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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 64 (MP)

Sunil Bhadoria v. State of M. P.

2015-01-15

ROHIT ARYA

body2015
ORDER Arya, J. -- 1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India petitioner has prayed that the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ of 1976) in Case No.134/84-85/CA and 32/92-93/B-121, 33/92-93/B-121, 34/92-93/B-121, 35/92-93/B-121, 36/92-93/B-121 against Ram Prasad and Babulal etc. be declared to be abated by force of coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Repeal Act of 1999’) w.e.f. 17.2.2000 by Gazette notification dated 10.3.2000 with further directions to respondents to correct the revenue entries of land situated in survey Nos.155, 156, part of 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 208 and 213 Kita 11 area 1.769 hectare at village Jagatpura, Tahsil and District Gwalior by deleting the entry in coloumn No.12 to the effect, ‘pendency of ceiling proceedings’. By amendment as per Court order dated 12.2.2014 amended relief for quashment of possession receipts Annexure P/8 and P/9 has been claimed. 2. One Devi owned different parcels of land in question being his ancestral property. Devi had two sons, namely, Kachchhu and Ramprasad, Kachchhu had three sons, namely, Babulal, Madan Singh and Gokul and two daughters namely, Munnidevi and Bhagwati (for brevity all of them are hereinafter referred to as ‘Babulal’). On the death of Devi, the entire land devolved upon Kachchhu and Ramprasad in the proportion of half share each. On death of Kachchhu, the same devolved upon ‘Babulal’ and the other half share of the ownership of Ramprasad was relinquished by him in favour of Babulal by registered relinquishment deed dated 15.11.2010. As such, Babulal became the successive owner of the entire land involved in this petition. ‘Babulal’ transferred the aforesaid land to petitioner and other partners by registered sale deed dated 9.11.2011. 3. Kachchhu and Ramprasad were required to submit return under the provisions of section 6 of the Act of 1976. Two separate cases were registered against Kachchhu and Ramprasad. Case No.134/84-85/CA (hereinafter referred to as the case ‘A’) was registered against Ramprasad and Case No.122/83-84/CA (hereinafter referred to as the case ‘B’) was registered against Kachchhu. 4. In case ‘A’ Draft statement under section 8(1) of the Act of 1976 was prepared on 25.6.1992 and an area of 6130 sqmt. was proposed to be declared as surplus. Case No.134/84-85/CA (hereinafter referred to as the case ‘A’) was registered against Ramprasad and Case No.122/83-84/CA (hereinafter referred to as the case ‘B’) was registered against Kachchhu. 4. In case ‘A’ Draft statement under section 8(1) of the Act of 1976 was prepared on 25.6.1992 and an area of 6130 sqmt. was proposed to be declared as surplus. On 2.11.1992 final statement was prepared under section 9 of the Act of 1976 declaring 6130 sqmt. land as surplus. Petitioner contends that neither the draft statement nor the final statment was served upon him by registered post as provided for under Rule 5 read with section 8(3) of the Act of 1976. Thereafter, on 18.10.1993 notification under section 10(1) and on 28.12.1993 notification under section 10(3) of the Act of 1976 were issued. The publication in the final Gazette was made on 21.1.1994. According to the petitioner, the procedure prescribed under section 10(1) read with rule 6 of the Act of 1976 was not followed as the copies of the Gazette notifications were not sent to the concerned authorities and holders of the land and also to the other interested persons. After Gazette notification, it is the contention of the petitioner, the alleged notice for taking possession under section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 though was claimed to have been issued on 28.2.1994 to Ramprasad, but the same was never served upon him. As such, Ramprasad neither had notice of draft statement nor final statement nor that of section 10(5) proceedings. He also never delivered possession of the land to the authority voluntarily or otherwise. As regards the fact that respondents have issued ‘possession receipts’ dated 29.3.1994, it is contended that it was mere paper formality in the office as neither any person reached to the spot to take possession nor actually possession was taken. No Panchnama was prepared of the proceedings of taking possession. As regards the fact that respondents have issued ‘possession receipts’ dated 29.3.1994, it is contended that it was mere paper formality in the office as neither any person reached to the spot to take possession nor actually possession was taken. No Panchnama was prepared of the proceedings of taking possession. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the proceedings before the Ceiling Authority in the aforesaid case in relation to Ramprasad on record as Annexure P/9 and submits that as per the order-sheet dated 28.2.1994 it was decided to initiate proceedings under section 10(5) of the Act of 1976, however, there is no mention as regards compliance of rule 5 in the matter of service of draft statement under section 8(3) and final statement under section 9 by registered post and no proceeding in the context of section 10(5) was recorded i.e. as to whether notice was issued to the person for surrender or delivery of possession within thirty days from the date of issue of notice and after 28.2.1994, on 24.3.1995 it is recorded in the proceedings that ex parte possession has been taken on 29.3.1994 and case was closed by Tahsildar (Nazul). 5. As referred above case ‘B’ was registered against Kachchhu and draft statement was prepared under section 8(1) of the Act of 1976, After his death, Babulal filed return in separate cases viz. 32/92-93/B-121, 33/92-93/B-121, 34/92-93/B-121, 35/92-93/B-121 and 36/92-93/B-121 total land was 962 sqmt. in their possession and after allowing admissible limit of holding the land of 1500 sqmt., 8120 sqmt. land was declared surplus by order dated 31.7.1993. In this case also neither the draft statement prepared on 31.7.1993 nor the final statement dated 28.9.1993 was served upon Babulal, as required under section 8(3) and section 9 read with rule 5 of the Act of 1976. Notification of the final statement was issued under section 10(1) on 18.10.1993 and under section 10(3) on 28.12.1993 published in the final Gazette on 21.1.1994. Again the proceeding as contemplated under section 10(1) read with rule 6 of the Act of 1976 was not sent to the concerned authorities and the holders and also to the other interested persons. 6. Allegedly under section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 notice in this case was also claimed to have been issued on 28.2.1994 to Babulal, but petitioner contends, that such notice was never served upon Babulal. 6. Allegedly under section 10(5) of the Act of 1976 notice in this case was also claimed to have been issued on 28.2.1994 to Babulal, but petitioner contends, that such notice was never served upon Babulal. Thereafter, the respondents issued ‘possession receipts’ dated 29.3.1994 alleging that ex parte possession has been taken. It is contended that it was mere paper formality in the office as neither any person reached to the spot to take possession nor actuaoly possession was delivered and no Panchnama was prepared of the proceedings of taking possession. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the proceedings before the Ceiling Authority in the aforesaid case in relation to Babulal on record as Annexure P/16 and submits that as per the order-sheets on 28.2.1994 it was decided to initiate proceedings under section 10(5) of the Act of 1976, however, there is no mention as regards compliance of rule 5 in the matter of service of draft statement under section 8(3) and final statement under section 9 by registered post and no proceeding in the context of section 10(5) was recorded i.e. as to whether notice was issued to the persons for surrender or delivery of possession within thirty days from the date of issue of notice and after 28.2.1994, on 24.3.1995 it is recorded that ex parte possession has been taken on 29.3.1994 and case was closed by Tahsildar (Nazul). As such, total surplus area is to the tune of 14250 (6130+8120) sqmt. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that as ‘Babulal’ were not served by registered post the copies of the draft statement, hence, there was no occasion for them to object to the same though they had statutory right to do so, as provided for under section 8(3) providing for objection to draft statement within thirty days of the service thereof. Consequently, the stage of deciding objections under sub-section (4) of section 8 had not reached, whereas under sub-section (4) of section 8 the competent authority was obliged to afford reasonable opportunity to the objector to object to the draft statement, but the provision was not complied with before preparation of final statement on 28.9.1993 finally declaring the land 6130 sqmt. in case A and 8120 sqmt. in case B as surplus. in case A and 8120 sqmt. in case B as surplus. It is further contended that the notification of final statement issued on 18.10.1993 under section 10(1) and the notification under section 10(3) dated 18.12.1993 were not issued as per the requirement of rule 6 of the Act of 1976 declaring the vacant land. As such, there was no occasion for deciding the claims of persons interested in the vacant land pursuant to the notification published under section 10(1) of the Act of 1976. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the entire proceedings of declaring the land of Babulal as surplus and vacant land was mere a paper formality and in fact and in effect vitiated by errors of law and fact. 7. As mentioned above, it is the contention of the petitioner that no notice was issued under section 10(5) calling upon the petitioner to surrender or deliver possession and in fact no physical possession was taken, hence, the stage for invoking section 10(6) did not arise, even otherwise the alleged claim of respondents of having taken ex parte possession under section 10(6) is devoid of substance for want of relevant material to demonstrate the aforesaid act i.e. Panchnama, signature of witnesses on the alleged possession receipts. It is submitted that possession of the land, as a matter of fact, has always remained with Babulal and after execution of sale deed dated 9.11.2011 with the present petitioner, as evident from the Panchnama prepared by the revenue authorities at the time of Batankan (sub division) of survey Nos.207 and 208 ordered by revenue authorities on 12.7.2012, which is on record as Annexure P/19. These documents reveal the fact that the land in question continues to be in possession of the holders and subsequent purchasers thereof. Besides, by way of rejoinder, petitioner has brought on record that for providing Rasta to Babulal out of survey Nos.159 and 179 (Govt. land) to his agricultural field, the Tahsildar issued notice to the Patwari for submitting the report, copy of the notice is on record as Annexure P/22. Patwari of the area had submitted the report with regard to land owners, copies of the report, map and Panchnama are on record as Annexure P/23. The Collector has also issued public notice on 16.2.2012 inviting objections from the TNCP Department and also from the public, which is on record as Annexure P/24. Patwari of the area had submitted the report with regard to land owners, copies of the report, map and Panchnama are on record as Annexure P/23. The Collector has also issued public notice on 16.2.2012 inviting objections from the TNCP Department and also from the public, which is on record as Annexure P/24. After recording of statement of Patwari and other persons, order was passed by the Tahsildar in Case No.3/11-12/Aa-13 on 19.4.2012 wherein it is mentioned that agriculturist Babulal are owner in possession of the land bearing survey Nos.155, 156 and 207 to 215 situated at village Jaganpura. As the land is adjacent to the Government land bearing survey Nos.159 and 179, therefore, their prayer for providing Rasta through the aforesaid Government land to the land in question in their possession was allowed. Petitioner contends that these facts reveal the fact that even upto the order passed by the Tahsildar on 19.4.2012 possession over the land was always with Babulal and possession wa not taken by the State authorities and, therefore, the alleged possession receipts dated 29.3.1994 are the fabricated documents having no bearing or relevance to the issue involved in this petition. 8. It is further contended in the rejoinder that besides there are electric connection in the name of Babulal bearing service No.3421181 granted by the Electricity Board on 6.9.1997 and the same is in existence. The electric bill is also enclosed as Annexure P/26. It is also contended in the rejoinder that the alleged notice under section 10(5) on its overleaf portion bears the remark that on 5.3.1994 it is mentioned that the person has refused to take the notice, whereas the alleged ex parte possession is stated to have been taken vide possession receipts dated 29.3.1994. It is submitted, if notice itself was not served upto 5.3.1994, then thirty days period from 5.3.1994 was not over. As thirty days’ time is granted for delivery of possession from service of notice, as provided for under section 5 of the Act of 1976, therefore, thirty days period ought to have been taken from 5.3.1994 and if possession was not delivered, only then the question would have arisen for taking forcible possession after expiry of thirty days’ period, whereas the alleged possession receipts show taking of ex parte possession on 29.3.1994. It is submitted that it is a fabricated document prepared to justify concocted story; no field map was prepared and no demarcation was made. That, apart, it is submitted that even the alleged remark on the notice does not specify the name of the land holder, who refused to take the notice, and it assumes importance as there are more than one land holders. No Panchnama is prepared of any person of the local inhabitants to justify the aforesaid remark of process server and, therefore, there is a complete violation of mode of service as contemplated under order V rule 5 CPC. It is submitted that possession receipts are mere paper formality prepared afterwards to justify the alleged ex parte possession without any foundation and justification. 9. With the aforesaid contentions advanced, it is submitted that in the light of the provisions as contained in section 3 of the Repeal Act of 1999 the ceiling proceedings stood abated, as the possession has not been taken by the State Government. To bolster the submissions, learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment in State of U.P. v. Hari Ram (2013)4 SCC 280 , relevant paras whereof read as under :- “Legal Fiction 18. Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction, for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really exist. Sub-section (3) of section 10 contained two deeming provisions such as “deemed to have been acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely”. Let us first examine the legal consequences of a ‘deeming provision’. In interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449 held that what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands. 19. James Lords Justice in ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy (1881) 17 Chance. D. 746 speaks on deeming fiction as : “ ..... 