JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. 1. This regular second appeal, filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stands admitted on the following substantial questions of law:-- "1. Whether both the courts below erred in appreciating the provisions of law applicable, pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced by them in its right perspective, thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees? 2. Whether impugned judgments and decrees as passed by the courts below stand vitiated for dismissing the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure?" Concurrent findings of fact are challenged by the defendant. 2. Plaintiffs Madan Lal and Banti Devi (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) filed a suit for possession against defendant Kundan Lal. 3. Based on the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues:-- "1. Whether the defendant is owner in possession of the suit land by way of exchange as alleged? OPD. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of possession as alleged? OPP. 3. Relief." 4. Appreciating the testimonies of the witnesses and the material on record, trial Court, by answering the issues, in favour of the plaintiffs, decreed the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 31.12.1993, passed in Civil Suit No. 376 of 1986, titled as Madan Lal and another Versus Kundan Lal. 5. Findings of fact judgment and decree stand affirmed by the lower Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 14.01.2003 rendered in Civil appeal No. 30 of 1994, titled as Kundan Lal Versus Madan Lal and others. 6. Hence the present appeal by the defendant. 7. That plaintiffs are owners of the land in question, stands established through the credible evidence, more particularly that of Plaintiff Madan Lal (P.W. 1) as also documentary evidence (Ex. D-1). 8. In defence, defendant (predecessor of the appellants herein) pleaded ownership by way of exchange. Undisputedly this document of exchange is unregistered and the witnesses, in whose presence the alleged exchange took place, have refuted such fact. Testimony of Nikka Ram (PW-2) is evidently clear to such effect. Testimony of Kishan Singh (D.W. 3), in no manner advances the case of the defendant, establishing the factum of exchange. Significantly the land which was exchanged, in lieu of the suit land, has also not been established in the ownership or possession of the defendant. Revenue entries, more particularly Ex. P-1, Ex. P-2, Ex. Testimony of Kishan Singh (D.W. 3), in no manner advances the case of the defendant, establishing the factum of exchange. Significantly the land which was exchanged, in lieu of the suit land, has also not been established in the ownership or possession of the defendant. Revenue entries, more particularly Ex. P-1, Ex. P-2, Ex. P-3 and Ex. P-4, right from the year 1968-69 onwards, reflect the plaintiffs to be owners and the defendant to be only 'Kabij'. Possession is not protected by any statutory right. Even with regard to the construction, so raised on the suit land, there is contradiction in the evidence led by the defendant. Thus, long standing possession of the defendant, cannot be said to be hostile or adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs. In fact, defendant has taken mutually destructive and contradictory pleas. 9. Findings of fact, recorded by the Courts below, cannot be said to be perverse or not borne out from the record, on the correct appreciation and application of the provisions of law. 10. Lower Appellate Court rightly rejected defendant's applications for framing of additional issues and adducing of additional evidence. In this regard, reference can be made to para 14 of the judgment rendered by the lower Appellate Court:-- "14. With regard to the plea of estoppels also, I find that this plea was not very specifically raised by the defendant in his written statement. It was no doubt alleged in para 1 of the written statement that the defendant had raised the construction of two Pucca rooms in the year 1970, against which construction, the defendant had not raised any objection and so the plaintiffs were estopped by their act and conduct from filing present suit. Be it noticed that this plea, even if true, could not raise the plea of estoppels against the plaintiffs in the context of this suit. As per allegations of the plaintiffs, the disputed premises were handed over to the plaintiffs as licensee in the year in the year 1978 and so, the construction of two rooms, if any, by the defendant over the disputed land could not constitute estoppels against the plaintiffs in respect of the suit which was based on the licence created in the year 1978 i.e. after eight years of the alleged construction. In fact, the plea which was raised by the defendant to substantiate his plea of exchange in the year 1968 could not be construed as a plea of estoppels in this suit. In any case, the trial court has judged this aspect of the case in para No. 17 of its judgment whereby the plea raised by the defendant has been considered and rejected. And so, the non-framing of an issue regarding estoppels in the suit has caused no prejudice to the defendant. In fact, the defendant has not made any grievance in this behalf either before the trial court or before this Court for nine long years and so, the plea seems to have been given up by the defendant. At any rate, as already stated, the raising of construction in the year 1970, even if true, would not constitute estoppels against the plaintiffs." 11. Consequently, I do not find any reason or ground sufficient enough to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. It cannot be said that the Courts below erred in correctly and completely appreciating the testimonies of the witnesses or that findings returned are illegal, erroneous or perverse in any manner which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 12. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.