JUDGMENT : Hasnain Massodi, J. 1. Appellants, in Letters Patent Appeals on hand, claim to be in possession of Wakaf property, detailed in respective memoranda of appeals, as lessees thereof. They aggrieved with eviction Orders, whereby they were asked to vacate the Wakaf property (hereinafter referred to as the leased Premises) earlier let out to them by respondent Board, filed writ petitions being OWP Nos. 55, 193, 135, 58, 80, 85, 86, 102 & 103 of 2007. Appellants on the grounds urged in the petitions, sought quashment of orders, whereby they were declared "unauthorized occupants" of the premises in their possession, as also the orders passed subsequent thereto including the eviction orders, directing their eviction from the premises in question. They further prayed for a direction, restraining respondents from interfering in their peaceful use, occupation and enjoyment of the leased premises in their possession as also an appropriate writ declaring Sub-Section 2 of Section 22-B, Sections 22-D, 22-E & 22-K of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Specified Wakafs and Specified Wakaf Properties (Management Regulations) Act, 2004, (for short, the Act) as unconstitutional. The writ petitions were resisted on the ground that Wakaf Board, constituted under Sub-Section 2 of Section 22-B, Sections 22-D, 22-E & 22-K of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Specified Wakafs and Specified Wakafs Properties (Management Regulations) Act, 2005, was not 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 Constitution of India and, therefore not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It was pleaded that appellants had equally efficacious, alternate remedy available under the Act and therefore, could not invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court. 2. Learned Writ Court, focused its attention exclusively on the preliminary objections taken to the maintainability of writ petitions. It did not look into and deal with the factual aspects of the case. The Court on going through the provisions of the Act and on scanning the case law on the subject matter, held Wakaf Board not to satisfy the tests, laid down by Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 (1) SCC 722 , to determine the character of a body and conclude whether it is 'State' within meaning of Article 12 Constitution of India. The Board was, therefore held not to amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 3. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 (1) SCC 722 , to determine the character of a body and conclude whether it is 'State' within meaning of Article 12 Constitution of India. The Board was, therefore held not to amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 3. Learned Single Judge noticing Sections 44 to 56 of the Act together with Order No. 101, dated 25th August 2005, held Appellants to have an equally efficacious remedy available in the form of an appeal to the Vice Chairman of the Board, to question the eviction orders. The writ Court was not impressed by the case set up as regards constitutionality of Sections 22-B, 22-D, 22-E and 22-K. It observed that provisions of the Act in question were not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case and that in any case the vires of the Act were questioned in a petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the matter was awaiting disposal on the date of the judgment. The objections to maintainability of writ petitions having been sustained by the writ Court, all the writ petitions were dismissed at admission stage and interim orders earlier granted, vacated. 4. The writ Court judgment dated September 7, 2007 is questioned in Letters Patent Appeals on hand, on the grounds, detailed in memoranda of appeals. 5. Appellants' case is that writ Court failed to appreciate that the real issue, was whether respondent Board was statutory body, created under a statute, performed statutory functions and as such Authority within the meaning of Article 12 Constitution of India and not whether the Board is a fully autonomous body. The core issue involved in the writ petitions, according to Appellants, was not considered and dealt with by learned Single Judge, in right perspective. The respondent Board, according to Appellants, falls within the expression "Other Authorities" used in Article 12 of the Constitution in as much as, it is a statutory authority, conferred statutory powers and saddled with duties under the Act. 6. Appellants also dispute that the Act provides them, an equally efficacious remedy against the orders impugned in writ petitions. It is maintained that doctrine of 'alternate remedy' would not be attracted where enforcement of fundamental right is sought, failure of principle of natural justice is alleged or the proceedings stated to be without jurisdiction. 6. Appellants also dispute that the Act provides them, an equally efficacious remedy against the orders impugned in writ petitions. It is maintained that doctrine of 'alternate remedy' would not be attracted where enforcement of fundamental right is sought, failure of principle of natural justice is alleged or the proceedings stated to be without jurisdiction. Learned Single Judge is said to have failed to appreciate that Order No. 101, dated 25th August 2005, on the face of it, is ultra vires the Act, as amended by the Act of 2005. 7. We have gone through the grounds set out to urge reversal of writ Court judgment, the writ Court judgment as also the writ record. We have heard counsel for the parties at length. 8. The Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Specified Wakafs and Specified Wakaf Properties (Management Regulations) Act, 2004, is enacted to provide for proper control, efficient management and regulation of specified Wakafs and protection, preservation and use of specified Wakaf properties and for the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 5 of the Act provides that w.e.f. 8th September 2003, i.e. the date of commencement of the Act, control and management of Wakafs and properties covered under the Act, shall vest in the Board of Directors, known as "Board of Directors for the Specified Wakaf Properties". Section 11 enumerates powers and duties of the Board. The first and foremost duty of the Board, as mentioned in Section 11(a) is to administer, manage and regulate the Wakafs and to preserve, protect and use specified Wakafs, specified Wakaf Properties and such other Wakafs and trusts as may be included in Schedule-A or Schedule-B from time to time either suo moto or on the recommendation of the Board. The Board in terms of Section 11 obviously has inter-alia power to lease out a Wakaf property on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit and to recover a Wakaf property and order eviction of unauthorized occupants from a Wakaf property in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules and Regulations made under the Act. 9. Section 22 of the Act deals with recovery of Wakaf property and procedure for eviction. It reads as under:- Recovery of Wakaf Property and Procedure for Eviction. 