Heard Mr. PK Kalita, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners (plaintiffs). Also heard Mr. R. Baruah, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents (defendants). 2. The Title Suit No. 64/2006 (originally Title Suit No. 26/2005) was filed to seek declaration, permanent injunction and precept for revenue partition, in respect of the suit land measuring 1 bigha 3 katha 18 lecha in Kisamat Khutikatia of Kachamari Mouza of Nagaon District. In schedule-B, the detail descriptions of the suit land in two segments were given. The petitioners claim 1 bigha land through inheritance from their ancestor and the balance 3 katha 18 lecha land through purchase by the plaintiffs’ immediate predecessor Late Kamala Kanta Bora. 3. According to the plaintiff, the suit land was originally owned by Mahendra Nath Bora, whose name was mutated in the revenue record on 1.4.1933. During his lifetime, Mahendra Nath Bora sold 3 katha 18 lecha land to one Lohoram Kalita and the purchaser’s name was then mutated in the revenue record on 5.10.1939. After Lohoram died, the land devolved on his son Tolan Kalita and the son sold the inherited land to one Phatik Chandra Saikia. Subsequently the purchaser Phatik sold the same from land to the immediate predecessor of the plaintiff, Late Kamala Kanta Bora. The name of the predecessor Kamala Kanta was incorporated in the revenue records through the mutation order dated 16.5.1946. The certified copies of the concerned sale deed No. 6244, dated 26.11.1940 and the sale deed No. 5020, dated 2.8.1945 were filed along with the plaint, in support of the pleaded case of the plaintiffs. The balance 1 bigha land was claimed through inheritance of 50% of 2 bigha land by the two sons of Late Mahendra Nath Bora, namely Kamala Kanta and Chandra Kanta and the plaintiff claims inheritance as the successor of the first son Kamala Kanta. 4. In the joint written statement (W.S.) filed by the defendant Nos. 9—12, they specifically denied the plaintiff’s claim to the 3 katha 18 lecha land through purchase by the plaintiffs predecessor, Late Kamala Kanta Bora and accordingly relevant issues were framed for adjudication of the suit. 5. 4. In the joint written statement (W.S.) filed by the defendant Nos. 9—12, they specifically denied the plaintiff’s claim to the 3 katha 18 lecha land through purchase by the plaintiffs predecessor, Late Kamala Kanta Bora and accordingly relevant issues were framed for adjudication of the suit. 5. The plaintiffs filed their list of five documents on 12.4.2005 (Annexure-2), where few public documents such as certified copies of zamabandi and draft chitha in respect of the suit land was mentioned along with the copies of the two sale deeds dated 26.11.1940 and 2.8.1945. Thereafter the plaintiffs applied for leave to lead secondary evidence in connection with the two registered sale deeds executed in the year 1940 and 1945, and this application was presented on 8.11.2006 (Annexure-3). A 2nd application was filed on 15.7.2008 (Annexure-4), under Order 7, Rule 14 of the C.P.C. to grant leave to the plaintiffs to produce documents, which were already specified in the list of documents. 6. However the learned Munsiff No. 1, Nagaon through the impugned order dated 22.07.2009 (Annexure-5) rejected the plaintiffs’ two applications to prove the sale deeds by adducing secondary evidence and also rejected their prayer to produce the other documents under Order 7, Rule 14 of the C.P.C. 7. Assailing the legality of the impugned decision, Mr. P.K. Kalita, the learned counsel submits that the certified copies of zamabandi are public documents and there could be no difficulty for the Court to allow production of the original of these public documents through the official custodian. In so far as the two sale deeds of 1940 and 1945 are concerned, Mr. Kalita submits that both sale deeds were mentioned in the plaint itself and since the petitioners traces their title for a portion of the suit land measuring 3 katha 18 lecha, leave should have been granted to lead secondary evidence for these two sale deeds, as the plaintiff had laid the necessary foundation for invoking the powers under Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 14 of Order 7 of the C.P.C. 8. On the other hand, Mr. R. Baruah, learned counsel for the defendants argues that the discretionary power under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the C.P.C. can’t be invoked arbitrarily but has to be exercised judiciously and unless factual foundation to the satisfaction of the Court is laid, invocation of powers to allow production of documents by the litigant will be unjustified. R. Baruah, learned counsel for the defendants argues that the discretionary power under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the C.P.C. can’t be invoked arbitrarily but has to be exercised judiciously and unless factual foundation to the satisfaction of the Court is laid, invocation of powers to allow production of documents by the litigant will be unjustified. The respondents contend that the plaintiffs have not made the necessary pleadings to allow them to produce documents at the stage of evidence and therefore Mr. Baruah submits that the learned Trial Judge rightly disallowed the plaintiffs’ applications. 9. The relevancy of the 2 sale deeds dated 26.11.1940 and 2.8.1945 can be noticed from the plaint itself and copies of both old deeds were enclosed by the plaintiffs. Therefore the defendants were certainly aware of the plaintiffs pleaded case and also their reliance on the two sale deeds from which, the plaintiffs predecessor Kamala Kanta Bora traces his title for the 3 katha 18 lecha land. Therefore the first significant aspect is that the pleaded case clearly disclosed to the defendants at the first stage itself about the 2 old deeds. Therefore it can be safely concluded that production of these original documents will not prejudice the plaintiffs. 10. Moreover through their pleadings, the plaintiffs have laid the foundation for production of the original documents at the subsequent stage of the proceedings and therefore non-invocation of the power by the Trial Judge under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the C.P.C., in my view, amounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction which led to avoidable injustice to the applicant. 