ORDER 1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, takes exception to the order dated 11.9.2013, whereby the application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under Order 6 rule 17, CPC, is rejected by the Court below. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of contract. During pendency of suit, he filed said amendment application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC on 30.8.2013 (Annexure P-6). Admittedly, said application was filed after commencement of the trial. The Court below rejected this application on the ground that under Order 6 rule 17, a proviso has been inserted w.e.f. 2002. As per this proviso, the amendment after commencement of trial can be entertained only when due diligence in belatedly filing the said application is shown. Since the petitioner has not shown any due diligence, the amendment was disallowed. 3. The said order is attacked by the petitioner on the singular ground that as per section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, the 'Act'), the Court below should have allowed the amendment application. 4. The stand of Shri Mahesh Goyal is that there is no ingredient on which interference can be made in jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. I deem it apposite to reproduce section 22 of the Act before dealing with rival contentions of the parties. It reads as under :- “22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for - (a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property, in addition to such performance; or (b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or 3[made by] him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused. (2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed: Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. (3) The power of the Court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice to its powers to award compensation under section 21.” (Emphasis Supplied) 7. A bare perusal of amendment application shows that the plaintiff prayed for refund of money/deposit paid by him. This is squarely covered under section 22(1) (b) of the Act. 8. It is relevant to note that Code of Civil Procedure is a general enactment whereas Specific Relief Act, 1963 is a special one. section 22 begins with a non-obstante clause. section 22 has been given overriding effect on any other provision of CPC. Although proviso to Order 6 rule 17 was inserted in 2002, i.e., after commencement of Specific Relief Act, yet fact remains that there exists a special provision to allow amendment at any stage in the particular/special law, which has an overriding effect on the provision of CPC. Thus, this overriding effect has to be given effect to. 9. Lord Philimore in Nicolle v. Nicolle, [(1922)1 AC 284], opined that it is a sound principle of all jurisprudence that a prior particular law is not easily to be held to be abrogated by a posterior law, expressed in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language applicable to and covering a number of cases, of which the particular law is but one. This, as a matter of jurisprudence, as understood in England, has been laid down in a great number of cases, whether the prior law be an express statute, or be the underlying common or customary law of the country. Where general words in a latter Act are capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. Where general words in a latter Act are capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. Mudholkar, J., in AIR 1963 SC 1561 (Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J.Joseph) opined that a general statute applies to all persons and localities within its jurisdiction and scope as distinguished from a special one which in its operation is confined to a particular locality and, therefore, where it is doubtful whether the special statute was intended to be repealed by the general statute the Court should try to give effect to both the enactments as far as possible. 10. In view of special provision, embodied in section 22 of Specific Relief Act, in the cases of this nature, proviso to Order 6 rule 17 CPC cannot be an impediment in seeking amendment even after commencement of trial. In such cases, the proviso of Order 6 rule 17 must give way to the amendment sought in proceedings under Special Relief Act, provided such relief is covered under section 22 of the Act of 1963. 11. The Court below has erred in not taking into account the mandate of section 22 of the Act. Thus, the order impugned has become vulnerable. A specific provision, which permits such amendment, has escaped notice of the Court below. Thus, interference is warranted by this Court. 12. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 11.9.2013 is set aside. The amendment application dated 30.8.2013 is allowed. The Court below is directed to proceed from the said stage. Petition is allowed. No costs. ................