9. Section 22 of the Act deals with recovery of Wakaf property and procedure for eviction. It reads as under:- Recovery of Wakaf Property and Procedure for Eviction. The provisions of Sections 44 to 56 (both inclusive) of the J & K Wakafs Act, 2001, shall mutatis mutandis apply for recovery of the Wakafs and Properties covered under Section 3 and eviction of unauthorized occupants thereof subject to the modification that the powers of the Chairman, Tehsil Committee and the appellate authority under the said provisions shall be exercised by such person or authority as the Chairman may, from time to time, appoint in this behalf. Inspection of Records. Subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed and without payment of any fees as may be leviable under any law for the time being in force, the person appointed under Section 22 or any person duly authorized by him shall be entitled at all reasonable time to inspect in any public office any record, register or other documents relating to Wakaf Prosperities covered under Section 3. 10. Section 22 of the Act makes it necessary to have an overview of Sections 44-56 of J & K Wakafs Act, 2001, applicable to the recoveries of wakaf properties and eviction of unauthorized occupants from such properties, mentioned in Sec. 3 of the Act. Ss 45 to 56 are included in Chapter V of the Wakaf Act 2001, laying down the procedure for eviction. Section 45 requires issuance of notice to show cause against proposed eviction. Section 46, deals with procedure, to be followed in eviction of unauthorized occupants of Wakaf premises/property. Section 47 confers power on the Competent Authority to remove unauthorized construction, immoveable structures, fixtures, etc., raised on wakaf property. Section 48 clothes Chairman, Tehsil Committee, with power to take possession of wakaf property. Section 49, confers on the Competent Authority power to order demolition of unauthorized construction and lays down procedure to be followed while making such order. Section 50 likewise deals with power to seal unauthorized construction raised on wakaf property. Once unauthorized construction is demolished or unauthorized occupant removed from wakaf premises, property left on wakaf premises upon such demolition or removal may be in terms of Section 51 of the Act, disposed off by public auction in the manner laid down therein. Section 50 likewise deals with power to seal unauthorized construction raised on wakaf property. Once unauthorized construction is demolished or unauthorized occupant removed from wakaf premises, property left on wakaf premises upon such demolition or removal may be in terms of Section 51 of the Act, disposed off by public auction in the manner laid down therein. Section 52 confers power on the Competent Authority to assess rents, damages on account of use and occupation of any property and require the person found to have used the wakaf property to pay rent or damages, assessed, to the concerned Authority, within such time as may be laid down in the order. Section 53 enumerates power of Chairman, Tehsil Committee, to make use of tools under Code of Civil Procedure, Samvat 1977, for enforcing attendance of any person, discovery and production of documents and any other matter, prescribed under rules. The order passed by the Chairman, Tehsil Committee in terms of Section 53(2) is to be deemed to be a decree of Code of Civil Procedure, within the meaning of Section 2(2) of Code of Civil Procedure, Samvat 1977. Section 54, important for present controversy provides for an Appeal against an order of Chairman, Tehsil Committee. It makes obligatory for the Appellate Authority to decide such appeal within a period of 90 days and gives discretion as regards cost of appeal to the Appellate Authority. 11. The purpose to highlight various procedural safeguards, available under Chapter V of J & K Wakafs Act, 2001, required to be followed and available to a person against whom eviction order etc. is made under Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Specified Wakafs and Specified Wakaf Properties (Management Regulations) Act, 2004, is to point out that there is a well designed mechanism available under the Act to redress the grievance of a person affected by eviction order or a like order, passed by Competent Authority under the Act. There is, thus, an equally efficacious remedy available to appellants under the provisions of the Act. It is pertinent to point out that respondents vide Order No. 101, dated 25th August 2005, have even identified the Appellate authority, to be approached by a person aggrieved with eviction order etc. passed under the Act. There is, thus, an equally efficacious remedy available to appellants under the provisions of the Act. It is pertinent to point out that respondents vide Order No. 101, dated 25th August 2005, have even identified the Appellate authority, to be approached by a person aggrieved with eviction order etc. passed under the Act. There in the circumstances is no scope for disagreement with conclusion drawn by learned Writ Court that appellants in all the writ petitions had equally efficacious remedy available in the form of appeal under Section 22 of the Act, read with Section 54 of J & K Wakafs Act, 2001 and Order No. 101, dated 25th August 2005. The Writ petitions, therefore, were rightly held not maintainable. 12. This takes us to the next limb of controversy. Mr. Jan argues that test applied by learned writ Court while concluding that respondent Board is not "State" within meaning of Article 12, Constitution of India, is not right test in light of settled legal position. Mr. Jan states that characteristic to be examined is as to whether the Board is creation of a "statute" and performs "statutory functions". It is argued that Board would fall within the purview of expression "Other Authority" as it is a statutory body, created under a statute (Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Specified Wakafs and Specified Wakaf Properties (Management Regulations) Act, 2004) and discharge functions, laid down in the Act. The Board according to learned counsel is 'State', within meaning of Article 12, Constitution of India, and therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction. The view taken by writ Court, it is insisted, being not tenable under law, deserves to be overset. 