11. The primary purpose of the Court in an adjudicatory process is to decipher the truth on the basis of pleadings and evidence of the parties. According to me, if the secondary evidence is allowed to be produced and the concerned public documents and the registered sale deeds are considered in the trial, the Court will be better placed to adjudicate the issues in the case. 12. According to me, if the secondary evidence is allowed to be produced and the concerned public documents and the registered sale deeds are considered in the trial, the Court will be better placed to adjudicate the issues in the case. 12. In Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. v. Saikia & Associates, reported in 2009 (1) GLT 151, this Court analyzed the power of the Court to receive documents in evidence when the same were not produced with the plaint and it was held that the discretionary power under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the C.P.C. is to be exercised judiciously on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case to do justice between the parties. If we proceed on this basis, the non-granting of the plaintiffs’ applications can’t be said to further the cause of justice. As was held in Bidhan Chandra Baruah (Dr.) v. G.L. Publication Ltd. (M/s), reported in 2012 (2) GLT 271, the discretionary power to allow documents is to be invoked to find out the truth without prejudice to the other side. Therefore when the plaintiffs have clearly mentioned the documents in the plaint and also in their list of documents, I hold that their judicial consideration would further the cause of justice in this case. 13. Of-course the pleadings in the two applications filed by the plaintiffs are not exactly uniform and therefore minor aberration of the pleadings are noticed. But nevertheless I feel that since factual foundation was already laid for production of both sale deeds in original and also introduction of the secondary evidence and consequently the marginal discrepancies in the pleadings should not according to me, prevent the Court from exercising discretionary powers under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the C.P.C. 14. The issue here is whether the learned Trial Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested on him under Order 7, Rule 14(3) of the CPC by not allowing the plaintiffs to produce the relevant documents. As earlier noted, the concerned documents were specified in the plaint and also in the List of Documents furnished by the plaintiffs. Moreover the relevancy of the documents is clearly discernable from the pleaded case of the plaintiffs. Under Order 6, Rule 2 of the CPC, only facts are required to be incorporated in the pleadings and the litigant is not required to refer to his evidence as part of the pleading. Moreover the relevancy of the documents is clearly discernable from the pleaded case of the plaintiffs. Under Order 6, Rule 2 of the CPC, only facts are required to be incorporated in the pleadings and the litigant is not required to refer to his evidence as part of the pleading. In this backdrop, it is difficult to accept that the Trial Court acted within jurisdiction by refusing to allow the production of the relevant documents, prayed for by the plaintiffs. 15. As regards the plea to produce secondary evidence in respect of the two Sale Deeds of 26.11.1940 and 2.8.1945 are concerned, the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the parties involved in those transactions have died long back. The plaintiffs’ immediate predecessor Kamala Kanta Bora purchased the land measuring 3 Kathas 18 Lechas from Phatik Chandra Saikia and this land was originally owned by Late Mahendra Nath Bora, whose name was mutated in the Revenue Records in the 1940s. For the pleaded case of the plaintiffs, the Sale Deeds were very much relevant and xerox copies of the Sale Deeds were enclosed to the plaint. Therefore in my view, the learned Trial Judge should have considered the age of the Sale Deeds and also the fact that the defendants were on notice about those documents. Thus the Trial Judge should have permitted the plaintiffs to adduce the secondary evidence to prove the 2 Sale Deeds as that would have assisted the Court to decide the rival contentions. But since this was not permitted, I hold that a legal error was committed by the Court which justifies intervention with the impugned decision. 16. That apart, under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, certain presumptions can be drawn for documents which are more than 30 years old. Therefore the concerned Sale Deeds could have also been proved by the plaintiffs under the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act. But this aspect was overlooked while dismissing the plaintiffs’ application. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion and the reasoning, I hold that the impugned decision of 22.07.2009 (Annexure-5) of the learned Trial Judge in the Title Suit No. 64/2006 is unsustainable in law and therefore the same is quashed. Consequently the plaintiffs’ application Nos. 1325/2006 (Annexure-3) & 679/2008 (Annexure-4) are allowed. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion and the reasoning, I hold that the impugned decision of 22.07.2009 (Annexure-5) of the learned Trial Judge in the Title Suit No. 64/2006 is unsustainable in law and therefore the same is quashed. Consequently the plaintiffs’ application Nos. 1325/2006 (Annexure-3) & 679/2008 (Annexure-4) are allowed. The learned Trial Court is accordingly directed to proceed with the matter after allowing the plaintiffs to adduce secondary evidence and also to produce the original documents, as prayed for in their two applications. As the proceeding of the suit is stayed through the interim order dated 7.9.2009, the same is vacated and the parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Judge on 15.6.2015 to proceed with the suit. It is ordered accordingly. 18. With the above order, the case stands allowed to the extent indicated, leaving the parties to bear their own cost. The Registry is accordingly directed to return the L.C.R. with a copy of this order, to the Court of learned Munsiff No.1, Nagaon.