JUDGMENT : Hasnain Massodi, J. 1. Letters Patent Appeal on hand is directed against writ Court Judgment dated 24-09-2013, whereby writ petition being SWP No. 1570/2012 titled Anil Vyas v. Union of India & Others has been allowed and the order dated 13th July 2012, imposing penalty of compulsory retirement from service on respondents/writ petitioner quashed. The Letters Patent Appeal arises against the following backdrop. Shri Anil Vyas, Commandant, 163 Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force, Rambagh Srinagar-respondent herein allegedly made overtures to wife of Medical Officer, serving in the same Battalion by sending Cherry Boxes through his security aide to the lady, making repeated phone calls to her and insisting of an exclusive meeting. The lady lodged a complaint with higher authorities in the Force resulting in inquiry by Deputy Inspector General, Central Reserve Police Force, Baramulla. The Officer on inquiry held allegations not proved against respondent. The Inspector General of Police, CRPF, found inquiry report full of lacunae and decided to get it inquired into afresh. On fresh inquiry substance was found in allegations leveled against respondent. The competent authority, on 29th August 2008, directed a regular inquiry to be conducted by Shri S.S. Dogra, Shri V.K. Bisht was appointed as Presenting Officer and later replaced by Shri Ram Krishan. The Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF on 29th August 2008, served memorandum of charges on respondent. He responded to charges denying allegation leveled against him. 2. Respondent in the meantime, questioned proceedings through medium of writ petition being SWP No. 1516/2012. During pendency of the writ petition, respondent came to know that the appellants had vide Order dated 13th July 2012, awarded major penalty of compulsory retirement from service. The writ petition was disposed of giving liberty to respondent to question the order whereby penalty was imposed. 3. Appellant after disposal of his petition filed writ petition being SWP No. 1570/2012, throwing challenge to the order dated 13th July 2012, on the grounds available to him. Respondent's case before the writ Court was that the Inquiry Officer appointed vide Order dated 30th October 2008, did not afford adequate and reasonable opportunity to respondent to put forth his stand and that the Inquiry Officer failed to go through the earlier inquiry reports, holding allegation against respondent as baseless and exonerating him from the allegations leveled. Respondent's case before the writ Court was that the Inquiry Officer appointed vide Order dated 30th October 2008, did not afford adequate and reasonable opportunity to respondent to put forth his stand and that the Inquiry Officer failed to go through the earlier inquiry reports, holding allegation against respondent as baseless and exonerating him from the allegations leveled. The respondent reiterated his stand that he did not make any overtures to the complainant nor made repeated phone calls to her, as alleged by complainant. 4. The writ petition was resisted by the appellants on the ground that earlier inquiry in the matter was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down under rules and that only after on a fact finding inquiry conducted by Additional Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, at the instance of Inspector General of Police, CRPF, reported prima facie substance in the allegations leveled, that a regular inquiry was directed against the respondent. It was insisted that a regular inquiry was held strictly in accordance with the rules and penalty was imposed only after enquiry was concluded. 5. Learned Single Judge on scanning material found that reasons were not recorded to justify the second inquiry after the first inquiry was concluded, charges found to be baseless and enquiry dropped against respondent. It was held that once on inquiry, charges/allegations were dropped, appellant had to compulsorily give reasons for directing second inquiry on same set of charges/allegations. In absence of such reasons, it was opined, that second inquiry and results thereof were liable to quashed. Learned writ Court placed reliance on law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 3 SCC 580 . 6. Learned writ Court making reference to law laid down in Muzaffar Ahmad Khan v. State & Others, 2011 (2) JKJ 590 [HC], and Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2013) 3 SCC 514 , highlighted the principles to be observed while taking a decision regarding compulsory retirement of a government employee. It held that the settled principles were observed in breach, in case on hand while passing order impugned in the writ petition. The writ Court as stated quashed the Regular enquiry proceedings, the report made on the basis of the inquiry so conducted and also order dated 30th July 2012, whereby penalty was imposed. 7. It held that the settled principles were observed in breach, in case on hand while passing order impugned in the writ petition. The writ Court as stated quashed the Regular enquiry proceedings, the report made on the basis of the inquiry so conducted and also order dated 30th July 2012, whereby penalty was imposed. 