interim order of status quo which had been granted on 18-6-2002 and in that view, having taken note that dispossession was subsequent to the order of status quo granted, it has proceed to allow I.A. No. 10 and directed the defendant to put the plaintiff in possession of the property. The defendant claiming to be aggrieved by the said order dated 16-4-2012, preferred an appeal in M.A. No. 7 of 2012 before the Fast Track Court, Sirsi. The lower Appellate Court by its order dated 4-8-2012 has set aside the order dated 16-4-2012 passed by the Trial Court on I.A. Nos. 10 and 13 and has remanded the applications in I.A. Nos. 10 and 13 to the Trial Court to pass orders afresh after passing a seeking order on the memo dated 3-4-2012 as per the law. The said order passed by the lower Appellate Court is assailed in this petition. 3. On having heard the matter, I have perused the petition papers. 10 and 13 to the Trial Court to pass orders afresh after passing a seeking order on the memo dated 3-4-2012 as per the law. The said order passed by the lower Appellate Court is assailed in this petition. 3. On having heard the matter, I have perused the petition papers. Since the lower Appellate Court, while remanding the applications for consideration indicated that a speaking order is to be passed on the memo dated 3-4-2012, I have perused the memo which is available at Annexure-M to the writ petition. 4. A perusal of the same would indicate that the defendant had filed the said memo in the suit stating therein that the consideration of I.A. No. 10 for mandatory injunction would require oral evidence of the parties and as such it is prayed that the application be heard along the main suit itself. Objections had been filed to the said memo. The question therefore for consideration is as to whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in setting aside the order passed by the Trial Court only on the ground that the said memo had not been disposed of by a speaking order and in that light required reconsideration by the Trial Court. 5. Firstly, it is noticed that notwithstanding the said memo being filed by the defendant, when the applications were taken up for consideration, the defendant had addressed his arguments on the applications. The contentions put forth has been referred to and considered. Further, before the consideration of I.A., the defendant did not take any steps to see that the applications are not taken up for consideration without disposal of the memo. Be that as it may, when a contention had been put forth before the lower Appellate Court stating that the said memo required consideration, the lower Appellate Court at the outset, by itself was required to consider the said memo and pass a speaking order on the same to come to the conclusion as to whether the contention as raised in the memo is acceptable only if the lower Appellate Court had come to conclusion by passing a considered order on the memo, the need or otherwise would have arisen to set aside the order passed on the IA's and not otherwise. Therefore, the order passed on the applications was not justified. Therefore, the order passed on the applications was not justified. The very reason that the Trial Court has presently remanded the matter for consideration to pass orders on I.A. Nos. 10 and 13 would indicate that it has not come to the conclusion on the memo that evidence is required to be adduced and therefore the applications have to be taken up along with the suit. In such circumstance, the lower Appellate Court could not have in a cursory manner taken note of the would aspect and pass orders on I.A. Nos. 10 and 13 more so when the Trial Court has passed detailed orders. Further a perusal of the order passed by the lower Appellate Court would indicate that the detail consideration as made by the Trial Court has not been adverted by the lower Appellate Court to come to the conclusion as to whether the order as passed by the Trial Court is justified or not. In fact, the lower Appellate Court while arriving at the conclusion has indicated that no specific date relating to the dispossession of the plaintiff has been indicated and therefore the applications ought not to have been allowed. Prima facie, a perusal of the order passed by the Trial Court would indicate that the order passed in the suit relating to the status quo has been referred and the manner in which the property was being enjoyed, was also considered and thereafter a consideration was made. If said order passed by the Trial Court was to be interfered by the lower Appellate Court, the scope of consideration in the appeal is well-circumscribed by the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and while doing so, the lower Appellate Court ought to have referred to the reason assigned by the Trial Court and thereafter a finding ought to have been recorded by the lower Appellate Court, if there was a need to set aside the order passed on I.A. Nos. 10 and 13 on its merits. On the other hand, the perusal of the order of the lower Appellate Court would indicate that in fact it is the lower Appellate Court which has vaguely considered the contentions instead of adverting to the same and arriving at the conclusion. Therefore, the manner in which the lower Appellate Court has proceeded cannot be justified. On the other hand, the perusal of the order of the lower Appellate Court would indicate that in fact it is the lower Appellate Court which has vaguely considered the contentions instead of adverting to the same and arriving at the conclusion. Therefore, the manner in which the lower Appellate Court has proceeded cannot be justified. The lower Appellate Court shall, however, take note of the details of the order passed on I.A. Nos. 10 and 13 and thereafter render the finding as to whether the said order is justified or not and the manner as adopted cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the order dated 4-8-2012 passed in M.A. No. 7 of 2012 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the lower Appellate Court to restore the appeal and consider the same on its merits and pass orders in accordance with law after adverting to all the contentions urged and considered by the Trial Court at the first instance. Since the appeal is remitted to the Court below, the parties shall now appear before the lower Appellate Court on 29-1-2015 as the first date of appearance whereupon the lower Appellate Court shall consider and dispose of the appeal in an expeditious manner but not later than three months from the date of first appearance. In terms of the above, the petition stands disposed of. Disposed off.