19. James Lords Justice in ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy (1881) 17 Chance. D. 746 speaks on deeming fiction as : “ ..... When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to”. 20. In Szoma v. Secretary of State for the Department of Work and Pensions (2006)1 All E.R.1 (at 25), Court held : 25. ........., it would ............ be quite wrong to carry this fiction beyond its originally intended purpose so as to deem a person in fact lawfully here not to be here at all. The intention of a deeming provision, in laying down a hypothesis is that the hypothesis shall be carried so far as necessary to achieve the legislative purpose but no further. (see also DEG Deutsche Institutions and another v. Kosby (2001)3 All E.R. 878. 21. Let us test the meaning of the expression “deemed to have been acquired” and “deemed to have been vested absolutely” in the above legal settings. The expression “acquired” and “vested” are not defined under the Act. Each word, phrase or sentence that we get in a statutory provision, if not defined in the Act, then is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act. As held by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India (1979) 4 SCC 573 that a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of a legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial legislation to futility. Reference may also be made to the Judgment of this Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan (1994) 3 SCC 440 . Words and phrases, therefore, occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner, it is associated on the context but are read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Act. 22. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 held : 12. “it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. 22. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596 held : 12. “it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The Courts must look to the object, which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary…….” 23. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. M/s Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376 , Justice S.R. Das stated: 6. “The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally that is, by giving to the words used by legislature their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation.” 24. The expression “deemed to have been acquired” used as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of section 10 can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests because till that time the land may be either in the ownership of the person who held that vacant land or to possess such land as owner or as a tenant or as mortgagee and so on as defined under section 2(1) of the Act. The word “vested” has not been defined in the Act, so also the word “absolutely”. What is vested absolutely is only the land which is deemed to have acquired and nothing more. The word “vest” has different meaning in different context; especially when we examine the meaning of vesting on the basis of a statutory hypothesis of a deeming provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and Partners (2004)2 All E.R.141 (at 11) described as “heroic piece of deeming”. 25. The word “vest” or “vesting” has different meaning. Legal Glossary, published by Official Language (Legislative) Commission 1970 Edition at Page 302: “Vest: 1. To give a person a legally fixed, immediate right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of property, 2. 25. The word “vest” or “vesting” has different meaning. Legal Glossary, published by Official Language (Legislative) Commission 1970 Edition at Page 302: “Vest: 1. To give a person a legally fixed, immediate right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of property, 2. To become legally vested; (T.P. Act.) “Vesting order: An order under statutory authority whereby property is transferred to and vested, without conveyance in some person or persons; 26. Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) 1990 at page 1563: “Vested: Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete; Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent, not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are “vested” when rights to enjoyment present or prospective has become property of some particular persons or persons as present interest; mere expectancy or future or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does not continue “vested right” Vaughan v. Nadel; 228 Kan. 469, 618 p. 2d 778, 783. See also Accrue Vest and specific typed of vested interest infra.” 27. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, of the English Language unabridged, Volume III S to Z at page 2547 defines the word “vest” as follow : “vest” vest …… To place or give into the possession or discretion of some person or authority (the regulation of the waterways …. to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as an estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in the grantee and a remainder in his children), (b) to grant endow, or clothe with a particular authority right or property ….. to put ( a person) in possession of land by the feudal ceremony of investiture ….. to become legally vested (normally) title to real property vests in the holder of a property executed deed.)” 28. Vest/vested, therefore, may or may not include “transfer of possession” the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions. 29. What is deemed “vesting absolutely” is that “what is deemed to have acquired”. Vest/vested, therefore, may or may not include “transfer of possession” the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions. 29. What is deemed “vesting absolutely” is that “what is deemed to have acquired”. In our view, there must be express words of utmost clarity to persuade a Court to hold that the legislature intended to divest possession also, since the owners or holders of the vacant land is pitted against a statutory hypothesis. Possession, there is an adage “nine points of law” In Beedall v. Maitland (1881) 17 Ch. D. p.183 Sir Edward Fry, while speaking of a Statute which makes a forcible entry an indictable offence, stated as follows: “........... This statute creates one of the great differences which exist in our law between the being in possession and the being out of possession of land, and which gave rise to the old saying that possession is nine points of the law. The effect of the statute is this, that when a man is in possession, he may use force to keep out a trespasser; but if a trespasser has gained possession, the rightful owner cannot use force to put him out, but must appeal to the law for assistance.” 30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 10, the words ‘acquired’ and ‘vested’ have different meaning and content. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 10, the words ‘acquired’ and ‘vested’ have different meaning and content. Under section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary Surrender 31. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P. and others (1977)1 SCC 155 , while interpreting section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 held that ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meaning and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by LRs (2000)8 SCC 99 held as follows : “28. .........“We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a “vesting” certain. “To vest, generally means to give a property in.” (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.” 32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under section 10(3) of the Act. 33. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word “vesting” takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under section 10(3) of the Act. 33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dispossession 34. Sub-section (5) of section 10, for the first time, speaks of “possession” which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression “where any land is vested” under sub-section (5) to section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of section 10. Sub-section (6) to section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) to section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e., taking possession by giving notice that is “peaceful dispossession” and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under section 10(5), than “forceful dispossession” under sub-section (6) of section 10. 37. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be understood as “shall” because a Court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 10. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’. 10. Per contra, Counsel for respondents/State has denied the averments made in the petition and submitted that the land holders were served with draft statements prepared under section 8(3) and final statements prepared under section 9 of the Act of 1976, however, there is nothing on record to suggest that the procedure as contemplated under rule 5 was followed in the matter of service of draft statements under section 8(3) and final statements under section 9 by registered post to the land holders. The order sheets of ceiling cases on record also do not reflect compliance of the aforesaid provisions in the matter of service of of draft statements and final statements. As such, there is substantial force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that for want of service of draft statements by registered post upon them, they had no occasion to file objection thereto as contemplated under section 8(4) of the Act of 1976, hence, the final statement was prepared without affording them opportunity of objecting to the same. The contention of counsel for respondents/State is that notice under section 10(5) was issued and was received back as refused by the holder of the land with an endorsement on the back of the notice. Notice was deemed to have been served upon petitioner and no grievance in that behalf can be considered. Therefore, failure to comply with notice, led to taking ex parte possession under section 10(6) of the Act of 1976. Submission considered in the context of documents on record. The endorsement of the process server on the overleaf portion of the notice under section 10(5) is said to be of 5.3.1994. The notice dated 28.2.1994 in its contents required the land holders to hand over possession of the land within thirty days, whereas the endorsement of the process server as regards refusal to take notice is dated 5.3.1994, hence even if notice is stated to have been served. The notice dated 28.2.1994 in its contents required the land holders to hand over possession of the land within thirty days, whereas the endorsement of the process server as regards refusal to take notice is dated 5.3.1994, hence even if notice is stated to have been served. Therefore, thirty days time was required to be given from the date of refusal i.e. 5.3.1994, but that was not done, instead it is claimed that ex parte possession was taken on 29.3.1994, therefore, on their own saying the respondents have not complied with the requirements of section 10(5) of the Act of 1976, hence, the submission in that behalf as regards service of notice issued to land holders under section 10(5) is of no consequence, as the alleged action of forcible possession on 29.3.1994 cannot be said to be in conformity and upon fulfillment of the requirements as contained in section 10(5). As regards next contention that ex parte possession was taken on 29.3.1994, on perusal of the possession receipts, it is apparent that no Panchnama was prepared of having taken the possession of the land in question, no witness is shown to have remained present particularly the witness who has endorsed his signature. Moreover, there is no mention of the procedure adopted by the respondents in self claimed ex parte possession as perusal of the order-sheet dated 28.2.1994 reveals that proceedings was initiated under section 10(5) of the Act and thereafter next date fixed is of 24.3.1995, on which date it is shown that ex parte possession has been taken on 29.3.1994. As such, from 28.2.1994 to 24.3.1995 for more than one year no proceeding is recorded much less that of 29.3.1994. Therefore, there is nothing in the order-sheets of the cases ‘A’ and ‘B’ as to when did they issue the notice dated 28.2.1994 under section (5) to the land holders and when the notices were treated to be served or deemed to have been served on the land holders for the purpose of counting thirty days, period, as provided for under section 10(5) to file objection to the publication of notification under section 10(3) as regards vesting of vacant land. There is no recording of proceedings for initiation of action under section 10(6) and issuance of possession receipts dated 29.3.1994 and the mode & details of taking possession as after 28.2.1994 only on 24.3.1995 the alleged fact of issuance of possession receipts is mentioned. The sequences of events go to show that the alleged issuance of notice and claim of having taken ex parte possession by issuance of possession receipts is de hors the record of proceedings and material on record and, therefore, submission of learned counsel for respondents to have taken ex parte possession by issuance of possession receipts on 29.3.1994 cannot be countenanced. Even otherwise, subsequent events in the case also show that possession of the land in question has never been taken by the respondents/State Government as evident from the copy of the notice dated 16.2.2012 issued from the office of Tahsildar directing the Patwari to submit the report for the purpose of providing Rasta to agricultural land of land holders falling in survey Nos.155, 156 and 207 to 215 from the Government land falling in survey Nos.159 and 179 situated at village Jaganpura. Copy of the report, map and Panchnama is on record as Annexure P/23 prepared by the Patwari and addressed to Tahsildar recommending to provide Rasta. Panchnama prepared, notice issued to various authorities including the public by public notice dated 16.2.2012 inviting objections for the said request of the land holders, thereafter order passed by the Tahsildar on 19.4.2012 are on record as Annexures P/24 and P/25. These are clinching evidence on record to conclude that even till 19.4.2012 the land in question was in possession of the land holders, even as per the revenue records. The case of Hari Ram (supra) is referred to. 11. In view of the aforesiad, in the opinion of this Court, the possession of the land in question in Case No.A and B cannot be said to have been taken by the respondents vide possession receipts dated 29.3.1994. Hence, by force of coming into force of section 3 of the Repeal Act of 1999 the land ceiling proceedings stood abated and land in question stood reverted back to its holders. Hence, by force of coming into force of section 3 of the Repeal Act of 1999 the land ceiling proceedings stood abated and land in question stood reverted back to its holders. Possession receipts dated 29.3.1994 are quashed and the authorities are directed to delete the fact as regards pendency of ceiling proceedings in coloumn No.12 in respect of the land in question in case No.A and B. With the aforesaid directions, writ petition stands allowed.