7. The writ Court Judgment is questioned in the Letters Patent Appeal on hand on the grounds that Hon'ble Single Judge erroneously proceeded on the assumption that respondent was exonerated in a regular inquiry initiated against him and that once the charges framed against respondent were found baseless, there was no reason to direct second inquiry against the respondent. It is pleaded that the inquiry that culminated into report against respondent and his compulsory retirement, was the only regular inquiry directed against him and therefore the inquiry proceedings, inquiry report and the order imposing penalty were not open to challenge on the grounds set out in the petition. It is next pleaded that as the respondent's compulsory retirement was in the nature of penalty imposed upon him for the misconduct proved, the order was not to be assessed at the touchstone of principles governing compulsory retirement of a government employee. The appellants state that the procedure to be followed in a regular inquiry, as reflected in Central Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, were strictly adhered to while conducting regular inquiry against the respondent. The respondent is said to have been associated with the inquiry from the day one, allowed to put forth his stand against the charges leveled, examine the witnesses in his defence and even make a statement on the conclusion of the inquiry. It is denied that the respondent at any stage requested for change of Inquiry Officer. Appellants also denied that the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the respondent. It is pointed out that as the misconduct proved involved moral turpitude and conduct unbecoming of an Officer, penalty imposed cannot be held to be disproportionate to the misconduct proved. 8. We have gone through memo of appeal, writ court Judgment questioned in the appeal, as also record available on the file. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 9. Mr. 8. We have gone through memo of appeal, writ court Judgment questioned in the appeal, as also record available on the file. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 9. Mr. Makroo, learned ASGI, dilating on the grounds urged in the memo of appeal argues that a preliminary inquiry is to be distinguished from a regular inquiry and therefore more than one preliminary inquires cannot stand in the way of Disciplinary Authority to order a regular inquiry. It is argued that a preliminary inquiry may proceed ex-parte, without giving opportunity to a government employee to put forth his stand, but once a Competent Authority decides to order a regular inquiry on the basis of the outcome of preliminary inquiry, or even otherwise, a government employee gets a right to be associated with the inquiry, submit his reply to the charges, examine the witnesses or secure their presence with assistance of the Inquiry Officer. Reliance in this regard is placed on law laid down in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [1964] 5 SCR 190 and Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 1 SCC 299 . Mr. Makroo argues that merely because preliminary inquiry was ordered into the matter more than once and in first such inquiry, the allegations leveled were found without substance, could not stand in the way of respondent to act on second preliminary inquiry report, and direct regular inquiry against the respondent. The writ Court Judgment, it is argued deserves to be overset on this ground alone. 10. Mr. Dar, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand reiterates his stand that once Shri A.K. Sharma, Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Baramulla, to whom preliminary inquiry was initially entrusted reported that the complaint was without any substance, there was no reason for Inspector General of Police, CRPF to get the matter second time inquired into by Shri K.M. Iyer, Additional Deputy Inspector of Police O/O, IGP, CRPF, Srinagar and on the basis of his report order a regular inquiry to be conducted by Shri S.S. Dogra, Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF. The course followed by the Authority, Mr. Dar, insists was not permissible under law and therefore regular inquiry proceedings as also the report of Inquiry Officer and the order imposing penalty on the basis of said report, were rightly quashed by learned writ Court. The course followed by the Authority, Mr. Dar, insists was not permissible under law and therefore regular inquiry proceedings as also the report of Inquiry Officer and the order imposing penalty on the basis of said report, were rightly quashed by learned writ Court. Learned counsel to buttress his arguments seeks to draw support from Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1958, Rajasthan 38 (Vo. 45, C. 12) (1), Rajender Prasad Gupta & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Others 2000 (3) SLR 655 (ALL), Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Others v. Dr. S. Wajid Ali & another, 1993 (2) SLR 631 (Cal), Mohinder Paul v. The Secretary, Health Deptt. Punjab Govt. Chandigarh & Ors., 2000 (5) SLR (Pb. & Hry.), R. Rama Rao v. A.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. 