Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’), petitioner-defendants have assailed the impugned order dated 7th of January 2014 passed by the Addl. District & Sessions Judge No.3, Jodhpur Metropolitan (learned trial Court), whereby the learned trial Court has rejected their application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC. 2. The facts apposite for the purpose of this revision petition are that first respondent-plaintiff instituted a civil suit before the learned trial Court against petitioners and proforma respondents for cancellation of sale-deeds and perpetual injunction. It is inter-alia averred in the plaint that Kewal Ram, father of respondent-plaintiff jointly owned land measuring 114 bighas and 17 biswas with his other siblings Shivji Ram, Basta Ram and Jawana Ram at village Doli, Tehsil Luni, District Jodhpur. By mutual agreement, all the brothers partitioned the entire land and in terms of partition, land measuring 41 bighas 10 biswas was entered in the name of joint Hindu Family property of Kewal Ram in the revenue records. The entire land, as per the version of respondent-plaintiff was mutated in the name of Kewal Ram as Karta of the family. 3. As projected in the suit, a revenue suit at the behest of proforma respondent Oma Ram was filed on 26th of May 2008 under Sections 53, 88 and 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 (for short, ‘Act of 1955’), wherein Kewal Ram, Mangilal, Mohan Ram and Smt. Sukhi Devi were arrayed as defendants. Along with the suit, a prayer for temporary injunction was also made by way of laying application under Section 212 of the Act of 1955. Respondent-plaintiff has specifically averred in the plaint that all the parties to the litigation entered into compromise just to deprive her from her share in the property and eventually the suit was dismissed as withdrawn. When this fact came to the fore, the respondent-plaintiff laid a revenue suit under Sections 53, 88 and 188 of the Act of 1955 for seeking her share in the agricultural land and also made endeavor for relief of temporary injunction under Section 212 of the Act of 1955. 4. In her application under Section 212 of the Act of 1955, interim injunction was granted by the Revenue Court, which remained in subsistence till its disposal. 4. In her application under Section 212 of the Act of 1955, interim injunction was granted by the Revenue Court, which remained in subsistence till its disposal. In the plaint a specific averment was made that despite subsistence of temporary injunction, her father Kewal Ram alienated part of the agricultural land alongwith fifth respondent to the present petitioners by executing two sale-deeds dated 01.01.2010 and 04.01.2010 respectively. 5. Categorizing sale transactions as illegal, respondent-plaintiff has pleaded that Kewal Ram has illegally alienated part of the land measuring 6 bighas 8 biswas in favour of fifth respondent Smt. Sukhi Devi, which was registered on 28th July 2008. Further, reiterating that the sale transactions between Kewal Ram and the petitioners were carried out during pendency of the revenue suit laid by the respondent-plaintiff. As per her positive assertion, Kewal Ram and the proforma respondents obtained her signature fraudulently for presenting application before the revenue Court for withdrawal of the suit and ultimately the revenue Court without passing any order on the application dismissed the suit on 30th of April 2012 in default as the lawyers were observing strike and not appearing in the Court. The respondent-plaintiff has further stated in the plaint that she made endeavor for restoration of suit by filing application under Order IX Rule 9 CPC but the same was also dismissed by the revenue Court. After dismissal of restoration application, an appeal is also filed by the respondent-plaintiff before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jodhpur, which according to respondentplaintiff is still pending adjudication. The entire edifice of the suit, as per the averments made in the plaint, was that the agricultural land was a Joint Hindu Family property and therefore Kewal Ram was not authorized to alienate the same without her consent and determining her share. On the strength of these pleadings, the respondent-plaintiff sought relief of cancellation of sale-deeds so as to render them as null and void and ineffective vis-à-vis her rights in the property. 6. The suit is contested by the petitioner-defendants and a detailed written statement is filed. After filing the written statement on behalf of petitioners, an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC is laid precisely on the ground that suit is liable to be rejected as it is not disclosing cause of action and is also barred by law. After filing the written statement on behalf of petitioners, an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 CPC is laid precisely on the ground that suit is liable to be rejected as it is not disclosing cause of action and is also barred by law. The learned trial Court, after hearing rival submissions, by the order impugned, rejected the application of the petitioners by concluding that neither suit is barred, nor it suffers from the vice of nondisclosure of cause of action within the four corners of clause (d) and (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC. 7. Mr. Sunil Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the learned trial Court has committed material irregularity or illegality while exercising its jurisdiction to dismiss the application of the petitioners. Mr. Joshi has brazenly argued that on meaningful reading of the averments of the plaint, accrual of cause of action to the respondent-plaintiff for laying the suit is conspicuously missing, which has lost complete sight of the learned Court below. He, therefore, submits that impugned order is the classic example of nonexercise of jurisdiction by the learned Court below with which it is endowed by law. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vociferously canvassed that in the revenue records the land in question is admittedly recorded in the name of Kewal Ram; the respondent-plaintiff cannot be permitted to assail the impugned sale transactions without seeking declaration about her alleged Khatedari rights from a competent Court. Learned counsel would contend that on the face of it, there is no right to sue available to the respondent-plaintiff, a very vital issue which has not been properly addressed by the learned Court below in the impugned order. Learned counsel, Mr. Sunil Joshi, has urged that suit for declaration about Khatedari rights is triable by revenue Courts and not by civil Courts and by virtue of Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 the suit is barred. Learned counsel, Mr. Sunil Joshi, has urged that suit for declaration about Khatedari rights is triable by revenue Courts and not by civil Courts and by virtue of Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 the suit is barred. Reiterating his submissions with reference to clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that suit for partition was withdrawn in terms of compromise unconditionally by sibling of the respondent-plaintiff, Oma Ram, and before withdrawal proceedings respondent-plaintiff has not made any endeavor to pursue that suit by seeking her transposition as plaintiff in the suit, the present suit at her behest is barred by law by virtue of Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC. Learned counsel further submits that after dismissal of revenue suit of the respondent under Order IX Rule 9 CPC and rejection of her appeal against that order by the Revenue Appellate Authority, suit of the respondent is per-se barred on the principles of res-judicata. Lastly, learned counsel Mr. Joshi has also taken shelter of law of limitation by urging that prima facie the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff is grossly belated and barred by limitation. 8. Strengthening his position, learned counsel has placed reliance on following legal precedents: 1. T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. ( (1977) 4 SCC 467 ) 2. Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Ors. vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors. ( 2004 (2) CCC 20 (SC) 3. Jagan Singh vs. Chotey Lal (WLN 1973 Part I 654) 4. Rooda Ram & Ors. vs. Rattu Ram & Anr. (WLN 1972 Part -323) 5. Temple of Thakur Shri Mathuradassji, Chhota Bhandar vs. Shri Kanhaiyalal & Ors. (2008 (2) CDR 1298 (Raj.)) 6. Mohanlal vs. Ratna (AIR 1971 Rajasthan 164) 7. Kamla Prasad vs. Krishna Kant Pathak ( (2007) 4 SCC 213 ) 8. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Machado Brothers & Ors. (2004(1) Apex Court Judgments 574(SC)) 9. Vijay Singh & Anr. vs. Buddha & Ors. (RLW 2012 (4) Raj. 2932) 10. Sangram Singh vs. Roop Lal & Ors. (1977 WLN (UC) 454) 11. Chandrakant Kantilal Jhaveri & Anr. vs. Madhuriben Gautambhai & Anr. (AIR 2011 Gujarat 27) 9. E converso, learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.K. Thanvi submits that impugned order passed by the learned Court below is just and proper warranting no interference in exercise of limited scope of judicial review under Section 115 CPC. (1977 WLN (UC) 454) 11. Chandrakant Kantilal Jhaveri & Anr. vs. Madhuriben Gautambhai & Anr. (AIR 2011 Gujarat 27) 9. E converso, learned Senior Counsel Mr. R.K. Thanvi submits that impugned order passed by the learned Court below is just and proper warranting no interference in exercise of limited scope of judicial review under Section 115 CPC. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that legal position remains trite that for ascertaining accrual of cause of action, or right to sue to the plaintiff, Court is obliged to threadbare examine the averments contained in the plaint or the supporting documents and no other material can be looked into for that purpose. Canvassing his argument on this aspect of the matter, learned Senior Counsel submits that a plain reading of the averments of the plaint and meaningful consideration thereof makes it amply clear that the respondent-plaintiff has disclosed the cause of action explicitly and feeling persuaded with the same, the learned trial Court has rejected the application of the respondent, which is a just decision warranting no interference. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the arguments, vociferously advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, are in the nature of defence, which are not liable to be appreciated at the stage of disposal of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Learned Senior Counsel, while seriously opposing the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners that suit is barred by law, submits that jurisdiction of civil court under Section 9 itself is very wide and bar of its jurisdiction cannot be lightly inferred. Learned counsel has strenuously urged that bar of civil court’s jurisdiction has to be either express or by necessary implication and both these conditions are conspicuously missing in the matter as is borne out from the impugned order and therefore impugned order deserves no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel, Mr. Thanvi, has lastly submitted that for cancellation of a registered instrument, jurisdiction vests with the civil Court and revenue Court cannot exercise such power for cancellation of a registered instrument. Joining issue with the petitioners on this vital issue, learned Senior Counsel would urge that bar of civil Court's jurisdiction envisaged under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 vis-à-vis suit for cancellation of a registered instrument is inapplicable. Joining issue with the petitioners on this vital issue, learned Senior Counsel would urge that bar of civil Court's jurisdiction envisaged under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 vis-à-vis suit for cancellation of a registered instrument is inapplicable. For authenticating his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on following legal precedents: Bhau Ram vs. Janak Singh & Ors. ( AIR 2012 SC 3023 ) Rohit Shekhar vs. Narayan Dutt Tiwari & Anr. (2010(2) CCC 452 (Delhi) (DB)) Om Prakash Choudhary vs. Dr. Kailash Garg & Ors. ((2013(3) RLW 2763 (Raj.)) Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta & Ors. (2006 (3) Civil Court Cases 577 (SC). Ramdhari vs. Jodhan & Ors. (AIR 1973 Allahabad 81) 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and scanned the material available on record. 11. Embattlement of the petitioner-defendants to seek the rejection of respondent’s suit at the threshold proved catastrophic by the order impugned, has prompted them to lay this revision petition. Although application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC preferred by the petitioner-defendants before the learned Court below is vague, cryptic and sketchy, but on probing it reveals that they have made endeavor to seek rejection of the plaint by invoking clause (a) & (d) of Rule 11 Order VII CPC. This revelation of the Court also finds support from the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners inasmuch as essentially submissions are confined to these two grounds for rejection of the plaint. Ground (a) envisaged under Rule 11 of the Order VII CPC clothes a Court with the jurisdiction to reject the plaint at the threshold if the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. Cause of action, as such, is not defined under CPC. Its plain meaning is “cause available to the suitor, which furnishes him right to sue for seeking redressal”. Jurists have found it difficult to give a proper definition. It may be defined generally to be a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a judicial tribunal. Hon’ble Apex Court in South East Shipping Corporation Limited vs. Bharat Enterprises ( (1996) 3 SCC 443 ) defines cause of action in following manner: “It consists of bundle of facts which can cause to enforce the legal injury for redress in a Court of law. Hon’ble Apex Court in South East Shipping Corporation Limited vs. Bharat Enterprises ( (1996) 3 SCC 443 ) defines cause of action in following manner: “It consists of bundle of facts which can cause to enforce the legal injury for redress in a Court of law. It must include some act done by the defendant.” 12. The law on the subject remains no more fluid, inasmuch as for accrual of cause of action the relevant facts need to be looked into are the averments in the plaint in its entirety and the supporting documents on which the plaint is based. In deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, any defence putforth by the defendant cannot be looked into. As this trite legal position is not a contentious issue between the rival parties, it is not necessary to refer the legal precedents cited at Bar on the subject for further elucidation. A Court of first instance, to which suitor has approached, is therefore expected to read the plaint meaningfully and not formally to find out that it is manifestly vaxatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue. In order to exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, a Court is also expected to make endeavor in unearthing the clever drafting that may have created an illusion of cause of action. 13. Hon’ble Apex Court in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable & Ors. (supra), after considering some of the earlier judgments, set out parameters for ascertaining accrual of cause of action within the meaning of clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII CPC. The Court held: 15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. 14. In Bhau Ram (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the same principles with a word of caution that pleas raised in the written statement are totally irrelevant for deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The Court held: 8. The law has been settled by this Court in various decisions that while considering an application under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, the Court has to examine the averments in the plaint and the pleas taken by the defendants in its written statements would be irrelevant. (vide C. Natrajan vs. Ashim Bai and another, (2007) 14 SCC 183 : ( AIR 2008 SC 363 : 2007 AIR SCW 6953), Ram Prakash Gupta vs. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and others, (2007) 10 SCC 59 , Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. vs. Hede and Company, (2007) 5 SCC 614 : (2007 AIR SCW 3456), Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and others vs. Owners and Parties Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and others, (2006) 3 SCC 100 : ( AIR 2006 SC 1828 : 2006 AIR SCW 863), Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others, (2004) 3 SCC 137 : ( AIR 2004 SC 1801 : 2004 AIR SCW 799), Saleem Bhai and others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2003) 1 SCC 557 : ( AIR 2003 SC 759 : 2003 AIR SCW 174)). The above view has been once again reiterated in the recent decision of this Court in The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman vs. M/s. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, 2012 (6) JT 149 : (2012 AIR SCW 4136). 15. The above view has been once again reiterated in the recent decision of this Court in The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman vs. M/s. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, 2012 (6) JT 149 : (2012 AIR SCW 4136). 15. As emerged out from the perusal of impugned order, the learned Court below has examined the issue of accrual of cause of action to the respondent-plaintiff threadbare in conjunction with the averments of the plaint and the prayer made therein. On persuasion of the learned counsel for the parties, I have also delved deep into the matter to examine the averments of the plaint. A plain reading of the averments of the plaint, more particularly averments contained in Para 12 to 14 makes it amply clear that the respondent-plaintiff has alleged infringement of his civil rights as a consequence of execution of impugned sale-deeds. If the averments made in Para 12 to 14 of the plaint and the prayer clause is harmoniously construed then it will ipso facto reveal that the case set out by the respondent-plaintiff is edificed on happening of certain events as well as acts and omissions of others at the cost of jeopardizing her alleged civil rights. Therefore, a meaningful and informal reading of the plaint has persuaded me to arrive at a finding that plaint itself discloses accrual of cause of action to the respondent-plaintiff for sueing the petitioners. In such circumstances, I am unable to find any infirmity with the impugned order on the touchstone of clause (a) of Rule 11 Order VII CPC. 16. Now, I would like to deal with the other ground urged on behalf of the petitioners for rejection of plaint on the anvil of clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII. 17. Legislature in its wisdom has clothed the Courts with the jurisdiction to reject a plaint at the threshold where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. The contentions raised at the Bar encircling the aforesaid clause (d) of Rule 11 Order VII CPC can be bifurcated into two parts; viz., bar of civil Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit, and a suit barred by limitation. 18. The contentions raised at the Bar encircling the aforesaid clause (d) of Rule 11 Order VII CPC can be bifurcated into two parts; viz., bar of civil Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit, and a suit barred by limitation. 18. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners on first part, it is necessary to examine the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Section 9 CPC is couched with the language that Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In terms of the language employed under Section 9 CPC, it is undeniable that civil Court will have jurisdiction to try all the suits of civil nature, and ouster of its jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. 19. Having bestowed my consideration to the averments contained in the plaint and the reliefs sought for, prima facie, the grievances ventilated by the respondent-plaintiff in her plaint are for vindication of her civil rights. The respondent-plaintiff in the plaint has asserted that the agricultural land, part of which is alienated to the petitioners, was joint Hindu family property of which her father Late Kewal Ram was a Karta. With this specific plea in the plaint, the respondent has made an attempt to castigate the sale transactions as dubious and illegal without her concurrence and on the strength of such pleadings has craved for cancellation of the sale-deeds. Curiously enough, the revision petitioners are the purchasers of the agricultural land and though party to the litigation, no endeavor was made by the proforma respondents to invoke clause (d) of Rule 11 Order VII CPC before the learned Court below is a fact of great significance. To unearth truth about true nature of the land, requisite efforts at the behest of proforma respondents were desirable. As the petitioners have stepped in the shoes of the vendor, from whom they have purchased the land, they cannot be allowed to raise a plea that the entire land was owned by their predecessorin-title, without any share of the respondent-plaintiff. To unearth truth about true nature of the land, requisite efforts at the behest of proforma respondents were desirable. As the petitioners have stepped in the shoes of the vendor, from whom they have purchased the land, they cannot be allowed to raise a plea that the entire land was owned by their predecessorin-title, without any share of the respondent-plaintiff. As