13. It needs to be pointed out at the outset that power of High Court to issue writs under Article 226 is not confined to "State" within the meaning of Article 12 Constitution of India. The ambit and scope of power, exercisable under Article 226 is much wider and brings within its sweep "any person or Authority". It is not restricted to enforcement of fundamental rights, conferred by Part-III Constitution of India but available "for any other purpose." In other words writ jurisdiction under Article 226 may also be exercised against "other Authority," that does not fall within the definition of "State" under Article 12 Constitution of India. It is not restricted to enforcement of fundamental rights, conferred by Part-III Constitution of India but available "for any other purpose." In other words writ jurisdiction under Article 226 may also be exercised against "other Authority," that does not fall within the definition of "State" under Article 12 Constitution of India. However, the test to determine status of the body remains control exercised by the Government, either by financial or administrative. The test laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111 , relied upon by the Writ Court, has been followed in Chunilal Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2008) 17 SCC 759 and reiterated in State of U.P. v. Raday Sham Rao (2009) 5 SCC 577 . 14. In K.K. Saksena v. Irrigation and Drainage (2015) 4 SCC 670 , Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the Status of "International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage" (ICID) in context of Articles 12 and 226 Constitution of India. ICID was held by the Writ Court not to be "State" as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution and not fall within the definition of "other Authorities" within the meaning of Article 226 and writ petition, filed by its 'Secretary to question his termination, dismissed. Hon'ble Supreme Court, dismissing the appeal against the judgment, impugned before it, held ICID to be neither instrumentally of the State nor any 'Other Authority'. 15. Hon'ble Supreme Court, after scanning law on the subject including law laid down in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 , Pradeep Kumar Biswa's case and also Anandi Mukta Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayani Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 and Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 , observed: (i) If the authority/body can be treated as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, indubitably a writ petition under Article 226 would be maintainable against such an authority/body for enforcement of fundamental and other rights. Article 12 appears in Part III of the Constitution, which pertains to "fundamental rights". Article 12 appears in Part III of the Constitution, which pertains to "fundamental rights". Therefore, the definition contained in Article 12 is for the purpose of the Constitution, which deals with powers of the High Courts to issue certain writs, inter alia, stipulates that every High Court has the power to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including, in appropriate cases, any Government, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose; (ii) In this context, when we scan through the provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution, as per the definition contained therein, the "State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and legislature of each State as well as "all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India". It is in this context the question as to which body would qualify as "other authority" has come up for consideration before this Court ever since, and the test/principles which are to be applied for ascertaining as to whether a particular body can be treated as "other authority" or not have already been noted above. If such an authority violates the fundamental right or other legal rights of any person or citizen (as the case may be), a writ petition can be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court and seeking appropriate direction, order or writ. However, under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of High Court is not limited to the Government or authority which qualifies to be "State" under Article 12. Power is extended to issue directions, orders or writs "to any person or authority". Again, this power of issuing directions, orders or writs is not limited to enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III, but also "for any other purpose". Thus, power of the High Court takes within its sweep more "authorities" than stipulated in Article 12 and the subject-matter which can be dealt with under this article is also wider in scope; (iii) In this context, the first question which arises is as to what meaning is to be assigned to the expression "any person or authority". Thus, power of the High Court takes within its sweep more "authorities" than stipulated in Article 12 and the subject-matter which can be dealt with under this article is also wider in scope; (iii) In this context, the first question which arises is as to what meaning is to be assigned to the expression "any person or authority". By a catena of judgments rendered by this Court, it now stands well grounded that the term "authority" used in Article 226 has to receive wider meaning than the same very term used in Article 12 of the Constitution. This was so held in Anadi Mukta Sadgura. In that case, dispute arose between the Trust which was managing and running science college and teachers of the said college. It pertained to payment of certain employment related benefits like basic pay, etc. The matter was referred to the Chancellor of Gujarat University for his decision. The Chancellor passed an award, which was accepted by the University as well as the State Government and a direction was issued to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the said award. However, the aforesaid Trust running the science college did not implement the award. Teachers filed the writ petition seeking mandamus and direction to the Trust to pay them their dues of salary, allowances, provident fund and gratuity in accordance therewith. It is in this context an issue arose as to whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable against the said Trust which was admittedly not a statutory body or authority under Article 12 of the Constitution as it was a private Trust running an educational institution. The High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable and the said view was upheld by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. 