1997 (5) SLR 508 (A.P.), M. Kolandai Gounder v. The Division Engineer, T.N.E.B. Thuraiyur & Ors., 1997 (1) SLR 467 (Mad.), K.R. Deb v. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, 1971 (2) SCC 102 and Union of India v. K.D. Pandey & Anr. (2002) 10 SCC 471 . 11. The argument advanced by Mr. Dar is specious and far from convincing. The case law relied upon by learned counsel does not extend any support to his case. The plea that after a government employee is exonerated of charges leveled in an inquiry, a second inquiry would not be permissible on the same set of charges except for the valid reasons, is not to meet any disagreement. However, it needs to be appreciated that the first inquiry must be a regular inquiry where memo of charges is issued to a government employee, he allowed to respond to the charges and in case he denies the charges evidence on either side recorded and thereafter conclusions drawn or arrived at. It is only in such case, that a second inquiry on the same charges without any plausible reasons raise eyebrows and the second inquiry held bad in law. The case law relied upon by Mr. Dar as its close reading would reveal involved a second regular inquiry on the same set of charges after a government employee was exonerated in the first such inquiry. The case law relied upon by Mr. Dar as its close reading would reveal involved a second regular inquiry on the same set of charges after a government employee was exonerated in the first such inquiry. In none of the case, the first inquiry was a mere preliminary inquiry and second inquiry or results thereof quashed on the ground that it was not permissible in view of exoneration of a government employee in the preliminary inquiry. 12. The preliminary inquiry as rightly pointed out by learned ASGI is a mere fact finding inquiry. It is ordered and made at the back of a government employee concerned. We need not to be reminded that the competent authority may without preliminary inquiry order a Departmental Inquiry against a government employee. Similarly, the Disciplinary Authority may on receipt of the report from the Officer asked to make a fact finding inquiry disagree with his tentative conclusions or opine that the Inquiry Officer had not dealt with all aspects of the matter or examined all those expected to unfold true facts. In such case, the Authority would be free to direct a regular inquiry notwithstanding the outcome of the fact finding inquiry or ask Officers to conduct preliminary inquiry afresh. The authority would be acting within its powers when it directs a regular inquiry on the basis of report of Officer asked to inquire into the matter afresh. 13. Learned Single Judge therefore was not right in assuming that the respondent was exonerated of the charges and therefore the second inquiry in absence of valid reasons was incompetent. Learned Judge erred in placing reliance on Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 3 SCC 580 , as the facts of the case relied upon were markedly different from the facts of the case before learned single Judge. In Nand Kumar's Case, the allegations against the Officer were made known to him by the Standing Committee and Officer given an opportunity to submit his explanation. The Officer accordingly submitted his explanation, appeared in person before the Standing Committee, offered unconditional apology for impertinent language attributed to him and the matter was closed and lapse condoned. The Officer was however as a consequence of the allegations leveled against him transferred to a different district. The Standing Committee, notwithstanding the aforesaid decision, decided to direct a Departmental Inquiry on the same allegations earlier leveled against him. The Officer was however as a consequence of the allegations leveled against him transferred to a different district. The Standing Committee, notwithstanding the aforesaid decision, decided to direct a Departmental Inquiry on the same allegations earlier leveled against him. It is in these facts that Hon'ble Supreme Court held a second enquiry not competent and the order reverting the Officer to a lower post on the basis of such inquiry to be not sustainable. It would be advantageous to extract following observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court; "...On general principles, there can be only one enquiry in respect of a charge for a particular misconduct and that is also what the rules usually provide. If, for some technical or other good ground, procedural or otherwise, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second enquiry cannot be initiated. Therefore, when a completed enquiry proceedings is set aside by a competent forum on a technical or on the ground of procedural infirmity, fresh proceedings on the same charge is permissible". In the present case, only because in initial fact finding inquiry, Inquiry Officer did not come across material in support of the allegations set out in the complaint, a second fact finding inquiry and a regular inquiry directed on basis thereof are not to be held incompetent and liable to be set aside. 14. This takes us to the next aspect of the case. Learned writ Court relying on law laid down in Muzaffar Ahmad Khan v. State & Others, 2011 (2) JKJ 590 [HC] and Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2013) 3 SCC 514 , has opined that the principles required to be adhered to by the Competent Authority while ordering compulsory retirement of a government employee were not followed in the present case and therefore the order impugned in the petition deserved to be set aside. It escaped attention of learned Single Judge that respondent's compulsory retirement in the present case was not part of an exercise to weed out indolent or corrupt employees. Where an exercise is made by the Competent Authority to get rid of sluggish, indolent, incompetent or corrupt employees. In such case that guidelines like perusal of entire service record, constitution of a Committee to go through material, recommendation made by the Committee etc. Where an exercise is made by the Competent Authority to get rid of sluggish, indolent, incompetent or corrupt employees. In such case that guidelines like perusal of entire service record, constitution of a Committee to go through material, recommendation made by the Committee etc. laid down in the case law referred to by learned Single Judge are to be followed. The facts of the present case are different and distinguishable from the facts of the case where a government employee is shown the door for any of the aforestated reasons. Here is a case, where a regular inquiry was conducted against the respondent on the charge of misconduct. The charges held to be proved against him and one of the penalties prescribed under Rules i.e. compulsory retirement from service imposed on the respondent. The matter therefore was entirely different from compulsory retirement on the basis of indolence, incompetence etc. The conclusion drawn by learned Single Judge therefore cannot be accepted. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent makes an effort to highlight departure from settled procedure by the Inquiry Officer while conducting inquiry and procedural irregularities committed in during inquiry and thereafter imposing penalty. An effort is made to raise pleas not agitated before the writ Court. In addition to infraction of rules, emphasise laid on the quantum of punishment. Mr. Makroo, learned ASGI has taken us through inquiry record. We do not find any merit in the grievance that Rules at any stage of the inquiry were compromised to the prejudice of the respondent. Respondent has been all along associated with the inquiry, granted adequate and reasonable opportunity to put forth his stand, impeach and rebut the evidence brought on record in support of the charges leveled against him. The writ Court has allowed respondent's petition on two grounds viz the second inquiry was not permissible in view of outcome of the first fact finding inquiry and guidelines required to be observed while ordering compulsory retirement, were not adhered to in respondent's case. Other ground urged in the writ petition did not find favour with the writ Court. Respondent has not been aggrieved, in this regard. We therefore did not find any merit in the respondent's case that prescribed procedure was give a go by, by the Inquiry Officer and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority. Other ground urged in the writ petition did not find favour with the writ Court. Respondent has not been aggrieved, in this regard. We therefore did not find any merit in the respondent's case that prescribed procedure was give a go by, by the Inquiry Officer and thereafter the Disciplinary Authority. An effort by the learned counsel for the respondent to convince us that the evidence brought on record, does not lead to the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer is, also bound to fail as neither the writ Court nor this Court is in exercise of power of judicial review, expected to assume the role of appellate court, scan and sift the evidence recorded during inquiry to conclude whether conclusion drawn are based on proper appreciation of the evidence. 16. The last effort made by the learned counsel for the respondent to question the penalty imposed on the ground of proportionality is also to fail. No doubt power of judicial review may include quantum of punishment or proportionality of the penalty imposed to the misconduct alleged, yet the court is not to interfere with the penalty imposed, only because if it had an occasion to award penalty in the same set of facts, it would have awarded a lesser penalty than the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Court may interfere with the penalty imposed only where it is so disproportionate to the misconduct proved, that it shocks the conscience of the Court. We are of the view that the present case is not one where aforementioned test is satisfied and interference with the penalty imposed warranted. 17. For the reasons discussed, we are not persuaded to agree with the view taken by learned Single Judge. Resultantly, Letters Patent Appeal against writ Court Judgment dated 24-09-2013, succeeds and is hereby allowed. The writ court Judgment is set aside and writ petition dismissed. Interim direction, if any, in force, is recalled. Allowed.