per the averments contained in Para 5 of the plaint, a dispute cropped up between proforma respondent Oma Ram with his siblings including the respondent-plaintiff and father Kewal Ram and a suit for partition is filed by him, but that suit was got withdrawn by Late Shri Kewal Ram and his three sons including Oma Ram collusively in terms of compromise to deprive her from her share. Similarly, in Para 10 of the plaint, the respondent-plaintiff has hurled serious insinuations against the performa respondents, as well as her late father, for practicing fraud by sheer manipulation and maneuvering. A specific case is set out by the respondent-plaintiff that she never wanted to withdraw her revenue suit but her thumb impression was obtained on an application by misguiding her. It is also borne out from the pleadings that the learned revenue Court has not acted upon said application of the respondent-plaintiff and has simply dismissed the revenue suit for non-prosecution. The persistence of the respondent-plaintiff for her cause is also discernible from the averments contained under Para 10 of the plaint inasmuch as she made endeavor to get the suit restored and even after dismissal of her application for restoration of suit, an appeal is also preferred by her before the Revenue Appellate Authority. Be that as it may, the appeal of the respondent-plaintiff has been dismissed, it cannot be said that the revenue suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff was adjudicated by the revenue Court on merits. In that background, at the threshold, from the averments contained in the plaint, it is not possible to infer that the plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless to empower the Court for nipping in the bud at the first hearing. 20. Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act under the caption “Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only”, reads as under: 207. 20. Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act under the caption “Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only”, reads as under: 207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only – (1) All suits and application of the nature specified in the Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court. (2) No court other than a revenue Court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Explanation- If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted. 21. A perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 207 of the Act of 1955 makes it amply clear that only those suits triable by the revenue court specified in the third schedule of the Act are barred before any other court except the revenue court. If Section 207 is read in conjunction with Third Schedule, then it would ipso facto reveal that in Third Schedule of the Act of 1955, there is no mention about a suit for cancellation of a registered instrument. Therefore, on the face of it, invocation of Section 207 of the Act of 1955 by the petitioners is misplaced and it cannot be said that suit for cancellation of a registered instrument is barred before a civil court within the four corners of Section 207 of the Act of 1955. 22. Hon’ble Apex Court in Dhulabhai vs. State of M.P. & Anr. ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ), while examining the scope of Section 9 CPC, referred to certain observations of the Special Bench in case of Kamla Mills Ltd. vs. State of Bombay ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) and quoted the observations in judgment, which are as under: "In cases where the exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such considerations would be very important and in conceivable circumstances, might even become decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf and it futher lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted it becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." The Special Bench refrained from either accepting the dictum of Mask Co.'s case, 67 Ind App 222 = ( AIR 1940 PC 105 ) or rejecting it, to the effect that even if jurisdiction is excluded by a provision making the decision of the authorities final, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the particular Act are not complied with. 23. After examining the matter thoroughly, Hon’ble Apex Court summarized the guidelines vis-à-vis jurisdiction of civil Court to try a suit. The guidelines are as under: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. 24. In Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta & Ors. (2006(3) Civil Court Cases 577(SC)), Hon’ble Apex Court has considered both the aspects i.e. whether the suit is barred by law, or barred by limitation within the meaning of clause (d) of Rule 11 Order VII CPC. While considering issue relating to suit barred by law, Court held: 14. The principle underlying clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 is no different. While considering issue relating to suit barred by law, Court held: 14. The principle underlying clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 is no different. We will refer here to a recent decision of this Court rendered in Popat and Kotecha Property vs. State Bank of India Staff Association 2005 (2) Apex Court Judgments 292 (S.C.): 2005 (3) Civil Court Cases 350 (S.C.): (2005) 7 SCC 510 where it was held as under in para 10 of the report: “10. Clause (d) of Order 7 Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed questions cannot be decided at the time of considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 applies in those cases only where the statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by any law in force.” It was emphasised in para 25 of the report that the statement in the plaint without addition or subtraction must show that it is barred by any law to attract application of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The principle is, therefore, well settled that in order to examine whether the plaint is barred by any law, as contemplated by sub-rule (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the averments made in the plaint alone have to be seen and they have to be assumed to be correct. It is not permissible to look into the pleas raised in the written statement or to any piece of evidence. Applying the said principle, the plea raised by the contesting respondents that the company petition was barred by limitation has to be examined by looking into the averments made in the company petition alone and any affidavit filed in reply to the company petition or the contents of the affidavit filed in support of Company Application No. 113 of 1995 filed by the respondents seeking dismissal of the company petition cannot at all be looked into. 25. Adverting to the issue relating to limitation, Court has opined in clear and unequivocal terms that issue relating to limitation is required to be decided after framing of issue on limitation and taking of evidence. Court held: 16. 25. Adverting to the issue relating to limitation, Court has opined in clear and unequivocal terms that issue relating to limitation is required to be decided after framing of issue on limitation and taking of evidence. Court held: 16. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The question whether the words “barred by law” occurring in Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC would also include the ground that it is barred by law of limitation has been recently considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member (Ashok Bhan, J.) in Civil Appeal No.4539 of 2003 (Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. vs. Hanuman Seva Trust & Ors.) decided on 8.11.2005 and it was held:- “After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Ex facie in the present case on the reading of the plaint it cannot be held that the suit is barred by time.” This principle would be equally applicable to a company petition. Therefore, unless it becomes apparent from the reading of the company petition that the same is barred by limitation the petition cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. 27. Some of the legal precedents, on which rival parties have placed reliance, are considered by me in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case. I do not feel persuaded to examine those precedents as most of the contentions putforth by the learned counsel for the petitioners are in the nature of defence to suit. At the behest of petitioners, an endeavor is also made to exercise power under Section 151 CPC by categorizing the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff as frivolous and vaxatious. I do not feel persuaded to examine those precedents as most of the contentions putforth by the learned counsel for the petitioners are in the nature of defence to suit. At the behest of petitioners, an endeavor is also made to exercise power under Section 151 CPC by categorizing the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff as frivolous and vaxatious. I am afraid, this contention is bereft of any merit for the simple reason that the respondent-plaintiff has alleged fraud against the proforma respondents and has made an affirmative attempt to depict the impugned sale transactions in favour of petitioners as dubious one. All these contentious issues can be thrashed out after taking into account evidence of rival parties for which civil Court is clothed with the jurisdiction to adjudicate. 28. The question relating to second part relating to the limitation, suffice it to observe here that the respondent-plaintiff has very specifically pleaded in Para 15 of the plaint that she came to know about the impugned sale-deeds in the month of August 2010 and that has furnished her cause of action to file the suit. In these circumstances, from the date of knowledge about the sale-deeds, apparently it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion that prima facie the suit is barred by limitation. Taking into account the averments of the plaint, the issue relating to limitation is still contentious and it has remained now a mixed question of law and fact which can only be determined after taking into account evidence of the rival parties. 29. In this view of the matter, on the second issue i.e. the suit is barred by law/limitation, I am unable to find any infirmity in the impugned order to make it vulnerable within the four corners of Section 115 CPC. The order impugned, therefore, does not suffer from any vice inasmuch as the learned Court below has neither exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, nor it has failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested in it. In totality, obviously, there is no reason to infer that the impugned order has occasioned failure of justice in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case. Resultantly, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.