16. The Court emphasizing that even if a body was found to be performing public duty and therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction, its all decisions are not subject to judicial review and to be questioned by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226, Constitution of India; that only those decisions which have public element, can be examined in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It would be advantageous to extract paras 49 to 51 of the judgment. 49. It would be advantageous to extract paras 49 to 51 of the judgment. 49. Even if a body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review, as already pointed out above. Only those decisions which have public element therein can be judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction. In Parag Tools Corpn. V. C.A. Imanual, as already discussed above, this Court held that the action challenged did not have public element and writ of mandamus could not be issued as the action was essentially of a private character. That was a case where the employee concerned was seeking reinstatement of an office. 50. We have also pointed out above that in Saka Venkata Rao this Court had observed that administrative law in India has been shaped on the lines of English law. There are a catena of judgments in English courts taking same view, namely, contractual and commercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action and not by judicial review. In R. (Hopley) v. Liverpool Health Authority (unreported) (30-7-2002), Justice Pitchford helpfully set out three things that had to be identified when considering whether a public body with statutory powers was exercising a public function amenable to judicial review or a private function. They are: (i) whether the defendant was a public body exercising statutory powers: (ii) whether the function being performed in the exercise of those powers was a public or a private one; (iii) whether the defendant was performing a public duty owed to the claimant in the particular circumstances under consideration. 51. Even in Anadi Mukta Sadguru, which took a revolutionary turn and departure from the earlier views, this Court held that "any other authority" mentioned in Article 226 is not confined to statutory authorities or instrumentalities of the State defined under Article 12 of the Constitution, it also emphasized that if the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus could issue. 17. The legal position that emerges against above backdrop, may be summarized as under:- i. That definition of 'State' contained in Article 12 is for the purpose of application of provisions contained in Part-III of the Constitution. ii. Writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 is not limited to the Government or Authority which qualifies to be 'State' under Article 12. Power extends to issue directions, orders or writs to "any person or Authority". iii. ii. Writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 is not limited to the Government or Authority which qualifies to be 'State' under Article 12. Power extends to issue directions, orders or writs to "any person or Authority". iii. The expression 'Authority' used in Article 226 is to receive wider meaning than the meaning given to the same expression used in Article 12 of the Constitution. iv. The term 'Authority' in Article 226 means a body, performing public functions or public duty. The emphasis always being on the nature of duty imposed on such body, namely "public duty" to make it exigible to Article 226 of the Constitution. v. That merely because the Government has power to depute an Officers), to be part of administrative set up, of an institution or body is not to be construed as 'pervasive administrative' control over the body. Regulatory power is always to be distinguished from administrative control. vi. Power to issue directions, orders or writs under Article 226 is not limited to enforcement of fundamental rights, conferred by Part-III of the Constitution but also 'for any other purpose'. vii. Even if a body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review. Only those decisions which have public element therein can be judicially reviewed under writ jurisdiction. 18. Coming to the Constitution, the nature of duty, performed by respondent Board, it is abundantly clear that the Government may have a power, regulatory in character over the Board, it does not have pervasive administrative control over the Board, so as to bring it within the definition of 'other Authority', as used in Article 226 of the Constitution. The power of the Board in terms of the Act and rules made there-under is to manage the Wakaf property. To accomplish the indented purpose, it is equipped with certain powers like eviction of unauthorized occupants, demolition of unauthorized constructions on the wakaf property etc. Board does not in strict sense discharge public functions or pubic duty. Even if, it is assumed that Board does fall within the definition of 'other Authority' within the meaning of Article 226 yet the decision, impugned in the writ petition did not have a "public element" as laid down in K.K. Saksena's case. 19. Board does not in strict sense discharge public functions or pubic duty. Even if, it is assumed that Board does fall within the definition of 'other Authority' within the meaning of Article 226 yet the decision, impugned in the writ petition did not have a "public element" as laid down in K.K. Saksena's case. 19. We, for the reasons discussed in the writ court judgment and also in view of settled legal position as discussed above, do not see any reason to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the writ court. In the circumstances and for the reasons hereinabove, challenge to writ Court judgment dated September 7th 2007, fails and Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed.